It’s been a while since we last jousted: We were in agreement on rendition, if memory serves, though for differing reasons. We’re certainly not in accord here.

Resident Fellow Reuel Marc Gerecht

I can understand--though not appreciate--Americans who don’t want to see Americans dying in Iraq because they value American lives more highly than they do Iraqi ones. This sentiment, more common on the right than on the left, inevitably leads to a bigoted isolationism that allows nefarious forces to run amok. Dressed up by a higher education, it usually depicts most foreigners as too culturally retrograde to sustain liberal and democratic values--and therefore not worth the loss of American life. Saving people from slaughter, even genocide, isn’t worth the effort for this school of thought, since such calamities are, in part, condign punishment for having retrograde political cultures. Foreigners would have to be real innocents being butchered by easily defeated bad guys before these folks would be compelled to dispatch American soldiers to stop a slaughter. Even if the United States were in part responsible for provoking a humanitarian catastrophe, this group doesn’t feel guilt long, at least not sufficiently to stop the mess, especially if we have to spill much blood and treasure for natives deficient in reasonableness and gratitude.

A more estimable variation of the above sees the Iraqis worth fighting for if they could pass just a few litmus tests--principally if the Sunnis and Shia Arabs and Kurds could demonstrate that they can peacefully cohabit. A political solution--or the very real possibility of one--must thus precede a U.S. military commitment to “stay the course.” Folks so inclined usually acknowledge that the United States assumed some responsibility for the security of Iraqis when it occupied Mesopotamia. These men and women sometimes even admit that American mistakes are partly, maybe even largely, responsible for the violence in the country.

But, for this category of war critics, who at least can feel guilt, it’s just all too big of a mess now. We can’t possibly correct our mistakes. (So let’s not try.) The Iraqi identity has been too battered. Nothing good can happen until the vengeful bloodlust works its way through Iraqi society. This may end up slaughtering hundreds of thousands, perhaps even a million or two. Rape, pillage, massive waves of Sunni Arab refugees fleeing the carnage may well happen. Jordanian society will become rabidly Iraqi Sunni (a particularly biting irony for the Hashemites, who made millions backing Saddam). In the Sunni-Shia clash, which the Iraqi Shia will inevitably win with the help of Iran, the Middle East will superheat. The U.S. retreat from Iraq--just imagine the images of Sunni holy warriors capturing U.S. bases in Anbar broadcast worldwide courtesy of Al Jazeera--will supercharge Sunni jihadism against the United States. Think about the way Sunni militants and holy warriors depicted the Soviet flight from Afghanistan (where the Arab Afghans played a very small part). Now imagine Iraq, where Sunni holy warriors can rightfully and accurately claim that they drove the United States from Mesopotamia.

And, if you want Afghanistan to get worse, just let the United States go down to defeat in Iraq. The Taliban and their Pakistani allies will be powerfully emboldened. Our allies in this cause will not. You want to add 20,000 troops in Afghanistan. Good luck. We already need that number. After we lose in Mesopotamia, we will need much more than 20,000. And the Europeans can’t handle the commitment they have already. Don’t expect them to become more committed after the Americans collapse in Iraq. (I’d make a friendly $50 wager with you: If we lose in Iraq, we will lose in Afghanistan. The scenario, most often found among Democrats, of saving Afghanistan through a flight from Iraq is a pipedream.)

I have written elsewhere about the probable scenarios for Iraq after (during) a U.S. retreat. I don’t need to go on here. What’s striking among so many war critics, especially those in the above categories, is that they acknowledge that it could well be awful (though they rarely expend much ink limning what will likely happen). But Humpty Dumpty has gone off the wall. A sensible man confronted with all of this must run.

What’s striking is that you don’t really fit neatly anywhere above. You’re what I’d call a “win-win” critic of the war. According to you, everybody--the Americans, the Iraqis, all the people of the Middle East, and all those who care about the global war on terrorism--will be better off if the United States leaves Iraq tout de suite. In a sense, you suggest that defeat would even be good for us. We would focus on diplomacy, not military power (as if the Bush administration hasn’t worked diplomacy tirelessly on Iraq, Iran, North Korea, et cetera). With defeat, the “ideological hubris”--your words--of Bush will be destroyed.

So far as I can tell from reading you, Larry, there really are no terribly serious consequences if we leave. You at one point say there will be problems, but that’s left behind in the promise of our departure. You could make an argument that the consequences would be ghastly, but more ghastly if we stay. You try to suggest this but never explain how. So the U.S. Army actually doesn’t protect anyone in Iraq? Are you serious? They’ve not done a splendid job, but they’ve repeatedly stopped very bad situations from getting worse. You could try and argue that all these ghastly consequences are unavoidable, so why try and waste American lives. But you don’t do that, either, since you imply that things will actually get better when we leave.

Your description of American military operations in Iraq is an echo of General John Abizaid’s light footprint, which has proven disastrously wrong since the summer of 2003. The presence of American troops in Baghdad has been a “magnet for violence”? I suppose one could have (poorly) made that argument in the summer of 2003, but not now. We’ve been diminishing American patrols and checkpoints in that city since the fall of 2003 and the violence has exponentially escalated since then. If you plot Abizaid’s strategy on a timeline, city after city, the results are damning. And, when American troops are reinserted in sufficient strength, they do restore order. This has proved bitterly ironic in the Sunni neighborhoods of Baghdad, where the denizens are often happy to see American soldiers, since they now fear the power of vengeful Shia militias
 
Will this all be too late? Maybe. This isn’t a large increase of troop strength. We had more soldiers on the ground in December 2005 than we will after the “surge.” If this is it, it will probably not be enough. But this is a fluid situation. When General David Petraeus takes over--and he needs to take over from General George Casey as quickly as possible--he could change the plan, deploying more troops if necessary. (The president would probably back his decision, assuming he could make it without Gates and Casey, who will, if confirmed, become the Army’s chief of staff, blocking him.) Abizaid and Casey may try a rearguard action against Petraeus and the new plan to deploy more in Iraq. This in-house fighting could weaken, perhaps cripple, the effort.

But the president’s plan is certainly worth a try, even if we have doubts. The awful likely consequences of an American retreat easily justify this effort. We can continue the discussion of Iraqi internal politics in our next exchange. Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki won’t likely be our savior in Iraq, and the Bush administration can be faulted for framing the current effort around Maliki. He’s neither angel, nor devil, nor incompetent, nor an admirer of the United States. He will not be able to assume responsibility for the security of Iraq by next year, and the administration shouldn’t expect him to. What’s important, however, is that the Iraqi political system among the Shia is still functioning. Bombed, brutalized, and frayed by Sunni savagery and sectarian strife, unsupported by the entire Sunni Arab world, and belittled constantly by many American officials, it continues to breathe--despite even “moderate” Sunnis’ efforts to use violence as political leverage. (This tactic works well with Americans, less will with Shia.) Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani, a bulwark of moderation, hasn’t yet been destroyed by Sadr and the Sunni holy war. The Shia have repeatedly pulled back from internecine strife that could have consumed the community. No one in the Shia community publicly speaks against democracy. No one. You may not like this type of illiberal democracy, but, for the Muslim Middle East, this can still be an enormous step forward. (A religiously supported Iraqi democracy was always going to have deeper roots and be more influential in the region than the liberal, secular democracy that Paul Wolfowitz had dreamed of.) For the Americans to give up now is a betrayal of those in Iraq who’ve bled far more than we have.

We assumed a responsibility when we rightly took down Saddam Hussein. We should not prove bin Laden again correct when he said that Americans cannot last in a war with men of faith. Let us be honest with ourselves: It’s not “civil war” that will blow us from Iraq. It’s Sunni insurgents and holy warriors. Calling upon a “civil war” is, for most of the war’s critics, I suspect, a dodge. (Relatively few Americans die from Shia attacks today; the Sunnis insurgents and holy warriors kill and wound the vast majority of Americans.) The specter of vengeful Shia militias could destroy the Iraqi government and, more important, the new political system, but that is a scenario surely more likely if the Americans run, not stay. There is no such thing as a “strategic redeployment.” Operationally and philosophically, that’s a myth--linguistic camouflage for “retreat and defeat.” It’s hard to comprehend why trying now, finally, to save us and the Iraqis from the abyss isn’t worth the sacrifice. It’s hard to see how we could make the disaster waiting for us worse by trying.

Reuel Marc Gerecht is a resident fellow at AEI.