

The Vanishing Conservative—Is There a Glass Ceiling?

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Introduction

The politics of professors has emerged as one of the most contentious topics in political sociology. There are two major elements of this debate: What do professors believe and what does it matter? Much of the evidence on these issues is dealt with in other papers at this conference. Here we deal with these issues insofar as they affect the academic profession, rather than faculty-student relations: Is academia heavily liberal and Democratic, and if so, does this affect advancement in the academic profession?

Our data are drawn primarily from the North American Academic Survey (NAAS), originally directed by S. M. Lipset, Everett Ladd, and Stanley Rothman, which is described in detail below. We also discuss a more recent survey, the Politics of the American Professoriate (PAP). In 2006, sociologists Neil Gross and Solon Simmons surveyed a stratified random sample of 1417 faculty teaching in departments offering undergraduate degrees at 927 2-year, 4-year, and graduate-degree granting institutions. They concluded that The PAP survey found less liberalism and more political moderation among faculty than previous studies suggested.¹

North American Academic Survey (NAAS)

The NAAS represented a partnership between Rothman, as an extension of his numerous surveys of social leadership groups, and Lipset and Ladd, who had conducted surveys of academic groups going back three decades.²

Conducted in 1999 by the Angus Reid (now Ipsos-Reid) survey research firm, the NAAS sample encompassed students, faculty and administrators at colleges and universities in the United States and Canada. The instrument included a wide range of items, among them demographic background variables; attitudes toward social, political, and academic issues; and (for faculty) academic background, activities, and accomplishments.

The United States sample included 1643 faculty members drawn from 183 randomly selected universities and colleges. Full-time faculty were randomly chosen from each institution in numbers proportionate to its size. Among those contacted for the U.S. faculty sample, a response rate of 72% was obtained. Unfortunately the deaths of two of the principals and illness of the third led to considerable delays in analyzing and reporting the findings. In 2005 communications scholar Robert Lichter joined the project to edit a manuscript on the political attitudes and behavior of U.S. faculty, which appeared in the Berkeley Press online journal *The Forum* in Spring 2005.^{3,4}

Party Affiliation

The NAAS instrument included three separate measures of political identification: political party preference, ideological self-designation on a left-right scale, and a set of items on social and political attitudes. First, faculty were asked to identify their political party affiliation as Democrat, Republican, Independent or “other.” Half (50%) identified themselves as Democrats, compared to 11% who identified themselves as Republicans, a ratio greater than 4 to 1. An additional 33% called themselves independent, and 5% specified some other party. At that time, 36 percent of the American public identified themselves as Democrats and 29 percent as Republicans.⁵

The largest spreads between the two parties were found in the humanities (62% Dem v. 6% GOP) and the social sciences (55% Dem v. 7% GOP). The least difference was found among business faculty, in which the two parties’ representation was even (26% for both). This group also had the largest proportion of independents. The most heavily Democratic departments, English literature, sociology history, psychology, linguistics, education and the arts, all of which contained at least eight self-described Democrats for every Republican.

Table 1 presents these results as well as comparable findings from the PAP survey, for all fields and departments for which published data were available from both surveys. The PAPs findings were remarkably similar to those of the NAAS, especially considering the differences in sampling and the seven year gap between the two (2006 v. 1999). Whereas the NAAS found 50% self-identified Democrats and 11% Republicans, the PAP found 50% Democrats and 14% Republicans. The similarities extend to numerous fields and departments, despite the rapid increase in confidence intervals as the number of cases diminishes.

Table 1: Party Identification by Field: NAAS vs. PAP

Field of Study	NAAS			PAP		
	Dem	GOP	Ratio	Dem	GOP	Ratio
All Faculty	50%	1%	5-1	50%	14%	4-1
Social Sciences	55	7	8-1	56	7	8-1
Humanities	62	6	10-1	54	11	5-1
Business	26	26	1-1	39	24	2-1
Engineering/Comp. Science	37	15	2-1	28	23	--
Natural Sciences	46	14	3-1	53	15	4-1
Selected Departments						
Communications	47	11	4-1	49	13	4-1
Computer Science	43	21	2-1	32	10	3-1
English	69	2	34-1	51	2	25-1
Biology	56	13	4-1	51	6	8-1
Psychology	63	7	9-1	78	7	11-1
Economics	36	17	2-1	34	29	1-1
Political Science	58	8	7-1	50	6	6-1
Sociology	59	0	--	49	6	8-1
Nursing	32	26	1-1	60	22	3-1
History	70	4	18-1	79	4	20-1
Agriculture	24	31	1-1	NA	NA	

Political/Social Attitudes

The NAAS also included numerous political attitude items, several of which were drawn from a 1995 survey of elite or “social leadership” groups in the United States.⁶ A factor analysis produced two factors that accounted for much of the variance in political attitudes, which represented dimensions related to social and political/economic liberalism respectively. The items representing political liberalism included the government’s responsibility with regard to employment and income distribution along with environmental protection; the social liberalism dimension was represented by attitudes toward gay rights, abortion, and extramarital sex.

The level of agreement with the liberal position ranged from a low of 66% who believed that the government should work to ensure full employment to a high of 88% who favored greater environmental protection, even at the cost of price increases or job losses. In addition, 84% agreed that it is a woman’s right to decide whether to have an abortion, 77% regarded homosexuality as no less acceptable as heterosexuality, 75% endorsed cohabitation without marital intentions, and 72% favored government action to reduce income inequality.

Carnegie Survey Findings


Finally, the NAAS included a measure of ideological self-designation modeled on several national surveys of faculty conducted for the Carnegie Corporation from 1969 through 1997.⁷ In 1969, 1975, and 1984 respondents were asked to identify their political leanings as left, liberal, middle of the road, moderately conservative or strongly conservative. In 1989 and 1997 the response categories changed slightly to liberal, moderately liberal, middle of the road, moderately conservative, and conservative.

Figure 1 shows that an ideological shift among college faculty apparently began to occur sometime in the mid-to-late 1980’s, as the difference between self-described liberals and

conservatives began to widen. The liberal plurality of 45% v 27% in 1969 had narrowed a 40% to 34% margin by 1984. But by 1989 the gap had increased to 56% to 28%, a 2 to 1 ratio of liberals to conservatives. The 1997 survey found little change, with a slight drop in the proportion of conservatives. Of course, part of the shift beginning in 1989 may reflect the change in response categories. Since that year, however, the growing predominance of liberal over conservative faculty is clear. This is shown in Figure 1, which also includes comparable data from the NAAS and PAP questionnaires, which are discussed below.

NAAS Findings

In 1999 the NAAS asked respondents to place themselves on a 10 point scale from “very right” to “very left.” These were recoded into pairs matching the five Carnegie categories, e.g., responses of one and two as liberal, three and four as moderately liberal, etc. We reported in the Forum that the results indicated a strong tilt to the left among faculty, with the proportion placing themselves left of center (i.e. 1-4 on the scale) outnumbering those on the right (i.e. 7-10) by 72 to 15 percent, and the remaining 13 percent in the middle of the ideological spectrum (i.e. 5-6 on the scale).



Following the publication of these data, however, we became aware of an error in the findings. When joining the project to revise the Forum manuscript, Lichter was unaware that the survey instrument contained the following screening question: “When it comes to political matters, do you ever think of yourself in terms of Left and Right?” Those who answered “no” were not asked to place themselves on the left to right scale. That turned out to be a substantial portion of the sample. So the reported data applied only to the subsample of respondents who responded “no” to this screening question. That amounted to 64 percent, leaving 36 percent who were not counted on this variable.

We regret the error, and we seek here to provide a better indicator of ideological self-placement that covers the full sample. In order to have some idea of how the ideological self-placement would look if the non-respondents were included, we imputed scores for them on the political self-identification scale according to their responses on the attitude questions shown in Table 2. When this was done, the proportion of left of center faculty fell from 72 percent for the original subsample of respondents to 62 percent for the full sample, the proportion of those to the right of center dropped from 15 to 12 percent, and the proportion of middle of the road respondents doubled, from 13 to 26 percent.

The overall findings and those for various fields and departments are shown in Table 2. Notably, the revised NAAS findings more closely resemble the 1989 and 1997 Carnegie findings and the 2006 PAP finding that 62% of faculty depicted themselves as left of center, 20% as right of center, and 18% as middle of the road, following the item categories appearing in Gross and Simmons’ article.⁹ (Unfortunately their published data did not permit a department by department comparison.) However, that was not the conclusion reached by Gross and Simmons, as we discuss below.

The PAP Challenge

The PAP measure of political ideology asked faculty to characterize their political ideology as “extremely liberal, liberal, slightly liberal, moderate or middle of the road, slightly conservative, conservative, or very conservative.” In reporting the results, however, instead of combining the three response categories on either side of the moderate category to represent self-described liberals and conservatives, Gross and Simmons combined “slightly liberal” and “slightly conservative” with the middle of the road category.

Table 2: Political identification of college professors by field on NAAS (%)¹⁰

	Liberal**	Conservative**	N
All Faculty	62	12	1643
Social Sciences	66	8	289
Humanities	77	8	449
Sciences	58	13	339
Selected Departments			
English Literature	85	3	87
Performing Arts	79	11	31
Psychology	80	6	68
Fine Arts	70	8	36
Theology/Religion	67	14	26
Political Science	79	2	67
Philosophy	79	4	26
History	79	7	62
Sociology	72	8	61
Biology	64	12	59
Communications	65	10	66
Music	63	9	53
Computer Science	66	18	44
Mathematics	43	9	49
Physics	59	10	37
Linguistics	63	9	53
Chemistry	51	21	52
Education	57	21	88
Economics	43	27	44
Nursing	39	19	32
Engineering	42	15	90
Business	44	22	101


This recalculation produced 44% liberals, 44% moderates, and 9% conservatives. Gross and Simmons inferred from this that they had found “a moderate bloc... equal in size to the liberal bloc.” Noting that this echoed the 46% liberal/left group that the 1975 Carnegie survey found, they concluded that “the biggest change over the past 30 years” has not been growth on the left but decline on the right and “movement into moderate ranks.”¹¹

However, this conclusion derived entirely from the decision to recode the “slightly” liberal and conservative self-identifiers into an expanded moderate group, which automatically depleted the liberal and conservative groups. Was this justifiable? Gross and Simmons provided a testable argument: “We would not be justified in doing so if it turned out that the ‘slightlys’ were, in terms of their substantive attitudes, no different than their more liberal or conservative counterparts. But preliminary evidence indicates that they are different.”¹²

The evidence came from political attitude items included in the PAP. Gross and Simmons computed the mean scores of each group on a scale derived from 12 Pew Values Survey questions, which dealt with attitudes toward the government’s role in helping the poor, terrorism and the use of military force, etc. On these questions the most liberal response was coded as one, a middle of the road response as three, and the most conservative response as five.

If the “slightlys” were really moderates, one would expect to find their average Pew Values scores hewing closer to those of the middle group than to the groups farther toward the ends of the ideological groups. But that isn’t what happened. As Figure 2 shows, the 1.7 mean score of the “slight” liberals was actually closer to the 1.4 mean score of the combined liberal and “extreme liberal” group than to the 2.2 mean score of the moderates. By contrast, the “slight” conservatives’ 2.8 mean score was closer to the moderates’ 2.2 than to the conservative and extreme conservatives’ 3.7 score.¹³

Figure 2: Self-identification by Pew Values Scale Scores (PAP)



In addition, Figure 2 shows visually how the entire spectrum of these responses was actually tilted to the left of center. The middle of the road position on the five-point Pew Values scale is represented by a score of three. Yet four of the five groups of professors, including the “slight conservatives,” had mean scores below three, i.e., on the liberal side of the midpoint. The liberal/extreme liberal group was much closer to the left end of the spectrum than the conservative/extreme conservative group was to the right end. In fact the “slight conservatives” were actually farther to the *left* of center than the more extreme conservative group was to the *right* of center.

Thus, it is difficult to understand how this statistical procedure could justify moving the “slightlys” into the moderate camp. The slightlys did *not* hold attitudes that placed them closer to the moderates than to their ideological peers. The whole spectrum of faculty attitudes was skewed toward liberal responses, so that the “middle of the road” was actually where the road forked to the left. Finally, the Pew Values items that were used to construct this opinion spectrum did not include the PAP’s questions dealing with sex and gender, such as abortion and homosexuality, on which the faculty sample was tilted farthest toward the liberal position. So

these findings may underestimate the degree to which the overall tenor of even “moderate” faculty opinion is actually well to the left of center.

This tilt to the left is consistent with responses to other PAP items. For example, among their faculty sample, the ratio of Democratic to Republican voters was about 2 to 1 in 1984 and 1988 and grew to 4 to 1 in 1992 and 5 to 1 in 1996, before receding to 3 to 1 in 2000. In addition, one out of 4 professors in the humanities and social sciences described themselves as radicals or activists, and 1 out of 7 social scientists (including 1 out of 4 sociologists) called themselves Marxists. These days there are literally more Marxists in faculty lounges than in the Kremlin. We do not question the PAP’s methodology, only the researchers’ interpretation of the results. In fact Gross and Simmons’ own summary is more circumspect than media accounts¹⁴ might suggest: “Although we would not contest the claim that professors are one of the most liberal occupational groups in American society, or that the professoriate is a Democratic stronghold ... there is a sizable, and often ignored, center/center-left contingent.” To which those who see a liberal hegemony in academe may well reply, with enemies like these, who needs friends?

Summary

When the trends in ideological self-description are combined with the party affiliation and attitude data, it seems clear that American college and university faculty are heavily Democratic and liberal, especially among the social sciences and humanities, and that their ideological homogeneity has increased since the mid-1980s. On these points our survey generally replicated the findings of other recent researchers.

Politics and Professional Status

The NAAS data confirm the predominance of liberal faculty on American college campuses. But it is harder to determine whether this situation makes it more difficult for

conservatives to advance in their profession. In addition to finding that conservatives are under-represented in college faculties, it would be necessary to show that conservative academics are disadvantaged in their career advancement, and that any gap is not simply due to a lack of merit on their part.

To address these issues we examined the correlation between quality of academic affiliation and the three NAAS measures of political orientation—left-right self-identification, political party identification, and social/political attitudes. To determine whether any political differences could be traced to different achievement levels by right- and left-leaning faculty, we constructed an academic achievement index from items measuring the number of refereed journal articles, chapters in academic books, books authored or co-authored, service on editorial boards of academic journals, attendance at international meetings of one's discipline, and proportion of time spent on research. This index was highly correlated with a simple count of academic publications. However, such counts have been criticized as simplistic or uni-dimensional measures of achievement, hence our use of an index including other factors.

There are various emblems of professional success in academia, ranging from amount of compensation to awards to chaired professorships. However, the most significant factor in the academic status hierarchy is the quality of the college or university with which one is affiliated. Therefore we operationalized professional status in terms of institutional quality. We constructed an institutional quality index by combining the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching classification with the well-known US News & World Report rankings of universities and colleges.

The widely used Carnegie classification divides schools into two levels each of research universities, doctorate granting universities, comprehensive universities and colleges, and liberal

arts colleges. Altogether these make up what are described as eight “tiers” of institutions. While controversial among some educators, the US News rankings are widely used, and they are derived from a plausible and measurable set of variables, including peer ratings, test scores of incoming students, resources available to students, etc. Further, the most frequently heard criticism is that the rankings measure institutional reputation rather than quality of students’ education; for our purposes this is not necessarily a disadvantage.

US News places the best colleges and universities in its “national” rankings. Institutions that do not make it into the national ranking are ranked regionally. We modified US News’ ratings by placing the “national” institutions in the top four Carnegie tiers and the “regional” institutions in the bottom four tiers, with the particular tier determined by the school’s ranking.

To determine whether professional advancement is influenced by ideological orientation over and above the effects of scholastic achievement, we conducted a multiple regression analysis in which scholarly achievement and political orientation were the key independent variables of interest, and the dependent variable was the quality of one’s institutional affiliation (operationally, the tier in which the institution is located). In addition to the political variables, we included several other factors that have been cited as sources of discrimination in other social contexts. Among them were race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, and marital status.

We entered each of our measures of ideological orientation individually into separate equations. This was done to provide a comparison of the statistical contribution of the various measures while avoiding problems of multi-collinearity, since party affiliation, ideological self-description and the attitude indices are all inter-correlated. Preliminary bi-variate analysis also showed an interactive relationship between religion and institutional affiliation—quality of school was related to religion only among active practitioners (defined as those attending

services “at least once or twice a month”). Therefore we included “practicing Christians” and “practicing Jews” as dummy variables in the equation. (Other religions contained too few practitioners for statistically valid comparisons.)

Table 3: Regressions Predicting Quality of Academic Affiliation

	Model I		Model II	
	Unstandardized coefficients	Standardized coefficients	Unstandardized coefficients	Standardized coefficients
Social ideology index	.145***	.134	.158***	.147
Political ideology index	-.040	-.040	-.028	-.028
Republican	-1.211	-.034		
Independent	-.787	-.033		
Female	-1.824**	-.072	-1.764**	-.070
Black	-2.974*	-.058	-2.756*	-.053
Asian	1.155	.022	1.096	.021
Gay or lesbian	1.041	.019	1.105	.020
Married	.776	.030	.775	.030
Practicing Jewish	1.275	.023	1.249	.023
Practicing Christian	-.920	-.041	-.878	-.039
Faculty achievement index	.423***	.375	.423***	.375
Constant	43.921***		40.937***	
Adjusted R squared	.202		.202	
N	1625		1625	

* Significant at the .05 level; ** significant at the .01 level, *** significant at the .001 level.

The various equations we examined all showed that scholarly achievement—primarily but not entirely based on publications—counted for by far the most variance in professional status, as we would expect in a meritocracy. However, political orientation also played a role, with the amount dependent on the measure that was used. First, placement on the left-right scale did not contribute significantly to explaining variation in institutional affiliation for the subset of individuals who were willing to provide such a self-designation. When the imputed values were assigned to the missing cases, this variable did contribute significantly. However, since the

political attitude items were used to create these variates, it makes more sense to simply use the attitude indices rather than this hybrid measure.

In the Forum article, we combined the social and political/economic ideology items into a single index. When we disaggregated this index into separate measures, however, it became clear the social ideology was the independent predictor variable that best captured the relationship between professorial politics and professional advancement. This can be seen in Table 3, which shows the unstandardized and standardized (beta) regression coefficients and amount of variation explained in two slightly different models. Model I includes both attitudes and party affiliation to predict the quality of institutional affiliation. This equation shows that the contributions of economic/political liberalism (beta = .04, n.s.) and party affiliation (beta = .04, n.s., for Republican affiliation) were both artifacts of the role played by social liberalism (beta = .134, p .001).

Moreover, the significance of religiosity disappeared as well (beta = .041, n.s. for practicing Christian), suggesting that its apparent significance was due to its intercorrelation with social conservatism. That is, the independent influence of religion, political party affiliation and political/economic ideology (defined as attitudes toward the government's role in equalizing economic conditions and protecting the environment) all disappeared, revealing the underlying influence of social ideology (attitudes toward social or cultural issues such as abortion, homosexuality, and sexual morality). Of course, the most important factor in all the equations was scholarly achievement (beta = .375, p .001).

The more parsimonious Model II eliminated the party variable, which slightly raised the beta weight of the social ideology variable to .147, while the beta for the achievement index remained at .375. In Model II, however, social ideology explained about one-third as much

variation in institutional affiliation as did achievement. In both models the independent variables together accounted for 20 percent of the variation in level of institutional affiliation ($R^2 = .202$).

Both models also contained two other variables that contributed to explaining level of institution with achievement held constant. These were race (beta = $-.053$, $p .05$ for Blacks) and gender (beta = $.07$, $p .01$ for women). Both relationships are statistically significant accounting for about one-third and one-half as much variation respectively as did social ideology. We are still exploring the source of the latter relationships, both of which suggest a basis for concern in areas where many colleges have sought to add diversity to their faculties in recent years. However, we have already uncovered some pertinent evidence.

In the case of race, the relationship with institutional prestige disappeared when historically Black colleges were deleted from the sample. This suggests that the presence of mainly Black faculty at these schools, which tend to fall into the lower institutional tiers, may account for at least part of this relationship. The influence of gender seems to be more complicated. We found an interaction among gender, productivity and institutional quality. High achieving women were as likely as high achieving men to be affiliated with more prestigious institutions. But women who were relatively unproductive in their scholarly activities were less likely than similarly unproductive men to be affiliated with higher-tiered institutions. For example, among faculty who had published two or more books, 72% of females and 73% of males were affiliated with high-tiered institutions. By contrast, among those who had not published any books, 58% of male faculty were nonetheless located in high-tiered institutions, compared to only 44% of women.

Summary/Conclusion

The purpose of our study was to advance the contentious debate over the political culture of academia and its effects on the careers of faculty members with divergent political perspectives. In effect, we formulated the debate in terms of two testable hypotheses: first, most professors in American colleges and universities are left of center politically; second, this ideological homogeneity hinders the professional advancement of conservatives.

To test these hypotheses we made use of the 1999 North American Academic Study Survey, which provided a systematic and comprehensive data set on the characteristics of American college faculty that permitted some time-series comparison with the Carnegie surveys that were conducted between 1969 and 1997. First, we examined the political party preferences of faculty members, their ideological self-descriptions on a left-right scale, and their views on controversial social and political issues, ranging from government intervention in the economy to environmental protection to abortion rights.

We found that the political orientation of the professoriate at the turn of the millennium was tilted toward liberal attitudes and Democratic Party affiliation. Further, the predominance of liberal and Democratic perspectives is not limited to particular types of institutions or fields of study. A comparison of the 1999 survey with previous surveys of American faculty indicates a substantial shift to the left in party identification and ideology since the mid-1980s, at a time when ideological and party identification among the general public has been relatively stable. We believe that more recent data from the PAP in large part replicated our findings, although Gross and Simmons argue that a “center/center left” group is unduly ignored by our conclusions.

Second, we performed a multiple regression analysis to test the effect of social and political/economic ideology on professional status. We found that even after taking into account

the effects of academic achievement, along with many other individual characteristics, social (but not political/economic) conservatives taught at lower quality schools than did liberals. That is, more liberal responses to the social attitude questions predicted a higher quality of institutional affiliation, after controlling for scholarly achievement.

It is in the nature of this mode of inquiry that the results cannot prove that ideology accounts for this difference in professional standing. There may be some other factor at work for which we failed to account, or we may have failed to eliminate some source of measurement error. It is important to note the limitations of our findings. They do not address the question of whether or how self-selection may account for the political differences we observed. Nor do they deal with ways in which ideological factors may affect the behavior of faculty members in or out of the classroom.

But the results are consistent with the hypothesis that at least one form of conservatism confers a disadvantage in the competition for professional advancement. These results suggest that conservative complaints of the presence and effects of liberal homogeneity in academia deserve a hearing on their merits, despite their self-interested quality and the anecdotal nature of the evidence that is frequently presented. In conjunction with evidence from other studies, our findings suggest that a leftward shift began on college campuses sometime in the later 1980s, and has progressed to an extent that conservatives have nearly disappeared from some departments.

Our findings on the more controversial issue of discrimination against conservative faculty should be regarded as more preliminary. To our knowledge this is the first time this sort of empirical analysis has been applied to this question, and there may be much more to learn from additional data analysis, as well as newer data sets such as the PAP. Our goal was to draw attention to the application of rigorous methods to evaluate this controversy systematically,

rather than letting the debate deteriorate into anecdotal charges and counter-charges. Our statistical analysis provides prima facie evidence that conservative complaints are not frivolous, despite their connection with the broader “culture wars” of contemporary politics. The important thing is that such complaints be evaluated by methods that minimize the impact of the strong feelings that such disputes bring out on both sides.

¹ Gross, Neil and Solon Simmons 2007. “The Social and Political Views of American Professors.” Paper presented at the Harvard University Symposium on Professors and Their Politics October 6, 2007.

² Lerner, Robert, Althea Nagai and Stanley Rothman, *American Elites* 1996. New Haven: Yale University Press. Ladd, Everett Carl, and Seymour Martin Lipset. 1975. *The Divided Academy: Professors and Politics*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

³ Rothman, Stanley, S. Robert Lichter, and Neil Nevitte. 2005a. Politics and Professional Advancement Among College Faculty. *The Forum*. 3(1): Article 2.

Rothman, Stanley, S. Robert Lichter, and Neil Nevitte. 2005b. Fundamentals and Fundamentalists: A Reply to Ames et al. *The Forum*. 3(2): Article 2.

⁴ The item wordings and scale constructions referred to below can be found in the Forum article listed as Rothman et al 2005a.

⁵ Harris Poll, The 2004, 2002, 1999. http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll

⁶ Rothman, Stanley, and Amy Black. 1999. “Elites Revisited: American Social and Political Leadership in the 1990s.” *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 11 (2): 169-195.

⁷ Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education. 1978. “Carnegie Council National Surveys, 1975-1976: Faculty Marginals.” (Volume 2), September.

Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching 1989. *The Condition of the Professoriate: Attitudes and Trends*. Princeton, NJ: The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 1989.

⁸ 1969-1997 from Carnegie Surveys

1999 from North American Academic Survey (excludes 2-year colleges)

2006 calculated from Politics of the American Professoriate Survey; includes “slight” liberal and conservative categories.

⁹ This does not take into account possible differences resulting from the inclusion of two-year community colleges in the Carnegie and PAP surveys but not in the NAAS sample. Based on data appearing in Hamilton and Hargens, the inclusion of 2-year colleges in the sample lowered the overall proportion of liberals by two percentage points in the 1984 and 1989 surveys.

Hamilton, Richard F., and Lowell L. Hargens. 1993. “The Politics of the Professors: Self-Identifications, 1969-1984.” *Social Forces* 71(3): 603-627.

¹⁰ Note: Scores for missing cases imputed by political attitude responses.

¹¹ Gross and Simmons, op. cit., 28.

¹² Id., at 26.

¹³ The line of criticism advanced in this and the following paragraph was first raised in a blog entry by National Association of Scholars President Stephen Balch.

¹⁴ Glynn, David 2007. “Few Conservatives but Many Centrists Teach in Academe.” *Chronicle of Higher Education*. October 19, pA10.