The following is a summary of an article, featured in a recent issue of Wprost, by Bartosz Jalowiecki, programming coordinator at the New Atlantic Initiative with the American Enterprise Institute in Washington.

A spectre is haunting Europe a spectre of two speeds. Poland and Spain are to be punished by Berlin, Paris, and Brussels for their persistence in defending the Nice provisions. The punishment will be a deeper integration of Germany, France, and the Benelux countries, leading to the creation of a European "hard core." Poland, after 15 years of huge effort in catching up with Europe, will be left in the margins of integration.
 
The Illusion of Integration

Europe has its parliament, a quasi-government (the Commission), as well as a central bank and a common currency. During the decades of the union, the member states have given up huge chunks of sovereignty to it. In what areas then could France, Germany, and the Benelux countries integrate themselves even further?

One could start with the EU's democratisation: it would, for instance, use a president elected in a general suffrage. There would also be no harm in extending the European Parliament's prerogatives, as most typically parliamentary work is today carried out by the Commission, which is not an electable body. One could hand over to the EU the seats France and the UK hold in the UN Security Council. It would make sense to give the EU control over France's and Britain's nuclear arsenals. All those things could be done, only no one in either Berlin or Paris wants a deeper integration like this.

The best proof that there is no political will for a serious deepening of European co-operation is the result of the European Convention's work. Besides changing the Council majority voting system, the draft of the so called constitution proposes nothing revolutionary in terms of the EU's functioning. The draft does not even precisely define European law. The vagueness of its provisions became obvious to the participants of a recent New Atlantic Initiative conference, where two former prime ministers, and at the same time members of the convention, an Italian and an Irishman, gave exactly opposite answers to the question whether the constitution makes it possible to introduce uniform European taxes and establish an European army. Evidence of the constitution's low importance is also the fact that most MEPs are ignorant about its contents. Out of a dozen European deputies who recently visited Washington, only one read the draft constitution.
 
An Alliance of Blackmailers

The threat of a European hard core appears to be just another way to force Poland and Spain to agree to the revision of the Nice voting system. Threatening Europeans with the prospect of two speeds has a long tradition in the EU: in the past, Germany and France threatened to isolate Italy, which had major problems in monetary policy. Those threats were not delivered, and today, paradoxically, Italy's fiscal position is better than its mentors' in Berlin and Paris.

Of course, France, Germany, and the Benelux countries can finally treat the idea of a two-speed Europe seriously. If that moment is now, then, according to most recent hints from the super-European Belgians, deeper integration would encompass foreign, defence, immigration, and tax policies. As far as foreign policy is concerned, the events of the past year suggest that France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg would have an ideal setting to demonstrate their skills. The candidates to a European hard core failed to prevent the US from invading Iraq, and their position led to deep divisions in the EU and weakened the UN Security Council. France, Germany, and the Benelux countries' deeper integration in foreign policy could lead to an even more fervent anti-Americanism. That is an attitude Poland cannot afford. Warsaw has to maintain good relations with Washington. In security policy, France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg have a rather poor record. Instead of focusing on creating a rapid reaction force within the NATO and boosting their own defence budgets, they started drawing up the consecutive versions of a "European defence identity." Those plans ignored the UK ? the only country in Europe with armed forces modern enough to fight hand in hand with the Americans. Intensification of France, Germany, and the Benelux countries' defence policy co-operation can result in the establishment of another institution in which an army of officials will find jobs, but it will hardly increase Europe's security. Poland has no interest in undermining the NATO's role. Nor does it need more illusory security structures ? the OSCE is enough.
 
Slower Integration Surer for Poland

The old European countries have for decades been raising anti-immigrant barriers. Deeper integration in immigration policy would probably mean new barriers for people arriving from outside Europe's most developed countries. At the same time, Europe is ageing and needs ever more labour to finance its pension systems. Europe has to open itself to immigration. Tough anti-immigration laws are also against Poland's interest. Contrary to their original pledges, more and more EU countries have been warning they would restrict the free flow of labour from the acceding states. As it stands today, the UK and Ireland will be the only countries that will open their labour markets to Polish citizens from May 1, 2004. Poland will hardly benefit from such a deepening of integration in immigration policy.

Deeper integration in tax policy, in turn, would probably lead to the introduction of standard tax rates. That is a move that renowned economists have long been warning Europe against. For Poland, it would be fatal. To keep developing, Poland needs inward investment. But because Poland is not attractive to investors in many respects (poor infrastructure, corruption, etc.), it has to offer them competitive tax rates. Deeper integration in this area would clearly be unprofitable for Poland.

If France, Germany, and the Benelux countries want to continue deepening their integration in the spirit of their hitherto actions, Poland will do best to keep its distance. Perhaps it will move more slowly in Europe, but instead more surely and safely.