EVENTS

Date:	Wednesday, July 27, 2005
Time:	9:30 AM -- 11:30 AM
Location:	Wohlstetter Conference Center, Twelfth Floor, AEI 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

July 2005

The Future of Iraq: Fighting an Insurgency While Building a Nation

As a bloody insurgency continues to ravage Iraq, it is vital that the Sunnis, Shia, and the Kurds put aside sectarian divisions and work together to lay a solid foundation for a future Iraq in its new constitution. Will the Iraqi National Assembly succeed in framing a constitution before the August 15 deadline? What are the priorities of the Iraqi government? Will the insurgency derail the constitutional process and incite civil war? These and other questions were discussed at a July 27 AEI conference.

Lieutenant General John F. Sattler
U.S. Marines

As there are multiple parts to the global war on terror, such as attaining stability in vital regions like the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, we must help these countries to extend their capabilities by helping to train their militaries and provide indicators of progress. I am confident that, through engagement, training, mentoring, and assisting, we will be able to help build a capability in these nations to destroy terrorist safe havens.

As I worked under General John Abizaid in Iraq, I learned that one of the military’s most important tasks is to train and mentor the Iraqi security capability. One cannot have governance without security. We must make the elimination of the intimidator our primary task. Intimidation is the only tool by which the insurgents can destroy the economy, deprive Iraqis of essential services, and prevent the Iraqi government from developing. The goal of the insurgency is to demonstrate that the Iraqi government will never be able to enforce the rule of law.

We must continue to pursue strategic victory beyond Najaf.  Experience tells us that the pecking order in the West--family first, then tribe, cronies, and the rule of law--may prevent us from successfully promoting recovery.  This was demonstrated not only in Fallujah but also in the Al-Anbar province in the western region of the country.

I wish to emphasize that this war is a “joint” war, in that Special Operations, Marines, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Army are all working together shape the fight. In fact, our victory in Fallujah required the joint operations of all these forces. Furthermore, Iraqi battalions were intermingled with the different representatives from the American services. I feel that the General Thomas Metz, a three-star general in the Army, has best demonstrated the services’ attitude when insisting that any capability required to fight the insurgency will be provided to commander and soldier. We have and will receive the materials and the personnel required to destroy the insurgency and build a nation.  Although it will take hard work to break the back of the insurgency, we can claim success in places like Najaf, Fallujah, and others.

Frederick W. Kagan
AEI

Regarding the war in Iraq, there is both good news and bad news. First, when addressing the good news, we must point out that there are very few similarities between the wars in Iraq and Vietnam, except in the sense that in both regions, the United States was and is fighting an insurgency. We are in an excellent military position in Iraq, for the insurgents are not capable of launching militarily significant attacks against our soldiers. Instead of comparing Iraq to Vietnam, it would be more useful to compare this war with the fight for Northern Ireland. United States forces have not had to wage battles with conventional forces, as it did in Vietnam, for the Iraqi insurgency is incapable of participating in such fights.

There is little widespread support for the insurgency against the Iraqi and American forces. It has become increasingly clear that foreign fighters are infiltrating the Iraqi borders and duping Iraqis into executing suicide attacks. Although capable of killing many, the insurgency has no political program and is fundamentally anarchistic.

Although Iraq is no Vietnam, we still have significant problems that we must address to win this war. First, we have underestimated the number of ground forces that we need to carry out essential military tasks. Second, we are fighting an insurgency which imposes on the United States a number of mutually straining duties.  The United States must achieve five different tasks should it hope to rebuild Iraq: it must provide for internal security, seal the borders, maintain security of the roads, attack the insurgents, and train Iraqi forces. These are five assignments which are essential to the survival of the Iraqi nation, and yet they are all manpower intensive and fail to complement one another.

The Bush administration is taking the wrong path by assuming that trained Iraqi security forces will adequately replace the U.S. military presence. On the other hand, we should consider the Iraqi forces as reinforcements to help us achieve the numerous tasks which will precede success. If we pull out our forces, we will be handing over the same set of problems to an even less capable Iraqi government and military.

We should also use our presence in Iraq as an opportunity to fight the war on terror. By traveling to Iraq and engaging in such activities, the insurgents have engaged in self-identification and have brought their network to our attention. We have an interest in maintaining our force presence to not only achieve stability but also to wage the war on terror.

Colonel Joseph Anderson
U.S. Army

Currently the U.S. Army is waging war in multiple places, such as in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans, all while it strives to transform and win the war on terror. In Iraq, each military commander is overwhelmed with responsibility, for he must provide for law and order while at the same time rebuilding infrastructure and promoting recovery. A commander does not always have the necessary number of troops or materiel. In this case, how does one determine what priorities are more demanding in an environment which calls for every task to be achieved?

As we move troops out of the region, new troops take their place. Transitioning is never seamless or painless, for we cannot pass on the knowledge and experience to those new to the region. Our soldiers need to quickly adapt to the culture and the military’s ever-changing priorities. Now that the Iraqis have successfully completed elections and are currently writing a constitution, we must continuously assess our progress. This will be a deliberate and painful time-intensive process.

Joost Hiltermann
International Crisis Group

There are three ingredients necessary for the stabilization of Iraq, none of which are individually sufficient in establishing security and the rule of law. First, the Iraqi security forces, not foreign forces, must secure the country. It is critical that the Iraqis emphasize the creation of a police force in addition to a military force, for the police will bear most of the burden of ferreting out the insurgents and defeating them in their localities. We must also make sure that the composition of any military or police force is not based on ethnic or sectarian lines. Such a breakdown would be particularly dangerous, as tensions currently point towards a potential civil war.

Second, in order to achieve stability, we must have economic reconstruction. This is not possible unless security is secured. We must also take care to employ Iraqis throughout this reconstruction period and focus on the provision of necessary services, such as electricity and water sanitation.

Third, we must assure the Iraqis of the development of a legitimate political process. The January elections demonstrated that positive steps were being taken in this direction, but the electoral outcome was disappointingly sectarian in nature. The Sunni Arab community absented itself from the elections, and now we must undo these consequences. Iraqis are now in the process of drafting a permanent constitution, and this process will only succeed if it is inclusive, transparent, and participatory.

The constitutional process is being rushed by all parties involved. The Iraqi leadership hopes to draft the constitution as quickly as possible in order to get it over and done with. The Bush administration wants to conclude this process because it assumes that a deadline will put the Iraqi feet to the fire. Secondly, the Americans assume that since the election was held on time, the constitution should be written on time. To fail to draft this constitution by the deadline would signal to the insurgents that they are winning in Iraq.

However, the constitutional process cannot be rushed if we hope to achieve stability in Iraq and create the foundation for a functional government. By accelerating a delicate process, we are jeopardizing transparency, inclusion, and participation. If the actual document does not reflect a social compact, it will lack credibility and will thus undermine the stability of Iraq in the long term. Thus, we must carefully draft this constitution, allowing this process extra time if necessary, and encourage the Iraqis to compromise on key issues.

Michael Rubin
AEI

The United States military is doing a masterful job at fighting the insurgency in Iraq. Yet, there is an element of psychological mistrust of America’s intentions, particularly as to whether or not we will stay and fulfill our commitments to the Iraqi people. If we announce that we plan to withdraw our troops from the region, this will play into the “abandonment” psychology which developed as a result of George H. W. Bush’s 1991 abandonment of the Shia. To the Iraqis, perception is reality; thus, America’s failure to help the Iraqis after encouraging a rebellion indicates that Americans may not be trusted.

A political cartoon of June 28 was published after word that the Americans were negotiating with the insurgents. Such an act would be an infringement on Iraqi sovereignty. The cartoon depicted an American military officer, surrounded by barbed wire, forced to approach an insurgent in order to free himself from his entanglement. The implication was not that the United States was being magnanimous to the insurgent, but rather was without power and weak.  Thus, we must be sure not to give the impression that violence is rewarded. Power can be awarded only as a result of the ballot box.

Many are complaining that the Sunnis are not being included in the political process, arguing that the Sunnis are the secular and liberal force in Iraq. A closer examination, however, indicates that many of the Sunni political parties are among the fiercest Islamist groups. By forcing too many Sunnis into the constitutional drafting or electoral process, there is the danger that the liberals, who hope to separate national law from religious law, will be thrown out of power. 

I strongly disagree that it is not important to adhere to a timeline when writing the constitution. More time will not lead to more inclusiveness. Iraqi politics operates according to the principle of brinkmanship. If the Iraqis are given a deadline, they will not finish by the deadline but rather will conclude an agreement hours beyond it. As such, intense time pressure is necessary.  If we do change the timeline, we will send the message to the Iraqis that Americans do not have staying power, a charge that is substantiated by our conduct in 1991. In order to win this war, we need to win back trust in addition to winning the hearts and minds.

 AEI research assistant Melissa Wisner prepared this summary.