Resident Scholar  Gary J. Schmitt

If one phrase captures America's policy toward Iraq over the past two decades, it's "better late than never."

We were slow to recognize the danger Saddam Hussein posed to the Middle East; slow to appreciate his willingness to use weapons of mass destruction; slow to understand just how close he was to developing nuclear weapons before the first Gulf War. We waited a decade to remove him from power despite his savage rule over his own people, his attempted assassination of former President George H. W. Bush in 1993, and his refusal to come clean on his weapons programs as mandated by U.N. resolutions.

Eventually, we did act--five years ago this coming week.

Yet here again, Washington was decisive in removing Saddam from power but slow in coming to terms with what needed to follow. We brought down a police state but were not prepared for the job of helping build a decent government out of the ruins. We had too few troops to maintain security and inadequate plans for helping Iraqis recover from decades of Saddam's tyranny. As a result, we allowed an insurgency to take root, which pushed the country to the brink of civil war and stalled progress on the political, economic and civic fronts. At times, it appeared that what we were asking of the Iraqis was the equivalent of asking a teenager who had just gotten a driver's license to drive in the 24-hour race at Le Mans, and do so with no lights and car bombs going off all around.

To President Bush's eventual credit, rather than follow the advice from virtually all the "wise men" of Washington in late 2006 to retreat, he changed the teams in both the Pentagon and Iraq and--most crucially--agreed to a change of strategy on the ground. The result could hardly be more telling. Where once defeat was likely, there now exists the prospect of creating what American strategy first envisioned: an Iraq that provides the Arab world with an important new model of democratic rule.

While the previous violence prevented Iraq from moving forward, the "surge" has provided the breathing room for Iraqis to start addressing the country's many problems. Of course the surge, devised by Gen. David Petraeus and implemented by Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno, was always about more than additional "boots on the ground." It marked a decisive break from the previous military strategy by combining relentless attacks on extremist safe havens while putting American forces onto the streets in partnership with the Iraqi military, with the goal of protecting ordinary Iraqis and their neighborhoods. It also involved American commanders following up those "clear and hold" activities with monies and programs designed to jump-start economic life in those same neighborhoods.

The results have been striking. Al-Qaeda in Iraq is on the verge of defeat. Shiite extremists are organizationally fractured, and like the remaining Sunni insurgents, increasingly isolated not only from the larger Iraqi population but also their sectarian brethren.

Not surprisingly, violence in Iraq, toward Iraqi civilians and U.S. troops, has dropped by an order of magnitude. With the assurance of American troops on patrol, and partnered with better trained and disciplined Iraqi soldiers, local Iraqis are now far more willing to provide intelligence on the bad actors in their neighborhoods, deepening the initial success brought about by the surge and change in strategy. Markets and small businesses have reopened, children are out and about, and refugees are returning. And with oil production now on the rise at last, economic forecasts for next year see Iraq's gross domestic product growing by some 7 percent to 8 percent.

Equally significant, Iraqis, no longer paralyzed by the violence, are turning to politics. As a sampling of the Iraqi press will reveal, Iraqis of all stripes are wondering why their government doesn't work: why it is slow to get needed laws passed, tolerates the corruption it does and can't provide promised resources and services to localities. In other words, rather than fleeing to Jordan or taking up arms, Iraqis are starting to behave like democrats everywhere.

With provincial elections likely coming this fall, followed by elections for the national assembly the next year, Iraqi politicians have started to take notice. The assembly recently moved legislation on provincial governance and elections, de-Baathification, amnesty, pensions and the budget. And while a proposed law on the distribution of oil and gas revenues remains stalled in committee, the government in fact is distributing those revenues through the budgets allocated by the central government to the provinces.

Iraq is still no Disneyland, as the recent spurt of car bombings has shown. And while the change in U.S. strategy in Iraq has allowed the Iraqis to turn a corner, the end of the path is still ahead.

The key is to keep Iraq moving down that path. The first step is to deepen the democratic infrastructure in the country by ensuring the laws governing Iraq's provincial affairs and elections reinforce notions of democratic accountability. Iraq's citizens need to see that voting and responsive, effective governance go hand in hand.

America and the international community must also do more to help Iraqis build effective governing institutions. The judiciary and the police forces should be priorities. Weak and sectarian, both institutions make it difficult for ordinary Iraqis to gain confidence in their new government.

Foreign aid to Iraq has to strike a better balance between current assistance and longer-range development. Iraq is still a broken country. Meeting its citizens' basic needs now--and keeping young men employed and off the streets--is just as important to Iraq's long-term success as a competent banking sector.

Finally, America's military effort must be sustained. With elections coming, security is paramount if the process is to be carried out in a way that is seen as fair and inclusive. Too precipitous a drawdown in U.S. forces would also reignite Iraqi fears that they are on their own when it comes to protecting themselves and their families. At the same time, it would give new life and legitimacy to the militias and insurgents. These groups are down. Now is the time to finish them off, not let them off the mat.

A sustained military effort is also necessary for the operational "partnering" that has proved so effective in professionalizing the Iraqi military. The Iraqi army is not only growing in numbers but also in its capacity to provide security on its own. For the sacrifice of maintaining American troop levels in Iraq now, there is the real promise of being able to turn over the keys to the Iraqis sooner.

America's effort in Iraq is now on a path to success, but success is not guaranteed. Without question, doing the right thing in Iraq is costly in blood and treasure. Yet the price remains relatively modest compared with past U.S. wars. The greater tragedy would be to turn our backs on the prospects of success, turning the sacrifices we have made as a nation--especially those of the men and women of our military--into pointless losses.

Churchill once famously remarked: "You can always count on the Americans to do the right thing--after they've tried everything else." In the case of Iraq, we appear to have reaffirmed Churchill's point, fumbling and mismanaging but finally finding the right strategy to help move that country forward into a decent, democratic future.

Gary J. Schmitt is a resident scholar at AEI.