Few dispute that a major turning point in the history of present-day Chile commenced with the election in 1970 of a Marxist physician, Salvador Allende. What followed were three years that shook South America, if not the world. Land reform, factory expropriation, the politicization of a sector of the armed forces, and curriculum reform in education--each in their turn led to a hardening of political fault lines and created the basis for the overthrow of the Allende regime.

In what is likely to be viewed as the most authoritative statement to date on the U.S.-Chile relatationship during this stormy period, Falcoff debunks the myth of a CIA-inspired overthrow of the democratic forces. He places responsibility on Allende's failure to obtain or even seek a decisive electorial mandate, on a governing coalition internally inconsistent and frequently at war with its constitutent elements, on an economic policy that polarized supporters and enemies, and ultimately on the need to turn to military for the stability that its policy failures could not achieve.

Mark Falcoff is a resident scholar at AEI.