EVENTS

Date:	Monday, April 24, 2006
Time:	10:00 AM -- 11:30 AM
Location:	Wohlstetter Conference Center, Twelfth Floor, AEI 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

April 2006

The Debate over Civil War: Is Iraq at the Brink?

Since the destruction of the al-Askariya shrine in Samarra on February 22, 2006, a growing number of commentators has warned that Iraq is slipping into civil war and that prospects for stability and democracy in Iraq are waning. The Iraqi police and security forces successfully shut down large-scale violence within a few days of the attack as Iraqi political leaders of all parties called for calm. The ever-precarious Iraqi political process has been continuing alongside insurgent and sectarian violence. Which way is Iraq really headed? Is success still possible, or is collapse inevitable? These and other questions were the focus of an April 24 AEI panel discussion.

Frederick W. Kagan
AEI

While many in Washington have acquired “Iraq fatigue,” it is still important to talk about Iraq before moving on to other issues. Iraq is the single most important issue facing the United States today. If it is not resolved, the consequences will be horrific. It is also the only place in the world where a significant numbers of American combat troops are actively engaged on a day-to-day basis.

Nathan Brown
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

At one point, this event was titled “Iraq: Into the Black Hole,” a pessimistic metaphor that implies irresistible movement towards a certain point. That metaphor does not translate well in this case. Current American policy is designed to support the creation of a consensus among the Iraqi political leadership, which is a standard form of post-conflict reconstruction. However, this is not the same as building democracy. Democracy is about building institutions, especially at the popular level, but American policy is geared towards an elite led plan. Democracy is based on the rule of a simple majority, a system which can potentially be unstable when minority groups do not have faith in the system. The operating assumption behind this plan is that progress is not possible until the major parties agree on a set of rules and, once this process is executed, democratic institutions can be created. At this point in time, however, this process is not working well in Iraq. Iraq does not have an elite consensus, and it does not have leaders that can deliver on the programs promised to their constituencies.

The problem with backroom elite bargaining is that this practice has arrived both too late and too early. It is too late in that it was not adopted until after the political reconstruction process had begun. This process clearly makes bargaining difficult, as some groups are heavily invested in the current system. A key example is Iraq’s proposed National Security Council, which is an object of much discussion at the moment but is totally outside of the previously negotiated constitutional structure. Another example would be a government of “national unity” which would include non-sectarian ministers. To implement such a system in Iraq, every group would be given a veto, making the process tediously slow and incredibly painful. Conversely, the bargaining process has also been conducted too early: this strategy is one patterned on post-conflict resolution situations, yet Iraq is still in the midst of a live and ongoing conflict.

We must keep in mind that a slow process does not breed disaster, although it can create disconnect between the smoke-filled room and the discourse on the street. The continuing level of political violence in Iraq has been stunning, and the bitterness and fear it creates have become facts of daily life. This drives a wedge between the slow paced political process and the situation on the ground, making any resulting agreement little more than an agreement among the elites themselves. The formation of a cabinet has been very slow and has taken longer than even a pessimistic outlook would have suggested, and the benefits of forming that government recede every passing day. Yet, despite this pessimistic outlook, the black hole metaphor still does not apply to Iraq, for Iraq is not destined to move in any particular direction. Our dilemma is that we lack the tools to solve the deep and intractable problems, not that we are incapable of solving these problems in their entirety.

Some modest steps could be taken to improve the situation in Iraq. First, we must support an elite, consensus, national unity government. The formation of a National Security Council and appointment of non-sectarian ministers would be a positive step, but will not solve Iraq’s problems. On the other hand, the United States needs to be less intrusive as it supports this model, for we have seen how recent public comments have backfired. Second, a move beyond ethnic and sectarian politics is an admirable goal, but the tools to get there are not up to the task of knitting Iraqi society back together. Third and finally, we have to come to terms with the potentially grave regional implications, at least through the medium term. In conclusion, Iraq is in an increasingly difficult situation and the policy tools to fix it are lacking. As such, the current policy focus is on keeping the situation from getting worse rather than any real reconstruction.

Michael Eisenstadt
Washington Institute for Near East Policy

A dramatic escalation of sectarian conflict in Iraq has the potential to derail the country’s political transition, undermine support for the U.S. presence, and draw Iraq’s neighbors into the conflict. However, the ongoing debate in Washington about civil war is not productive. It is fairly clear that the sectarian struggle fits the classic definition of a civil war--a violent internal struggle to change a government or its policies. To a great extent, U.S. efforts have focused on the creation of a broadly based government, and rightly so. But these conflicts are driven by a variety of socioeconomic and military processes that also need to be addressed.

The first issue relates to the insurgency, which is directly related to the sectarian conflict. This has a lot to do with the insurgency’s recruitment base. Currently the insurgency has little appeal outside of the Sunni community, with some exceptions. However, the insurgency has mobilized few of its non-Sunni support and could therefore substantially increase the strength of its power base. As such, promoting Sunni involvement in the political process is essential. The challenge is walking a fine line between pressuring the Shiites and maintaining a healthy alliance. Second, the needs of ethnic cleansing need to be addressed. During the Lebanese civil war, many internally displaced persons could not return to their old neighborhoods and jobs due to sectarian violence, and they resorted to employment by sectarian militias. This is a dynamic which we must prevent in Iraq. Third, U.S. forces should focus on the protection of target populations. While random violence does occur, most atrocities are strategic. Some studies have noted that atrocities tend to occur in the areas most hotly contested between the rival parties. As such, we should create early warning and rapid reaction capabilities in probable and known hot spots. Fourth, U.S. policy must work to avoid the disintegration of the Iraqi security forces. Due to the high number of Shiites in the Iraqi security forces, this is not an immediate concern. A larger issue would be internal violence in the Kurdish or Shia communities. Fifth, the drift to chaos must be halted. The Palestinian case is useful in this regard. Since 2000 and the second intifada, elites unresponsive to the Palestinian Authority have created chaos on the streets. The parallel rise of militias in Iraq may indicate a similar drift to chaos. Embedding U.S. forces in Iraqi security forces will help head this off. Efforts should also be increased to deny funds to militias and to clamp down on illegal smuggling of oil and other products. To put it broadly, U.S. policy should strive to dismantle the conflict economy, which creates individuals who have an interest in its continuation.

In conclusion, the United States should be prepared for an increase in civil violence, but this increase may not occur. The major Shia parties have a strong motivation to keep the violence from getting out of hand, yet it is uncertain if they have the ability to do so. Should sectarian violence increase, the United States will find it difficult both to prevent sectarian violence and to combat the insurgency. In any case, the United States cannot be seen as standing by or disengaging while sectarian slaughter occurs.

James Dobbins
RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center

Like many people, my view on Iraq has shifted toward pessimism over time, yet it is neither hopeless nor time to cut our losses. Things could get much worse, and the United States has an obligation to prevent that. There is an important distinction between a conventional and unconventional civil war. In the former case, both sides have access to heavy weaponry, can take and hold territory, and can exact high numbers of casualties. In the latter case, only one side has access to such weaponry, while the opposing side is forced to resort to raids and alternative low-technology tactics. The real threshold is whether Iraq passes from an unconventional civil war to a conventional civil war. This is indeed possible. A complete American pullout at this point would lead to fragmentation, and with the help of neighboring powers, this outcome is conceivable. As such, the bottom line is that we must prevent this scenario.

The situation on the ground in Iraq has been compared to models in Vietnam and Yugoslavia. The United States does not have the troop strength to mount a campaign of either of these types; as such, we should pursue a strategy similar to that which we conducted during the 1980s in Central America. In this way, we would focus more on advisors than on ground presence. It is imperative that we make these decisions in a nonpartisan atmosphere, but that we not take them out of a political context. Those who suggest that we enlarge our military presence need to realize that public opinion is turning against the commitment in Iraq.

We have learned a fair amount about post-conflict reconstruction over the past years, and one of the most important lessons is that one cannot repair a failed state if its neighbors intend to disrupt progress. Neighbors need to be engaged for success. This was true of Milosevic and Tudjman in Bosnia’s reconstruction, and of Afghanistan as well. Unfortunately, the stated objective of democratizing Iraq and reshaping the political environment of the Middle East precludes this sort of cooperation. Iraq’s neighbors have no interest in this goal and, in fact, have no reason to cooperate. As such, the United States needs to create a vision of Iraq and the region that the neighboring governments can buy into. This does not mean abandoning democracy, it means subordinating democratic themes to more urgent regional priorities, such as stability. If the administration moves in this direction, it will receive an increase in regional support.

Reuel Marc Gerecht
AEI

Right now Iraq policy must focus on the basics. The most essential thing is keeping Muqtada al-Sadr in the political process. The choice of Al-Maliki and the anti-American Dawa Party is, on the whole, a good thing. Currently, the worst thing that could happen would be for al-Sadr to return to arms. Because the majority of the violence against American soldiers comes from the Sunnis, American policy tends, in a reflex action, to appease the Sunnis in hopes of resolving the insurgency. This idea is misleading, as it demonstrates the American misconception that troop presence fuels the insurgency. If anything, our experience in Tal-Afar indicates that American forces are indispensable to the fight against the insurgency.

The best solution is to imbed U.S. forces with Iraqi defense forces, as opposed to engaging the militias directly--the time for that has passed. The most important goal right now should be to maintain the strength of the Shiite coalition. The public pressure against Al-Jafari over the last few weeks has been troubling in this regard. Washington must maintain the support of the Shia community at all costs. Furthermore, if al-Sadr can be kept in the political process, then the worst elements of his community will be kept in check. As long as the Shiite political alliance stays together, the internal tensions between the al-Sadr and the Hakim camps can be addressed politically.

Despite what Jim has suggested, it would be very problematic to bring Iraq’s neighbors into the Iraqi mix. Syria and particularly Iran are satisfied by Iraq’s current chaotic state. Importing Syria and Iran into the discussion is a terrible idea and would never be accepted by the Iraqi people.

Frederick W. Kagan
AEI

The idea behind this panel emerged out of the discussion after the bombing of the al-Askariya mosque a few months ago. In the immediate coverage it was predetermined that Iraq was headed to a civil war, independent of the Iraqi reaction to the bombing. As the panelists noted, debating over whether Iraq had crumbled into civil war was irrelevant; the insurgency is by definition a “civil war” of sorts. These news reports anticipated mass casualties as one would see in a conventional civil war, a development which has not occurred. On the other hand, as we look at the reaction to the al-Askariya bombing, the Iraqi government denounced the violence and called for restraint. It then ordered the security forces to shut down the country. The Iraqi security forces acted promptly, effectively, and efficiently to control the situation. These signs of progress were overlooked by the media in the rush to declare the situation hopeless.

In regard to the constraints of political reality, statements like these are never truly objective. Suggestions at an event like this all point to policy changes and hint that particular constraints should be relaxed. For example, some panelists took certain facts, such as the drawdown of American troops, to be a given, which we must remember is not necessarily an inevitable outcome. Also, the question of democratization is a fundamental constraint of the situation at this point. This variable could be relaxed, and similarly other constraints could to be relaxed as well. To have a constructive policy debate, all options should be open to adjustment; we should not designate particular variables as adjustable and set others in stone.
 
Regarding the number of troops needed to conduct certain sorts of operations, these estimates are often made with a lack of specificity based on previous conflicts. In Iraq, the United States would not need to deploy large numbers of troops to the Shia and Kurdish areas. When the numbers are recalculated, the military strategy becomes more realistic. This is not a discussion that lends itself to the abstract; it needs to be carried out in concrete terms regarding specific areas and objectives.

AEI research assistant Melissa Wisner and AEI intern Tom Lewis prepared this summary.