EVENTS

Date:	Friday, April 23, 2004
Time:	10:00 AM -- 11:00 AM
Location:	Wohlstetter Conference Center, Twelfth Floor, AEI 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

April 2004
United We Stand?

Simultaneous unrest in Sunni and Shi'a areas of Iraq have raised the specter of a countrywide uprising, but sustained violence has not spread beyond Fallujah, and mainstream Shi'a have declined to join the firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. The lack of popular support for this revolt raises questions not only about the unity of Iraq's Shi'a and Sunni communities, but also the factions within each group and our perception of the relationship between them.

At an April 23 AEI conference, Zainab al-Suwaij, Hedieh Mirahmadi, Reuel Marc Gerecht, and Michael Rubin drew on their extensive experience in Iraq and the Middle East to discuss Iraq's Shi'a and Sunni communities in light of recent events.

Hedieh Mirahmadi
World Organization for Resource Development and Education

The story of Sheikh Abdul Qadir Gilani is illustrative of an important lesson that needs to be learned about Iraq-that of the isolation of moderate voices. Sheikh Gilani is a leading Sunni cleric who could have assisted Coalition efforts to restore peace and order in Iraq.  He was an internationally respected Islamic scholar and teacher of classical moderate Islam. He was responsible for a mosque, a community center, and a school; five thousand people were fed on a daily basis because of his charity. But now he is now in self-imposed exile in Kuala Lumpur. 

Sufi Muslims are more concerned with their relationship with God than with politics, and they accept additional religious duties in order to achieve heightened spirituality. Historically, Sufis were considered nonpolitical and were thus allowed to practice their religion freely, even under Saddam Hussein. Sheikh Gilani did not enjoy an easy life under Saddam, but he was free to practice Islam as the established Sunni Authority of Greater Baghdad.  Saddam knew well that the Sufis (who are Sunni, but not Baathist) were the best bulwark against the rise of jihadists.

But in the commotion of war, the Islamists, the jihadists, and the Muslim Brotherhood donned the guise of Saddam dissidents and gained access to the ear of the Coalition leaders.  They cleverly made the case that, as opponents of Saddam, they were natural allies. The Coalition used them as informants, translators, and confidants-and inadvertently empowered the very people who are now plotting attacks at night.

Other than Michael Rubin, Sheikh Gilani and the more than one thousand clerics who follow him had no friends in the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which left them removed from power.  Islamists, in the meantime, were pleased because the Coalition forces were bearing the brunt of the labor, but the Islamists were free to take over schools and mosques that were formerly controlled by moderates. But, for the most part, local leaders were scarce. Without community and religious leadership, Iraqis sought revenge for the deaths of their loved ones or those taken by Coalition forces in old tribal fashion: they exacted retribution. 

Recently, the Islamists came to Gilani's own mosque and demanded his expulsion.  The community begged him to stay and fight, but he refused.  The centuries-old home of his noble ancestors is now probably in the hands of jihadi fighters who revile his spiritual beliefs and are undoubtedly using it as a safe house for terrorists.

This is a portrait of the mess, but there is a way out. We must realize that what we see today in many parts of Sunni Iraq is the combined resistance of radical Islamists and traditionalist Sunni Arabs fighting desperately for self-preservation.  The moderate Arab Sunni majority has no seat on the Governing Council, no friends in the CPA and, hence, no future in the governance of Iraq. Continuing disenfranchisement of this sector is a recipe for disaster and possibly for the dreaded civil war prophesied in so many corners since the beginning of the war.

We owe it to the Iraqi people not to have had a hand in inciting such internal turbulence.  We need to reach out to the moderate Sunni masses and give them a seat at the table before they decide to take it by force.

Michael Rubin
AEI

There was a Sunni mosque in Karradah, a predominantly Shi'a neighborhood in Baghdad. The Badr Corps, the militia of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), moved into a building down the street, and repeatedly asked to have Shi'a preach in this mosque every other Friday. They were refused. The next week the mosque was raided by U.S. troops who had received an anonymous tip that there were weapons being stored there.  All that was found was one old watchman with a Kalashnikov, and in Iraq one Kalashnikov per property is permitted. The Coalition forces are used by people who we think are our allies, in this case the Badr Corps. But if anyone actually went to a Badr Corps headquarters, they would see the anti-American, anti-Western, and anti-democratic slogans plastered on the walls.

Iraqis may not seem politically unified right now, but lack of political unification is healthy in a post-totalitarian society learning to embrace diversity of opinion, tolerance, and compromise as components of democracy.  Iraqis, however, are unified in their opposition to the Baath Party.  In Najaf, Kirkuk and other non-Shi'a areas one sees banners that read, in Arabic, "Death to the Baath Party."  The perception that the Coalition has reversed its de-Baathification policy is very dangerous, born out of the mistaken perception that the Baath Party represented the Sunnis of Iraq.  It represented some of the Sunnis, but it oppressed many more.  Allowing Baathists to return to power with the goal of appeasing Sunnis in Fallujah may result in losing the support of the vast majority of the Iraqi people. 

Some people say Iraqis only joined the Baath Party in order to have jobs, but the top four levels of the party were unattainable unless you actively informed on others, collaborated against dissidents, and de facto (at the very least) sent others to prison.  It is not true, for example, that the education system collapsed because of de-Baathification.  Baathist school teaches were fired, but there were more than thirty-thousand school teachers who were unemployed under Saddam because they refused to join the Baath Party.  Re-Baathification must be understood not as an exercise to smooth ruffled feathers, but the replacement of those who opposed and were oppressed by Saddam Hussein with those who were loyal to him.

Reuel Marc Gerecht
AEI

There is concern that a Shiite-Sunni alliance will be built as a result of how the United States has handled the siege of Fallujah, but it seems unlikely that this will happen. The SCIRI and followers of Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani do not seem inclined to join forces with the Sunnis, and the Sadriyyin-those loyal to Muqtada al Sadr-will certainly never do so, and may, in fact, become an open opponent of fundamentalist Sunnis in the coming months.

The CPA has not done enough to contain Sadr's growing influence, especially given the Pentagon intelligence indicating that Sadr was responsible for the death of American soldiers.  When Sadr tried to declare his own shadow government and march on Najaf, the CPA again did not take a firm stand against him. Instead, the CPA has established a pattern of acquiescence. The traditional clergy in Najaf have made their distaste, and even hatred, of Sadr known. We may not like them, but the forces of the SCIRI and Dawa are not fighting against us, nor are the armed Shiite tribesmen.  If these groups were to ally themselves with the radical fringe of the Sadriyyin, the death toll in Iraq would undoubtedly rise. 

A far more important issue, however, is the evolution of relations between the Shi'a and the Kurds. 

Zainab al-Suwaij
American Islamic Conference

While the vast majority of Shi'a see the actions of Sadr and his followers as violations of the Shi'a tradition, the Sadriyyin have been supported by other states interested in disrupting the transition to sovereignty and democracy in Iraq. These external actors support hostile activities through Iraq, including in Fallujah and the Sunni triangle.  Their only goal is instability; they want to prevent democracy in Iraq.

What is the best way to deal with Muqtada al-Sadr, his militia, and the insurgents in Fallujah?  The Coalition forces could institute marshal law.  A military government could rule the country for at least a year, in order to achieve some degree of stability.  The Iraqis are grateful for their freedom, but many do not know how to practice democracy.  Marshal law in Iraq will stop the current hostilities and prevent groups from entering Iraq from Syria, Iran, and Iraq's other neighbors.  A legitimate government can take then take control.

AEI research program manager Molly McKew prepared this summary with intern Jason Fill.