Resident Scholar  Michael Rubin

The Iranian government's decision to take 15 British marines hostage is an act of war. The decision was both deliberate and central. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps is not a rogue element. The regime created it to conduct the operations which the leading clerics did not trust the army to execute.

That Iranian decision makers took such a step is not the result of too little diplomacy, but rather too much. Since Germany launched its critical dialogue with Iran in 1992, European countries have showered the Islamic Republic with apologies and incentives to compromise. Rather than abandon terrorism as a tool of state or reconsider its clandestine nuclear program, the Iranian government has redoubled its efforts to defy. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's May 31, 2006 offer to engage Tehran resulted not in a suspension of uranium enrichment, but rather public gloating by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei about U.S. weakness. Nor did the British "softly-softly" approach toward Tehran or its proxies in Basra bring peace in our time. Rather, it convinced the Revolutionary Guards that the British were targets of least resistance.

While Western diplomats seek an elusive formula of concessions and incentives, the fact remains that the Iranian regime has yet to offer a single confidence-building measure. Freelance proposals by Swiss diplomats are no substitute.

The Iranian decision to take hostages is in part an outgrowth of the moral equivalency of Western diplomats and intellectuals. The Iranian government will try to construct a linkage with Iranian operatives detained by U.S. forces in Baghdad and Erbil. Such a claim is risible. The Iranian government--which has yet to apologize for its seizure of U.S. hostages in 1979--did not grant the detained Qods Force operatives diplomatic credentials until after their arrest. None appeared on Iraqi diplomatic lists. But, in a world where U.S. and British diplomats apologize for slights real and imagined, and professors see their role to advocate for their countries of study rather than pursuit of dispassionate knowledge, Tehran counts on the fact that Western intellectuals will rationalize the most irresponsible and illegal behaviors.

Tehran has grown accustomed to expecting rewards for non-compliance. It is time U.S. officials, if not their European counterparts, recognize failure. Ratcheting up pressure only enables Iranian officials to adjust. True leverage requires comprehensive sanctions which can be lifted in response to changes in Tehran's behavior. The West should abandon the illusion that factionalism within the Iranian government matters. The Office of the Supreme Leader has exercised remarkable control and coordination over its security apparatus. Presidents, whether pragmatic, reformist, or hardline, may differ in style, but have all operated toward the same goals. The White House should not differentiate between officials, power structures, and proxies and should hold the Iranian government accountable for all its actions.

Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at AEI.