This book is a study of ways to reduce the costs of accident liability litigation through tort reform.

"A crisp and lucid little book that deftly and helpfully explores for both the expert and the general reader flexible contractual alternatives to the gross and rigid inefficiencies of tort law."

--Jeffrey O'Connell, University of Virginia School of Law

"An accessible, sensible, and persuasive study that demonstrates the enormous social benefits from one simple social reform: allowing parties to a consensual arrangement to limit by contract the damages recoverable in the event of personal injury."

--Richard A. Epstein, University of Chicago Law School

"Paul Rubin is onto something. . . . Rubin deserves praise for challenging a legal system that, in pursuit of both power and profit, ostentaciously holds out rights while systematically hiding their price tag."

--Clark C. Havighurst, Duke University

Paul H. Rubin is a professor of economics at Emory University.