EVENTS

Date:	Tuesday, September 28, 2004
Time:	2:00 PM -- 4:00 PM
Location:	Wohlstetter Conference Center, Twelfth Floor, AEI 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

September 2004

The International Atomic Energy Agency: The World's Enforcer or Paper Tiger?

Soon after stepping down in 1976 as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Daniel Patrick Moynihan said that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) "is the one UN institution the world could not very well do without." But in the 1980s, Saddam Hussein nearly completed the development of a nuclear weapon under the noses of IAEA inspectors. Since then, rogue states like North Korea and Iran have either produced nuclear weapons or brought themselves to the threshold of doing so by defying or evading the IAEA. This calls into question the overall efficacy of the inspection agency as a monitoring organization. Is the IAEA an effective shield against nuclear proliferation? If not, how can it be improved? Is there an alternative mechanism that can be proposed? Experts on the IAEA discussed these and other questions at a September 28 AEI conference.

John R. Bolton
Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security
U.S. Department of State

Nuclear proliferation is becoming an increasingly critical issue. When addressing nuclear proliferation it is important to look at both the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) and United Nations Security Council and their respective roles. One must begin with understanding the way the UN system works. Among the member states of the UN there are perspectives on the charters of the various agencies. The United States has a tension in the way it views UN agencies. It possesses an enormous frustration with the inefficacy of UN agencies and at the same time is concerned that the agencies not exceed their mandates. The second line of thought in U.S. policy toward the UN is the desire to avoid the politicalization of agencies.

The IAEA Statute, Article III, sets out the purposes of the organization. The first four functions have to do with the peaceful application of nuclear power. The fifth function deals with safeguards. It allows the IAEA to set out safeguards to ensure nuclear energy is not used for military purposes and then to apply safeguard agreements. The safeguard agreements are very carefully devised to ensure that special fissionable materials are not taken out of the safeguarded facilities and used for military purposes. The IAEA monitors and enforces safeguard agreements.

In the case of North Korea, in light of its violations of the 1994 Agreed Framework, the IAEA board of governors referred North Korea to the UN Security Council. In the case of Iran, despite its obstruction of IAEA inspectors, the board of governors has not referred the case to the Security Council. There is a variety of reasons for the board of governor's hesitation to take this next step, one of which is institutional.

There are three possible grounds on which the IAEA can refer to the UN Security Council. First, Article 12 instructs the board of governors to report noncompliance of safeguard agreements to the UN Security Council. The second ground is found in Article 19: if the board of governors, after examination, find that they are unable to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear energy, it must refer the case to the Security Council. The third ground, contained in Article III, states that if questions arise that are within the confidence of the Security Council, the board must notify the Security Council.

There are alternatives to the IAEA that are fully multilateral that can and should have a dramatic effect on proliferation. For example, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a multilateral effort that aims at interdicting the shipment of weapons of mass destruction in international commerce. PSI is flexible and robust. One of its successes was seen in the interdiction of the BBC China, which was shipping uranium centrifuge material destined for Libya. This PSI accomplishment played a significant role in Libya's decision to abandon its pursuit of weapons of mass of destruction.

Joseph Cirincione
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Director of Nonproliferation

The IAEA's primary purpose is not to enforce or draw up safeguard agreements. From its inception the IAEA was designed to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy. If the IAEA did not exist, there would be considerable problems in the nuclear power industry. Their business depends on the functions of the IAEA.

The IAEA is not an autonomous group of international bureaucrats; rather, it is merely a thirty-five-member board. Inspectors work at the request of the board of governors. The IAEA is a tool of the international community and the United States. When we discovered that Iraq was developing a nuclear program under our noses, we improved the tool, in the form of the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.  The Additional Protocol is allowing us to uncover the Iranian program.

The lesson from the most recent war in Iraq is that the inspections were working. In the run up to the war, the IAEA had better intelligence than the CIA. With regard to Iraq, the IAEA got it right. They understood that there was no nuclear program in the country. U.S. national security depends on utilizing all available intelligence mechanisms; the United States needs to use the tools provided by the IAEA.

Why has the board of governors not taken the Iranian case to the Security Council? It is not an institutional problem; rather, it is a political problem. The United States has severe credibility problems. Our allies are slow to trust that this administration will not hijack the UN security process just as it did with Iraq.

Gary Milhollin
Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control Director

The IAEA is an historical relic. It was invented at the same time as the old Atomic Energy Commission. The IAEA is in charge of both promoting and monitoring nuclear energy. It is an international organization whose official purpose is proliferation. The inspectors have a disincentive to discover noncompliance because nuclear power used for military purposes should not be proliferated. Discoveries of breaches in agreements impede the IAEA from performing its primary purpose of proliferation.

The inspected country has an obligation to tell the truth and present a comprehensive picture of its nuclear capability. The continuous pressing and prodding of inspectors allows the agency to arrive at a more comprehensive picture. Inspections are limited because they can only verify statements, but cannot verify lies.

The IAEA has reported discrepancies in Iran's reported nuclear capabilities. The agency has failed to take it to the Security Council. This is an institutional problem. The IAEA has a disincentive to refer cases to the Security Council because the case is then taken out of its hands.

Mark Groombridge
Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security
U.S. Department of State

The IAEA has played a positive role in the case of North Korea throughout its twenty-seven years of interaction. The initial safeguard agreement was signed in 1977, followed by the North Korean cessation to the NPT in 1985, and then the second safeguards agreement in 1992. The rigorous determination of the IAEA to verify North Korea's declarations led to the exposure of the North Korean nuclear problem. The IAEA itself was the sharpest critic of the 1994 Agreed Framework under the Clinton administration. It argued that the Agreed Framework was not comprehensive enough because it limited the role of the IAEA to merely monitoring the situation. The Agreed Framework ultimately did not solve the North Korea problem--it only postponed the problem.

The IAEA board of governors has provided political benefits. After North Korea kicked out inspectors in December 2002, the IAEA responded almost immediately. In January 2002 they issued a resolution that called upon North Korea to readmit inspectors and continue the verification process. Then in February 2002, the IAEA referred the noncompliance of North Korea to the UN Security Council. The IAEA's referral helped the international community to recognize the severity of the problem.

The future role of the IAEA in North Korea is unclear. North Korea has accused the IAEA of being a "shaggy dog" of the United States. They have indicated a desire to exclude the IAEA in any future verification regime. It is, however, difficult to imagine a verification regime in which the IAEA is absent, since it brings international legitimacy to the table.

AEI staff assistant Kara Nichols Barrett prepared this summary.