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| Dimensions: 5.5'' x 8.5'' |
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| 40 pages |
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AEI Press
(Washington)
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| Publication Date: September 2008 |
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| Paperback |
| ISBN: 978-0-8447-4267-0 |
| Price: $ 10.00 |
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Download the full text of Why Groups Go to Extremes from the AEI Center for Regulatory and Market Studies. 
View the press release for Why Groups Go to Extremes
How does group behavior drive extremism and challenge democratic values? The answer lies in social dynamics--the ways people influence one another.
Conventional wisdom suggests that open discussion within groups will lead to compromise and moderation, yet just the opposite often occurs. In the course of exchanging opinions, like-minded people frequently develop more extreme versions of their original views on such issues as climate change, labor policy, same-sex relationships, and affirmative action. Groups ranging from citizens' forums to judicial panels tend to squelch diversity and polarize opinion. With the Internet facilitating the formation of like-minded groups, this phenomenon may help account for the intensity and division of contemporary social and political debate. Indeed, the dangers of homogeneity and polarization within groups highlight a fundamental tension between the consequences of free speech and assembly, and the value of intellectual diversity to a civil society.
In Why Groups Go to Extremes, Cass R. Sunstein argues that the key to preventing the spread of extremist views is not to suppress deliberation among the like-minded; such groups productively challenge conventional thinking and majority opinion. Instead, policymakers should develop institutions to ensure that like-minded groups encounter a diversity of opinions within civil society. The goal, Sunstein contends, must be to create opportunities for civil deliberation that expose like-minded group members to opposing views, while exposing society at large to the views of such groups.
Cass R. Sunstein is the Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and the recipient of the 2007 AEI Reg-Markets Center Distinguished Lecture Award. 

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments
Foreword, Robert Hahn 
Why Groups Go to Extremes
The Basic Phenomenon
Citizens
Federal Judges and Polarized Differences
Juries
Why Polarization? Some Explanations
Information Strengthens Antecedent Beliefs
Corroboration Breeds Confidence, Which Breeds Extremism
Social Comparisons Shift Positions
Polarization and Democracy
Polarizing Events and Polarization Entrepreneurs
Outgroups
Feuds, Ethnic and International Strife, and War
The Internet, Communications Policy, and Mass Deliberation
Deliberative Trouble
Why Deliberate?
The Virtues of Heterogeneity
Enclave Deliberation and Suppressed Voices
The Public Sphere and Appropriate Heterogeneity
Notes
About the Author