On November 1, Jeffrey I. Herbst, professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, delivered the third of the 2004-2005 Bradley Lectures. Edited excerpts follow.

As of yet, there has been little democratic theory developed in Africa. Many countries, especially in Francophone Africa, are using the same basic institutional structures that they originally inherited in the 1960s. Anglophone countries have moved further, especially since many have adopted an executive presidency, but this usually occurred during the period of authoritarian rule. There have been a few exceptions. Although Ethiopia can in no way be considered a democracy at the moment, its formal recognition of group (since the provinces are defined by ethnic identity) rights to self-determination was a monumental step on a continent where almost all efforts have been directed to shoring up state integrity.

The first constellation of issues raised by democracy concerns the nature of the polity itself. In a rather audacious legal maneuver that demonstrates how the weak can mold the international legal agenda, the Africans and others in the developing world had the right to self-determination redefined so that it only applied to "blue-water" rule--that is, independence from a power separated from its colony by an ocean. Groups ruled by a capital several hundred miles away could not rely on the same right to self-determination.

This was a clever maneuver but not one that will survive democratization. Already, we are beginning to see some groups reassert themselves when given the democratic right to organize. For instance, it is questionable how long Nigeria can survive given the profound splits that are developing between the Islamic north, where many states now say that they are adhering to sharia law, and the rest of the country. The right democratic formula might bind the disparate groups in Nigeria together in a more profound union but, at the moment, the groups that seek to undermine federal rule have the freedom to organize but not the need to commit to the federation.

Most African countries will not face secessionist pressures, and it may well be that most countries will become more viable if the right institutions are developed. However, it does not seem unreasonable to predict that, in a minority of countries, efforts to finally define the polity will lead to profound pressures to change the arrangements that were inherited from the colonialists.

Reforms may have progressed further if African countries had a more solid material base undergirding them before diving into democratization, but it is also the case that many economic reforms could not be attempted until the old authoritarian leaders were overthrown. Kenya is a good example of a country where democratic pressures to oust the old regime also jump-started economic reform. More generally, the best predictor of economic reform is that it will not occur under long-standing regimes because leaders that have developed a particular way of ruling and rewarding specific constituencies through patronage cannot be expected to adopt reforms that will lead them to political suicide.

One sign that African governments are advancing is that they are finally compelled to explain what they are doing to their citizens economically. Democracy, despite its profound western origins, has a good name in Africa, and leaders are quick to indicate that they want to belong to the worldwide democratic club. Capitalism does not have a good name in Africa because the tremendous ideological baggage from the slave trade and colonialism is still too great. Thus, even leaders who have taken enormous risks implementing market-based reforms do not frame those initiatives in a way that can be more generally communicated to the population.

The early democracies in Africa often failed because the militaries took over. Professionalizing militaries so that the norm of civilian supremacy is clear would be helpful to Africa's democrats. More importantly, however, African democracies are threatened by lawlessness, crime, the spillover of rebel activity from neighboring countries, and terrorists. It is imperative that the security services work better so that the security situation of individual countries can be improved.

Roles for Outsiders

Westerners should expect that African democratization will take a long time and that there will be many twists in the road. Western countries should also expect political and economic reform to be asynchronous. The United States should continue to engage and support African countries as long as they are making important progress somewhere, either in economics or politics, or security.

What is important is to sift through the inevitable setbacks to see if some progress is being made on the critical issues that will allow for institutionalized democracies to emerge in future decades. The United States cannot decisively affect the democratic trajectories of countries, but we can try, in suitably modest ways, to help foster democracy and be appreciative of what is being accomplished under extraordinarily difficult circumstances.