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At this critical juncture in US policy toward North Korea I believe it is constructive to critically review our approach top-down and from start to finish.

When we began the Bush administration we conducted a policy review that tried to address **three big questions**:

1. What are our essential strategic priorities?
2. What is our desired end state?
3. What sort of policy could support these aims?

I. What are our essential strategic priorities?

- containing WMD proliferation
- deterring against offensive use of WMD, missiles, and conventional military forces
- fundamentally changing the nature and direction of the regime

II. What is our desired end state?

- A North Korea that does not pose a threat to the world
- A unified Korean peninsula on terms favorable to the ROK and the US and UN allies.

III. Was the Clinton policy worth continuing? What could do better to address our common sense priorities and achieve the desired end state?

- We assessed that the previous US-ROK diplomatic approach of sunshine had in effect become a “moonshine policy,” using aid to addict the DPRK to ROK assistance and placate it rather than fostering needed change. We also saw our alliances weakening under the threat of missile deployments and potential WMD weaponization and the US itself threatened by a developing ICBM capability.
- We realized early on that the DPRK was in serious breach of its commitments under the Agreed Framework and was engaged in proliferation activity well outside the boundaries of the NPT and the MTCR.

Our solution was three fold:

- Six Party Talks

- Bolstering the alliances with the ROK and Japan and deploying missile defense and enhanced forward deterrence
- Constructive pressure against illicit and proliferation activities and finances via the Proliferation Security Initiative/ Illicit Activities Initiative

Allow me to reflect on our progress in achieving our desired ends, beginning with the Six Party Talks, something I helped create. We designed the 6PT with the clear purpose of establishing the grounds for ending the Cold War in East Asia. It was not just about nuclear weapons, it was about changing the North Korean regime and its intrinsically hostile orientation to the world. We aimed to remove the fear of change inside the DPRK and surround it with opportunities for opening up and developing while still requiring it to abandon a hostile military first state policy built on nuclear weapons and programs. To provide us important leverage we developed the Illicit Activities initiative that used law enforcement to pressure North Korea's considerable illicit income streams and overseas financial networks.

- Unfortunately, after establishing a sound policy direction and modest success in the early stages of the Six party talks, the Bush administration itself seems to have gotten inebriated on Clinton-era moonshine and lost sight of our original goals.
- In the 6PT we are ready to declare pre-emptive victory without any serious change in North Korea's direction, including on nuclear weapons and programs, proliferation, and human rights (or wrongs). A declaration that only tells us what we already know – perhaps because someone has coached them on what to say – is worthless as is a deal that looks past the existential threats that matter most to our security – weapons, proliferation, and clandestine production.
- Likewise, lifting the Trading with the Enemy Act against North Korea when they haven't withdrawn a single gun emplacement or troop from the areas abutting the DMZ or stood down a single missile battery is absurd. So is removing them from the terrorism list when they are actively arming the two largest state sponsors of terror. But it actually gets worse.

The PSI, which is one of the very best ideas to come out of the administration, also has been a failure. This is not due to founders' intent but due to a remarkable failure to implement a regime that is ready, willing, and able to counter proliferation due to a bizarre fear of the consequences.

Under our watch, as has been made painfully public in recent months, some unacceptable, dare I say, outrageous acts of proliferation have occurred which we have been unwilling, though not unable to counter. Our CP efforts have been continuously emasculated by a fear that they could undermine diplomacy. The cost is alarming and totally unacceptable, whatever one thinks of the importance of the diplomatic track.

- In 2001-2002 Libya received blueprints for nuclear weapons from the A.Q. Khan Network and the North Koreans apparently provided uranium hexafluoride, the gas that is used to feed enrichment centrifuges.

- Throughout the administration's first term we observed but rarely acted against large scale procurements of equipment and material for the HEU program, including via China—the host of the 6 Party Talks.
- In 2003-2004, according to the *Wall Street Journal*, Iran received the BM25 IRBM from NK, delivered on North Korean flagged vessels right through the Persian Gulf (one wonders why Iran would buy a missile with a clear nuclear weapons delivery purpose if it did intend to build nuclear weapons)
- According to the DNI, Syria's Yongbyon on the Euphrates dates back to 1997, with major aspects being delivered right in the middle of 6PT in 2004-2007. If NK would sell a nuclear program to Syria, what wouldn't they sell to its patron, Iran?

Regarding DPRK- Syria nuclear cooperation, President Bush said at a news conference in Washington yesterday: "We... wanted to advance certain policy objectives through the disclosure," "One would be to the North Koreans to make it abundantly clear that we may know more about you than you think. "Then we have an interest in sending a message to Iran and the world, for that matter, about just how destabilizing nuclear proliferation would be in the Middle East."

- The irony of the President's remarks is that the Bush administration has done so little to effectively counter the threat he describes.
- By acting as the low cost and most aggressive supplier of WMD technology and systems NK is fueling an arms race throughout the Middle East that has dramatically accelerated under our watch. Spurred on by Iran and Syria, there are now multiple "nuclear research programs" going on in the region in the Oil rich Gulf. One would not be surprised if the DPRK were assisting these programs, too.
- Whatever, the President decides to agree to in the Six Party Talks, the quid pro quo should be a decisive defensive stance on proliferation and a bolstering of our military deterrence in the face of likely nuclear weaponization of the North's missile forces, including capable of striking the United States and Japan.
- North Korean proliferation networks represent a clear and present danger to the United States, the stability of the Middle East, and the international economy.
- They have crossed all of the redlines that we delivered in the 6PT, have blown pass all international treaty commitments, including when they were members of the NPT and MTCR, and have paid no attention to UN resolutions 1695 and 1718, neither of which has been implemented.
- North Korea remains in the business of selling weapons, including weapons of mass destruction and associated technology and will not voluntarily exit. As one can find simply by looking them up in the Cairo, Beirut, or Damascus phone book, multiple sanctioned entities continue business as usual with few consequences.
- I have a simple proposal: North Korea's weapons trading companies, their people, their finances, accomplices, and facilitators should be given a simple offer: 90 days to completely cease operations in the Middle East, Asia, Europe, and Africa

or face being acted against using all instruments of national and international power.

- All of this is essentially mandated under UN Res 1718 which should be implemented immediately, beginning with the specific designations of entities involved in the weapons trade.

We can do this and it need not get in the way of whatever hope some might have for a diplomatic solution:

- In late 2003-2004 the US and many friendly governments around the world joined together to pursue the AQ Khan network, disrupting its operations. This effort showed that nuclear proliferation could be stopped decisively and effectively when sufficient political will and resources are brought to the table. It did not undermine the US-Pakistani relationship, either, as some had felt.
- The US counter-proliferation effort is manned by some of the nation's finest policy officials and intelligence officers. I know many of them personally and have great confidence in their abilities.
- Unfortunately, they have been infrequently given the political top cover to accomplish the mission that they are entrusted with. This has to change.
- Finally, many argue that the North will not get out of its most lucrative business without being compensated. I see no problem with a US-ROK Nunn Lugar program to shut down weapons factories and retrain their workers. If the ROK government, that it is sincerely committed to supporting a shift from swords to plough shears, it could put \$500 million into a UN controlled account for the dismantlement of factories. I doubt the North would accept this but they should have the chance before being dealt with forcibly.

In conclusion, at this critical stage, we need to realistically look at where are heading and how far off course our policy has drifted from its original, realistic aims. We have not contained the threat of proliferation, we have weakened the credibility of our deterrence and spurred doubt among our allies (even as North Korea has significantly bolstered its own capabilities), and – most of all- we have failed to use diplomacy and pressure to compel a shift in the Kim Jong Il regime. Allowing North Korea to win in its Cold War with the world will go down in history as one of the most remarkable and disturbing elements in the administration's legacy if it does not change course.