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| Dimensions: 0.25'' x 8.25'' x 5.50'' |
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| 45 pages |
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AEI Press
(Washington)
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| Publication Date: December 1997 |
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| Paperback |
| ISBN: 0844771007 |
| Price: $ 9.95 |
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The full text of this book is available in Adobe Acrobat PDF format
The financial safety net constructed in the 1930s--in which government absorbs the risk of private bank defaults--may be the single most destabilizing influence in the financial system. According to the author of this volume, government policies to stabilize the banking system by insuring deposits create perverse incentives by protecting weak institutions from the discipline of the market. The author argues that the efforts of Chile, Argentina, and other countries to reform their banking systems provide useful lessons to the United States and other countries about ways to introduce private market discipline into government deposit insurance.
The Postmodern Bank Safety Net is one in a series of new AEI studies on subjects relating to the deregulation of financial markets. The series will focus on the regulation of the new multiproduct financial services firm; the costs and benefits of the government safety net; pricing and access for banks and nonbanks; globalization and the level playing field; mutual fund regulation; electronic commerce; securities markets; and corporate governance.
Charles W. Calomiris is the Paul M. Montrone Professor of Finance and Economics at Columbia University and a visiting scholar at AEI.

Table of Contents

Foreword: Christopher DeMuth
- The Evolution of the Modern Financial Safety Net
- Questioning the Safety of the Safety Net
- The Postmodern Safety Net
- Limited Progress in Chile and Argentina
- Conclusions
References
About the Author