The apparent success of the Clinton-Blair summit only underscores how the administration's less-noticed diplomatic failures have left the United States isolated in the U.N. Security Council. Russia and China clearly do not believe that we have adequate authority from the council to use force against Iraq, and France's position is, at best, unclear. Thus, as we draw nearer to increasingly certain military strikes against Iraq, the United States faces grave diplomatic risks from debate and division within the Security Council, even as it tries for the last time to pressure Iraq into a peaceful resolution of the crisis.

Accordingly, we should understand exactly what authority the United States actually has, and why further action by the Security Council is both unnecessary and unwise.

To start, the United States does not need authorization from the Security Council or any other external source to defend its national interests. Neither "international law" nor the U.N. Charter is to the contrary. Indeed, the charter itself rejects, in Article 51, the notion that its provisions "impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense" in the event of an armed attack. The United States has always understood this provision not to preclude self-defense even before an armed attack, and to be at the discretion of the nation whose interests are threatened.

While some international lawyers argue the contrary proposition -- that Article 51 does substantially restrict the sovereign right to self-defense -- pressing this point now might well destroy the remaining congressional support for continued U.N. funding. Today, no serious American political figure contends that the Charter limits our options.

Whatever one's reading of the charter, previous Security Council resolutions fully and unconditionally authorize the use of force against Iraq now. Immediately after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the council authorized wide-ranging measures, including a sweeping system of sanctions, against Iraq, to be observed by the international community. On Nov. 29, 1990, Resolution 678 specifically authorized states cooperating with Kuwait "to use all necessary means" to expel the Iraqi invaders and uphold earlier council resolutions. Significantly, however, the council's authorization went far beyond simply restoring the status quo prior to Saddam Hussein's invasion. Resolution 678's mandate to use force also extended to restoring "international peace and security in the area."

After Operation Desert Storm, the Security Council labored mightily over what became Resolution 687, commonly known in U.N. circles as the "ceasefire resolution." Resolution 687 covered numerous topics, including demarcating the Iraq-Kuwait border, establishing a compensation mechanism to repay the victims of Iraq's aggression, and creating an intrusive inspection system to preclude Iraq from ever again developing or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or delivery systems. It ordered Iraq to agree to its weapons provisions "unconditionally." In exchange for this unconditional acceptance, Iraq was granted a formal ceasefire, which took effect when it conceded in an April 6, 1991, letter that it "has no choice but to accept this resolution."

Thus, the ceasefire resolution provided Iraq relief from the use-of-force resolution, but only so long as Iraq complied with its stringent requirements. Failure to comply meant, ineluctably, that the suspended authorization to use force in Kuwait's defense and to restore "international peace and security in the area" came back into full efficacy. Violations by Iraq, in short, mean that a state of war exists again between it and the original coalition forces, or any of them still willing and able to carry out Resolution 678. Moreover, just as there was no need for the U.S.-led coalition to consult with the Security Council when to stop using force against Iraq in 1991, so there is no need to consult today on when to resume it. That decision, and how to implement it, by the words of Resolution 678, is left to the pertinent U.N. member states.

Some argue, however, that it is either necessary or prudent to obtain from the Security Council an affirmation that Iraq is in fact breaching the ceasefire resolution, and that, therefore, the use of force against it is once again legitimate. Given the views of Russia and China, and perhaps France, not to mention several of the council's nonpermanent members, returning to the council for another resolution is fraught with peril. Those opposed to any force will almost certainly attempt to limit its use; to condition or delay it; to impose onerous reporting or justification requirements; to link it to other, unrelated issues or to other proposals we will find intolerable. We could then face two unappetizing alternatives. One would be a resolution authorizing force that would unacceptably tie our hands militarily or politically. Even worse would be the possibility of a resolution so restrictive that the United States would have to veto it. In that case, the United States might have to use force after the Security Council had seemingly rejected it, a scenario that only Saddam could love.

In either case, we would be worse off than we are now. Given the present parlous state of the Persian Gulf war coalition, and our tenuous position in the Security Council, it would be foolhardy to risk either of the two alternatives. Instead, the Clinton administration should simply say: "We have all the authority we need from the Security Council's earlier resolutions, and we need no further elaboration."

To some, this will smack of American unilateralism and of a disregard for the Security Council's role. Such a characterization is flatly incorrect. We are functionally no more or less restrained today than we were on Nov. 29, 1990, when the council adopted Resolution 678. No one (other than Iraq) questioned the wisdom of that course of action seven years ago, and no one should question it today.

John R. Bolton is senior vice president of the American Enterprise Institute.