EVENTS

Date:	Thursday, April 5, 2007
Time:	10:00 AM -- 11:30 AM
Location:	Wohlstetter Conference Center, Twelfth Floor, AEI 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

April 2007

A Fair Deal with North Korea?

The February 2007 six-party agreement on North Korea's nuclear program was hailed in the capitals of its signatories as proof that Pyongyang is finally serious about denuclearization and that multilateral negotiations have finally paid off. But the agreement raised almost as many questions as it answered. What will be the fate of North Korea's existing nuclear weapons stockpile, which went unmentioned in the treaty? And what of Pyongyang's uranium enrichment program, which American officials now indicate may never have existed? How will the lifting of financial sanctions on North Korean accounts affect U.S. leverage against Pyongyang's recidivist tendencies?

Panelists John R. Bolton, Nicholas Eberstadt, and Dan Blumenthal discussed these and other questions concerning the North Korean nuclear crisis at this April 5, 2007 AEI conference.

The Honorable John R. Bolton
AEI

North Korea's nuclear weapons program is one of the most profound issues that the United States faces today. The success of North Korea in maintaining their weapons program has consequences around the globe for countries and terrorist groups alike.

The fundamental question is whether it is believable that North Korea will ever voluntarily give up its weapons program. If it is a believable possibility, then trying negotiations might seem to work. However, North Korea will never give up its nuclear weapons voluntarily since they are crucial to the survival of the Kim Jong Il regime. North Korea will continue to commit to agreements but will perpetually fail in upholding their end of the deal.

Information that came to the United States in the spring and summer of 2002 indicated conclusively that North Korea was pursuing a highly-enriched uranium program. Discussions since then have purported that the highly-enriched uranium program is a direct reaction to the United States. The success of the six-party talks will hinge on whether or not the North Koreans fully disclose their highly-enriched uranium program.

There is a substantial chance that the North Koreans will not do anything to meet the sixty-day deadline set out in the February 13 agreements. The State Department will claim that there has been progress, discussions are working, the United States will continue to put pressure on North Korea, and the process can not be hung up on a technicality. This language only allows North Korea the opportunity to achieve its goal. North Korea must prove itself by following through with the agreement and meeting deadlines.

Nicholas Eberstadt
AEI

North Korea's quest for a nuclear program is not a passing fancy for a negotiation card; the program has been in progress since the 1960s and is now entering its fifth decade. Before his death, Kim Il Sung said that his son had been in charge of day to day activities in North Korea since the early 1980s. Likewise, Kim Jong Il has been the official chairman of the highest military commission, the DPRK National Defense Commission, since the early 1990s. He has pushed the nuclear program forward despite all of the problems that it caused for the state like international economic and diplomatic isolation, strained relations with China, and a catastrophic famine in the 1990s.

North Korea's official policy has been to build a powerful and prosperous state through established military might. Furthermore, North Korea embodies military-first politics which dictate that they lay the foundations for a powerful, self-sustaining national defense industry, in order to rejuvenate all economic fields and enhance the quality of the people's lives. North Korea relies on international military extortion to bring in resources and forestall economic reform. These two official positions support the conclusion that North Korea will not fulfill their obligations, much less permanently end their nuclear programs.

Dan Blumenthal
AEI

Denuclearization is the key to the U.S. effort and not a tactical tradeoff. If the North Koreans are willing to sell nuclear information or material, it places world security at stake. Current and future negotiations must ensure denuclearization on the Korean peninsula. If not, increased financial support will enter North Korea without an ounce of plutonium leaving the peninsula, allowing the regime the opportunity to restart their weapons program at any time.

The alliance with Japan is the U.S. plan for a strategic vision in East Asia. Although the Japanese are not happy with the current North Korean negotiations, they are not coming out and saying so. The prime minister of Japan ran on a platform of strict containment of North Korea, but the failure of the United States is only hurting him politically. Each time the North Koreans hold up the negotiations process, the United States goes back to China in order to get the North Koreans to come back to the table. Unless our strategy is the same as that of China, such practices are not good for the United States or its allies.

AEI intern Gregory Trum Jr. prepared this summary.