EVENTS

Date:	Monday, March 22, 2004
Time:	5:00 PM -- 6:15 PM
Location:	Wohlstetter Conference Center, Twelfth Floor, AEI 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

March 2004
Taiwan: Implications of the March 20 Vote

On March 20, the people of Taiwan voted on a closely contested presidential election and controversial referendum.  China, however, feared that Taiwan was laying the groundwork for a formal declaration of independence. As Taiwan grows more assertive, how should U.S. policy in the region adapt?  Is it time for the United States to abandon the polite fiction of the "one China" policy and support Taiwanese independence?  In the face of China's military buildup in the Taiwan Straits, should the United States balance its defense of Taiwan's flourishing democracy with its traditional interest in a stable relationship with China? A panel of experts discussed these issues at a March 22 AEI conference.

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
AEI

This was the second democratically planned and executed election for the presidency of Taiwan. The incumbent Chen Shui-bian won re-election by a very narrow margin: his party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), won 50.1 percent of the vote, while Kuomintang (KMT) candidate Lien Chan won 49.9 percent. The small margin of victory is considered suspicious by some due to both the assassination attempt on the eve of the election and the 337,297 ballots that were declared invalid (only half as many ballots were invalidated in the previous election). Prior to the assassination attempt, it was assumed that the KMT would be victorious, but the DPP came from behind to win the election. It should be noted that some two hundred thousand police and military personnel did not participate in the election because a state of alert had been declared in Taiwan due to the assassination attempt; it is widely believed that the military and police would have more likely voted for the KMT than the DPP.

The referendum did not pass due to insufficient voter turnout.  Election law requires that 50 percent of eligible voters participate in a valid referendum, but only 45 percent voted. This seems very odd, since the referendum had been so controversial.

Natale Bellocchi
Former U.S. ambassador and former director of the American Institute in Taiwan

In 2000, the DPP inherited a government with a bureaucracy that was created during a period when the party and the government were both controlled by the KMT, and this initially hindered the DPP. By 2003, the KMT realized that they could regain power by focusing on the economy during the campaign, since in this regard they had a larger talent pool to draw from than the DPP. Additionally, the KMT made a drastic ideological shift. Since 1992, polls on perceptions of identity-on whether people in Taiwan view themselves as Taiwanese, Chinese, or both-have changed dramatically.  In 1992, about 10 percent of the population said they were Taiwanese, 40 percent said they were both, and about 20 to 30 percent said they were Chinese.  Today, 40 percent claim they are Taiwanese only, 40 percent self-identify as both Taiwanese and Chinese, and less than 10 percent say they are Chinese. This forced the KMT to alter its discourse during the campaign, since it was unhelpful to be known as the "one China party."  They even said that independence may be an option.

Just before the election, private polling showed that the KMT had regained the lead.  After the assassination attempt-from which the president and vice-president emerged relatively unhurt-it was assumed that there would be many sympathy votes for President Chen Shui-bian, but polls showed that the KMT was still leading. After the winner was announced, Lien Chan asked for a recount, and the emotional nature of his speech caused an elevation of the street protests into riots. The government handled them well and had clearly issued orders to the police not to use violence, which was very wise in this case.

Three justices have been appointed to decide whether or not there will be a recount.  Taiwanese law calls for reasonable indication of fraud before the court will permit a recount, and thus far, everything has proceeded according to the law. There will definitely be an effort to settle this matter prior to the May 20 inauguration, but this may not be possible.

Samantha Ravich
Long Term Strategy Project

The results of the Taiwan election seem to confirm everyone's preconceived notions of that election. For those who believe that Taiwan is moving towards independence, President Chen's apparent victory confirms this. For those who praise the virtues of Taiwan as a true democracy, there was plenty to celebrate, since the idea of taking a measure directly to the people seems to be catching hold. Those who believe China is evolving as a responsible international actor point to China's restrained comments on the elections so far. Those who think Taiwan is not a fully formed democracy point to some of the more irresponsible statements coming from both sides. Those whose views on Beijing are critical caution that China actually might be sizing up the situation in order to take advantage of a crisis-if and when one presents itself-to "protect" the Taiwanese people from their own instability. And finally, for those in the U.S. foreign-policy establishment, the events over the weekend have re-affirmed the idea that the inability of American officials to hold qualitative dialogues with Taiwan officials has serious security ramifications. The United States is Taiwan's main protector, yet our commander-in-chief must rely on lower level intermediaries to communicate with the island.

In the short term, the U.S. policymaking establishment will ignore the issue as long as possible. When Chen is finally recognized as the winner, he will be pressured into making some conciliatory remarks prior to his inaugural speech. The United States will continue to try to find a nuanced, balanced way both to urge caution and to find an international space for Taiwan. Assuming that neither China nor Chen take bold action in the near future, the United States will continue ignoring the serious questions for U.S. policy that revolve around the Taiwan issue. First, the U.S. must reconcile its promotion of democracy throughout the world with our current policy which maintains that Taiwan is still part of China. Second, the U.S. must overcome this notion that borders that exist today are somehow immutable. Third, does the U.S. perceive China's increased role in Southeast Asia as a threat or as something we can work with? Fourth, how does the U.S. intend to continue to manage its role as the world's only superpower with growing restraints on its resources resulting from its war on terror? Finally, what factors will be used to decide what is in the best interests of the United States concerning an independent Taiwan or one more integrated with China?

Thomas Donnelly
AEI

Historically, this election in Taiwan will be viewed as one of the moments when American policymakers finally recognized that the "one China" policy is obsolete. Only a small fraction of the Taiwanese population accepts the reality of the old "one China" fiction. The Taiwanese people have shown that they prefer to choose their own leader without the interference and opinions of U.S. leaders. "One China" policy no longer makes strategic sense and certainly is no longer favored by the people who are our supposed allies.

This summary was written by AEI interns Stacy Schafer and Jason Fill with AEI research coordinator Molly McKew.