EVENTS

Date:	Wednesday, May 5, 2004
Time:	4:30 PM -- 6:30 PM
Location:	Wohlstetter Conference Center, Twelfth Floor, AEI 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

May 2004

Whither Nation-Building?

From Bosnia to Iraq, the challenge of rebuilding collapsed and war-torn societies has emerged as one of the defining features of the post-Cold War world. Once perceived as errands of mercy, exercises in "nation-building" have since moved to the center of international security concerns. The United States and the United Nations have traditionally assumed the lion's share of responsibility for these efforts, sometimes working together harmoniously-but often not. At a May 5th conference-part of AEI's series on the future of the United Nations and the UN Development Programme's Washington Roundtable series on issues of global development, experts examined the U.S.-UN cooperation, frictions in post-conflict reconstruction efforts, and current plans for strengthening international capacity and U.S.-UN dialogue for future efforts.

Mark Malloch Brown
Administrator, United Nations Development Programme

Nation-building activities have grown exponentially in the post-1989 world. Future nation-building activities that the United States and the UN have mutual interest in are much more likely to be caused by internal collapse rather than external intervention. We will have more Haitis, whereby internal strife aggravated by the unfulfilled promises of corrupt governments will lead to the breakdown of states, than we will situations of external intervention as in Iraq.

The context in which we seek to approach failed states involves a media world very different from that of our forefathers. The CNN factor, where there is an intense focus and concern on the ups and downs of the conflict but very little media staying power, creates political obstacles. It is difficult to sustain political commitment when political commitment is largely dependent on the presence of the media.

One cannot mention the media without highlighting another phenomenon. No longer do citizens of failed states rely primarily on the BBC and CNN for their news. Today, they receive news from the Internet or local/regional media outlets. The State Department spokesman in Washington or the UN Secretary General's spokesman in New York may make statements on events occurring in a particular region and find that the regional perception bears no resemblance to what we read and hear in the U.S. media.

There are a series of nation-building lessons that can be drawn from several decades of experience. Lesson one: democratic governance is not a short-term project. It takes at least five to seven years to establish a sustainable democracy. When the process is aborted prematurely, as in the experience of Somalia and Haiti, the country is quickly ushered into rehabilitation where a variety of services must be offered: strengthening democratic institutions, establishing rule of law, running demobilization and reintegration programs, and small arms collection and de-mining. The first election is but one milestone, not the moment to declare victory and pack up. For long-term success, staying power is required.

Lesson two: personal security matters the most to citizens of a failed state. The breakdown of basic law and order on the streets necessitates policemen more than it does the presence of peacekeepers. Taking into consideration that 50 percent of all peace agreements fail within the first three years, mobilizing the security sector is critical. In addition to quick attention to the police, prisons, and justice systems, demobilization and reintegration must possess high priority. Effective action must be taken in the early months when militias and semi-demobilized armies are wandering around making a living from civilian populations, with their guns still in hand.

Lesson three: contrary to popular belief, UN political leadership does not need to be synonymous with military leadership. The UN recognizes that when countries put their soldiers in the line of fire, they must be allowed responsibility for military decision-making. Mixed hybrids of state and UN involvement have particular advantages, as seen in Kosovo, where the United States paid less than a quarter of the reconstruction costs and provided a small minority of the peacekeeping forces, yet possessed control over that operation.

Lesson four: the first six months after a ceasefire are extremely critical to securing the foundation for nation-building. Often this phase is the least well funded. The gap created by insufficient long-term reconstruction funding often leads to the failure, because of the inability to create the required momentum for peace.

Finally, while the private sector is difficult to establish in the early stages of instability, it is absolutely indispensable. The private sector plays a vital role in harnessing the economic energy of a populace emerging from conflict. After decades of experience, there exists no successful example of modern nation-building around anything other than a vibrant private-sector economy.

In looking toward the future, I offer a few observations. First, when it comes to nation-building, there is an indispensable partnership between the United States and UN. The United States needs the neutrality and trust of the UN to act as an intermediary in the very difficult and sensitive tasks of building new institutions. Due to the high propensity to fail in nation-building endeavors, it behooves the international community to work and learn together from the successes and the failures. It is critical to have a multilateral home for cultivating better understanding of the best practices and principles for addressing future problems. Finally, nation-building is extremely expensive. For example, development spending in Afghanistan costs $2.5 billion a year, and peacekeeping costs along the order of $11 billion a year. It is imperative that we, the United States and the UN, make sure that countries that emerge from peacekeeping into reconstruction succeed because of the exorbitant price of undergoing another peacekeeping operation.

Ambassador W. Robert Pearson
Director of Foreign Service and Human Resources, U.S. Department of State

Over the decades, crises have arisen in a variety of regions: Central America, East Africa, West Africa, South Africa, and the Middle East. The general pattern is to allow the event to occur and then think about the proper response. Today, there is a broad consensus that the approach must change; there is a great need to respond more quickly to crises.

Secretary Powell desires to meet this need, in part, by instituting a readiness reserve. Foreign officers typically serve in at least two geographic bureaus over the span of ten years. A new emphasis will be placed on training officers comprehensively throughout their careers. This involves keeping people's language skills, area of expertise, and intelligence access up to workable levels, thereby multiplying the effectiveness of policy execution without accumulating additional expenses.

There are two other factors that need to be addressed. One is the horizontal factor, namely global demographics. Approximately a quarter to a third of the world's population has gone through the democratic economic transition. A quarter to a third is in the process, and the rest of the population is not yet ready for such a transition. The countries that are abandoning traditional practices and desire to join the democratic club are most at risk. The United States must have a highly developed diplomatic service that can help those countries make the transition as profitably as possible.

Second is the vertical factor in the wake of September 11, 2001. After the attacks, the American public quickly consented to sending troops overseas and was willing to absorb causalities. The reality of 9/11 will color our lens of the world for a long time to come and will increase our ability to react.

Right now there is discussion over developing a center for the coordination of reconstruction within the executive branch. The purpose of the center is threefold: First, it will monitor developing crises. Second, before the crises come to fruition, the center will train and equip personnel. Third, the center will organize the personnel necessary to respond to the crises. Obviously, the United States cannot predict and prepare for every crisis, but it can create a mechanism that can anticipate and generate a quick response. It is imperative that the United States more intelligently decides how to prepare in advance of crises, in order to ensure more successful results.

Larry Diamond
Hoover Institution

Key lessons in nation-building can be drawn from the critical conditions now present in Iraq. First of all, James Carville's 1991 statement, "It's the economy, stupid," can be rephrased to fit the situation: "It's the security, stupid." In post-conflict situations, it is impossible to fail on security and succeed in political institution design, economic reconstruction, or anything else. In order to ensure security, twice as many forces are required in the aftermath of the conflict than were necessary at any other point in the conflict. A recent Rand study suggests twenty peacekeepers per every thousand people; without an adequate security force-population ratio, it is very difficult to establish effective security.

This is a necessity for several reasons: First, inevitably, there are people who do not want peace, democracy, or political order. Without sufficient force, any disarmament, demobilization, or reintegration effort, regardless of how well funded, will fail. Those engaging in the peaceful political game must know that the alternative to negotiations is being crushed by force. Spoilers, who will never play the peaceful negotiation game, must be defeated by force. Looking at the present situation in Iraq, Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi army are spoilers who should have been confronted with full force.

Second, from an analytical perspective, sufficient force is needed to protect the physical reconstruction of the country. Without protection over physical reconstruction, the electricity, running water, schools, markets, and the economy will not rebound. If the economy does not rebound, then progressing toward political reconstruction becomes impossible. Everything is interconnected and goes back to the original point: security is the key.

Occupation, in any form, is disliked; however, not all forms of occupation are equally offensive. The Iraqi populace does not perceive America's motives as altruistic; instead, they believe America has a hidden agenda. Most people, however, do not believe that the UN desires to set up permanent military bases worldwide. It is imperative that the United States capitalize on the UN and have UN officials in the forefront, managing the political aspects of the post-transition situation.

As evidenced by the bombing of August 19, 2003, blue helmets are no longer shielded from bullets; instead, they are now a bull's-eye to many terrorist. The UN must take sufficient measures to bolster its own security. Spoilers want to drive out the UN, and if they think a car bomb will provide the impetus for UN flight, that is exactly what they will do.

Experience and technical expertise matter greatly to the UN and the United States. On the UN side, seniority must not stand in the way of putting capable younger people on the fast track to senior leadership. If the United States wants to be a serious player in nation-building over the long run, it needs to create a cabinet-level department, headed by a secretary for international development and reconstruction.

Finally, no one in the international community is immune to the consequences of failed states-we are all in this together. All established nations must step up to the plate.

AEI staff assistant Kara Nichols prepared this summary.