EVENTS

Date:	Monday, July 25, 2005
Time:	12:00 PM -- 1:30 PM
Location:	Wohlstetter Conference Center, Twelfth Floor, AEI 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

July 2005

The United States and India

On July 18, President George W. Bush announced that the United States would share civilian nuclear technology with India. Under the terms of the arrangement, the United States will share civilian nuclear technology with India, and in exchange India will continue its freeze on testing nuclear weapons and agree to have its civilian nuclear facilities monitored. But India’s nuclear arsenal--developed in secret--will remain unmonitored, and India will continue to produce weapons-grade plutonium. Has President Bush offered partnership to India but signaled the death knell of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons? And what about the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which bar sales of nuclear technology to any country without full-scope safeguards? It appears that without realizing he has done so, President Bush has created two sets of rules. Does this now mean that Israel can be eligible for nuclear cooperation? And if Israel is eligible, why not Pakistan? Or, as we will soon hear from Tehran, why not Iran? These and other questions were considered at a July 25 AEI conference.

Danielle Pletka
AEI

Contrary to what the Bush administration seems to have said, India has not adhered to the terms of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP). India has also not joined the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Moving forward, it will be interesting to see if Congress changes our laws before India ever fully agrees to and complies with any of the international nuclear treaties.

When considering the recent U.S.-India joint statement, it is unclear what the United States has gained. Though India has committed to the terms of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines, they have not committed to joining the Chemical Weapons Convention or the Biological Weapons Convention. Ultimately, the United States cannot change the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to sell nuclear materials to countries without International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

Robert Einhorn
Center for Strategic and International Studies

There is a strong strategic case for increasing India’s power generation capabilities. And although there is agreement that U.S.-India bilateral cooperation should be expanded, there is disagreement about whether or not that should include civilian nuclear energy cooperation. Should the United States change long-standing laws in order to allow the sale of nuclear materials to a country that has not joined the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT)?

The central question in this debate is one of net costs and net gains. Though the administration apparently believes that this new deal is a net gain for non-proliferation, this is not the case. The deal does bring some positive results, such as India’s reaffirming of their existing moratorium on nuclear testing and their agreement to adhere to MCTR and IAEA guidelines. This will strengthen India’s status as a responsible nuclear power. However, the new deal takes away the principle of special privileges given to NPT nations, gives almost no attention to fissile material production, omits references to nuclear security, and ignores what this will mean for proliferation challenges such as North Korea and Iran. It is clear that this hastily negotiated deal is a net loss for non-proliferation.

The administration has lowered the bar for compliance for nuclear powers. This deal will undoubtedly weaken international allegiance to the NPT and be resented by non-nuclear NPT parties such as Japan, Germany, and Australia. Additionally, in lowering the bar for India, we are adding to the perception that our non-proliferation interests are selective and self-serving. In order to minimize these risks, the United States should work closely with the NSG and Congress, as well as create a separate U.S.-India working group.

Moving forward, the United States should persuade India to stop the production of fissile material, maintain a differentiation between the way we treat NPT parties and non-NPT parties, get a commitment from India on nuclear security vis-à-vis Pakistan, and ensure that India is active with respect to the proliferation challenges of North Korea and Iran. The United States must raise the bar for all non-NPT countries--opening up eligibility but demanding adherence to tough standards.

Thomas Donnelly
AEI

The debate over the Indian nuclear situation must be viewed within the context of the broader strategic relationship between the United States and India. This new deal may not be significant in terms of non-proliferation, but is a step forward in the strategic alignment of states. This loss for non-proliferation is a win for the United States.

Because the history of non-proliferation and arms control has yielded almost no success stories, the international community must approach the situations in Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan in a new way. An expanded strategic partnership with India is extremely valuable because India is the key to the future of the liberal international order. Unlike Europe, India cares about the American project of reform in the Middle East. Additionally, the United States needs India’s partnership in dealing with the rise of China. Indeed, India is the only country in the world that is a democracy willing to use military power, serious about combating radical Islam, and concerned with China. Therefore, the strategic gains associated with this deal outweigh concerns about non-proliferation.
 
Henry Sokolski
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
 
With increased United States job outsourcing to India, the leverage that the United States has over India is diminishing. The premise of this argument cannot be that the U.S. should be friendly to India in order to use them as a pawn. If this administration is intent upon making the NPT irrelevant, they must recommend an alternative way to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It is not clear if this deal with India is particular to the case of this one country or a change of standards for all countries. The deal brings into question the status of countries like Pakistan and Israel, and countries like China and Japan see a blatant double standard being set. The United States cannot ignore the rules for one country, because we need to be able to act appropriately when the rules are broken by others.

AEI researcher Rachel Hoff prepared this summary.