Resident Scholar Gary J. Schmitt

Resident Fellow Reuel Marc Gerecht

Do the Europeans really want to prevent a war between the US or Israel and Iran? If they had to choose between curtailing trade with the Islamic republic, or seeing either America or Israel preventatively strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, which would London, Paris and Berlin prefer? These are not unfair questions: at no time since the European Union started the “EU3” negotiations with Iran’s clerical regime in 2004 have the Europeans probably had more leverage over Tehran’s actions. At no time since 2002, when it became clear that the mullahs were conducting a clandestine nuclear research programme, has there been a more critical moment for determining which path diplomatic or military the US and Israel will choose to try to stop Iran’s pursuit of the bomb.

Washington and Jerusalem clearly have no desire to attack Iran. But if the Europeans close down the option of boosting the soft-power of sanctions, the odds on military strikes will increase significantly. Most in Europe’s political elite may well agree with President Jacques Chirac of France when he recently revealed he had no problem with Iran having “one or two” nuclear weapons. Embracing the theory of deterrence, Mr. Chirac apparently envisioned the Israelis or the Americans threatening annihilation of Iran as a means of escaping from the international contretemps provoked by the mullahs’ nuclear aspirations. The European hope is that the Americans and the Israelis will realise that an attack on Iran’s nuclear sites is unthinkable.

But what if the Americans or the Israelis do not see it that way? George W. Bush and many other Americans are not convinced that the theory of deterrence is either a moral or effective idea when used against a terrorist-supporting state. Is the US going to slaughter hundreds of thousands even millions of Iranians for an unclaimed nuclear terrorist strike? If Tehran launched a conventional terrorist attack on a US facility such as the one it is strongly suspected of having masterminded on the Khobar Towers complex in Saudi Arabia in 1996 would not Washington be even less likely to respond, knowing the other side has the bomb?

We know that Iran’s leaders allowed members of al-Qaeda to pass through their territory after al-Qaeda had successfully displayed its penchant for slaughtering Americans. Even after the anti-Semitic tirades of Mr Ahmadi-Nejad, which echo the “bye-bye-Israel” nuclear bravado of former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Europeans remain surreally casual about how a nuclear Iran could effectively intimidate Israel politically, spiritually and economically. Both Americans and Israelis reflect seriously on the awful prospect of ideologically volatile Sunni Arab dictatorships obtaining their own nuclear weapons to counter Shia Iran’s bomb-enhanced ambitions.

Within Iran, is the clerical regime likely to reform, or become more paranoid, as internal dissent mounts? The permanently dysfunctional nature of the Islamic republic the tension between theocracy and democracy and the corrupt, impoverishing statist economic structure guarantee the continuing insecurity of the regime and hence, in part, its willingness to use violence internally and externally. Since the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989, Iranian society has been shearing away from its clerical overlords, who see themselves as the vanguard of the Iranian nation and the Muslim world. This process will continue and, with it, the anti-American and anti-Israeli animosity of the regime.

In 2003 when the British, French and Germans feared that Mr. Bush might attack another “axis of evil” member, European nuclear negotiations with Tehran began in earnest. One of the most serious diplomatic undertakings in the EU’s history, the EU3 process signalled to the Iranians, as well as to all EU members and the US, that Europe would use both carrots and sticks to persuade the mullahs to cease their uranium enrichment activities. In the intervening four years, the EU3 has dangled various inducements before Tehran to no avail. Proceeding with tougher sanctions is a real opportunity for transatlantic relations; conversely, failure to do so will only signal how great remains the divide in relations.

Timing in a poker game is critical: if you do not know when to raise, you always lose. There are signs of serious political and economic turbulence inside the Islamic republic’s autocratic, socialist system. Iran’s rulers have now seen the Americans deploy a new battle group to the Persian Gulf, implement more aggressive rules to counter Iranian meddling in Iraq, interrupt the cash-flow of Iranian banks overseas (with some European participation), and watched the Americans and Europeans move forward with a sanctions regime at the United Nations. It is no coincidence that the internal Iranian discussion about Mr Ahmadi-Nejad’s competence and the “nuclear energy” programme has heated up. The effect inside Iran of EU-imposed sanctions could be considerable, given the fragility of the Iranian economy and concerns among Iranians about the possible cascading effect of sanctions. Poker may well have been invented in Iran, but it came to the Americans via the Europeans. Do the Europeans still know how to play?

Reuel Marc Gerecht is a resident fellow and Gary J. Schmitt is a resident scholar at AEI.