For years, the small size of America’s land forces has been a fundamental constraint on U.S. military strategy. The cutbacks of the Clinton years and the Bush administration’s failure to foresee the need for larger ground forces in the wake of 9/11 have undercut America’s ability to fight the “Long War.” Resolving the stark divergence between America's military ends and means--in terms of force size, training, and modernization--will be a crucial challenge for the next U.S. administration.

In Ground Truth: The Future of U.S. Land Power (AEI Press, May 2008), AEI scholars Thomas Donnelly and Frederick W. Kagan pose a series of urgent questions for policymakers: What is the strategic role of American ground forces? What missions will these forces undertake in the future? What is the nature of land warfare in the twenty-first century? What qualities are necessary to succeed on the battlefields of the Long War? What is the ideal size and configuration of the force--and how much will it cost?

On Thursday, May 15, Donnelly, Kagan, and Kathleen Hicks of the Center for Strategic and International Studies will discuss these and other questions about the size, shape, and costs of the land forces the United States will require in the years ahead.