On November 30, 2005, President George W. Bush unveiled the National Security Strategy for Victory in Iraq at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. In the face of declining public support and mounting casualties, the president reiterated that winning, not withdrawal, will pave the road to democracy in post-Saddam Iraq. In an environment in which political progress cannot be separated from events in the battlefield, to what extent will the terror campaign succeed in disrupting political and democratic developments in Iraq? Are Iraqi Security Forces capable of taking the place of American troops in the event of a drawdown? What does the president mean by “victory” in Iraq? These and other questions were the focus of a January 18 AEI panel discussion.

Peter W. Rodman
U.S. Department of State

I would like to provide an assessment of the general context of the situation in Iraq. Progress in Iraq can be divided into three primary sectors: political, military, and economic. Of these, I would argue that political progress is the most important. Strong Iraqi institutions will strengthen Iraqi moderates and isolate extremists. Last year’s three elections signify this progress and serve as evidence of the gradual entry of the Sunni community into the political process. A confluence of these factors has made the terrorists and insurgents a minority of a minority.

On the economic track, we must prove that these institutions can work and improve the lives of Iraqis at the fundamental level; in contrast, terrorists only wish to perpetuate hardship. Much work remains in the economic sector, however, as Iraq suffered for thirty years under the mismanagement and corruption of the Hussein regime. Withdrawal from Iraq cannot be based on any arbitrary timetable; rather, it must be based on the achievement of our goals. The primary issue in Iraq is legitimacy as the Iraqis establish a democratic government that is unique in the Arab world. While our enemies have grand ambitions for the fight in Iraq, they should reexamine their strategy, for they are in fact being defeated. The fact that the majority of Iraqis support a democratic Iraq serves as an excellent example of how politics has empowered moderates, which is why the United States has aligned itself with the political process throughout the Middle East. Both sides in this conflict see Iraq as crucial to the future of the region.

I want to focus on the war in Iraq as part of the long war on terror. September 11 was the most visible event of the long war and displayed our enemies’ intention of destroying our way of life. This long war is not a war against Islam, but rather a war against an extreme ideology that does not accept tolerance. This twenty-first-century conflict has much more to do with will and perception than territory and arms; our enemies believe that they can show more resolve and wait us out. The enemy is violent, ruthless, and elusive; they are a loose network tied together by ideology without a firm chain of command. Their writings indicate that they wish to establish a caliphate with Iraq at its center. This is not alarmism--their writings make this goal clear. However, I have confidence that they will not be able to accomplish these goals. Our enemy is vulnerable; we have eliminated high-level operatives and made it difficult for them to operate. We are also seeing an unprecedented amount of global anti-terror cooperation.

In Iraq we are fighting a lethal insurgency that has been unable to overcome the political process. The insurgents are themselves divided between Saddamists, rejectionists, and al Qaeda operatives. This division provides an opportunity to exploit the gap between the Iraqi-based insurgency and al Qaeda. The elimination of safe havens for terrorists and the creation of a legitimate government in Iraq are both central to our effort. In contrast, the terrorists are attacking infrastructure, focusing on tearing down Iraq rather than building it up. The end goals for the Multinational Force are clear: first, to create an Iraq that is at peace; second, to establish a nation that is an ally in the war on terror; third, to help build a representative government that respects human rights; and lastly, to ultimately withdraw when a sovereign Iraqi government is capable of defending itself externally and internally.

Iraqi security forces have shown signs of progress, a development that will only help the progress of democratization. In December of 2005, Iraqis reported 4,700 insurgent tips, an all-time high that demonstrates their growing confidence in the Iraqi government. We now have ninety Iraqi combat battalions and, last month, half of the military operations conducted were done so jointly with Iraqi forces. Another quarter of these operations were conducted independently by Iraqi forces. In 2006, we will to continue to develop the Iraqi security force, especially the police force, and create new units to protect borders, dignitaries, and infrastructure. No accurate timetable for success in Iraq exists. An American withdrawal will be based on conditions on the ground. Iraq is the frontline of the long war, and it is a test of will.

My remarks will focus political and economic situation in Iraq. Last fall’s elections represented a triumph for Iraq and the region. In February the Council of Representatives, Iraq’s newly elected parliament, will select a Presidential Council, which could take some time. Once this occurs, the prime minister is required to submit a cabinet for approval within thirty days. We want the Iraqi government to be effective and inclusive. Within four months the Council of Representatives will review the Iraqi Constitution, which could be a long and difficult process. After this the government will work on de-Baathification and combating separatism. The Sunnis must realize that they cannot dominate the new Iraq; they must choose quickly between the insurgency and the political process.

Economically Iraq is slowly recovering from its 2003 position, at which time per-capita income was comparable to that of Angola. In contrast, in 1980 per-capita income in Iraq was comparable to that of Spain. The $20.9 billion the U.S. Congress allocated for Iraqi recovery has done a great deal in this regard. The year 2004 showed us that change was needed, and in response we allocated $4.5 billion for democracy and capacity building. We are moving more in this direction over time and have added over 2,500 megawatts of power to the Iraqi electrical grid, and we have significantly reduced infectious disease in the country. We have also achieved considerable success on the international front, as the multinational force in Iraq is composed of 20,000 troops from thirty countries. It is important that these nations remain in Iraq to send a positive message to the Iraqi populace. The UN has also made major contributions, as has the Paris Club, whose promise to forgive 80 percent of Iraq’s Saddam-era debt is significant for Iraq’s economic recovery. Despite these promises, disbursements of relief funds are lagging, and more funds are needed. Stability is important in Iraq, but pluralism and tolerance are essential to Iraq’s future as well.

The current administration has fielded much criticism on Iraq, but it has not received the praise that it deserves for aggressively pursuing the political process. Although some may have thought that the early push for political progress was foolhardy, the administration’s dogged determination in this regard was extremely intelligent. If the situation works out well in Iraq, it will be for this reason alone. Furthermore, the political progress in Iraq makes it a bridgehead for Middle East reform. I agree that Iraq is the central front on the war on terror. However, we should avoid focusing too narrowly on al Qaeda. The ideology that drives them is neither new nor unique. In fact, it previously inspired groups like that of the Ayatollah Khomeini and will inspire others once al Qaeda is defeated or cease to exist.