apdk/Flickr/Creative Commons

On June 4, President Obama will use Egypt as a backdrop to extend his long-awaited olive branch to the Muslim world. While speculation abounds over the content of his remarks, less ink has been spilled over what his visit portends for the U.S.-Egyptian relationship, once Washington's cornerstone partnership in the Arab world. If Obama's fence-mending bid is to succeed, he must first convince Egyptians that change begins with Washington's closest Arab ally.

Speaking to the Arabic satellite station Al-Arabiya in the first week of his presidency, Obama spoke not of human-rights abuses, poor governance, or economic stagnation--ills affecting several hundred million Arabs--but rather of his desire to resuscitate the peace process and restore "the respect and partnership that America had with the Muslim world as recently as 20 or 30 years ago."

How unfortunate that the relationship that Obama seeks to resurrect was never predicated on popular support, but on a Faustian bargain sacrificing liberty upon the altar of stability. Arabs may lament the plight of the Palestinians, but that issue is perpetuated by regional leaders to channel frustration away from their domestic shortcomings. Few policies have bred more Arab antipathy toward the United States over the decades than its unswerving support for authoritarian regimes.

Obama would be hard-pressed not to address the democracy deficit, but, as he acknowledged to Al-Arabiya, the Muslim world will judge him not by his words, but by his deeds. (To be fair, Obama has inherited a delicate situation in Egypt. With Pres. Hosni Mubarak having recently turned 81, Egypt may soon face its first transition of leadership in nearly 30 years.)

President Bush's "freedom agenda" strained relations with Cairo when Bush made Egypt a test case for his democracy-promoting "transitional diplomacy." For a time, the Arab world's most populous country was where the U.S. focus on democracy seemed to bear the most fruit. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's exhortation in Cairo in June 2005 that the Egyptian government must "put its faith in its own people" preceded the country's first multi-candidate presidential election. Yet, as the Bush administration shifted its focus elsewhere, Mubarak cracked down on peaceful dissent.

Here, the case of Ayman Nour is illuminating. He is one of Egypt's foremost dissidents and was the runner-up to Mubarak in the 2005 presidential election. Several months after that vote, he was tossed in prison; he had been convicted on trumped-up charges after campaigning for human rights and constitutional reform.

Nour's release shortly after Obama's inauguration was less about change and more about Mubarak laundering his image, but the ploy succeeded: Obama rewarded Mubarak with the Oval Office photo op he coveted.

Yet, in typical Mubarak fashion, his regime moved against Nour again as soon as U.S. attention strayed. Since releasing Nour, the regime has disbarred him, stripped him of political rights, and sought to intimidate him into silence. A day after Nour declared his intent to run in the 2011 presidential election, an assailant accosted him on the street and ignited an aerosol can in his face, resulting in first-degree burns. Ironically, it has been the State Department, not Nour, that has since remained mum.

Emboldened, the Mubarak regime now replicates the same strategy with Saad Eddin Ibrahim, another prominent democracy advocate and former prisoner of conscience. The government forced Ibrahim into exile in 2007 when it convicted him of "tarnishing Egypt's reputation" by penning several op-eds in the Washington Post. On May 25, a judge threw out the conviction, no doubt with Mubarak's blessing, but a host of politically charged lawsuits impede Ibrahim's safe return.

From Mubarak's perspective, the Nour and Ibrahim overtures are low-cost, high-reward concessions. They will allow Obama to save face in Egypt, evade criticism from Capitol Hill, and claim success where his predecessor failed. But alas, government by ad hoc decree does not a democracy make. While Washington may think it has demonstrated the wisdom of realpolitik, Cairo continues its systematic repression of Egypt's more anonymous dissidents unchecked.

No matter. Obama, like other U.S. presidents before him, has bought Mubarak's gambit. In doing so, he has given new life to Egypt's assertion that we must either side with the status quo or risk an Islamist tidal wave. But that, as the saying goes, is a false choice. It is precisely because Egypt's government has persecuted its liberal opponents that no suitable alternative exists.

Obama may believe the need for Egypt's cooperation on the Middle East peace process trumps all other considerations. But if the events of recent years demonstrate anything, it is that authoritarian regimes such as Egypt's are a very thin reed upon which to construct U.S. foreign policy.

Jeffrey Azarva is a research fellow at AEI.