

NCLB Remedies in Action: Four of NCLB's "Restructured" Schools

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INTRODUCTION

One of the No Child Left Behind Act's most striking provisions is the requirement of significantly more dramatic actions for schools that chronically fall short of their achievement targets. Under the law, districts must develop a plan for "restructuring" schools that do not make AYP for five consecutive years. Schools that fail to make AYP for a sixth year in a row must implement the restructuring plan to improve student learning. In contrast to previous federal education law, NCLB's restructuring provisions appear on their face to require more than just continued "school improvement" through professional development, new instructional programs, and other standard fare. For schools that have failed year after year, the law envisions change that is more drastic, involving fundamental shifts in the way schools are "structured."

So has NCLB led to this kind of drastic change in how districts approach the problem of chronically low performing schools? Answering that question on a large scale will require more time and wide-ranging research. But it is already possible to gain preliminary insight into what restructuring looks like "on the ground" by examining some of the early experience of restructuring schools. Toward that end, we profiled four schools that entered the final stage of restructuring in 2005-06. These case studies offer a picture of how three districts and four schools have interpreted the restructuring requirements of NCLB and provide the basis for several observations about how NCLB's restructuring mandates will play out.

Under the law, districts can choose from several tactics for restructuring failing schools:

- 1) reopen the school as a public charter school;
- 2) replace "all or most of the school staff (which may include the principal) who are relevant to the failure to make adequate yearly progress";

- 3) contract with “an outside entity, such as a private management company, with a demonstrated record of effectiveness, to operate the school”;
- 4) turn the “operation of the school over to the state educational agency, if permitted under State law and agreed to by the State”; or
- 5) engage in another form of major restructuring that makes fundamental reforms, “such as significant changes in the school’s staffing and governance, to improve student academic achievement in the school and that has substantial promise of enabling the school to make adequate yearly progress.”¹

Non-regulatory guidance from the U.S. Department of Education in 2006 further defines this final option to include reforms such as:

- changing the governance structure of the school to either diminish school-based management and decision making or increase control, monitoring, and oversight by the LEA;
- closing the school and reopening it as a focus or theme school with new staff or staff skilled in the focus area;
- reconstituting the school into smaller autonomous learning communities;
- dissolving the school and assigning students to other schools in the district;
- pairing the school in restructuring with a higher performing school; or
- expanding or narrowing the grades served.²

These restructuring options, herein referred to as options 1 through 5, are each intended to usher in a significant shift in how the school is governed. Aside from these enumerated lists, however, the Department of Education has given little guidance on how restructuring

should be implemented. As a result, the specific approaches to each alternative vary among states and districts and the actual implementation looks quite different for each school.³

During the 2005-06 school year approximately 600 schools entered the final stage of restructuring.⁴ This number is modest, in large part because most states have not been tracking AYP long enough for schools to move into the restructuring phase (the few states with large numbers of schools in restructuring, such as Michigan and California, established state accountability systems that allowed them to begin calculating AYP earlier than others). According to data compiled by the Center on Education Policy (CEP), only about 15 percent of schools in improvement in 2004-05 exited improvement status in 2005-06 (1,011 out of 8,646 schools).⁵ As the other 85 percent continue to fail to make AYP, it is fair to expect the number of schools in restructuring to grow dramatically over the next few years. It is foreseeable based on current trends that nearly 2,000 schools will be in restructuring in 2007-08, and more than 3,200 will be in restructuring in 2008-09.⁶ Meanwhile, approximately 1,000 schools are planning for restructuring in 2006-07, and another 6,150 are in various stages of “corrective action” leading up to restructuring.

To date, restructuring has been largely an urban phenomenon: in 2005-06 about 90 percent of schools in restructuring were located in urban districts. Fifteen districts accounted for nearly half of all schools in restructuring.⁷ These schools serve traditionally disadvantaged populations, as well. In 2004-05, sixty percent of students in restructuring schools qualified for free or reduced-price lunch (compared to 41 percent of students in all public schools), 40 percent were Hispanic, and 37 percent were African-American (compared to 19 and 16 percent, respectively, in all public schools).⁸ California, Georgia, New York, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Maryland and Ohio had the highest numbers of schools in restructuring in 2004-05, accounting

for nearly 70 percent of all restructuring schools. The majority of restructuring schools in past years have been elementary schools.⁹

Most schools facing NCLB sanctions are not arbitrary victims of one missed target, but are chronically failing large numbers of students. Of the schools that failed to make AYP in 2004-05, fifty-one percent missed targets for two or more subgroups or for all students. Less than a quarter of schools that missed AYP did so because only one student subgroup fell short of achievement targets.¹⁰

Recent surveys suggest that most districts are implementing mild or moderate interventions in restructuring schools – option 5 – rather than the stronger interventions – options 1 through 4.¹¹ In Michigan, for example, 93 percent of restructuring schools in 2004-05 used option 5. In 2005-06, seventy-six percent of restructuring schools in California used option 5.¹² In a 2006 review of the effects of NCLB, the Center on Education Policy found that in districts that used these moderate interventions, 42 percent appointed an outside expert to advise the restructuring school; 24 percent extended the school day or year; 14 percent “restructured the internal organization of the school.” Almost no districts invited private firms or state agencies to take over restructuring schools or reopened the school as a charter school.¹³ Of those schools that implemented more drastic reforms, many used the law to replace staff members who would have been difficult to replace without the power of federal sanctions (14 percent of all restructuring schools replaced some or all staff members in 2004-05).¹⁴

These national statistics offer a broad picture of how states, districts and schools are being affected by NCLB. National numbers cannot tell us, however, what restructuring looks like as it is implemented in districts and schools. As more schools enter restructuring each year, our

four case studies provide an important picture of how the restructuring requirements of NCLB are being put into practice at the local level.

Methodology and Overview of Cases

This article profiles the restructuring experiences of four schools in Michigan and California. We chose to profile schools in these states because both have well-established accountability systems that allowed them to begin calculating AYP earlier than most states. As a result, they also have a relatively large number of schools in restructuring compared to other states. For these same reasons, restructuring experiences in Michigan and California have been the subject of intensive studies by the Center on Education Policy.¹⁵ The CEP analyses provide valuable contextual information about how restructuring works in these two states. Education officials in each state provided lists of “year five” schools from which we selected four that, at least on paper, represented a diverse set of restructuring approaches. In California, we chose Balboa Elementary and Gompers Middle School (both in San Diego); in Michigan, Buchanan Elementary (Grand Rapids) and Milwood Middle School (Kalamazoo). To gather information about the cases, we conducted structured interviews with officials at the schools in summer or fall 2006 and detailed reviews of relevant state, district, and school-level documents, such as the schools’ required restructuring plans.

Our study of Buchanan Elementary School in Grand Rapids, Michigan to some extent reflects the national trend of districts and schools that avoid NCLB’s more radical restructuring options. Buchanan chose to restructure by making several modest changes under option 5 because the district had implemented a new instructional model in 2004 and wanted to allow it time to “take hold,” according to the principal, rather than instituting major additional reforms in 2005.

Though they did not all appear to on paper, our other three case study sites involved more radical restructuring. Balboa Elementary in San Diego chose to restructure using option 5, by reorganizing the school day to build in greater instructional time and offer within-day professional development. But by district-wide policy in San Diego, staff in all restructuring schools were required to reapply for their jobs. The changes at Balboa in many ways resembled the changes at Milwood Middle, then – even though Milwood chose to restructure under option 2, replacing nearly all of the school’s staff. Gompers Middle School in San Diego instituted the most major reforms, choosing to close and reopen as a charter school under NCLB’s option 1. “Going charter” allowed the school to replace the majority of its staff, create a governing board comprised of parents, community members and teachers, and obtain school-level control of the budget. Milwood, Balboa and Gompers reflect findings by the CEP that, of those schools that have made more radical changes under NCLB, many have replaced staff. At these schools, the requirement to restructure has allowed districts to remove teachers that would otherwise be protected by contracts and bargaining agreements.¹⁶

With only one year of testing data available since Balboa, Buchanan, Gompers and Milwood implemented their restructuring plans, these case reports offer little evaluation of whether the schools’ restructuring has in fact put them “back on course to meet state standards,”¹⁷ as the law intends. In addition, because of the diversity of schools in restructuring across the country, it is not possible to hold these out as representative of the national population of schools in this phase of NCLB. Instead, the case studies offer a picture of how three districts and four schools have interpreted the restructuring requirements of NCLB and provide the basis for several observations about what restructuring looks like at the school level.

Restructuring in California

In 2005-06, just over 400 schools in California were developing or implementing a restructuring plan – about four percent of schools in the state. This was a 49 percent increase from the previous year, largely because the state raised its AYP targets in 2005. Of the state’s restructuring schools, approximately five percent were in rural areas, 26 percent in suburban areas, and 69 percent in urban areas.¹⁸ As in most parts of the country, the most frequently used option for restructuring in California was option 5, implemented in 76 percent of restructuring schools. Across the state this option took a variety of forms, from hiring coaches to help teachers at the school, to appointing a leadership team to oversee school operations, or reorganizing the flow of the school day.

Option 1 – reopening as a charter school – was the least popular option in the state, implemented in two percent of restructuring schools. While certainly small, this two percent is noteworthy compared to other states that allow charter schools, such as Michigan, where no schools have chosen this restructuring option.¹⁹ By contrast, in California, in 2005-06 three schools chose to “go charter” in San Diego Unified alone.

Because the state is so large and has so many schools in restructuring, the California Department of Education (CDE) took option 4 – turning the operation of a school over to the state – off the table. It also allowed districts primary responsibility for restructuring schools. The CDE encouraged districts to involve schools in developing the restructuring plan, but did not tell districts and schools what should be done. Instead, it offered support to districts through survey tools, regional conferences, and minor elaborations on the federal options for restructuring. The state did not attach any specific funding to restructuring plans in 2005-06.²⁰

In San Diego Unified, while some district-wide policies applied to all restructuring schools – such as the requirement that all staff re-apply for their jobs – the district generally encouraged schools to develop their restructuring plans with input from the local community. The district sponsored parent meetings at each school to solicit volunteers for School Restructuring Workgroups, the team responsible for recommending the restructuring option they feel is best suited for their school.²¹

Restructuring in Michigan

According to CEP’s 2005 survey, 133 schools, or about five percent of schools in Michigan, were in the planning or implementation phase of restructuring in 2004-05. Of these, about four percent were in rural areas, and 16 percent in suburban areas. Half of all restructuring schools were located in Detroit.²² Forty-nine schools were in the planning or implementation phase of restructuring in Michigan in 2005-06.²³

Many Michigan schools in restructuring implemented two or more restructuring strategies simultaneously. Of the options available in 2004-05, the most popular choices were option 2 – which Michigan’s restructuring policy calls “appointing a new principal,” implemented in 59 percent of schools; and option 5 – “implementing any other major effort that significantly changes the governance of the school,” used in 93 percent of schools. State officials in Michigan made another choice available to schools that restructured under option 5: “employing a coach” from the state’s Coaches Institute to facilitate the school’s reform. In 2004-05, this option was implemented in 17 percent of schools. In Michigan, like California, it was also common for superintendents to make staffing changes during restructuring that would be infeasible without the power of federal law.

Like California, Michigan chose not to give districts the option of turning the operation of the school over to the state. But the MDE did take a more hands-on approach to restructuring, encouraging districts to use an individualized process for every school to develop a plan that targeted the school's specific weaknesses. The state also elaborated on the federal restructuring options to define them more clearly, and added a "coaching" model to districts' choices. The state affected school and district restructuring plans most notably through additional grant funds, which were allocated based on applications that described schools' restructuring plans in detail. The state earmarked \$16 million from its 2005-06 Title I school improvement funds for these grants to schools in need of improvement, corrective action, and restructuring. For 2005-06, an additional \$11 million was added from Title I school improvement funds left over from 2004-05. Schools in years 3, 4, 5, or 6 of school improvement in 2005-06 were eligible to apply for \$45,000 grants to support their improvement efforts.²⁴


CASE STUDIES

Buchanan Elementary School

Buchanan Elementary School is located a few miles south of downtown in Grand Rapids, serving approximately 500 students from pre-kindergarten through fifth grade. While Grand Rapids' population is roughly 67 percent white and 16 percent Hispanic, at Buchanan in 2005-06, 90 percent of students were Hispanic, eight percent were African American, and only one percent white; ninety-seven percent qualified for free or reduced-price lunch. Buchanan has struggled for years: until the current principal Roberto Garcia joined Buchanan in 1999, the school had suffered from constant turnover in administration. Student test scores were consistently low, with as few as ten percent of students meeting grade level standards in English

Language Arts (in Spring 2003). A large proportion of the student body speaks English as a second language, and an achievement gap between these students and English-speaking students has persisted at the school, particularly in reading and writing. In 2004-05, for example, 49 percent of students at Buchanan overall met state standards in reading and 24 percent in writing, compared with only 36 and 15 percent of English-language learners (Figure 1 shows school wide achievement trends from 2002 to 2006). By 2004, when the school entered year five of school improvement under NCLB, Garcia says, “we’d had a school improvement team for a while.”

Figure 1
Buchanan Elementary School:
Percentage of Students Meeting State Standards



In 2004 the Grand Rapids school district placed Buchanan among a group of schools that had failed to make AYP for four or five consecutive years. These schools were divided into three cohorts, each of which answered either to the district Superintendent, the Chief Academic Officer, or a district reading director during the school’s restructuring. Principals from these schools were required to meet monthly with their district contact to monitor implementation of a school restructuring plan.²⁵ As Garcia describes, the schools’ restructuring was “basically a district decision. The Superintendent developed the plan for all of us in the district. There wasn’t a good deal of choice at the building level.” There was also no parent or community voice in the

development of the restructuring plans, according to Garcia. Staff and parents were invited to provide input to a group of staff volunteers from each grade level: the school improvement team, which had been in place at the school for several years. But “in my particular building,” says Garcia, “if we decide to implement a program, there really isn’t a whole lot of questioning from parents.”

District staff met with Garcia in the fall of 2004 and presented their plan to restructure Buchanan. Although NCLB gives schools up to a year to develop a restructuring plan, the CEP has found that many schools in Michigan began implementing restructuring during their planning year.²⁶ This was the case at Buchanan as well. In most other ways, however, Buchanan is a classic story of an option 5 restructuring. The district’s restructuring plan did not call for changes to governance or staffing at Buchanan, but instead recommended changes to the school’s use of data, instructional model, and school day. First, under the plan, an external review team made up of district and intermediate school district staff visited the school regularly to discuss student progress with a school improvement team.²⁷ “The external review team visited the school periodically to look at achievement data,” says Garcia. “They would ask us about how students were doing in every grade level and what kind of intervention plans we had in place for students who were not achieving.”

Second, all schools were also required to adopt a new instructional model chosen by the district.²⁸ Garcia was glad for the change, which the school made in 2004. “The previous instructional model didn’t work very well for us,” he says. “We have a large number of students who are Spanish-speakers and our biggest challenge was to get enough of them to learn the language and the content to be successful on the tests.” With the Four Block Framework as their new instructional model, teachers began concentrating on reading and writing and worked to

include ESL strategies in every classroom. Half of the classrooms at Buchanan now include bilingual education where students study traditional academic subjects while learning English.²⁹ To help staff learn the new model, Garcia dedicated extra Title I funds to two new coaches who observe and train teachers in math, language arts and writing. “We got a lot of Title I money,” he says. And while Garcia reports that “some teachers were more comfortable with the coaching than others,” this on-site staff development “was probably one of the most effective changes.”

According to CEP’s national surveys, 95 percent of districts increase the use of student data as part of their restructuring plans. This was true in Grand Rapids as well. As the third component of its plan, the district required schools to demonstrate regular use of assessment data to guide instruction.³⁰ This was a major change at Buchanan, according to Garcia. “Teachers always used tests to see how their students are doing, but in the past they would administer a test and keep moving forward. The new focus on data forces them to take a look at how they are doing on a more regular basis. I think it’s caused teachers to rethink how they instruct.” Under the school’s restructuring plan, teachers review data four times per year with their colleagues, and at least three times per year with Garcia.³¹ Garcia encourages this by establishing collective planning periods for teachers on each grade-level team. “We’re all more accountable now to each other, to the district, and to our students,” he says.

Buchanan was also required to implement an all-day kindergarten as part of the district’s restructuring plan.³² Garcia says, “this was one of the greatest things for me. I had always wanted an all-day kindergarten, so I was glad it was mandated. Our kids need it.”

Garcia remained at the helm throughout Buchanan’s restructuring, and there were no staff changes in 2005 aside from the usual turnover. The school received external assistance and extra funds, and implemented a new instructional approach with accompanying professional

development. According to Garcia, these changes brought about several improvements at Buchanan, including greater district involvement in the operations of the school and a renewed focus on students' learning needs. Student test scores have risen since 2004: in 2005, the school made AYP for the second year in a row, and in 2006, scores climbed even higher. Still, less than half of the students at Buchanan are meeting state standards in reading and math.


All in all, the changes at Buchanan are hard to distinguish from the "school improvement" efforts underway at thousands of public schools nationwide, including at Buchanan itself pre-restructuring. While Garcia says "these [changes] were good things for us to be involved in," he acknowledges that "we were doing a lot of these things already." Without changes in governance, leadership, or staffing, the same people are still working in largely the same environment. Since Buchanan's challenges are so great, it is not clear that the scope and substance of the changes underway are sufficient to lift the school's achievement over time to meet NCLB's lofty goals for 2014.

Balboa Elementary School

Located in southwest San Diego about 10 miles from the US-Mexico border, Balboa Elementary School operates year-round to serve approximately 800 students in grades K–6. Statistics on Balboa show a school facing every challenge: the entire student body qualifies for free- or reduced-price lunch. More than 70 percent of students are just learning English. Every year the school loses about 20 percent of its students; most of these are thought to travel home to Mexico at Christmas and not return. The majority of teachers are in their first or second year of teaching, and turnover is very high – in any given year, principal Sylvia Gonzalez has to use new recruits to fill about one-third of her teaching staff. In recent years, Balboa has to fight to keep its students, too: the student body has declined from a peak of nearly 1000 in 2000-01 to just under

800 in 2004-05. Given this environment, it came as no surprise in 2004 when the school entered its fourth year of Program Improvement – the state’s designation for schools that fail to make AYP in the same subject for two consecutive years.³³ English language-learner students and socio-economically disadvantaged students had failed to meet performance expectations for another year. The school’s scores as a whole had continued to fall substantially below the district-wide averages for each grade level in both reading and math (see Figure 2).

Figure 2
Balboa Elementary School:
Percentage of Students Meeting State Standards



The San Diego Unified school district notified Balboa in 2004 that it must propose a plan for restructuring the school in 2005-06. The district also required the proposal to be developed by a School Restructuring Workgroup composed of parents, teachers, and community members. Gonzalez recalls that schools were told to “keep our working group to 12 members, no more. But we wanted everyone to be involved in the plan.” So that fall, she hung notices around the school and sent letters home with students to encourage parents, teachers, and community members to attend evening meetings. “Many parents, especially my parents, are not used to having a voice. They believe that what’s going on in school is the responsibility of the teachers – they’ll take care of it. They don’t get involved in school.” But attendance was surprisingly high. Staff hosted parent meetings during evenings and on weekends “so no one would feel left out. We told them,

‘twelve of you will be the working group and make final decisions, but all of you are welcome to participate.’ This way, everybody felt heard all the time.” Gonzalez felt this design was critical to successfully implementing the plan.

Though Gonzalez herself was aware of Balboa’s greatest challenges, she involved parents in the process of examining standardized test scores “to see where our deficits were and where our needs were going to be.” Parents and teachers were also invited to share their own concerns by listing the needs they saw at the school. After a series of about 20 meetings throughout the fall of 2004, the workgroup elected option 5 and began fashioning a plan to restructure Balboa. The workgroup bypassed the charter option, even though it initially considered it, because members believed they could implement the necessary changes at Balboa without converting to charter status.

The primary goal of the Balboa plan was to improve student achievement, with a particular focus on overcoming the learning gap between English learners and English-speaking students. A key strategy to meet this goal was to minimize what had become a constant stream of interruptions during normal class time.³⁴ Over the years at Balboa in an effort to meet district requirements, the day had become, according to Gonzalez, “a lot of wasted time. We had staff always coming in and out, and we knew that the steps were not developing a quality program for our students.”

Balboa’s restructuring plan also sought to institute reforms that would help the school retain teachers. “We have a lot of brand new teachers on a regular basis that we have to train. But we wanted to look at what it would take to make them want to stay.” Many of Balboa’s teachers “are still in school, finishing certification or working on their masters’ degree. Others are young parents, and they want to go home to their children.” Gonzalez knew that she would have to

continue training her teachers every year. But it became clear during the restructuring planning that it would be necessary to include their professional development within the school day.

Parents also wanted instruction in the arts, which had been dropped several years earlier to allow teachers more time to improve test scores. As Gonzalez explains, “we developed a plan in order to have it all.” Under the “Fifth-Day Collaborative Plan” put together by the school workgroup and implemented in fall of 2005, grade-level teams of teachers meet for collaborative planning every fifth day.³⁵ Instead of using substitutes in classrooms while teachers are planning, students spend their assigned day cycling through six 50-minute “Extended Learning Labs” in drama, music, social studies, writing, science, and math. These labs allow time for extra focus on subjects in which Balboa students are lagging while also reintroducing arts into the curriculum. The length of the school day was also extended by 35 minutes, which adds the equivalent of 20 days of instruction without adding days to the instructional year.³⁶

One of the biggest changes at Balboa in 2005 came as a surprise to everyone involved in developing the plan. Unless they chose to reopen as a charter school, all restructuring schools in San Diego Unified were bound by the district’s contract with the local teachers’ union, the San Diego Education Association, which required all teachers to re-apply for their positions. Principals at restructuring schools were allowed to select the first 30 percent of qualified teachers who reapplied; the remaining 70 percent of teaching slots were required to be filled based on seniority.³⁷ After struggling for years with extremely high staff turnover at Balboa, Gonzalez applied immediately for a waiver from this district-wide requirement. In retrospect, had Gonzalez known initially about this requirement, she might have been more enthusiastic about pursuing the charter route, which would have allowed the school to make its own hiring and firing decisions. “I had already gone through the process of hiring new people, and I was very

happy with the people that we had,” says Gonzalez. “Why would I want to go back five years when I’ve already trained these teachers and gotten them up to par?” The district did not allow a waiver. “Many of my teachers were offended by the district, hurt and angry, and did not re-apply. Others who had helped develop the plan ended up having to leave. I didn’t understand why the district wouldn’t make an exception. We made all these changes with these teachers and then they couldn’t stay with us.”

The district-wide requirement for staff replacement seemed an odd fit at a school that struggled to keep one-third of its staff in any given year. Gonzalez did find ways to keep about 60 percent of her staff in 2005, however, by using her 30 percent primarily to rehire qualified but less senior teachers, and then asking her most experienced teachers to re-apply. All of the teachers who started with Gonzalez in the fall of 2005 stayed through to the 2006 school year. Gonzalez attributes this in large part to the targeted professional development. As for the restructured school day, Gonzalez says “students are really enjoying it. They love drama, they love science, they love being able to do things that they wouldn’t usually be able to do in the normal classroom. And we’ve really noticed their self-esteem going up.”

Like Buchanan’s plan, Balboa’s “restructuring” resembles standard school improvement efforts nationwide, with its emphasis on professional development and reorganizing instructional time. Leadership, governance, and the school’s policy environment have remained largely constant. While there has been some staff change, this was due to turnover and collective bargaining restrictions rather than a deliberate effort to refashion the school’s teaching force. Will these changes be enough to lift the school out of chronic low performance? Test scores are on the rise at Balboa, but passing rates are still very low: in 2005-06, less than a quarter of students met state standards in English; only 35 percent met standards in math. And while the


changes at Balboa have helped the school retain teachers, they have done little to ensure stability in the student population. Only additional time at the restructured Balboa will show whether the Five-Day Collaborative Plan can usher in the improvements that the district, staff and parents have hoped for.

Milwood Magnet School

With a population nearing 80,000, the city of Kalamazoo, Michigan holds 2 public high schools, 3 middle schools, 16 elementary schools, and 9 magnet schools. In an environment this small, drops in public school enrollment are perceptible. Administrators felt it at Milwood Middle School, where enrollment dropped in 2004-05 from 540 to 390 students in grades seven and eight. Milwood had experienced a loss of many middle class families to other options in the district: private and charter schools in the area drew almost half (45 percent) of the students in southeast Kalamazoo in 2005. This, according to Principal Kevin Campbell, “starts to signal a downward spiral.”

As enrollment at Milwood slipped, so did its test scores. The percentage of eighth graders scoring at proficiency levels on state tests in science dropped by more than eight percentage points between 2002 and 2003; the percentage of seventh graders scoring proficient in reading dropped by 13 points between 2003 and 2004 (see Figure 3). But as state and federal sanctions against the school increased, the philosophy among the teachers remained, according to Campbell, “give us different students; we’ll give you a different result.” Many of the teachers at Milwood had been there since the school served a majority-white population, but in 2004, the student body at Milwood was approximately 60 percent African-American, 25 percent white and 15 percent Hispanic. Most students (80 percent) participated in the free and reduced lunch program.

Figure 3
Milwood Magnet School:
Percentage of Students Meeting State Standards



Campbell arrived at Milwood in 2004 after the school failed to make AYP for the fifth year in a row. He was brought in by the district during Milwood’s Corrective Action phase in an attempt to improve performance at the school. According to Campbell, who had previously served as an elementary school principal in the district, “it didn’t take long to realize what was going on. There was a very negative school culture, an entrenched staff. I knew that if we were really interested in fixing this school quickly, we’d need to consider some of the other options available to us.” When no significant changes were immediately apparent at the school as a result of Campbell’s work in early 2004, he recommended to Superintendent Janice Brown that she use the “nuclear option in [her] back pocket: bomb it and start over.”

Campbell and Brown agreed that reconstitution would likely be the best way to restructure the school: the teaching staff had stayed largely the same over the years as the student body had shifted significantly, and many teachers did not have the desire or the skills to work with the new population. “But,” Campbell explains, “we knew if that message came from us, it would probably fall on angry ears.” So the Superintendent appointed a governing board to oversee the development of a restructuring plan, and hired external evaluators to assess the school’s weaknesses. The governing board was made up of principals, teachers and parents from

Milwood's feeder elementary schools, as well as a union representative and staff and parents from Millwood.³⁸ Campbell arranged the governing board's first meeting where, as he describes, "we went to the parents and teachers and said, 'here is the issue: we are at phase five and we want to do some major restructuring at the school. We need your thinking and your input.' Parents' first response was, 'what's wrong?'" So the work of the external evaluators was really critical."

Two external evaluators certified by the state's Academic Coaches Registry as school turnaround coaches spent ten days at Milwood in 2004 observing teachers, students, and administration. The evaluators' interview, survey, and walk-through data confirmed Campbell's concerns about the school's climate, including student disrespect for staff, lack of a clear direction or vision for instruction, and a lack of collective ownership for improving the school.³⁹ At the conclusion of the audit, the evaluators made a presentation to the governing board with ten recommendations. Campbell explains, "after our conversation that night, the Board unanimously said 'we want to act on all of them.'" The evaluators' recommendations allowed the restructuring message to come from an objective source other than the principal or district superintendent. Their recommendations formed the basis of the governing board's proposal to close Milwood Middle at the end of the 2004-05 school year, reconstitute the staff, and reopen the school in 2005-06 to serve grades six through eight.

Campbell points out, however, that "we didn't get into anything about the school being a magnet at that point." The magnet approach, while "helping to infuse a focus into the school that would help market it to parents," mainly arose out of necessity: reopening as a magnet allowed Milwood to require all staff to reapply for their jobs and bypass contract provisions regarding seniority. "In our district we have favorable language for magnet schools that allows them to

staff by matching credentials and interests with the focus of the school. So we decided that would be the best option.”

Though the governing board and external evaluators agreed that reconstitution was necessary, the announcement caused an uproar at the school. “I remember the day that everybody got a letter saying, ‘the school’s closing; you’re going to have to reapply for your jobs.’ You can’t imagine how ugly it got. There was a lot of blame...and finger-pointing. But I don’t blame the teachers. They were a product of the conditions that were created here over time. When you’re in the middle of a mess you can’t really see that you’re in it. Still, we had to do it.” At the end of the 2004-05 school year, all staff positions were posted with interviews and placements were completed before students left for the summer.⁴⁰

The school workgroup chose to pursue three further changes in addition to reconstitution at Milwood during restructuring.⁴¹ The school incorporated a new curriculum focused on math, science, and technology. As Campbell explains, before restructuring “the curriculum was entrenched and traditional. But kids today are very tech-savvy. Trying to make them go to home-ec. and make pillows just wasn’t working. So we threw out a lot of the curriculum and brought in something that is responsive to what kids are going to need to know. They need to know how to use Microsoft Office more than they need to make pillows. So now we teach all the Office tools as part of our curriculum.”

With approximately 65 percent new staff at Milwood in the fall of 2005, professional development was also a major focus. “We had a culture that was very much into control, rules, and punishment as a way of trying to maintain order” before restructuring. With this new staff, “we needed to become more relational to kids.” The new staff was hired for their expertise as well as their willingness to learn. Teachers participated in intensive training during the summer

of 2005 to set up common expectations and prepare them for working with children from poverty. Still, Campbell says, “it was a pretty ugly year. Every single school structure didn’t exist. No one shared common bonds. Even though we got extra time, it didn’t even come close to scratching the surface of what we needed to bring everybody together.”


As he begins a new school year, Campbell is grateful for the changes at Milwood. “Without NCLB,” he says, “we probably wouldn’t have gone to this extreme. Most schools change principals, and that suffices in terms of meeting a restructuring claim even though they really aren’t changing anything; they’re just reshuffling. But I told my Superintendent: ‘I don’t want to be in this environment for 10 years. You have federal law behind you, and you can use it.’”

Unlike Buchanan and Balboa, Milwood’s changes appear to fall more in the category of dramatic change in structure envisioned under NCLB’s restructuring provisions. Between 2004 and 2006, Milwood undertook two of the most drastic methods of reform, bringing in a new principal and replacing most of its staff. Its curriculum changes were wholesale, rather than piecemeal. Its new magnet focus did not significantly change Milwood’s student population, according to Campbell (in 2005, 53 percent of the students were African-American, 36 were white, and nine percent were Hispanic). But in 2005 the school made AYP for the first time in over five years. Test scores in reading are improving, with nearly 50 percent of students meeting state standards in 2005-06. But math scores have dropped consistently since 2003-04, and in 2005-06 only 27 percent of students met standards in math. Nonetheless, Campbell is optimistic. “You stripped the school bare. It has to be built back up again. You can’t have it be the Taj Mahal in one year. It’s going to take 3-5 years.”

Gompers Middle School

Five rival gangs claim territory in the Chollas View neighborhood surrounding Gompers Middle School in southeastern San Diego. Crime and drugs are common. And in the words of principal Vince Riveroll, Gompers has “some of the student subgroups that need us the most.” Most students are poor – in 2004-05, 81 percent qualified for free or reduced-price lunch. Of just over 1500 students in grades six through nine, 58 percent were Hispanic; 29 percent were African-American; 43 percent were English-language learners. Since the school served in the 1980s as a magnet for students bused from across town, test scores had dropped dramatically. In 2004, fewer than 20 percent of Gompers students were proficient in language arts and math, ranking the school as one of the lowest performing in the district (see Figure 4). There were nearly 1000 suspensions that year; the school had 18 teacher vacancies.

Figure 4
Gompers Charter Middle School:
Percentage of Students Meeting State Standards



Gompers’ transformation from this dismal condition in the fall of 2005 hit the national news. Students arrived in August wearing white oxford shirts and ties, plaid skirts and knee socks. Governor Schwarzenegger, California Secretary of Education Alan Bersin, the superintendent of schools, the chancellor of the University of California at San Diego (UCSD)

and the president of the local Urban League welcomed students from a red carpet to their first day of school. For the first time in the building's history, there were no teacher vacancies on the first day of class.⁴² All these changes were the more visible results of Gompers' 2005 restructuring efforts under NCLB.

In 2004, San Diego Unified had classified Gompers Middle School in year four of Program Improvement and called for the creation of a restructuring plan. The process began at Gompers with a workgroup similar to the group that served at Balboa. "A group of 20 to 25 parents, teachers, students and community members signed up to be a part of the group." Riveroll credits much of their restructuring success to this workgroup structure. "People heard about our plans because it wasn't a principal talking; it was parents talking to parents. Parents became very knowledgeable about NCLB and why we were restructuring. It was very empowering. Our parents were able to make very informed decisions about what the school was to become."

The Gompers workgroup met weekly, sometimes until 10:00 at night, and hosted biweekly meetings with students and the general public. "We did a lot of soul-searching in the workgroup. Why is this school low-performing? What are the real issues?" The meetings revealed that the number one barrier to success at Gompers was the school's inability to hire its own staff."

With this as their primary focus, the Gompers workgroup immediately sought a waiver from the San Diego Education Association (SDEA) to allow the school to hire and fire its own teachers. "We asked the SDEA to the workgroup table to negotiate solutions for the school. We believed as a group of parents, staff, administrators and community members that this was the best option for us, that this should be our restructuring." Riveroll explains, "we were under the

impression that this workgroup was going to recommend what should happen at the school, and that would happen. We had looked at the issues and knew what was wrong with the school. But [the SDEA's] answer was no.”

With their waiver request denied, the workgroup started planning “the next option that met the needs of our school” – becoming a charter school. But “going charter is a very difficult process. It required a lot of work. We faced very hostile responses from the school board at that time. Every time we went to a board meeting, a new obstacle was put in front of us.” During this period, the school board was locked in an epic battle with then superintendent Alan Bersin over the direction of change in the district. After the November 2004 election, a new majority of the board opposed Bersin’s reforms, including his support for charter schools.

The workgroup knew they would have to offer signatures from 50 percent of parents in support of their charter petition. Parents, teachers, administrators and community members went door-to-door over the winter holidays to garner more than 700 signatures. But then in January, the new school board reversed the district’s earlier stance by also requiring 51 percent of Gompers’ tenured classroom faculty to approve a change to charter status. The policy change seemed like a fatal setback, another roadblock laid down by a school board hostile to charter schools. But within a day, Riveroll delivered.

“A teacher who had 29 years of service at Gompers was the first to sign the petition,” he explains. “She told me, ‘I can go anywhere. The kids can’t.’ Many other teachers followed in that sentiment, saying ‘it isn’t about the adults, for once. It’s about the kids.’”

Despite this show of support for Gompers’ charter, the school board removed Mr. Riveroll as principal in early February. “I was removed from a school that was barely holding on,” he says. Community members viewed Riveroll’s removal as another attempt by the school

board to derail Gompers' charter effort.⁴³ "The most wonderful thing, though," says Riveroll, "is that I may have been the starting pitcher in this effort, but I wasn't the closing pitcher. I sat on the bench and watched as parents and community members fought for their school." After a heated board meeting in March of 2005, the board unanimously approved Gompers' charter proposal in the face of strong community pressure. "The community rose to the occasion," says Riveroll. "It was an amazing thing to witness." The school's new charter board had the authority to make all hiring decisions for the school, and at their first meeting in 2005, the trustees voted unanimously to reappoint Riveroll as principal.⁴⁴

Gompers had several sources of support during its restructuring, including the San Diego Urban League and local churches. The school is also working in partnership with UCSD to model several aspects of the University's successful Preuss School, including a college-preparatory focus. As Riveroll explains, "parents wanted a college-preparatory school; they were tired of our students not having access to college. UCSD offered the expertise to make it happen."

University professors also train Gompers faculty. With authority to hire its own staff, Gompers filled its vacancies with many teachers new to the profession, and professional development immediately became a major focus. "We developed a master schedule to make sure that teachers have time built into the day to develop their own learning." Teachers also engage in three weeks of training during the summer before students arrive.

The swell of community support evident at the 2005 board meeting was one of the most important changes brought about by Gompers' restructuring. According to Michelle Evans, the school's parent-engagement director, many parents had watched for years as the school steadily declined. Before restructuring, parents "were angry at the school. They were angry that nothing

was being done.”⁴⁵ But during the summer of 2005, parents and community members cleaned, painted, and remodeled the Gompers building and grounds in preparation for students’ arrival at the new school. The student population has not changed significantly at Gompers since it became a charter school (in 2005-06, 62 percent of students were Hispanic, 26 were African-American, and 45 percent were English-language learners). But the new focus on professional development at Gompers has helped establish a new culture at the school, and greatly increased retention. Between 2005 and 2006, sixty-five percent of teachers returned to their positions. “That was a complete turnaround,” says Riveroll.

Gompers was one of only a handful of schools to “go charter” under NLCB in 2005. According to Riveroll, “it was a very difficult route to take. It’s a route that we don’t regret, because it’s paid out more than we put in – our kids are learning. But it wasn’t an easy thing.” Test scores have improved since restructuring – the school’s own internal analysis shows a 24 point gain on California’s Academic Performance Index between 2004-05 and 2005-06 – but passing rates are still dreadfully low. In 2005-06, just under 13 percent of students met standards in English; less than seven percent did in math. It’s clear that “going charter” has not been the solution to all of Gompers’ problems. Riveroll is optimistic: “we’re definitely on the right track,” he says. “It’s amazing what can happen when you have quality teaching and learning in the classroom. The same kids that were suspended last year are the ones that are in school now, wearing a tie.” Still, the Gompers experience underscores the difficulty of making dramatic test score improvements even when implementing the kind of drastic changes enabled by the charter route.

COMMON LESSONS AND CONCLUSIONS

These four case studies of schools that have restructured in two states certainly do not provide a representative picture of districts' and schools' implementation of the restructuring provisions of NCLB. They do, however, offer a picture of how these particular communities have been affected by a federal law meant to inspire fundamental school reforms. They also allow us to make several observations about what restructuring can look like at the school level.

1) **NCLB provides schools and districts an *opportunity* to make change, but gives them wide flexibility on how to proceed.** Broad surveys of restructuring have found that most schools nationwide are implementing mild changes, such as option 5, rather than more drastic reforms under NCLB.⁴⁶ When compared to national trends, two of our four case study schools are atypical in their magnitude of change. District and school leaders at Milwood and Gompers initiated major reforms in attempt to improve student learning through restructuring. The case studies do, however, echo the national finding that among schools choosing drastic restructuring, NCLB can empower them to make changes that they would not be willing or perhaps able to make without the “power of federal law.” Administrators at all four of our case study schools agreed that without the restructuring requirements of NCLB, “we probably wouldn’t have gone to this extreme,” or “it would have taken longer.” Specifically, Gompers and Milwood used the more radical restructuring options under NCLB to remove principals or teachers who would otherwise be protected by contracts and bargaining agreements. In Grand Rapids, the district invoked NCLB as the rationale to impose a raft of changes on schools. While school officials perceived the district’s plans for restructuring as requirements of the NCLB Act itself, in fact the

imposed changes were just one of a more or less infinite range of responses the district could have pursued.

This flexibility runs in contrast to the inflamed rhetoric on both sides of the NCLB debate. On the one hand, it belies the fear expressed by some that NCLB is forcing localities and schools to engage in disruptive reform that may or may not align with school needs. Instead, NCLB's requirements appear to work more as a symbolic call to action, giving districts and schools extraordinary leeway about how to proceed. It seems clear that any district or school so inclined could simply continue whatever reforms it was undertaking before and call it "restructuring."

On the other, flexibility undermines the claim of NCLB proponents that federal law no longer tolerates chronic failure. While the restructuring provisions may nudge districts to take more dramatic action, this nudge falls short of a mandate. The Act has, in effect, placed a tool in the hands of local leaders. How (or even whether) they employ that tool remains largely a local decision. And as discussed in the next point, numerous considerations beyond NCLB are likely to influence those local choices.

2) NCLB is just one of many forces acting on failing schools. Staff and administrations at Buchanan, Balboa, Milwood and Gompers felt pressure to improve from sources other than NCLB. Due to changes in the neighborhood and district policies in recent years, before restructuring Balboa was under pressure to improve if only to preserve its enrollment (and therefore its funding). Milwood was under similar pressure to improve, lest it be forced to close for lack of enrollment amidst growing competition from private, magnet, and charter schools. The state accountability system kicked in at Buchanan years before federal restructuring requirements, and brought with it school improvement teams, extra resources, and personnel

shifts in an effort to improve performance. In addition to these pressures, schools operate in the midst of public education's notorious web of constraints, such as collective bargaining agreements and charter school laws requiring faculty votes in favor of charter conversion. Finally, district and school leaders respond to the restructuring provisions in the context of the wider politics of education reform in their localities. In general, these politics are likely to include numerous pressures *not* to take dramatic actions, especially those that involve replacement of school staff, radical moves like chartering or contracting out, or state takeover. Instead, local leaders face incentives to take more incremental, symbolic actions that may amount more to "spinning wheels" than to true forward motion.⁴⁷ While NCLB may place one fairly light weight on the scale in favor of substantial change, it will often not be sufficient to outweigh the heavy load on the other side.

3) **Districts' involvement in the planning process varies widely.** While the law makes clear that local education agencies (usually districts) hold primary responsibility for the creation of a restructuring plan, it does not specify the degree to which schools should be involved in the process. Our case studies make clear that, as a result, there is a great deal of variation from one district to the next. For example, in Grand Rapids, all Phase Five schools were required to implement the same or similar restructuring actions under the district's restructuring plan, such as implementing a full-day kindergarten. In San Diego, too, the district required staff at all restructuring schools to reapply for their jobs and laid down several roadblocks before schools that sought to pursue charter status. But also in San Diego, school-level workgroups had a great deal of flexibility in devising their restructuring plans, and the two schools profiled here went in very different directions. In Kalamazoo, an enterprising school principal worked with district leaders to engineer a dramatic change. In just these four schools, then, we see four very different

approaches to district engagement – from outright mandates to collaboration to empowerment of school level teams.

4) **The restructuring process can offer a chance for meaningful community involvement.** Prior to restructuring, principals in each of our case study schools were accustomed to very little parent involvement. But in those districts that interpreted restructuring as an opportunity to respond to unique needs at each failing school, principals reported increased community involvement as one of the greatest benefits of the restructuring process. In Kalamazoo and San Diego, where restructuring workgroups held primary responsibility for developing plan proposals, restructuring gave parents, staff, and community members a concrete reason to meet regularly throughout the planning year, a forum in which to express their concerns, and an opportunity participate in the creation of strategies to address those concerns. NCLB requires local education agencies to provide parents and teachers an opportunity to participate in the development of a restructuring plan, but does not specify the means schools and districts must use.⁴⁸ School leaders in districts that fully implemented this provision report that real community involvement is worth the trouble: at Balboa, Milwood and Gompers, parent commitment and a reinvigorated community are reportedly providing strong and necessary support for the other changes brought about by restructuring.

Ironically, though, parent involvement in restructuring may in some cases put a brake on major change. Parents nationwide tend to believe their schools are already serving their children well – in a 2006 survey, 64 percent of parents rated their child’s school as an “A” or a “B.”⁴⁹ It is perhaps not surprising, then, that so many restructuring schools opt for the less drastic restructuring strategies under NCLB.

Ultimately, the aim of restructuring is to achieve dramatic, measurable improvements in student achievement. In the literature on organizational turnarounds, one of the consistent findings is that in successful turnarounds, managers achieve relatively quick, measurable wins on important metrics. These wins, while not representing complete organizational turnaround, create momentum to take the next steps, leading to a virtual cycle of improvement.⁵⁰ One year into these four schools' experiences, there is little evidence of that kind of improvement in achievement. Yet, school leaders are optimistic; they think their schools are going in the right direction. Whether they are right or wrong, what's clear from these case studies is that NCLB's restructuring mandates will be just one part of a much more complex story.

¹ No Child Left Behind Act, 2001.

² U.S. Department of Education, *LEA and School Improvement: Non-Regulatory Guidance*. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education, 2006).

³ The federally funded Center for Comprehensive School Reform and Improvement has commissioned a series of resources on restructuring, including four white papers reviewing the literature on approaches to restructuring and a guide for district leaders making restructuring decisions. See Emily A. Hassel, Bryan C. Hassel, Matthew Arkin, Julie Kowal, and Lucy Steiner, *School Restructuring Under NCLB: What Works When* (Naperville, IL: Learning Point Associates, 2005). Available online at

http://www.centerforsri.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=282&Itemid=88.

⁴ Center on Education Policy, *From the Capital to the Classroom: Year Four of the No Child Left Behind Act*. (Washington, DC: Center on Education Policy, 2006). Available online at <http://www.cep-dc.org/nclb/Year4/CEP-NCLB-Report-4.pdf>.

⁵ Ibid

⁶ Analysis based on current trends reported in Center on Education Policy, *From the Capital to the Classroom*.

⁷ Kerstin Carlson Le Floch, James Taylor, and Yu Zhang, *Schools in NCLB Restructuring: National Trends*. (Washington, DC: American Institutes for Research, 2006).

⁸ Ibid.; National Center for Education Statistics, *Participation in Education*. (Washington, DC: NCES, 2005).

⁹ Le Floch, Taylor, and Zhang, *Schools in NCLB Restructuring*.

¹⁰ Stephanie Stullich, Elizabeth Eisner, Joseph McCrary, & Collette Roney. *National Assessment of Title I Interim Report: Volume I: Implementation of Title I*. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance, 2006), citing data from the Study of State Implementation of Accountability and Teacher Quality under NCLB and the National Longitudinal Study of NLCB; Le Floch, Taylor, and Zhang, *Schools in NCLB Restructuring*.

¹¹ Center on Education Policy, *From the Capital to the Classroom: Year Four*; Center on Education Policy, *From the Capital to the Classroom: Year Three of the No Child Left Behind Act*. (Washington, DC: Center on Education Policy, 2005); Rebecca Wolf DiBiase, *State Involvement in School Restructuring Under No Child Left Behind in the 2004-05 School Year*. (Denver, CO: Education Commission of the States, 2005).

¹² Center on Education Policy, *Hope but No Miracle Cures: Michigan's Early Restructuring Lessons*. (Washington, DC: Center on Education Policy, 2005); Center on Education Policy, *Wrestling the Devil in the Details: An Early Look at Restructuring in California*. (Washington, DC: Center on Education Policy, 2006).

¹³ Center on Education Policy, *From the Capital to the Classroom: Year Four*.

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- ¹⁴ Center on Education Policy, *From the Capital to the Classroom: Year Four*; DiBiase, *State Involvement in School Restructuring*.
- ¹⁵ Center on Education Policy, *Hope but No Miracle Cures*; Center on Education Policy, *Wrestling the Devil in the Details*. CEP also studied the effects of NCLB in Maryland: *Building on State Reform: Maryland School Restructuring*. (Washington, DC: CEP, 2006). Available online at <http://www.cep-dc.org/pubs/mdschoolSep2006/CEP-MdSchlRestruct.pdf>.
- ¹⁶ Center on Education Policy, *From the Capital to the Classroom: Year Four*.
- ¹⁷ U.S. Department of Education, *NCLB Executive Summary* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education, 2002). Available online at <http://www.ed.gov/nclb/overview/intro/execsumm.html>.
- ¹⁸ Center on Education Policy, *Wrestling the Devil in the Details*.
- ¹⁹ Ibid.
- ²⁰ Ibid.
- ²¹ San Diego City Schools, *Plan for Schools Subject to Restructuring*. (San Diego, CA, Sept. 2004) Available online at http://www.sandi.net/board/reports/2004/0928/e7a_report.pdf.
- ²² Center on Education Policy, *Hope but No Miracle Cures*.
- ²³ According to data published by the Michigan Department of Education, available online at <http://www.michigan.gov/mde/0,1607,7-140-22709---,00.html>.
- ²⁴ Center on Education Policy, *Hope but No Miracle Cures*.
- ²⁵ Bert R. Blake, "Focus, Consistency, and Commitment Drive Change in Grand Rapids Schools," *Leading Change* (Fall 2004). Available online at <http://cenmi.org/LeadingChange/F04/article1A.asp>.
- ²⁶ Center on Education Policy, *Hope but No Miracle Cures*.
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- ²⁹ Buchanan Elementary School, *School Action Plan for Learning* (2005).
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- ³¹ Ibid.
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- ³³ California Department of Education, *Title I Program Improvement Status Determinations*. Available online at <http://www.cde.ca.gov/ta/ac/ay/tidetermine.asp>.
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- ³⁶ Ibid.
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- ³⁸ Milwood Middle School, *Title I School Improvement Plan* (2005).
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- ⁴⁷ Frederick M. Hess, *Spinning Wheels: The Politics of Urban School Reform*. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998).
- ⁴⁸ No Child Left Behind Act, 20 USC §6316(b)(8)(C) (2001). See also U.S. Department of Education, *NCLB 2006 Non-Regulatory Guidance*. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education, 2006).
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- ⁵⁰ Sudi Sudarsanam and Jim Lai. "Corporate Financial Distress and Turnaround Strategies: An Empirical Analysis." *British Journal of Management* no. 12 (2001); Rob Paton and Jill Mordaunt. "What's different about public and non-profit 'turnaround'?" *Public Money & Management* (August 2004). For a summary of this research as it relates

to the NCLB school restructuring context, see also Julie Kowal and Emily Ayscue Hassel, *Turnarounds with New Leaders and Staff*, part of the *School Restructuring Under NCLB: What Works When?* series (Naperville, IL: Learning Point Associates, 2005).