EVENTS

Date:	Thursday, September 20, 2007
Time:	8:30 AM -- 2:00 PM
Location:	Wohlstetter Conference Center, Twelfth Floor, AEI 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

September 2007

AFRICOM: Implications for African Security and U.S.-African Relations

American policy toward Africa will soon enter a new era: the establishment of the joint military United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) creates an important instrument and signals a new direction for U.S. security strategy. On September 20, AEI held a conference to better understand the role and mission of this new command, both from U.S. and African perspectives.

Though AFRICOM has yet to be formally established, it is already controversial. Some in the United States and in Africa worry about the "militarization of aid." Other debates have focused on the possible locations of AFRICOM's headquarters and speculated about the "real" U.S. interests--such as balancing China's growing presence in Africa or securing the continent's natural resources--that the new structure is designed to serve. At the same time, relatively little attention has been devoted to understanding Africa's security dilemmas from an African perspective and articulating how the United States can respond to African priorities with the limited set of security cooperation tools at its disposal. In sum, AFRICOM's mission, plans, and purpose are poorly understood.
 
Speakers at this conference addressed some of the major questions raised by AFRICOM's creation: What are U.S. interests in Africa, and what forms of security partnership will protect them most effectively? How does Africa define its own security priorities, and what forms of U.S. engagement does it find most valuable? Does this signal a fundamental shift away from a primarily humanitarian foreign policy toward Africa to a more "normal" policy based on mutual interests and common threats?

Panel I: What's New about AFRICOM and What's Not?

Theresa M. Whelan
U.S. Department of Defense

The major problems with AFRICOM concern separating the realities from the myths. There are three features of AFRICOM that distinguish it from its predecessors: AFRICOM will unify Africa under a single security command, instead of the 3 separate commands that it is currently under; AFRICOM will integrate the skills of various U.S. agencies, with a high degree of civilian involvement; and the focus of the mission will no longer be "war-fighting" but will instead center on building security and stability on the continent. Amidst all these changes, there are many persistent features of the command. U.S. foreign policy will still be conducted through the Department of State, and U.S. ambassadors in individual countries will not be placed under the control of AFRICOM. African countries will retain their leadership over security issues and policy priorities will remain the same. There will be no additional bases built on the continent and the formation of AFRICOM will not be indicative of an increased U.S. troop presence in Africa.

General James L. Jamerson
U.S. Air Force (Ret.) and Lockheed Martin Corporation

The formation of AFRICOM must be placed in its historical context. It is not a new concept. It in fact follows from a long line of events and organizations that have culminated at this point. A key priority for AFRICOM will be acceptance in Africa, which can only be accomplished by being "on the ground," talking to Africans. Without this, resistance will continue and cooperation will break down. The primary hurdle for AFRICOM will be the role of resources. Without sufficient resources for the new security command, it will not be effective. The U.S. might want to look to its allies, especially those in Europe and private industry, to help resource AFRICOM.

Paul Wolfowitz
AEI

The perception of AFRICOM will be the biggest obstacle for the new command to overcome; even among U.S. supporters in Africa there is some trepidation. The fundamental U.S. interest in the area should be helping Africa turn the corner and become a "continent of hope." Progress is being made. The number of conflicts on the continent is down from a decade ago, but there is still a great deal that needs to be done. In Africa's case, however, development goes hand in hand with managing peace, security and stability, so any security venture will have to encompass all aspects. Peacekeeping is a tool that could help in all areas, and it is something that AFRICOM should focus on. Perhaps the most important contribution of AFRICOM will be its ability to give Africans a seat at the table. It will allow African voices to be heard in the discussions of issues that relate to their needs.

Panel II: African Security Priorities

Lt. Gen. Tsadkan Gebretensae
Center for Policy Research and Dialogue, Addis Ababa

There is widespread skepticism in Africa regarding AFRICOM and what the United States's modified role will be on the continent, even in U.S.-friendly countries. For the most part, this skepticism is warranted. The timing of AFRICOM corresponds with increased interest from China, the U.S.-led war on terror, and the general perception that the U.S. military is self-interested. There are several security challenges in Africa, however, that create the potential for cooperation between the two parties. The dominance of internal state conflicts and civil wars, the need for post-conflict reconstruction, and peacekeeping operations all provide opportunities for positive U.S. involvement. But they also create the possibility for negative influences if the interests of the African people are not seriously considered. AFRICOM will work best if both parties start with common interests and then slowly build from there.

Brig. Gen. Robert Winful
Ghana Armed Forces

AFRICOM provides several opportunities for cooperation for the United States and Africa but it has also created the potential for pitfalls. The best outcome for AFRICOM will be a relationship that is mutually beneficial for both parties. This cooperation should serve as a tool for simultaneous enhancement, provide a framework for cooperative defense, and enhance the capacity of the African Union. AFRICOM will increase African priorities on the U.S. agenda, which will be advantageous to both parties. However, there is the potential that AFRICOM will lead to a scramble for resources on the continent, degenerating into a power struggle between the United States and China.

His Excellency James Kimonyo
Ambassador of Rwanda

To examine U.S. security priorities in Africa, it is interesting to look at the case study of Rwanda. During the genocide in the 1990s, the United States and the international community as a whole did nothing to protect those being killed. This creates a challenge when the United States now speaks of AFRICOM. When the African people hear the "command" in AFRICOM they become immediately resistant to the idea, even if the U.S. intention is not to command the continent. The goal of AFRICOM should be to strengthen and increase cooperation to ensure peace and stability in the area. The struggle that the United States faces will be to convey this to the African people and change the perception in the area.

Linda Thomas-Greenfield
U.S. Department of State

The United States has always had a security presence in Africa. AFRICOM as a concept is not new; it is simply an internal restructuring that will place the whole continent of Africa under one command, instead of the three that have historically existed. AFRICOM will start by strengthening cooperation between the two parties to create a more cohesive approach to African security. The idea is not to drop troops on the continent or use the command to compete with China. There will be an increased and more formal role for civilians within AFRICOM. The new command will provide an opportunity to influence how the U.S. military interacts with African governments.

Panel III: Models of U.S.-African Security Cooperation

Brownie J. Samukai
Liberian Ministry of Defense

The United States needs to better communicate its intentions for AFRICOM on the continent. Africa's concerns stem from suspicions due to the history of U.S. involvement, but an increased dialogue can alleviate these worries. AFRICOM will be most successful if it can address the problems that concern Africans. The United States has the potential to work with Africa to bring specific and technical expertise to the continent and to build the capacity for crisis prevention in Africa.

Lt. Gen. Daniel I. Opande
Kenya Armed Forces (Ret.)

Each country in Africa is different. Each has its own individual threats, needs, and visions, and because of this, each needs a different type of partnership with the United States. Peace will be better served if strong partnerships can be formed to foster cooperation to work toward solving problems. In-depth discussions are needed to shape the future of AFRICOM and ensure its relevance and positive impact. The problems of Africa can only be solved by discussing them with the developing world, and AFRICOM has the potential to do just this.

Michael L. Smith
U.S. Department of State

There are several possible characteristics of AFRICOM that, if employed, will make it a more effective command. In order to create a successful program, AFRICOM must center on shared security issues and areas of interest. The command must balance security needs with democracy and development concerns and should focus on generating self-sufficiency among Africans. The program should complement--not make redundant--what other countries are willing to contribute to the continent.

Mauro DeLorenzo
AEI

There are several important points to stress with regard to AFRICOM. AFRICOM will only succeed to the extent that it aligns itself with the security concerns of the African people. It can offer a security partnership for democratic allies on the continent. Due to the risks of unintended consequences, AFRICOM will do its best to move slowly and cautiously, testing the waters as it goes. The basic benefit that AFRICOM can provide is a "seat at the table" for Africans, which will hopefully normalize U.S. policy toward the continent.

AEI intern Jess Nagro prepared this summary.