EVENTS

Date:	Tuesday, November 9, 2004
Time:	11:00 AM -- 12:30 PM
Location:	Wohlstetter Conference Center, Twelfth Floor, AEI 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

November 2004

Foreign Policy in the Second Bush Administration

Afghanistan. Iraq. The war on terror. Iran. North Korea. Russia. Non-proliferation. U.S. relations with the European Union. Saudi Arabia. Lebanon. Promoting reform in the Arab world. At a panel on November 9, 2004, AEI scholars Leon Aron, Thomas Donnelly, Nicholas Eberstadt, Reuel Marc Gerecht, Michael Rubin, Danielle Pletka, and Radek Sikorski discussed what we can expect from foreign policy in the next four years.

 

Danielle Pletka
AEI

During the 2004 presidential election, many speculated about a possible change in the Bush administration's foreign policy agenda. They predicted a return to the strategic thinking exemplified by the administration of President George H. W. Bush, or a drastic shift in approach to Iraq and Iran, or a substantial re-calibration of strategy for the war on terror. However, in the end, the foreign policy proposals that Bush campaigned on were consistent with his first-term policies. By running on his foreign policy record, the president has indicated that American foreign policy in the next four years will not be radically different from the previous four; the tone, style, and strategy of Bush's relationship with the world will remain mostly unchanged.

However, the challenges facing the second Bush administration are also the same: countering the terrorist threat, including al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden; addressing nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran; building democracy in the Middle East; finding a resolution on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; understanding the evolution of the Russian state; and improving EU relations.

Leon Aron
AEI

The second Bush administration must give relations with Russian more priority. The policies of Russian president Vladimir Putin continue to damage economic and social aspects of the emergent Russian state, including the federal structure, and could destabilize the Russian state. Two primary dangers can be seen in the Kremlin's policies: First, the initiative to restructure the federal order in favor of a more uniform and more centralized state threatens the unity of the Russian Federation. The proposed elimination of ethnic regions has not been well received and has resulted in the threat of secession by several provinces. If the Kremlin persists, resistance from both the popular and the elite classes will be fierce, particularly in Tatarstan. Second, the Kremlin's insistence on pursuing a more authoritarian system has meant that non-state organizations have atrophied. This is likely to cause a decrease in popularity for the national leadership, an economic downturn, and an increased probability of a terrorist attack. This is a prescription for disaster.

The United States can help avert this crisis by capitalizing upon President Putin's relationship with President Bush. The second Bush administration should remain intent on reminding Putin of the dangers inherent in his current policies, but they must also be prepared to react to a crisis.

Thomas Donnelly
AEI

The results of the 2004 election indicate that Americans see Iraq and Afghanistan as two parts of a single war. The challenge for the second Bush administration is to take the principles set forth in the Bush Doctrine and put them into practice. Part of this will be securing Iraq. Iraq's Sunni population did not react to the fall of Saddam in the way that the Bush administration had hoped. The uprising in Fallujah is a part of this problem; the American response must be a large campaign to suppress the Sunni resistance and cut off foreign support for the insurgency.

Regional strategies must also be redefined. Will we continue to focus on the Arabian Peninsula or expand to the periphery of the Arab world? How will regional strategy in East Asia change now that Taiwan has apparently taken a back seat to questions concerning North Korea? What do the peace of Europe and the growing irrelevance of France and Germany mean for American strategy? The administration must assure that the strategic means match the goals proposed by the Bush doctrine.

Nicholas Eberstadt
AEI

The first Bush administration garnered widespread criticism for their approach to North Korea. Though it was clear that President Bush had an unfavorable attitude toward the policies of the North Korean government, he did not present a coherent, cohesive, and consistent policy for dealing with it. The second Bush administration must address this shortcoming.

There are two precepts under which the United States should proceed: First, it is extremely unlikely that North Korea will be diplomatically "talked or bribed" out of its nuclear program. Second, the North Korean nuclear problem is synonymous with the North Korean government. Thus, it seems that anything short of regime change will be ineffective in creating a solution to the problem.

There are five principles for American involvement in North Korean affairs. First, regime change is necessary--in the U.S. State Department. Colin Powell's recent visit to East Asia exemplifies the Bush administration's failure to effectively convey the message to North Korea. Second, the administration must define the parameters for success and failure with regard to the six-party talks. Third, China must take ownership of both the problem and the process in North Korea. Fourth, the United States must invite Europe to play an active role, especially by providing a strong voice on human rights. And fifth, the administration should think about the non-diplomatic instruments available to help create change in North Korea.

The current situation in North Korea is worse than it was four years ago. If the same can be said four years from now, it will represent a significant failure in the second Bush administration.

Radek Sikorski
AEI

The reelection of President Bush has been met with fairly widespread disapproval in Europe. In order to productively respond to four more years of President Bush, Europe must take its focus off of its opposition of the Iraq War and direct its energies to following through on its commitments in Afghanistan, the Balkans, and Eastern Europe. But it is incumbent upon the second Bush administration to improve its relationships with its European allies. This will serve a dual purpose in providing a source of troops for possible military action and acting as a safeguard against an anti-American European constitution. The United States should also support European integration instead of encouraging the disintegration of the European Union. Next year's anniversary of EU enlargement will provide an opportunity for President Bush to outline his new vision for transatlantic relations. America and Europe should work together to ensure that their common goals are accomplished.

Michael Rubin
AEI

January's elections in Iraq will be the first gauge of the second Bush administration's success or failure in terms of Iraq policy. And there are many signs that the elections will be a positive formative process for Iraq. Shiites are aligning with non-Shiite groups. The effective military coup d'état in Kurdistan indicates that accountability of governance is starting to become an expectation. Ultimately, it is unlikely that Iraq will have an "American-style" democracy, but this was never the intent of the democratic reforms.

The challenges for the second Bush administration in Iraq are twofold: guaranteeing security and assuring the Iraqi people that the rhetoric on Iraq during the campaign was not a hollow promise. President Bush must remain committed to establishing democratic self-government in both a sovereign Iraqi state and the region.

Reuel Marc Gerecht
AEI

The success of the Iraqification of the Sunni triangle is going to be the true test of the Bush administration's Iraq policy. If this fails, Bush's Iraq policy will collapse. Even if the suppression of the uprising succeeds in Fallujah, the Sunni resistance is an unstoppable force throughout Iraq. Regardless of the outcome, the test is in evaluating how the administration (or more specifically, the State Department) will adjust.

In Iran, if diplomacy fails, the second Bush administration has a major policy decision to make. Will the United States accept the fact that Iran has a nuclear weapons program and learn to live with it, or will President Bush determine that this is unacceptable and issue or condone a preemptive strike against Iran?

AEI researcher Rachel Hoff wrote this summary.