AEI - The Antitrust Paradox

SAVE

BOOKS

The Antitrust Paradox

A Policy at War with Itself

By Robert H. Bork | Simon & Schuster Adult Publishing Group
(October 1997)

Simon & Schuster Adult Publishing Group

October 1997

Paperback

8.3'' x 5.58''

479 pages

ISBN: 0029044561

Examination Copies

Judge Robert H. Bork gives a fascinating, though demanding, review of the most important antitrust issues in the United States.

Judge Robert H. Bork gives a fascinating, though demanding, review of the most important antitrust issues in the United States. The central, pragmatic thesis of Bork is maximization of consumer welfare (also called economic efficiency) and not the protection of small businesses in addressing any antitrust issue. Unfortunately, the legislative, executive and judiciary branches of power as well as the practicing bar have not always shown consistency in making, interpreting, and applying antitrust rules. The main reason for their shared sub-optimal performance in that area is the too-often absence of a rudimentary understanding of market economics according to Bork. Bork believes that law and economics are two complementary disciplines that should be taught together as part of the academic requirements or at least whose teaching could be made optional at the undergraduate level in our universities.

Table of Contents

New Introduction: The Passing of the Crisis
Preface
Acknowledgments
Introduction: The Crisis in Antitrust

Part I: The Theory

The Historical Foundations of Antitrust Policy
The Goals of Antitrust: The Intentions of Congress
The Goals of Antitrust: The Responsibility of the Courts
Business Behavior and the Consumer Interest: Some Rudiments of Theory
The Consumer Welfare Model
The Method of Antitrust Analysis
Injury to Competition: The Law's Basic Theories

Part II: The Law and the Policy

Monopoly and Oligopoly: The Problem of Horizontal Size by Internal Growth
The Clash of Merger Policy: The Brown Shoe Decision
Horizontal Mergers
Vertical Mergers
Conglomerate Mergers
Horizontal Price Fixing and Market Division
Resale Price Maintenance and Vertical Market Division
Exclusive Dealing and Requirements Contracts
"Barriers to Entry"
Boycotts and Individual Refusals to Deal
Predation Through Governmental Processes
Tying Arrangements and Reciprocal Dealing
Price Discrimination

Part III: Summation

Recommendations
Final Thoughts
Epilogue

Appendix to Chapters 13 and 14
Notes
Index of Cases
Subject Index