Since their victory in Palestinian legislative elections almost a year ago, Hamas has run the Palestinian Authority into the ground. Rather than restore order and root out corruption, Palestinians fight over unpaid salaries and misallocated funds. Security deteriorates as Hamas and Fatah, the political party of the late Yasser Arafat and his successor Mahmoud Abbas, battle in the streets. Meanwhile, human-rights groups cite Gaza’s dire economic circumstances to argue that Western aid should resume to the impoverished territory. The American Friends Service Committee, for example, blamed the embargo and not Hamas for depriving the Palestinian government of the “means or capacity to deliver basic services.”

The White House appears ready to succumb to such pressure. But, unwilling to countenance Hamas’s overt embrace of terrorism, the Bush administration bets on Abbas. By bolstering the Fatah leader with political, military, and monetary support, Washington believes it can cripple Hamas and resuscitate the peace process. Relations with Abbas were one of the chief topics of conversation when President Bush met Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert at the White House on November 13.

Six months ago, after Abbas proposed a referendum to allow Palestinians to decide whether or not to endorse a two-state solution, White House spokesman Tony Snow praised Abbas for his pragmatism. While Abbas describes himself as a moderate alternative to Hamas and the State Department describes him as a partner in efforts to negotiate an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, his motivation appears to be personal power rather than peace.

As always, the devil is in the details. Abbas’s referendum was based on the so-called Prisoners’ Document, a manifesto that not only refrained from recognizing Israel, but also endorsed terrorism in the West Bank and Gaza and the eradication of the Jewish state. Rather than distance himself from Hamas’s platform, Abbas merely sought to repackage its radicalism in pragmatic-sounding language.

Abbas’s actions belie his words. He still shuns the Palestinians’ 2003 Roadmap commitment to “arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere.” Though obligated to confiscate illegal weaponry, he has declined to combat arms and explosives smuggling on the Egypt-Gaza border.

His inaction is personal choice, not the result of powerlessness. His personnel decisions show his true inclination. Days after receiving White House praise, Abbas appointed terrorist mastermind Mahmoud Damra to lead Force-17, the “presidential guard unit” responsible for killing scores of civilians in terrorist attacks.

Here the State Department’s realist strategy to play Abbas off Hamas backfired. After the U.S. pressured the Israeli government in June 2006 to allow the transfer of ammunition and 3,000 Jordanian M-16 rifles to Force-17 in order “to strengthen Abbas,” reality collided with diplomacy. Three days after receiving the transfer, senior Force-17 official Abu Yousef told an interviewer, “These weapons will not be used in an internal war, but against Israelis.” He was true to his word. Fatah gunmen staged a number of shooting attacks on Israeli civilians.

Still, U.S. aid increased. In August, Gen. Keith Dayton, the U.S. security coordinator for the Palestinian territories, began training 400 Force-17 members in the West Bank. Under U.S. auspices, these men receive ammunition, assault rifles, and training in advanced combat techniques, in order to help them maintain law and order. The State Department kicked in an additional $42 million to support Hamas “alternatives.”

That the U.S. continues to court Abbas is troublesome. Diplomacy must be based on deeds, not words. When Abbas pledged to stem rocket-fire in Gaza on November 26, Israel agreed to halt military activity in the strip. But after Olmert withdrew his forces, Fatah and Hamas terrorists rained more Qassam rockets down upon Israel. Abbas may dress his rhetoric in secular terms, but his actions show an objective not dissimilar to Hamas.

White House faith in Abbas is misplaced, and its support will backfire. Realism should not trump reality. Any peace process must be based upon the understanding that nonviolent diplomacy is the only mechanism to win concession. So long as Palestinian politicians believe that violence pays, diplomacy is a non-starter. Some civilians may suffer because of their elected leaders’ decisions, but the only way to peace is a zero-tolerance policy for any party that encourages war. Western funding is no entitlement. The aid embargo should continue until the Palestinians learn such a lesson.

Jeffrey Azarva is a research assistant at AEI.