Dimensions: 6'' x 9'' 250 pages AEI Press  (Washington) Publication Date: November 2000 Paperback ISBN: 0844741345 Price: $ 25.00 Add to Cart   Hardcover ISBN: 0844741337 Price: $ 39.95 Add to Cart   Examination Copies

November 2000
The Permanent Campaign and Its Future
Edited by Norman J. Ornstein and Thomas E. Mann

In this book, eleven prominent political scientists aim to make sense of the permanent campaign, to understand how and why it has evolved, to weigh its consequences for our ability to govern ourselves effectively, and to consider whether steps might be taken to ameliorate its more damaging effects. In publishing these essays, they seek to make a substantive contribution to understanding this critically important feature of contemporary American politics.

This work is part of AEI’s Transition to Governing Project, which is run in conjunction with the Brookings Institution and Hoover Institution and generously funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts. The project directors--Norman J. Ornstein, a resident scholar at AEI, and Thomas E. Mann, the W. Averell Harriman Senior Fellow in American Governance at the Brookings Institution--edited the volume and wrote its concluding chapter, from which this summary is largely drawn.

The other contributors are Karlyn Bowman, a resident fellow at AEI; David Brady, the McCoy Professor of Political Science at Stanford University; Anthony Corrado, an associate professor of government at Colby College; Morris Fiorina, a professor of political science and a senior fellow of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University; Hugh Heclo, the Clarence J. Robinson Professor of Public Affairs at George Mason University; Stephen Hess, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution; Charles O. Jones, the Hawkins Professor of Political Science Emeritus at the University of Wisconsin Madison and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution; Burdett A. Loomis, professor of political science at the University of Kansas; and Kathryn Dunn Tenpas, associate director of the University of Pennsylvania’s Washington Semester Program.

We live in the era of the permanent campaign, in which the line between campaigning and governing has been nearly erased. As Hugh Heclo makes clear in the opening chapter, even if campaigning and governing are inextricably interlinked in American-style democracy, the process is distinctly different now from what it was some decades ago. Sidney Blumenthal popularized the term permanent campaign in 1982, but the change in governing style goes back further. Systematic and sophisticated polling in presidential campaigns nearly reached its full bloom in 1960, but the process of tracking public views, or of politicians garnering support from the public for their priorities, is not what we mean by the permanent campaign. Rather, we mean, as Heclo suggests, "a nonstop process seeking to manipulate sources of public approval to engage in the act of governing itself." In this era of the permanent campaign, the process of campaigning and the process of governing have each lost their distinctiveness. Just as significant, the process of campaigning has become in many ways the dominant partner of the two.

As Charles O. Jones suggests, Bill Clinton is the epitome of a politician governing by means of a continuous campaign, "a process changed not at all by his inability to run for a third term. In his eighth and final year in the White House, Clinton remains in full campaign mode. And many would argue that the 2000 presidential campaign began not with the first formal contest for party delegates in Iowa in January 2000, nor even at the conclusion of the last presidential election, but with the carefully showcased keynote speech of Vice President (and heir apparent) Al Gore at the Democratic convention that renominated Clinton in August 1996," or even with Gore’s selection in 1992.

The permanent campaign means that campaigns are nonstop and year-round and that the process of governing and campaigning takes place in a continuous loop. Campaign consultants move without pause from the campaign trail to work for the victorious elected officials and help to shape their policy messages and frame issues for advantage in the next campaign. As described by Kathryn Dunn Tenpas, some consultants go directly on the White House or congressional payroll; others contract with the party national committees (at high rates of compensation via soft money). Yet others provide inside advice without direct charge and make their money by lobbying their former campaign clients on behalf of a wide range of new clients ranging from corporations to foreign governments to labor unions to wealthy individuals. When policy and political aides leave White House, Senate, or House staffs, they regularly join campaign consulting shops or lobbying operations.

Legislative proposals, routinely subjected to intense polling and focus groups before they are launched, are thereafter monitored by tracking polls. Outside groups complement their inside lobbying with advertising campaigns designed to shape the policy agenda and define the terms of debate, a practice documented in the chapter by Burdette A. Loomis. As elections approach, many of those groups run "issue" advertising campaigns, indistinguishable from electioneering, that target candidates directly, often with less issue content than any other kind of advertising, including that of the candidates. More recently, political parties have become the biggest players in the sham issue advocacy game. Funded in substantial part with soft (unregulated) money, their broadcast ads make no pretense of discussing issues or promoting parties; they are overwhelmingly attack ads against specific candidates run only in the relevant electoral jurisdictions.

The permanent campaign takes place on the campaign trail, on the airwaves, on the floors of the House and Senate, in the Oval Office, and increasingly in the courts and in law offices. Private groups now almost routinely orchestrate legal challenges to laws they oppose, sue the government or their adversaries, and use the discovery process to troll for politically embarrassing revelations, as Anthony Corrado makes clear, about their opponents. Meanwhile, congressional leaders devote more and more of their time and energy to building campaign war chests for themselves and their parties, an activity that distracts from--or even shapes--their governing responsibilities. Many legislators turn their attention to amassing extra campaign funds, via leadership political action committees, to distribute to party colleagues to build chits for possible runs for congressional leadership posts in parties or committees and thus further interconnect campaigns and legislative activities. Elected officials, including high-ranking leaders in Congress, now are often willing to campaign directly against their colleagues on the other side of the aisle, thus violating an unwritten norm against doing so that persisted for decades and also damaging the bipartisan comity of the legislature.

The press is also involved. For decades, critics of campaign journalists decried the excessive media focus on who was up or down and on the strategies and tactics of the contenders as opposed to a focus on what the candidates stood for or how they would implement their plans if elected. But reporters now increasingly cover policy battles in Congress and the White House as campaigns as well, with the focus on who is winning and losing and on the motives and machinations of the players, not on the stakes or choices involved.

The Press, Polling, and Fund-Raising

Heclo starts by providing an overview of the permanent campaign, its history as well as its effect on U.S. politics. He notes the interrelation of six trends: the decline of political parties, the rise of interest group politics, the development of new communications technologies, the rise of public relations, the need for political money, and the high stakes for individual interests in an activist government.

His conclusion about the effects of the permanent campaign is pessimistic: "The story’s central narrative is the merger of power-as-persuasion inside Washington with power-as-public-opinion manipulation outside Washington. The two, inside and outside, governing and campaigning, become all but indistinguishable as they now are in any one of the big-box lobbying or consulting firms in Washington. The paradox is that a politics that costs so much should make our political life feel so cheapened."

Next, Stephen Hess describes the role the press plays in the permanent campaign. He recounts the rise of political journalism in this century and notes the changing story lines, the relationship between journalists and government officials, and the blurring of the line between journalists and political actors.

Karlyn Bowman details the rise of polling and the pollster in campaigns, transitions into office, and governing. The sheer number of polls taken has risen dramatically. For example, the Roper Center Archives contain 9,157 individual questions from polls from the 1960s. During the 1990s, the archivists added more than 132,000 questions to the center's database. Many more polls are taken by more organizations. Campaigns, media organizations, academic institutions, and sitting presidents all conduct polls. Bowman notes the increase in public opinion data but worries about the competitive pressures on polling and that as polling becomes common, it may lose value.

Corrado describes how fund-raising has come to occupy more and more of the time of members of Congress. The costs of campaigns have risen dramatically because of a number of factors. Now it is not inconceivable that a newly elected representative will hold his first Washington fundraiser before he casts his first vote. Fund-raising now takes place not only in election years, but every year.

Corrado worries that such permanent campaigning is diminishing the quality of representation in Washington. Legislators are spending excessive amounts of time on fund-raising and electioneering. Their focus on campaigning comes at the expense of the legislative craft; if they are spending more time raising money, they are spending less time learning legislative practice, understanding the details of major policy debates, or becoming acquainted with their professional colleagues.

Congress and the Presidency

Tenpas describes how the presidency has been transformed over the past thirty years by the addition of "outreach" offices designed to buttress the president’s popular support, the expansion of the president’s advisory network to include professional political consultants and pollsters, and the use of campaign-style tactics to govern. Modern presidents have responded to the coming of the permanent campaign by acquiring the resources necessary to compete in a vastly altered political and policymaking arena. The permanent campaign mentality not only has affected individual presidents, but has also had an enduring effect on the institution of the presidency. Offices such as public liaison, communications, and political affairs; techniques such as message of the day; and the hiring of political consultants all ensure that the president’s message is constantly heard.

David Brady and Morris Fiorina note that because members of Congress are "single-minded seekers of reelection," Congress operates according to a two-year electoral rhythm. Members of the House function in a campaign mode more or less all the time, and while senators serve six-year terms, the needs of the one-third standing for reelection every two years exert a strong influence on the actions of the larger body.

Over the years, Congress has changed in ways that facilitate the permanent campaign. For example, there is a greater prevalence of roll call votes, which may be used to put people on the record for political purposes rather than to further a legislative end. More significant than the changes in rules or internal institutions is the change in congressional behavior. Members of Congress travel home much more frequently than at midcentury, and they vote with their party in opposition to the other party much more frequently.

The character of congressional leadership has also changed. At one time congressional floor leaders were viewed as political tacticians whose principal goal was facilitating the business of the chamber. Now they are required to be national spokespersons for their party’s positions.

Loomis shows how organized interests campaign for their goals not so much with appeals to the mass public, but by constructing narratives that attempt to persuade an appropriate group of elites in a policy community. The outlines of the permanent campaign as practiced by organized interests in American politics offer few surprises. Issues are frequently condensed into catch phrases and symbols. Moreover, in the wake of the campaign rhetoric, the framing techniques, and the attempts to manipulate information, important decisions are made: to deregulate cable television rates, to allow patients to sue their employers over HMO decisions, and to permit banks and brokerage firms to enter each other's markets.

At least three implications of the permanent campaigning on issues deserve attention. First, organized interests often campaign a lot more on issues than on electoral politics. Second, the infusion of permanent campaign tactics and funding into interest-group politics contributes to the decline of deliberation in Congress. If the stakes are high and interests have "invested" a great deal in both politicians and the framing of issues, why would they encourage deliberation? Finally, the permanent campaign on issues favors those interests that can bring the most resources to bear in a context in which the disparity in resources is usually immense. The very power of constructed narratives allows moneyed interests to make the case that they are acting to benefit citizens and consumers as part of their overall argument on a given policy.

The Permanent Campaign's Future

Jones concludes by showing how the campaigning style of the presidency has developed. With close attention to Clinton’s governing style, he explores the role of new technology, a more visible and familiar presidency, and the ability to mix governing and campaigning personnel and techniques.

Jones believes that a campaigning style of governing is likely to persist beyond Clinton’s manner of conducting his presidency. The developments in information technology and distribution and the effects of Clinton’s methods of managing his presidency virtually guarantee public and participatory governing styles. As Jones cannot imagine reversing the information revolution, altering Clinton’s style, or ignoring the effects of either, he is moved to consider the way that candidates should prepare for effective campaign-mode governing.

While Jones sees some negatives to the permanent campaign style of governing, he also acknowledges that it is here to stay and offers advice on how it might be combined with effective governance.