Much ink has been spilled over the question of the collapse of the Hamas-led Palestinian government. Should the United States concert all its energy toward causing a collapse? Must the international community, its collective heartstrings stretched by the prospect of a humanitarian crisis, avert a collapse with a cash infusion? What will it mean for the War on Terror? The dream of a two-state solution?

Vice President Danielle Pletka

But what exactly is "collapse" and what will it mean? Hamas, the political group in control of the Palestinian Authority is already in fiscal crisis. Hamas, the terrorist organization, appears to be doing well. Hamas (government) doesn't have money to pay salaries. Hamas (terrorist group) has sufficient resources to re-equip and arm a 3,000-man militia in Gaza. Therefore, it is safe to assume that whatever collapse observers believe could be imminent is unlikely to affect the agenda of the terror group Hamas--to eradicate the State of Israel.

Second, collapse could mean the dissolution of civil society: riots, demonstrations, factional warfare in the streets. Fateh and Hamas have begun their own campaigns of targeted killings. But will that mean the government falls? Will there be new elections? A trusteeship? Confederation with Jordan?

Answers to these questions are not incidental to the formulation of policy. Because, of course, an election would merely reinstall Hamas, which won overwhelmingly the last time. A trusteeship should be inconceivable--an anachronism in this day and age; certainly, in the wake of the disastrous American attempt to govern Iraq, Washington should wash its hands of any such idea. A confederation, an idea enjoying a resurgence lately, would be resisted by Jordan's Hashemite ruler as a death knell.

Some have suggested that pushing Hamas toward "collapse" or merely isolating it to the point of political impotence will empower Fateh's Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president. Abbas, a weak-kneed leader with a lengthy track record of failure, looks pretty good next to Ismail Haniyeh, the hardline Hamas prime minister.

In addition, Abbas' lost convictions appear to have returned in recent months. He has thrown his weight behind the Palestinian National Accord, a vague quasi-endorsement of the two-state solution issued by Palestinian prisoners. Indeed, he has even threatened to call a referendum on the question if the government does not sign up. In addition, Abbas is planning to meet with new Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, and has declared a willingness to negotiate directly with Israel.

The fact that the Palestinian president has no power to deliver to Israel (or to the Palestinian people, if their election results are any indication) has not deterred ardent peace processors. But making peace with powerless partners is ridiculous, and Israel is unlikely to be enticed down such a dead-end road.

As far as the United States is concerned, the law is clear. Aid to the Palestinians has been sharply curtailed. Thus far, the Bush administration has held firmly to its demand that Hamas recognize Israel's right to exist and renounce violence. But in the months since Hamas' victory, Washington's allies have proven less steadfast. The European Union is itching to resume payments to the Palestinian Authority, including some government employees' salaries. The US Department of State, unenthused about the salaries, is nonetheless pondering a pool of "humanitarian" aid.

This is nothing short of capitulation. Aid funneled through an international fund will not be subject to US congressional restrictions. It will immediately lift pressure on the Hamas government. It will free money for state terror. Too cruel?

Though the Palestinians were until recently the world's number one beneficiary of per capita aid, an end to international assistance is indeed harsh. But let us recall that the Palestinian people freely and overwhelming elected Hamas. This was not (though some may quibble) an act of God. Hamas too has a choice; these consequences can be averted through the simple and customary expedient of recognizing the agreements forged by past governments, and acknowledging Israel's right to exist and renouncing violence. We cannot force this choice on Hamas, but its constituents can.

If this is still more than some can stomach, consider the rest of the world. For how long did the people of Darfur languish and die before nations rebooted their collective conscience? How much aid flowed to the Afghans when they were crushed by the Taliban?

The Palestinian people and their government have choices to make. They will live with the consequences of those choices. Israel, too, must decide whether to divorce itself from the West Bank and Gaza, recognizing that what may be over the fence is a terrorist state. But the collapse of the Palestinian Authority, whatever that means, will not end the terrorism, nor will cash handouts.

The Palestinians must decide the way forward for themselves. And no amount of cajoling, strategizing or talking can change this most basic fact. The United States should support moderate parties, and encourage pluralistic democracy. But at the end of the day, Washington can only hold open the door to peace and freedom; no one can be forced to walk through.

Danielle Pletka is the vice president for foreign and defense policy studies at AEI.