EVENTS

Date:	Wednesday, September 20, 2006
Time:	8:45 AM -- 10:15 AM
Location:	Wohlstetter Conference Center, Twelfth Floor, AEI 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

September 2006

Breakfast with Representative Pete Hoekstra

Five years after September 11, the extent of the terrorist threat is just being revealed. Al Qaeda remains dedicated to the destruction of the United States, and al Qaeda’s friends, sponsors, and allies are no less committed. AEI hosted Representative Pete Hoekstra, the chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to discuss the Committee’s new report on al Qaeda. Following Representative Hoekstra’s remarks, a brief discussion with intelligence expert Michael Tanji preceded a question-and-answer session.

Michael A. Ledeen
AEI

There are at least three great mysteries in the modern world concerning the history of words. These mysteries also apply to many processes in Washington and the discussion at hand. The first is how the meaning of the word virtue, which meant the masculinity of men, came to be applied to the chastity of women. Secondly, how did people who advocate revolution come to be called conservatives? Finally, how did the word oversight come to be applied to people who actually look at things, when the word has come to mean the opposite in Washington, D.C.?

The oversight committees established to keep watch over unruly elements at the Central Intelligence Agency have evolved to become unruly themselves  They are now trying to become intelligence agencies themselves, so far as anyone can tell by reading the newspapers. If they are “riding herd” on anyone, it is on the executive branch, not the intelligence community.

The Honorable Pete Hoekstra (R–Mich.)
Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

The purpose of reports like the one recently published about the Iranian threat by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence is to open the work of the Committee to public scrutiny, thus fostering better understanding of the threats and challenges that face the United States. The report on Iran does not offer definitive answers; its objective is to stimulate a discussion early in the process of negotiations. Other subjects on which the Committee focuses are intelligence reform, al Qaeda, and North Korea.

Although the Intelligence Committee knows that al Qaeda is planning future attacks, many details remain uncertain. The successes of post-9/11 counterterrorism efforts have generated a sense of complacency. Nonetheless, it is not an overstatement to say that the United States remains in the midst of a global war.

Radical Islamist terrorism has transformed into a “quick and nimble” decentralized organizational structure. This poses a serious challenge. Al Qaeda does not have control-oriented central leadership. Instead, it has evolved into an agile organization with many of the characteristics of “participated management,” it has a clear vision and objectives, it allocates resources where they are needed, and most importantly, its structure empowers members to carry out actions independently.

The United States’ success in the War on Terror is due to the fact that it has been on the offensive. The United States needs a comprehensive strategy to counter the efforts of the terrorists on military, intelligence, economic, and communications fronts. It has to develop partnerships and manage its public relations better. For example, through effective communications we can encourage moderate Muslims to speak out against radical Islam. We should also better prepare ourselves for the threat of homegrown terrorism. Only with such a complete strategy can we win this war.

Those responsible for fighting the war should be given the tools they need to win. The challenge for the United States is to remain a step ahead of the enemy. Excessive laws, rules, and guidelines can be barriers to winning the War on Terror. In combat, no textbook will ever ensure that soldiers will always make the right decisions. There is no manual on how to fight a war.

Michael Tanji
Former Defense Intelligence Agency officer

It is worth discussing whether it is the Intelligence Committee’s job to publish intelligence assessment reports and to inform the public about the threats that face the United States. The focus on these threats is refreshing, and since public perception of threats has decreased, it is important to acknowledge the merit of how committed officials are to addressing these threats.

The new report on al Qaeda emphasizes the role that intelligence plays, especially since future targets will probably be “hard targets,” where U.S. intelligence is denied access. Therefore, intelligence resources will generally be scarce and any decision to go to war will be surrounded by ambiguity. This realization is important to issues concerning intelligence reform. Neither more funding nor more oversight will make U.S. intelligence and security more flexible or responsive.

Future terrorist threats are likely to come from light infantry. Future attacks might therefore not necessarily be large-scale attacks, although such attacks will certainly remain serious threats. The danger is that we might see U.S. cities and towns become a Fallujah or Ramadi. A narrow focus (such as on airport security) will be insufficient, and greater emphasis should be placed on civil defense and response capabilities. It is impossible to protect every target, but this should not be the objective. Flexibility and responsiveness will enable quick recovery after an attack, leaving the United States bruised but not beaten.

Failure to acknowledge that this is a global conflict will set the United States up for a chain of failures.

AEI intern Ivan Kooiman prepared this summary.