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Gubernatorial appointments to fill Senate vacancies are justly under fire. Sen. Russ Feingold (D-Wis.) has introduced a constitutional amendment to ban the process altogether. The impetus for the change is understandable, but getting rid of gubernatorial appointments has its own set of problems.

The poster child for gubernatorial appointments is former Illinois Gov. Rod Blagojevich, who allegedly tried to sell Barack Obama's old Senate seat. Then came the delay in naming a replacement, the surprise appointment of Roland Burris, and now questions about Burris' contact with agents of Blagojevich.

But it is not just Illinois. We had New York Gov. David Paterson agonizing over appointing Caroline Kennedy to fill Hillary Clinton's seat. In Delaware, some have criticized the appointment of Vice President Joe Biden's former staffer Ted Kaufman as merely a placeholder, perhaps keeping the seat warm for Biden's son to run in 2010. And consider the strange case of Sen. Judd Gregg, who negotiated a deal with Democratic Gov. John Lynch to appoint a Republican to replace him in the Senate, only to decline the offer to be commerce secretary and to return to the Senate before Newman ever took office.

After such a series of events, who wouldn't be skeptical about gubernatorial appointments? In response to this tumult, Feingold has introduced a constitutional amendment to abolish the appointment process. Under the 17th Amendment of the Constitution, states are allowed the option of granting their governors the power to make temporary appointments to fill Senate vacancies. The governors of 45 states have such power. The exceptions are Wisconsin, Oregon, Alaska, Massachusetts and, in certain instances, Oklahoma, where when a Senate vacancy occurs, the seat remains vacant for a few months until a special election is held. Feingold's amendment would implement this system in all states.

Unfortunately, getting rid of the appointment process would create new problems.

The death or resignation of a senator would lead to a state effectively losing representation for a prolonged period, likely five or six months, before the special election is held. In 1995-96, the Oregon seat long held by Republican Bob Packwood remained vacant for nearly five months after his resignation. This possibility is dangerous in the extreme case of a terrorist attack on Congress. The Continuity of Government Commission (which I am associated with) worried that the House would be effectively crippled for months after a mass attack because members are chosen only by election. The Senate could regenerate itself quickly, as governors would make appointments to fill vacancies within days of the attack.

One argument against gubernatorial appointments is that unelected appointees benefit from the power of incumbency and ensconce themselves in the Senate for many years to come. But experience does not bear out this concern. Since the 17th Amendment was ratified in 1913, 184 senators have been appointed. Of those, 71 have not run for election. Of the remaining 117 who ran, just 51.2 percent were elected.

Special elections under the Feingold amendment would arguably be less democratic than the current system, in which most states' appointed senators face voters in the next general election. States would have incentives to fill the vacancy quickly to regain its representation in the Senate. In the House, where there are no appointments, some states forego party primaries in special elections and allow party committees to select the nominee.

Without appointments, states would be in a tough position. If they allow for a full election process with primaries, they lengthen the duration of the Senate vacancy and the time the state is without representation. On the other hand, doing away with primaries takes the people out of the choice for party nominees.

Consider also who might run in special elections. Candidates who could immediately jump into a race only a few months away would likely be wealthy, well-known or politically connected. There would not be much room for an outsider candidate, like Barack Obama, to break through in a rushed election.

And turnout in these elections themselves could be less than ideal. Typically, under today's system, when a vacancy is filled, the special election is held on the next November election in an even year. The special election coincides with the presidential or midterm elections, which see high turnout. There tends to be significantly lower turnout in special elections for the House, Senate runoffs and other elections not coinciding with midterm or presidential contests.

Enactment of the Feingold amendment might stop complaints about bad appointments, but it could trigger new gripes about lack of representation during vacancies and special elections dominated by rich and connected candidates who would be running in low-turnout contests.

John C. Fortier is a research fellow at AEI.