EVENTS

Date:	Thursday, February 23, 2006
Time:	12:15 PM -- 2:00 PM
Location:	Wohlstetter Conference Center, Twelfth Floor, AEI 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

February 2006

Politics and Population in Gaza, the West Bank, and Israel

According to demographic projections by the United Nations, the U.S. Census Bureau, and the Palestinian National Authority, the Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza are the world’s fastest growing population--and residents of the Palestinian National Authority will outnumber Israeli Jews in the foreseeable future. But are these estimates accurate? In a forthcoming monograph entitled Arab Population in the West Bank and Gaza: The Million Person Gap (Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 2006), American-Israeli Demographic Research Group authors Bennett Zimmerman, Roberta Seid, and Michael Wise demonstrate that inconsistencies and contradictions in the Palestinian National Authority data raise the possibility that the West Bank/Gaza population may be significantly--and increasingly--overcounted. On February 23, Zimmerman, Seid, and Wise presented their latest study, “A Forecast for Israel and the West Bank 2025,” which further challenges some commonly held assumptions about population in the region.

Bennett Zimmerman

“A Forecast for Israel and the West Bank 2025” examined the statistics of the Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). It found that there was a significant gap between their published figures and the actual population in the West Bank and Gaza. The first official Palestinian number for the West Bank and Gaza, issued in 1997, was 2.78 million people. At the same time, the forecast to 2015 was set at 5.81 million people. This forecast became the basis of all future population reports issued by the PCBS. In 2004, the PCBS estimated that 3.8 million Arabs were living in the territories in addition to the 1.3 million Jews, for a combined total of 5.1 million people.

Israel estimated in 1995 that there were 2.1 million inhabitants in the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinian figures diverged in 1997, when the PCBS issued a number of 2.783 million. The question then became whether the Palestinians overcounted or the Israelis undercounted. The main difference was one of definition. The Palestinians included at least 325,000 residents who were living outside of the territories. This number was the main cause for the jump between the Israeli and Palestinian counts in the mid-1990s.

On top of the population base, the PCBS developed a projection for births to 2015. By 2003, the PCBS expected that there would be 143,000 births in the territories. The Palestinian Ministry of Health statistics showed a much lower rate of birth activity in the territories.

Immigration assumptions are also an important aspect of the Palestinian forecast. The original Palestinian assumption was that statehood would occur in 1999 and that people would immigrate on the level of 50,000 people per year, starting in 2001. This inclusion is what made the Palestinian Authority forecast the highest growth rates in the world, which over time turned into the highest forecasted birth rates in the world. However, actual activity at the borders showed net emigration of only 10,000-20,000 persons per year since 1997.

Migration to Israel across the Green Line is also a significant consideration. According to the Israeli Ministry of the Interior, 105,000 people changed status from a Palestinian identification to an Israeli identification under family reunification programs since 1997.

The beginning assumption numbers were combined with births, deaths, and migration for a total of 1.4 million at the end of 2003 for the West Bank and 1.1 million for Gaza. From the 3.8 million PCBS broadcast in 2004, however, the Begin-Sadat Center study produced a significantly lower figure of 2.49 million total: 1.14 million in the West Bank and 1.08 million in Gaza by mid-2004.

In terms of growth rate, the PCBS assumption was a 4.9 percent growth rate for 2003. However, the actual growth rate was 2.1 percent for the West Bank and Gaza in 2003. Similarly, the 4.7 percent growth rate projected for Gaza Arabs was actually 2.9 percent in 2003, and the 4.4 percent growth projected for West Bank Arabs was actually only 1.8 percent.

The Begin-Sadat Center study produced total fertility rates (TFRs) of 5.2 for the West Bank and 5.4 for Gaza. These numbers were comparable to the PCBS 2004 Household Survey, which yielded numbers of 5.2 for the West Bank and 6.6 for Gaza.

When making a forecast, it is necessary to examine the different scenarios that are favorable to low, medium, or high Arab or Jewish growth, respectively. The future demographic balance of the region will be determined by trends in the Jewish majority--which recently has shown rising birth rates and immigration while the Arab population has experienced high, but declining, birth rates and emigration.

The forecasts consisted of three groups: Israeli Jews, Israeli Arabs, and West Bank Arabs. For Israeli Jews, the population will fall from an 81 percent proportion of the population in 2000 to a 73 percent, 75 percent, or 77 percent proportion. The key assumption behind the Jewish population growth is the Jewish fertility rate. In this case, the PCBS assumed that Jewish TFRs would remain stable at 2.6 (in the high case scenario), or decline to 2.4 or 2.1 (in the medium and low scenarios, respectively). However, between 2000 and 2004, the Jewish fertility rate actually rose to 2.71 percent. “A Forecast for Israel and the West Bank 2025” considers three slightly higher fertility scenarios for Israeli Jews (with a base birth rate of 2.7 births per woman), and projects birth rates in 2025 of 2.4, 2.7, or 3 for the low, medium, and high cases respectively.

For the Israeli Muslims, the PCBS projected that the current rate of 4.7 births per woman would continue to 2025. The medium and low PCBS projections were 3.8 and 2.6 respectively. However, since 2000, the actual Israeli Muslim rate has dropped to 4.36. Similarly, the overall Arab TFR has fallen to 4.02 in 2004. Thus, the Begin-Sadat Center study predicts three new scenarios for Israel Arabs: birth rates at 2.4, 3, and 4 for the low, medium, and high projections, respectively.

For West Bank Arabs, the UN population estimates (which come from the PCBS) predict that by 2025, the TFR will drop from 5.4 to 3.2 births per woman for the middle scenario. The Begin-Sadat Center study predicts a drop from 5 to 4 births per woman for the high scenario, or a significant drop from 5 to 2.4 births per woman for the low scenario. This drop in TFR is consistent with the entire Middle East region, which saw significant drops in TFR across the board between 1970-1975 and 2000-2005.

The overall mid-case scenario for Israel and the West Bank presented by the Begin-Sadat Center study posits that by 2025, the portion of the population of Israel Jews will decline from the current 67 percent to 63 percent. In a worst-case scenario, the Jewish population would decline to 56 percent of the population; whereas a best-case scenario would see the Jewish population growing to 71 percent for Israel and the West Bank. For Israel proper, the mid-case scenario calls for the percentage of Israeli Jews to drop from the current 81 percent to 77 percent in 2025. The low scenario could see Israeli Jews drop to as low as 72 percent, and the high scenario could see the percentage of Israeli Jews grow to 83 percent.

Ultimately, contrary to popular belief, there is tremendous stability in the demographic forecast for Israeli Jews over the next twenty years.

AEI intern Karla Herdzik prepared this event summary.