iStockphoto/Maxim Bolotnikov

 President Obama might want to reset his "reset" of U.S.-Russia relations.

Last week, the president revealed that he had sent a not-so-secret letter to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev "talking about a whole range of issues." The offer that made the headlines was logical: If Moscow helps forestall a nuclear-bound Iran, Washington will slow down or even abandon a missile-defense project in Poland and the Czech Republic.

Pretty neat, worth a try--and bound to fail.

The "swap" will not work because it runs against the strategic calculus of the Putin-Medvedev administration. To put it in terms of Russia's favorite pastime, chess, as Moscow sees it, Washington has offered to sacrifice a pawn for the queen.

In addition to a billion dollars in Iranian nuclear technology contracts for Russia to build an energy plant at Bushehr (and hundreds of millions' worth of conventional arms and technology, including surface-to-air missiles), the brinkmanship, hedging and "mediating" around Iran's bomb effort have for years given Moscow what it craves and needs most: a sense of being a great power again.

A play for status

Every time Russia dissents at the United Nations Security Council, every time it is treated as an equal by the leading industrial democracies--a status to which neither the Russian oil- and gas-driven economy, nor the standard of living (not to mention its neo-authoritarian political system) entitles it--the Kremlin sees the great-power objective becoming closer. Bent on recovering at least some of the key geostrategic assets lost in the Soviet Union's collapse, Russia sees its role in the Iranian crisis as an entry point to--and a bargaining chip at--the table of top world players in the Middle East.

Furthermore, playing a "protector" of one of the largest Muslim states against the West accrues Moscow favorable attitudes among many Muslims. That, along with Iran's goodwill, moreover, is critical to keeping at least a semblance of peace in Russia's Muslim Caucasus, an area seething with anger, penetrated by international terrorist organizations and teeming with unemployed and angry young men.

Most important, domestic political and ideological considerations almost always shape a country's foreign policy. Along with economic growth, "Russia is getting up off her knees" propaganda in the Kremlin-controlled mass media has provided the bedrock of the regime's legitimacy and popular support.

A diminished stature

Russia's economic crisis, however, has proved to be far worse than in other Group of Eight countries and is quickly weakening the government's standing. Because of that, Russia's international stature--together with the drumbeat of utterly fictitious threats from the West--is even more central to the regime's stability.

What has Obama offered in exchange for this tangible, hefty chunk of Moscow's strategic and political agenda?

A puny 10-interceptor missile defense complex that might be years away from completion and which might or might not work. (And no one can take seriously Russia's claims that the site will somehow thwart the more than 700 nuclear-tipped long-range missiles in Moscow's arsenal.)

One does not have to be world chess champion Gary Kasparov, who is also leader of the Russian democratic opposition, to decline Washington's offer.

At Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov last week, the "grand bargain" was deferred to the Obama-Medvedev meeting April 2 at the Group of 20 summit in London.

But there is no need to wait for the "official" rejection until then, President Obama. Think of your next move.

Leon Aron is a resident scholar at AEI.