Constitutional interpretation, as a rule, tends to divide scholars, judges, and commentators between two camps: those looking to find some "original intent" on which to hang their hats and those wanting to "see into" the Constitution some principle that time, knowledge, and circumstances should now bring to the fore regardless of whether the founding generation would recognize it as belonging to the constitutional order they intended. But a striking exception to this split occurs when it comes to interpreting the powers of the presidency in the area of national security. Here, more than in any other area of constitutional disputation, one finds both defenders and critics of presidential decisions racing to find quotes, arguments, and precedents from the founding period to bolster their views on what the president should or should not do when it comes to foreign affairs and national security. This is even more salient when one thinks about the fundamentally altered position of the country in world affairs from 1787 to today. If there were ever a situation ripe for reading the Constitution as a "living" document, one would think this would be it. Yet, there is something about such a fundamental civic issue as war and peace that we are continually drawn back to the founding period for guidance. Indeed, few today would argue that we should jettison the framers' allocation of the war and foreign affairs powers between the Congress and presidency.

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Gary J. Schmitt is a resident scholar and director of Advanced Strategic Studies at AEI.