

# **Strategy and Missions of the Future Navy**

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**Conference on the Future of the  
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## A Strategy For the Global Maritime Competition

- The global maritime competition is an enduring race between an ever-changing and disparate group of competitors
- In 1890, the Navy's basic competition strategy changed from conducting hemispheric blockade breaking and *guerre de course* to competing with, and surpassing, the top naval competitors
  - The Navy achieved this goal in 1944/45
  - Despite being pushed hard during the Cold War, it has not relinquished the lead since
- Despite concerns over size of the fleet, the Navy enjoys a formidable lead in the global maritime competition. It can claim:
  - A 17-Navy tonnage standard
  - 12 of 15 aircraft carriers
  - 12 of 19 “light carriers”
  - A 2.5-navy standard combatants; the magazine capacity of its 71 major combatants is equal to the total magazine capacity of 366 combatants in the 17 next largest navies
  - Submarine force ratios for two navies is better than Cold War ratios for one navy

**“The Past is an Uncertain Guide to the Future,  
But it is All We Have”**

**National Security Eras**

- **The Continental Era (1783-1889)**
- **The Oceanic, or Expeditionary Era (1890-1946)**
- **The Transoceanic, or Garrison Era (1947-1988)**

**Battle Force Eras**

- **The Frigate/Cruiser Era (1783-1889)**
- **The Battleship Era (1890-1941)**
- **The Carrier Era (1942-1990s)**
  - **Carrier/Amphib Phase**
  - **Carrier Phase**
  - **Carrier/SSN Phase**
  - **Carrier/Surface Combatant Phase**

- **A New National Security Era (1989-present)**

- **A New Battle Force Era ?**

## We Are Now a Decade and a Half Into the Joint Expeditionary Era

- *“The whole power of the United States, to manifest itself, depends on the power to move ships and aircraft across the sea. Their mighty power is restricted; it is restricted by the very oceans which have protected them; the oceans which were their shield, have now become both threatening and a bar, a prison house through which they must struggle to bring armies, fleets, and air forces to bear upon the common problems we have to face.”*
- Joint operations are greatly facilitated by the daunting US maritime lead and its command of the seas
  - As Samuel Huntington said, US command of the seas allows US military commanders to conceive of the “sea as base”


## 2005 QDR Promises to Be the First True Defense Review of the Joint Expeditionary Era

- The view of the future is far less blurred by the lens of the Garrison Era/Cold War
- There is less concern about “traditional” threats, and more concern about “non-traditional threats
- There is a good chance the standard force planning and sizing standard will change
  - Budget pressures are building up
  - Hard to see the “two major combat operation” standard surviving
- One-one-one?:
  - Maritime defense-in-depth of the homeland (prevent a WMD attack on the homeland)
  - Fight a persistent irregular war against extremists
  - Be prepared to conduct one major Joint power projection operation
- “10-30-30” to go away?

## As it Did in the First Expeditionary Era, the Navy Will Plan A Vital Role in the Emerging Joint Expeditionary Era

- Maritime defense-in-depth of the homeland
  - In conjunction with the US Coast Guard, the Navy will conduct forward counter-proliferation operations on sea and land, and global maritime interdiction operations
    - Will require a true “National Fleet”
  - The Navy will also provide sea-based missile defense capabilities
    - 15 DDGs to be converted to Long-range Search and Track platforms
    - 3 CGs to be armed with anti-ballistic missiles
    - All 18 will become multi-purpose track and engagement platforms by 2010

# With Regard to the Persistent Irregular War, The Enemy May Not Have a Navy, But He Has a Clear Naval Strategy: *Guerre de course*



**DoN Wartime Mission:**

Along with Joint and allied forces, and other USG agencies, fight and defeat the enemy within the central theater for irregular warfare;

Oppose any enemy moves to expand operations beyond the central theater;

Defeat the enemy's maritime strategy of *guerre de course*

Deny the enemy the use of the oceans for operational purposes;  
deny the enemy's "threat-in-being" of attacking the homeland from the sea

Will require a *National Fleet* and a far more integrated DoN Battle Force

## **In Addition to Confronting Irregular Challenges, the DoN Must Also Be Prepared to Support a Major Joint Power Projection Operation and Hedge Against a Disruptive Maritime Competition**

- Maritime support of Joint power projection operations
  - Assume that WMD may be used; be prepared to penetrate an anti-access/area-denial network
  - Be prepared to conduct forcible entries
  - Provide extended air and missile defense over Joint forces
  - Provide persistent fire support
  - Provide sea-based logistics support
- Hedge against a disruptive maritime competition with China
  - A “disruptive” challenge is not just associated with technology

## The Range of Tasks Presents a Tough Design Problem

- Conceptually, the Navy needs four different fleets:
  - A Strategic Deterrent/Dissuasion Fleet
  - A Homeland Defense/Irregular Warfare/Global Patrol Fleet
  - A Sea as Base Power Projection Fleet
  - A Counter-A2/Ad Fleet
- However, it will be tough to build four different fleets on expected shipbuilding budgets of \$9-11 billion a year
- Budget concerns will require the Navy to develop a modular fleet platform architecture designed to form integrated Naval Battle Networks, themselves components of Joint Multidimensional Battle Networks
  - Reconfigurable components
  - Adaptable networks
  - The Navy is entering a new Naval Battle Network Era
- “Strategy of the Second Move?”

# **Sizing, Shaping, and Posturing the Fleet**

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## Start Shaping the 21<sup>st</sup> Century “National Maritime Battle Network”

- Size the Navy for “one-one-one”
  - Provide maritime defense-in-depth of the homeland (prevent WMD attack on the homeland)
  - Fight the persistent irregular war
  - Be prepared to support one major Joint power projection operation
- “Total Ship Battle Force” is an outdated term; Navy needs to think instead of the **Total Force Battle Network**
  - Ships are just one part of the network
  - MMA, BAMS, ACS are equally important parts
  - MEFs, MEBs. MEU(SOCs) are too
- Moreover, the Navy should change the ship counting rules for the TFBN:
  - Current rules: ships that provide *immediate* combat contribution to the Navy
  - New rules: vessels that contribute to the maritime defense of the homeland, and that provide Joint combat capability within 30 days

## Covert Network Combatants (Submarines)

- Immediately reduce the SSBN fleet to 12 boats
  - Convert two more SSGNs, for a total of 6 boats
- Conduct independent study to determine if the SSBN fleet can be reduced to 10 boats
  - If so, convert two SSBNs to SSUNXs, or nuclear-powered UUV tenders
- Continue to build *Virginia*-class SSNs at a rate of one per year
  - Fleet range of 37-41 boats will give a “1.5-2.0” navy standard
  - At a build rate of one SSN per year, the fleet will not fall below 40 boats until 2023
  - Consolidate production in a single yard
- Start immediate design effort to introduce new “Undersea Superiority System X” in 2017/2018
  - Design teams use SSUNX as bridge toward USSX
- 2020 Fleet:
  - 12 (10?) SSBNs
  - 6 SSGNs
  - 2 (?) SSUNXs
  - 43 SSNs with USSX in production

## Aviation Network Combatants

- In 2008, when the *Bush* is commissioned, adopt a front-line CVN fleet of 10 *Nimitz*-class carriers
  - Reorganize air wing structure: nine active and one reserve all-Navy CAWs, with one Marine JSF augmentation squadron assigned to each
  - Start to recapitalize the fleet with CVN-21s, at a build rate of one every five years, starting in FY 08
- Simultaneously, redesignate the *Enterprise* as a J-Afloat Forward Staging Base, or J-AFSB
  - Replace with the *USS George Washington* next decade
- Redesignate the LHAR as the J-CVE (Joint Escort Carrier)
  - Marine Corps/Air Force STOVL JSF air wings
  - Build a class of four, at a rate of one every three years, starting in FY 07
- 2020 Force:
  - 10 CVNs (8 *Nimitz*, 2 CVN-21s)
  - 4 J-CVEs
  - 1 J-AFSB
  - 8 Auxiliary CVEs (LHDs/LHDXs)

## Small Battle Network Combatants

- Current fleet includes:
 

– 30 FF7s	Average displacement: 2,387 tons
– 26 mine warfare ships	Average draft: 17.85 feet
– 8 PCs	Average crew: 138
  
- Replace with 84 LCSs
 

– Average displacement:	2,757 tons
– Average draft:	13.8 feet
– Average crew:	75
  
- 84 LCSs carry:
  - 84 ASW, or 84 mine warfare, or 84 SOF support packages, with inherent anti-boat capabilities
  - Twice the number of automatic cannon; all ships with ASCM self-defense
  - Magazine capacity of 15,120 littoral guided missiles (PAMs and LAMs)
  - Over three times the aviation capacity
  - Up to 336 RHIBs, USVs, UUVs

## Don't Forget About the US Coast Guard Deepwater Cutter Fleet

- 8 National Security Cutters (4,200 tons, full load displacement)
- 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters (3,200 tons, FLD)
- 58 Fast Response Cutters (composite, approximately 300 tons, FLD)
- 64 Coastal Patrol Boats (approximately 90 tons, FLD)
- Broad compatibility with LCS fleet
  - 57 mm cannon
  - CIWS
  - RHIBs
  - M-60 helo support
- **National** Small Battle Network Combatant Fleet = 239 vessels, all types

## Major Battle Network Combatants

- In 2011, the TFBN will have 84 Major Battle Network combatants: 22 CG-52s, 28 DDG-51s, 34 DDG-79s
  - 85% of the 600-ship Navy requirement for CGs/DDGs
  - Average age of the fleet: 12.5 years
  - Total VLS cells: 8,468
- A force of nine DDXs will add an additional:
  - 1,440 equivalent VLS cells
  - 1,350 manning spaces
- Strategy:
  - Build one DDX as a technology demonstrator, with R&D money
  - Improve legacy fleet
    - AEGIS Open Architecture Program
    - VLS Open Architecture Program
    - AEGIS s-band Upgrade Program
    - Manning Improvements
  - Build two additional DDGs in FY 07; to retain industrial base, consider replacing DDG-51s on a one-for one-basis with DDG-79s after that
  - Start long-lead design for new modular “SCX”
    - Prototyping competition
- 2020 Major Battle Network Combatant Fleet = 86 ships, with SCX in production


## Sea-based Maneuver Fleet

- Amphibious landing fleet:
  - Ramp LPD-17 production up to two ships per year, starting in FY 07
  - Build 24 LPD-17s
  - Retire 12 LSD-41/49s as the second flight of LPD-17s comes on line; convert four to T-LSDs
  - Organized into eight, 4-ship **Distributed Expeditionary Strike Bases**
  
- Buy out the leases for the three MPF squadrons
  - Create four, 3-ship, Irregular Warfare Support Squadrons
    - Three MPF ships with one T-LSD
  - Maintain one MPF squadron, equipped for a major combat operation
    - This squadron becomes the focus of sea basing experimentation
  
- 2020 Force:
  - 8 LHD/LHDX
  - 24 LPD-17
  - 4 Irregular Warfare Support Squadrons
  - 1 MPF Squadron

## By 2020, 556 ships for the TFBN

- **12** (10?) SSBNs
- **50** (52?) nuclear-powered submarines, including:
  - 43 SSNs
  - 6 SSGNs
  - 1 Special Mission Submarine
  - (2?) SSUNXs
- **15** aviation power projection platforms, including:
  - 10 J-CVNs
  - 4 J-CVEs
  - 1 J-AFSB
- **86** AEGIS/VLS surface combatants, including:
  - 22 CG-52s
  - 36 (36?) DDG-79s
  - 28 DDG-51s
- **84** LCSs
- **155** USCG Deepwater Cutters and boats
- **54** “Sea as Base” maneuver platforms, including:
  - 8 LHD-1s
  - 24 LPD-17s
  - 16 MPFs
  - 4 T-LSDs
  - 2 T-AFSBs
- **65** (69?) NFAF ships, including:
  - 9 T-AOE/T-AOE(X)s
  - 11 T-AKEs
  - 17 T-AOs
  - 8 T-LKAs
  - 4 JCCXs (?)
  - 5 Fleet Support Tenders
  - 4 Salvage Ships
  - 5 Fleet Tugs
  - 4 Ocean Surveillance Ships
  - 2 AHs
- **35+** Prepositioning and surge sealift ships

# Five New “Fleet Stations” Would Provide the Operational Framework to Fight the Persistent Irregular War and to Support a Major Joint Power Projection Operation



**Mediterranean Station:**  
 -6th Fleet  
 -Irregular Warfare Squadron  
 -LCS Divisions

**Western Pacific Station:**  
 -7th Fleet  
 -CSG  
 -DESB  
 -6 SSNs  
 -LCS Divs

**Indian Ocean Station:**  
 -5th Fleet  
 -CSG  
 -DESB  
 -MPF Squadron  
 -LCS Divisions

**East Asian Station:**  
 -Irregular Warfare Squadron  
 -LCS Divisions

**West Africa Station:**  
 -Irregular Warfare Squadron  
 -LCS Divisions

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 miles  
 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 km  
 Limits of the Muslim World  
 Route of Vasco da Gama  
 Chinese (Ming) voyages  
 Trade routes  
 Dates in Asia Minor & Balkans show Ottoman advance  
 Dates in Africa show Portuguese advance  
 Route of Tamerlane 1400-02