American Enterprise Institute

February 15, 2008

[Edited transcript from audio tapes]

2:15	Registration
2:30	Panelists:	John R. Bolton, AEI
		Bruce Jackson, Project on Transitional Democracies
	Moderator:	Gary J. Schmitt, AEI
4:00	Adjournment

Proceedings:

Gary J. Schmitt [Moderator]:  Welcome.  I want to thank everybody for coming out on a Friday, particularly a Friday before a three-day weekend.  It just shows how little you have to do that you are coming to an AEI event.  But it is a timely event, I must say.  It looks like Kosovo’s parliament will issue its proclamation of independence probably on Sunday and then immediately following that there will probably be recognition by a number of governments, including the U.S. government, of Kosovo’s independence.

 Again, welcome.  And I also want to welcome my two guests, John Bolton and Bruce Jackson.  I’m sure that most of you know their biographies quite well.  John is now a senior fellow here at AEI but, obviously, before that, was our ambassador to the U.N. and the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security.  John has had a very distinguished government career, obviously, and it is great to have him back at AEI.  He is also the author of a recent book Surrender Is Not an Option, a title I’m sure John actually came up with.  It’s a very good read, so in case you haven’t read it, I highly recommend picking it up.  I’m also interested in how the movie will turn out and who is going to play John.

 Another good friend today is speaking--Bruce Jackson, who is the founder and president of the Project on Transitional Democracies.  I have known Bruce for a very long time.  He has spent an immense amount of time teaching me about expansion of democracy in Europe.  He was also a member of the International Commission on the Balkans and for almost a decade was the president of the U.S. Committee on NATO.  What you actually won’t see in the bios, which I think is actually far more relevant than all their distinguished posts and career, is the fact that both John and Bruce served on the Board of Directors of the Project for the New American Century, which is now in the open.  And I’m sure in the afterlife they will pay for that sin.

John Bolton:  I thought it continued clandestinely.  Are we not supposed to say that?

 Gary Schmitt:  So again, welcome.  The format is going to be quite simple.  Bruce will start us off with ten to twelve minutes worth of comments, and then John will go about the same amount of time.  And then we will give them a chance for a short back and forth, and then we will throw it open to the floor for questions.  Again, thank you for coming and I’m sure this is going to be a very interesting discussion.

 Bruce Jackson:  Thank you.  I drew the short straw and I’m going first, which is a difficult position.  I think Gary already gave the game away that we are going to move into a new period this weekend in the region and in Kosovo.  So I thought I would do two things:  one, go back and look at the pre-history of how we got here in a larger sense and then, maybe, take, say, the Russian objections to this and go through why those are not substantial objections.

 So let’s look at the pre-history.  Let’s begin where it all began, which I think was in the seventh century A.D. where somewhere between Belarus and Ukraine, the southern Slavs decided to go south.  Well, they got there, and it was the beginning of the Slavic migrations to the south that basically created modern-day Macedonia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. 

Looking at the beginning of the modern period, Balkan states started to become national states in 1804 through to about 1864; all of them did, beginning with Greece.  And all around Kosovo and Macedonia you had this national formation.  About as soon as the first phase was completed we got a series of crises, all in the Southern Balkans, all about the question of Macedonia, the question of Kosovo from, basically, 1875 through the first and second Balkan wars. 

Up until that period, Prishtina was always a part of Albanian ethnicity; it was all within the Ottoman Empire.  It never, basically, emerged as a state.  Actually, it didn’t really emerge as a province within Serbia until 1945.  So we don’t have a pre-history here and any historical claims are extremely dubious--practically non-existent if you look at maps of those, say, thousand years.

 The first legal precedent really occurs in 1966 when Tito basically said that Kosovo was an autonomous province of Serbia, and would have equal status with the republics.  This is a very important distinction.  It is the Yugoslav constitution--which is not, basically, a document that is much revered here--but nevertheless, it said Slovenes and Croats and others are nationalities of Yugoslavia.  Albanians are ethnic minorities, national minorities. 

That’s a big distinction--whether you are a minority or a Slovene nation or a Croat national republic.  It’s unclear, exactly, why that distinction was made but that distinction has been maintained, because in 1991, all the Yugoslav nationalities created their individual states:  Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Montenegro.  The one minority that was restrained, because of their status, was the Kosovar minority—they’re still a national minority.  This system broke down eight years later--where we had the incidents with which we are all familiar--in the war of ethnic cleansing;  and the international community stepped in and 1244 was set up--which John knows much more about than I do. 

Since then, a series of commissions and reports have looked at the region.  I was on the Balkan Commission that reported that the status of Kosovo was unsustainable and the status quo was leading us to disaster.  This was followed by the Kai Eide report, which reported that economic development was impossible in Kosovo and that region because of their lack of status. 

Then there was the Ahtisaari report, which is now the basis of international determinations, which called for the supervised independence of Kosovo.  That was followed up, actually, and largely Russian request of extended period of Wolfgang Ischinger and Frank Wisner, which basically came up late last year with a coordinated declaration of independence.

More recently the Secretary General of the United Nations, Ki-moon said that Kosovo is a European issue and the responsibility of the European Union.  I don’t know how expositive that is, but it seems to be a recognition that the European Union is taking responsibility for this.  And then we have sort of the denouement:  on Sunday Kosovo will declare independence; on Monday there will be recognition by the United States and a majority of the EU states;  and then on Tuesday in ministerial meetings, you will see some EU declaration that they are taking over, that it’s their responsibility. And there will be a phase-out between the U.N. and others, and the oversight in supervision of the European Union.

So looking back on this large pre-history, what kinds of things can we say?  One, we can say borders have been redrawn rather continuously over many years, so this is not unprecedented in the slightest.  In the near period you can see a gradual building of a Balkan peace based on a European model, and what will happen this weekend is one further step in this.  Thirdly, you can see that Kosovo is taking the national trajectory that was taken by every other Balkan state beginning with Greece.  This is an extended part of a history that began in 1804. 

Fourthly, if you look at the authors of Kai Eide and Ahtisaari, the status of Kosovo is designed by Europeans; they were the driving force on every determinative report and this is very much the creation of a European model.  Fifthly, looking at the history, Russia has, at best, had a cameo appearance in Western Balkan history.  The claim that this has always been a region of Russia is just false; they’ve played a marginal role at best and not always constructively.

And basically, if you look from 1991 at the formation of Balkan states --from Slovenia through the status of Montenegro--it has been a fairly natural process, so I do not think we should anticipate doom-and-gloom-and-disaster.  There was a war in Slovenia in 1991; they are the president of the European Union today.  That would have to be called success, so I don’t see that the presumption of failure, that there is a historical justification.

Now, let me switch to sort of the immediate criticisms of this decision: its arbitrariness and its hastiness.  The largest argument is this is a challenge to Mr. Putin and the Russian Federation.  It seems to me that that is rather overstated.  As I have already said, there are not obvious supreme national interests of Russia in the region. 

To the extent that they have them, they are mercantile and economic reasons and interests, which have been more than satisfied.  They own half of the Montenegrin coast; they own the energy industry of Serbia; they are doing very well in their investments.  If you are making a huge profit, it is hard to see where your national interests are at stake.  I think everybody who is on the official negotiations thinks that Russians are just fishing in troubled waters just for fun.  It basically disrupts European Unity.

So, particularly in the lightof what Secretary Rice called the reprehensible rhetoric of Russia recently on nuclear targeting, I’m not sure exactly what legitimate concerns Russia has in this issue.  I mean, if the legitimate concern is making sure that ethnic cleansing doesn’t pay off, okay, there’s a legitimate concern.  If it’s a concern about the persistence of corruption in the Balkans, fine.  But presumably the EU will address that.

The second argument is the EU or the international community lacks the authority to do this, and that these processes have to be consensual.  Well, that doesn’t seem to be true either.  I mean, there’s been -- the international community rules on this kind of issue all the time.  Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia left Yugoslavia without the permission of Belgrade.  This is sort of a natural development.  And we actually have been doing a series of status determinations.  The international community’s  ruling in Bosnia, the divorce of Serbia and Montenegro, the Kosovo status and, perhaps, again, the constitution of Bosnia.  All these things are status issues that the international community has played a role in resolving.

Thirdly, there’s the argument that you hearoften from Russia--that there is a dangerous international precedent that is about to be invoked.  Well, I’m not sure exactly what the precedent is, and exactly what court it’s presented to.  But what is the meaning of what is occurring?  If a state attacks its neighbors and the minorities within the state commit ethnic cleansing, such that the international community is compelled to intervene, then the international community must take responsibility for the governance of that state and will, in the absence of agreement between the parties, decide the status of that state.  If that is the precedent, then it is a good precedent. 

To the extent that I tried to allude to in history, we have always been trying to basically make determinations in the Balkans--admittedly, with imperfect results--because powers after a breakdown of the system will try to rebuild order.  And that’s been what’s happening, certainly, since the break-up of Yugoslavia. 

And also, even though we were creating this precedent, it is unclear, given the role of the international community and U.N. in Kosovo, that it applies to any of the other frozen conflicts that Russia often invokes.  Also, their argument is somewhat undermined by the fact that Mr. Lavrov and Mr. Ivanov tell the Americans privately, “Don’t worry.  We’re not going to do anything.”  So I wonder about that.

And the final argument is that Kosovo and Serbia will be worse off after this weekend and these decisions are over.  Well, that really doesn’t seem to be the over-all argument.  Kai Eide and others argue that economic development will become possible when Kosovo’s status is resolved.  The late Prime Minister Dindic and others in Serbia recognize that without Kosovo, Serbia would move much more rapidly into the European space and European Union.  In fact, we can already see that occurring.  We would expect that by December, Serbia will have a formal EU perspective from the French and all Serbian citizens will have access to Schengen visas.  So there’s confirmation that things are going to get better as soon as we clear this up.

Anyway, it seems to me that the overall view is that both countries will be better off closer to Europe and grounded in a basically safer and more stable Kosovo; this is the proposition.  There is also the argument that this is not being done because it is the best possible solution; it is being done because it is the least bad solution, and it is not obvious that there is another solution. 

Anyway, it seems to me as we have this meeting, the debate has really narrowed down to whether the parties need to have reached agreement and how quickly should we do this.  It seems to me these tactical decisions have been made before we came here today recently.  The answer to the first question on agreement is, “No, you don’t have to have everybody agree.”  And the answer to when is it all going to start to happen is, “This weekend.”  So that’s it, I think.

Gary Schmitt:  Thanks, Bruce.

John Bolton:  Well, thanks very much.  And thanks to Bruce for his presentation.  What we are doing today here is taking seats in advance of what is, quite likely, a car wreck about to happen.  It is the kind of thing where you can see it in advance, you can see it coming and we are all sitting here watching it happen; nobody is going to do anything about it, but we are going to be left with the consequences. 

It is a situation where there is so much blame to spread around,  there is probably no time to do it in the amount of time we have,  and given the direction that I plan to take, let me just say at the outset you can certainly pin a lot of the blame on the United States, especially in the past couple years, for the single-mindedness of its policy in disregard of what I think our real American interest as opposed to more abstract ones.

Let me just touch briefly on some of the things that have happened that I think have gone wrong in the past, leading up to the problem we are about to have on Sunday. Because in large part, I agree with Bruce that this is fundamentally a European solution that we are about to see play out here, which is why in the interest of even-handedness I criticized the United States first. Do not forget that as the afternoon goes on I’ll criticize them again at the end.  But to get to the proximate cause here, this is a real European moment. 

We have been in a process for nine years with Security Council Resolution 1244, and having come to the end of the process, there is no alternative for the Europeans that they can see other than to grant independence, even though within the European Union itself there is at least some division on this outcome.  But as in so many other cases, having pursued this route, Europe cannot draw back from it at this last moment.  And the route itself, I think, was flawed from the beginning.  I think that the passage of Resolution 1244 and the effective imposition of a U.N. trusteeship on Kosovo was a mistake.  I think that having extended it for nine years just made sure the mistake was nine years long, and ending it in the way we are about to end it ends it with a mistake. 

I think this is a problem that, so far, we find unique to the situation in Kosovo. The trusteeship idea has not gathered steam in other parts of the world and, frankly, I hope that it doesn’t, quite apart from the fact that it is not really the idea of the trusteeship that is found in the U.N. charter.

I think the argument that the U.N. -- and let’s remember: What was contemplated here from the outset was a U.N. process that would come to some mutually acceptable solution.  Resolution 1244--and I wasn’t in the government so I didn’t have anything to do with it -- Resolution 1244 reaffirms Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo.  Anybody from Europe here disagree with that?  And what Europe contemplated was that there would be another Security Council resolution that determined that Kosovo would be independent.  This was the argument that said, indeed, Kosovo is unique--it’s the first time the U.N. has done this, andsince the U.N. has done it, it’s got the ability to split Kosovo off and declare it independent if that’s what it decided to do. 

And yet we come to the end of the process, Russia threatens veto, and there’s no Security Council resolution.  So launched on the process to give legitimacy to whatever the outcome was going to be--but, particularly, if it was independence--the Security Council is now unable to follow through on it and the European design has failed.  So Europe, or at least big chunks of it, will recognize Kosovo’s independence in the absence of Security Council legitimization.  This recalls to me the absence of Security Council authorization for NATO’s air strikes on Serbia in the late 1990s.

So here we have two clear cases, both involving Kosovo: no Security Council authorization for the use of force and no Security Council authorization for dismembering Serbia.  Now let me just say, I’m delighted by this.  I was delighted by the NATO attack on--as a matter of international law, anyway--by NATO’s use of force against Serbia in the absence of a Security Council resolution when it happened.  I thought it was unwise from the perspective of American national interest, but I just want to make sure everybody takes careful note that we now have two clear-cut precedents of important international action of this sort without Security Council authorization. 

I would just like to say to all of our friends from Europe: it should be a long time before any of you criticize the United States for taking action without Security Council authorization. A long time.  Now, I think the Kosovo situation is also an example of how not to negotiate.  For one thing, this trusteeship by the Security Council lasted for nine years with little or no progress.  Now you can blame that on Serbia, and with considerable measure, for its unwillingness to negotiate. 

But you come close to the end of the period and then say, “Okay, we’re done.  Now we’re going to say Kosovo is going to be independent.”  And that was the outcome that was foreordained through all of the different courses of negotiation that Bruce mentioned.  It was clear, that was the outcome that was desired.  And it was clear, particularly, to the Serbs and the Kosovar Albanians. 

What was the outcome there? That the Albanians saw absolutely no need to compromise and the Serbs’ back was put up against the wall to a point where, particularly, pro-democratic forces in Serbia couldn’t be seen to be compromising because to do so would be politically suicidal inside Serbian politics.  So that the result is we’re going to get a situation where, by having foreshadowed the outcome, in effect the negotiations--the possibility of a negotiated solution was undercut.

And here I would be more directly critical of the United States policy, although I think it applies to many Europeans as well.  The only consistency that you can see here in this arena since the beginning of the break-up of Yugoslavia is an anti-Serbian direction.  Now, I do not have any brief for Serbia, for the Kosovar Albanians, or for anybody who lives in the Balkans.  But I think there is a materially different situation with Serbia today, struggling to establish the institutions of representative government, compared to the Serbia under Slobodan Milosevic.  And what made sense as a policy before, I think, does not make sense in the current circumstances.

Now, what are the outcomes that we are likely to face as a result of this decision that independence will come now, and now because the Kosovar Albanians want it now?  I think there is a high risk of continued instability in the Balkans, in Bosnia, in cases of other unredeemed territory of ethnic groups that are not in the nation-state that they would like to be in.  I think this is an avoidable circumstance; it could have been avoided.  But I think that by supporting Kosovo independence in the coming days, we are just sowing the seeds for future conflict in the Balkans--at a minimum, political conflict; sad to say, possibly military conflict. 

And that will not be conducive to economic development.  Remember the cliché: “Capital is a coward.”  It will not go into circumstances where security is not assured.  Or given an alternative, it will go to some place where security is more assured than it is going to be in the Balkans for the foreseeable future.

I think there is risk to the pro-democracy forces inside Serbia; I cannot say that it will be fatal.  I do not know how negative it will be but it will be negative, to be sure.  And that will have demonstrable consequences, given the size and centrality of Serbia for years to come.  And I think we have got to be clear-eyed here and look at the risk that the state of Kosovo itself will be a weak state, subject to exploitation by radical forces, radical Islamic forces from outside of the region, not necessarily at the behest of a majority of the Kosovar Albanians, but with the full support of some of them.  And that that gateway, that potential gateway for radicalism in Europe, is much to be regretted.

Now let me come to Russia and to say unequivocally here that I judge the Russia interest in this through the prism of American interest, which is what American decision makers should view their role in Kosovo through.  I do not pretend to believe all of the protestations of Russia’s leadership about its concern for its brother Slavs or its deep interest in the region. 

I look at this as a factor in Russian-American bilateral relations that will complicate important issues that we have that Europe should recognize, too, such as missile defense, such as the continued regulation of strategic nuclear forces, such as resolving other conflicts more dear to the heart of the Russians that we want to resolve in a pro-Western way in Moldova and Georgia and elsewhere.  All of these are going to be made more complicated, more difficult by Kosovo, whether it is because it reflects actual Russian interest or because they are using it as a symbol or an excuse in Russian domestic political terms and in international terms, as well.

So what is the solution here?  The obvious answer, which is not going to be the answer given, is more negotiations without a predetermined outcome but with real pressure of the kind that could be applied to the parties to come to a mutual agreement.  This could have been done before.  One could have used, for example, Mayor Daley’s famous tactic when dealing with unions in the city of Chicago; he would take the negotiators, lock them in a room and say, “you’re not coming out until you reach a deal.”  There are all kinds of ways that pressure could have been applied.  It was applied in the wrong way in the run-up to this coming Sunday.

But Kosovo is not living under Serbian oppression today.  It’s surrounded by U.N. and EU observers and personnel.  It’s not like the people are going to incur enormous hardships by some modest extension of the period for negotiation, during which something that would give at least a fig leaf to the various sides to be able to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution could have been found.  That will not happen, unfortunately, and I think that will have very negative consequences--mostly for Europe rather than for the United States--but it’s something that, quite surprisingly, seems to me to have been a fairly obvious solution.

I’ll just close by saying that I, John Bolton, favored negotiation in this case to mutual agreement and the European Union did not.  So you figure it out.

Gary Schmitt:  Thanks John.  Bruce, why don’t you take about five minutes if you want to respond to some of John’s points?

Bruce Jackson:  Well, just let me respond to two major points.  One, I tend to agree with John on the overall performance of the international community in the nine-year period in which we worked.  I don’t think it’s so necessary [audio glitch] of the Balkans was the first intervention in the post-war—the first intervention of not only NATO but in the south of Kosovo but by the European Union in Macedonia.  This was an important event for both sides, and we had a tendency and still do have a tendency to say everything went well.  This is a paradigm for everything else we’re going to do in Sudan and elsewhere around the world.  Not completely true.

The international organizations and the NGOs tend to be a substitute for home-grown liberalism.  If you’ve got hundreds of liberals from outside going around, what is the use of a Bosnian liberal politician if his job is already done?  So what we didn’t see is the communities taking responsibilities for themselves; as long as Paddy Ashdown was there, you don’t have to make any decisions.  And people got used to that--so not so good. 

We did leave--through accident and Rambouillet and Dayton and other things--we left them with constitutional arrangements that were completely dysfunctional, and it’s hard to set up.These were jury-rigged things, whether you do it [inaudible] or anything else.  It does leave you with certain sharp edges in your constitutional system because it was not arrived at organically.

And we get into the ironic situation where Javier Solana was selling marriage counseling services to Serbia and Montenegro, and then turned around and sold them divorce procedures:  first get married and then three years later, don’t.  It is that kind of going this way and that way that I think, as we look at these things again, I think we have begun to learn in Iraq--if we’re going in there, we really have to think out the entire 10-year portfolio, and how do you make them whole again.  I think John has illustrated a couple of points, and there is certainly criticism to be had about the way things were negotiated and the paternalistic tone with which we tend to negotiate with these countries.

Where I disagree is sort of the overall conclusion, which I think is a conceptual conclusion.  We had a vision in our head throughout these discussions which had roughly the biases that John suggests, but not exactly for those reasons.  I think the belief that undergirds this is we were not helping democratic Serbia, that this process was killing the politics in Serbia and empowering the radicals. 

A way to think of it is that Kosovo is killing Serbia politically,and Europe is disappearing on the horizon for Serbia, and it’s possible to think of another quarter of a century where they are isolated from Europe.  And that possible outcome was the most dangerous thing that one could imagine.  Serbia is desperately needed within Europe both for Serbia and for Europe.

Secondly, there was the failed Kosovar state, which John is perfectly right to be concerned about.  The view, when we werelooking at it is it was isolation that was killing Kosovo economically.  There’s just no possibility for economic development, hence, the persistence of crime.  And until you end that isolation from international organizations, lending institutions, other things, they cannot possibly get out of that trap. 

So it was not so much how it was done.  The geopolitical imperative of this entire plan is that European integration is the end-goal.  And that was the superseding end-goal and, maybe, it shouldn’t have been.  But that is certainly why the European Union is going in rapidly.  This is why Olli Rehn and others from the European Union will try to put these countries on a fast track.  Basically, that’s a bit of the explanation of how they had these biases, certainly in the end game.

John Bolton:  Well, the only other point I would make - and I would be interested in what people in the audience may think of this - is you now will have two Albanian states in Europe but with substantial Albanian populations in other countries.  I think that is one of the first tests we are going to see, whether there is a desire for unification and further territorial shifts to account for this, and whether the threat of radical Islamic infiltration is exacerbated by the intra-Albanian politics.  And I think this is a question, certainly, in the United States that there is very little information about but should be the cause of substantial concern. 

And I don’t think that it’s a hypothetical, just looking at the example of Belgium having trouble keeping itself together.  And if there is somebody from the embassy here, I’m just reflecting what I read in the newspapers.  But if in a country of such impeccable European Union credentials as Belgium having difficulty maintaining its status, one has to wonder what the fate of these new countries in the Balkans will be.

Gary Schmitt: Go ahead, Bruce.

Bruce Jackson: I just want to get a couple shots in. Look, I don’t think it is fair to say two Albanian states; these are different entities.  And, frankly, Albania itself has been doing extremely well in all the categories we were concerned about.  But if we are going to count those as two Albanian states, then exactly how many Russian states are there and how many French states are there?  And if we look at the minorities, half of Hungary lives outside of Hungary; that’s always been the case.  So ethnicities are always over borders ,that’s kind of the European experiment.

Gary Schmitt:  I think what we will do now is throw it open to the floor for questions.  Please, we have mikes so wait for the mike and identify yourself and, as they say, ask a question.

Michael Polt:  My name is Michael Polt.  I am one of the participants in what John would call the ‘failed policy’ of the last three years in Serbia and Montenegro, and Serbia, in this case, as the U.S. Ambassador there for the last three years.  I would obviously disagree with him that it was a failed policy; I think that what might happen on Sunday is the combination of a successful U.S.-European enterprise to deal with an issue that simply did not lend itself in the end-result to any other resolution.

But I would like to take up one particular point that sort of underlines, I think, John’s argument which I would take some issue with.  And that is that the pre-ordained solution for the independence of Kosovo was one that was always out there as part of the failed negotiating process and in the end result was prejudiced against Serbia.  Certainly, during my three-plus years in Belgrade, it was always out of concern for Serbia and out of recognition that the future of Serbia is what’s key for the region and for Europe and for Euro-Atlantic integration of the region, much more on the forefront of our minds than the independence of Kosovo and what happens to that province.  That was also a concern.

All the things that Bruce has said I can certainly attach myself to because I think he spoke of them very eloquently.  But the fact that the future of Serbia was the most important thing in our minds was always out there.  Now, I think you are right, John, that we felt from very early on that the likelihood of an agreement between the two sides was nearly going to be impossible.  But it was not because we stacked the deck so much that it was impossible for the Serbs to find a way to accommodate themselves to something that they would find at least marginally acceptable.

With all due respect to my great friend, Ivan Vujacic, the Serbian ambassador here, who is a truly superb and outstanding friend and diplomat, Serbia did not handle its future well at all in this process.  It was given numerous opportunities to go ahead and find a way for a better future to be found within the context of realities which were not caused, as you very rightly said, not caused by the current democratically struggling regime but by Milosevic and his henchmen.  So the fact that we had an unconstructive Russia, the fact that we had an, actually, very recalcitrant Europe trying to find desperately ways to reach an agreement while we were saying, “Look, we can’t go on forever to negotiate this issue.  We have got to close this chapter.”  For Serbia, first and foremost, and for Kosovo second, I would say.

I’m currently on detail from the State Department with the German Martial Fund, so I have a little bit of freedom to speak out in public and I’m going to publish something in the Washington Times in response to your and Larry Eagleburger’s and Peter Rodman’s article.  Not in response, but it will contradict, regrettably, what you are arguing.  And that is the heading of my op-ed piece will be ‘It’s Time for the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Serbia.’  And that is the way we actually view the situation.

John Bolton:  Well, Mike, thank you very much for coming today.  It’s good to see you again.  But I think your remarks really prove the point I was trying to make.  Your criticism of Serbia - and there is plenty to criticize - is they did not figure out how to accommodate themselves to the inevitable result of Kosovo being independent.  You know, I came to this when I was at the U.N., free of any taint of involvement or interest, frankly, one way or the other. 

But when I first met Martti Ahtisaari at the U.N., somebody I had known since 1989 when he was undersecretary general for Management and Administration and conducting the successful referendum and election in Namibia, the first thing he said to me was, “We know how this is going to come out,” which sort of surprised me.  But that was what Martti was saying in all candor because he’s a very candid guy.  That’s what he expected and, indeed, that’s what everybody else expected too.

So when you put your thumb on the scales of the outcome of the negotiation, whatever your motivation - pro-Serbian integration into Europe, pro-Kosovar independence - however you’ve decided, there is no doubt it has a dynamic impact on the negotiations.  The Kosovar Albanians see no reason to compromise because the train is headed in their direction.  And the Serbs’ lack of gracefulness in part was I think because they were unable to answer the question:  “If this is inevitable, who is going to stand up and say, ‘Yes, I favor Kosovo’s independence?’”  It was politically crazy for them inside the context of Serbian politics.

Now, what that says to me at the moment, if we could relive these circumstances or if we knew the inevitable wasn’t to happen on Sunday, is to say we’re going to have real negotiations without a thumb being put on either side of the scale.  And to say that that -- which I think many in Serbia recognize the situation is not going to go back to the way it was before, but to give them a legitimate chance to find a way to accommodate themselves that they were never given. 

Now, I’m not saying that because I hold a grief for Serbia or against the Kosovar Albanians but because the fact that this has been handled in a way that I think exacerbates tension rather than reducing tension leads to the risk of instability in the future greater than a 12-month further negotiation.

  Milena Jorgic:  I’m Milena Jorgicwith Voice of America.  My first question is actually to Mr. Bolton.

 John Bolton:  Aren’t there any Europeans here today?

 Yelena:  My question is--it is apparently imminent that Kosovo is going to proclaim independence on Sunday.  How do you see the role of UN in this situation in the future?  If it is possible to predict that -- how the UN is going to behave in this situation?  And my second question would be for both of the speakers:  What do you recommend to the countries in the region how they should behave regarding the recognition of Kosovo?  Since I have come from Montenegro I would, maybe, focus that question on Montenegro.  Thank you.

 John Bolton:  Well, with respect to the first question on the UN, I think its role is likely to be quite limited in the future, and I think, the arrival of the European Union mission signals that both politically and operationally.  And I think this should be a lesson to people.  The fact is whether they are justified or not justified, the Russians have said they have got an intense interest in this question.  They oppose the course that Kosovo is on that most in the European Union support -- the United States government supports -- and they do not intend to allow the Security Council to legitimize it or bless it in any way. 

Now, to my mind the absence of Security Council actions signifies absolutely nothing in terms of international legitimacy or anything else.  It is a reflection -- the inaction that you will see from the Security Council--is a reflection of international reality.  And that is a reality that exists despite the best wishes of some people who think that Security Council approval is necessary for legitimacy.  It’s not going to happen in this case, and it’s a lesson to be borne in mind for situations in other circumstances around the world. 

In terms of what the neighboring government should do concerning recognition, I don’t think that the element of recognition, frankly, is going to make that much difference one way or the other.  I think some will withhold; some will grant.  But the fundamental political tensions that exist are not going to be mitigated substantially or exacerbated substantially by recognition in the next thirty days.

 Bruce Jackson:  I agree with John’s point on that.  I would basically say two things.  One, I think Montenegro and the rest of the countries in the region should recognize that the Kosovo status decision is just but one of a stream of decisions that is coming soon on historical and structural issues in the region.  There is obviously going to be a decision by NATO to invite three other countries to join NATO, which will change the security framework all around Montenegro and Kosovo. 

There will be discussions on reconciling Macedonia and Greece on the name issue, which will relieve a neuralgic issue in the south.  There would even be discussions of Montenegro and, perhaps, Bosnia going into an intensified dialogue with NATO.  And there will be a huge effort in the European Union to upgrade and advance its relations and the status of all discussions within the region. 

I think that is all going to occur in the next sixty days.  In the course of this year, you will see that all brought to fruition.  So I don’t think that this is – stop here, this is the defining issue for the region.  This is one of many defining issues that will occur.  So with regard to recognitions, there already will be recognition of the major powers and the majority of the European Union and decisions by the European Union to follow up.  If other countries will come in in waves over the next five to ten years when it is convenient for them and their bilateral relations, I would encourage many of the countries who are neighbors of Serbia. 

I would not basically jump in on the first day; you do not really have a dog in the fight.  This is a discussion between Europe and the Kosovars.  And, frankly, let the first wave go and then come after it when you decide to.  I just do not think there is any urgency in making decisions after the larger ones have been made.  Maybe, it may not even be helpful.

 Jane Bojadzievski:  My name is Jane Bojadzievski, Voice of America.  I have one short question from my colleague Milena.  Kosovo imminent declaration of independence presents a significant diplomatic challenge for Macedonia.  What should be the reaction for Macedonian authorities if we have in mind the multi-ethnic base of the country to gain respect and support for their decision from the both sides, Belgrade and the Pristina?  Thank you very much.

 John Bolton:  Well, let me just take a shot.  I mean, this is an example of where I think the muddle of European thinking is resolved.  Bruce has correctly said borders in Europe don’t exactly coincide with ethnicity.  But the fact is the absence of that coinciding is what increases the risk of instability in the Balkans as the Albanians have to decide whether they want one greater Albania that would result from the merger of these two states, whether they want to pick up the little pieces that are largely populated by ethnic Albanians in neighboring countries, or whether they want some other resolution.  And it is a decision that will have, I think, a possibly significant impact on Bosnia because if there are claims for Albanian irredentism elsewhere in the Balkans, what’s to say the Serbs are wrong by saying that the largely Serbian populated parts of Bosnia should be merged with Serbia?  That just goes and reopens a question we all went through in the early 1990s and to me it’s a reflection of a lack of a strategic plan. 

We in the United States have watched this unfold over this period of time and it is just continuing to unfold in a manner that doesn’t seem to have any coherence.  We got into part of the problem with the breakup of Yugoslavia, with the decision that it just absolutely was time to recognize Slovenia and Croatia, and the bloodshed in Bosnia followed.  So I just see that the rushed independence for Kosovo has a greater likelihood of continuing or expanding instability in the Balkans than a solution that would go back to negotiation.

 Bruce Jackson:  A couple points: one, John,  please don’t tell Tirana you are thinking about greater Albania; they’ll have a heart attack.  The last thing that Albania wants is to get involved in the Kosovar issue.  They have been completely out of it; they are on their way to Europe.  So I do not think that’s a danger.  With regard to Macedonia, though, I think it does have an important role. 

Macedonia is an example of a successful multi-ethnic state that works well.  Parties talk across; they have shown that Slavic peoples and Albanian people can work extremely well together and effectively.  Also, the relationship between Albania and Macedonia within the Adriatic Charter and the joint implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement shows that the states can work internationally.  So, frankly, there is a southern proof of what is beginning to happen slightly to the north.  So I think you are essentially a role model and a bit of a coach here. 

Secondly, when it happens on Sunday and Monday we hope that Macedonia can do with Greece on Tuesday because you have issues to your south that need compromise and adjudication that are also necessary for the further integration of the region.  So, one, you should be pleased that somebody else took up your model.  And two, you should rededicate yourself to the issues that have to be resolved with NATO allies before the entry into NATO.

 Ruth Wedgwood:  Not to act like an international law professor, but I do have worries about international law here insofar as some of its ideas.

 Gary Schmitt:  Ruth, can you introduce yourself?

 Ruth Wedgwood:  Oh, sorry.   Ruth Wedgwood.  I wrote another naughty piece on John’s line -- are helpful to international stability and not to give, God forbid, Belgrade any ideas, God forbid.  But in the 19th century, premature recognition of a breakaway republic was considered a hostile act; it’s not trivial.  And other than setting up Belgium and swiping it from the Dutch in 1831, that’s about the only other instance in -- when Yugo broke up the Badinter Commission said, “We’re not breaking it up.  We’re just saying it already is broken up.  We’re not the ones doing it.” 

Here, the international community is clearly the causative agent breaking up Kosovo and Serbia.  And I worry at the precedent because whether you can predict it now or not, it will give other people ideas.  Second worry: we had Soren Jessen-Petersen who was a very energetic SRSG in Kosovo over at SAIS two days ago, I guess.  But before Soren got there in March 2004, the violence was so terrible,  the inefficacy of NATO troops was so profound, that even though the caveats that are supposed to limit the deployment of NATO troops are technically lifted, the actual willingness of UN folks, NATO folks, to do micro-policing in robust circumstances is very limited. 

And if another major ethnic riot happens under European Union auspices, this time it will denature the legitimacy of Europe as much as it did the UN presence.  I just never understood -- I like Nick Burns but I never understood his answer:  Unique way forward, full stop, without any other  explanation why one couldn’t explore all the other structures of the devolution of authority, guaranteed autonomy that have worked in many other instances in Africa and elsewhere.

 Bruce Jackson:  I’m not a lawyer so --

 John Bolton:  It doesn’t make any difference.

 Bruce Jackson:  -- I don’t have a sense that it does.Look, I think the general rules of common sense, you know -- one, it is very difficult to put peoples together again after ethnic cleansing and genocide occurs on both sides.  We have seen this around the world; it does present you with a fait accompli.  As much as we might like to restore the status quo ante, it cannot be done. 

Secondly, I think there is an implied loss of legitimacy in the way you conduct yourself in international affairs.  If you engage in these kinds of crimes against humanity and demonstrate to the satisfaction of the international community you will not meet your responsibilities to protect, then you do lose certain claims, the legitimacy of certain claims. 

This is of course -- the Kosovo wars at the end against the serial aggression of Belgrade in that period -- four wars were started before that; this was sort of the last straw.  And there was over one million Albanian refugees driven to other states in one of the other waves of this.  It was beginning at that period, I think, that there was a general recognition that there had to be a new status and I think people were completely clear about that. 

I mean, even though it did not go back to the United Nations for the consummation, 1244 does say we will seek a new status.  I mean, it admitted that it could change status at the beginning, so that everybody knew that was a possibility. Whether or not it needed to come back to get approved a second time, people are disputing.  But from a conceptual -- I’m a theorist.  In theory we already agreed in 1999 that status could be changed.

 John Bolton:  Let me just jump in on that, because 1244 is clear in reaffirming Serbian sovereignty, right?

 Bruce Jackson:  That’s part of it.

 John Bolton:  It reaffirms Serbian sovereignty but says it is possible that that could change.

 Bruce Jackson:  Right.

 John Bolton:  Right. And it will change but it won’t change with the UN Security Council resolution.

 Bruce Jackson:  I conceded that point.

 John Bolton:  So what you have done is start a process that can’t be finished and that leaves it open to challenges of illegitimacy.  And that is the seedbed that risks future instability.  Now all this is subject to empirical proof beginning on Monday.  The trouble is this is carrying an abstraction through to experiment on the lives of the people who live there.

  Andrea Komnenovic: Question for Mr. John Bolton.  My name is Andrea Komnenovic and I’m coming from Belgrade, Serbia.  Your Excellency, I share all your political philosophy views and principles, and I would like you to explain me one phenomenon.  Why -- as a person who is leaning more to Republicans, I’m very interested in that--why is Kosovo issue the single issue Bush’s administration is consistent with the Clinton legacy?  And I would like to know why this --?

 Gary Schmitt:  There’s no reason to be nasty.

 Andrea Komnenovic: Why they insist on the same path of resolving of that issue?  And just one observation as how I describe myself,  and as a Serbian, I’m against my country to join the European Union for the same reasons as, for example, Tories in Great Britain would be against it.  So I don’t see a solution of my country or of all the regional problems over there by joining the European Union.  Thank you, Excellency, very much.

 John Bolton:  Thank you.  Well, at the beginning you asked why this is the one policy where the Bush administration continues the policy of the Clinton administration.  And if that were correct, I would give you a different answer.  But, sadly, this is only one of several policies where they are following the policy of the Clinton administration.  I believe as much as anything else it is because the State Department has been on auto pilot since Rambouillet. I think that was the clear direction that the Clinton administration wanted to go; they wanted Kosovar independence and it was hard for anybody else to imagine a different solution.  I think this is a view that is punitive towards Serbia. 

And I say that not because I’m here prepared to try and defend anything about what Serbia has done in Albania under dictatorships; there isn’t any defense for it.  But the circumstance now is that you have aspirations and some evidence of success in establishing a democratic society in Serbia.  And we’re about to tell that evolving democratic society, “Sorry, you lose.  We’re taking part of your country away from you.”  And I think that rewards intransigents on the part of the Kosovar Albanians because they could see the direction this was going in.  And I think it will embitter many in Serbia and Serbs in other parts of the Balkans. 

That is why I think, looking at all of these factors, moving to independence now risks greater instability in the future than trying over another period of time to see if there is not some way, as with alternatives as either Ruth described or some other path that gets you to the same result, but which is not so destructive of pro-democratic leadership in Serbia.  You’re going to have -- these problems are not going away because of the independence.  This is not the culmination of the end of Yugoslavia, this is just one more iteration in a continuing problem.

 Ivan Vujacic:  Yes, my name is Ivan Vujacic.  I’m the Ambassador of Serbia.  The reason I did not take this mike before was that Ambassador Bolton was doing such a great job in presenting our case.  I guess I have to earn my salary myself.  Really, this is a very dangerous situation we are facing.  I will make just a small comment and throw a few thoughts on how you see the future of this and ask the panelists to comment on that. 

First of all, I was at the Security Council yesterday; there were about 50 nations present to see what was going to happen.  This in itself I think denies the “uniqueness” of the case.  That many people and that many countries would not have been present to see the debate yesterday if they thought this was a one-time unique affair.  They see consequences for it; they see consequences for the United Nations; and we will see what will happen in that respect in the future. 

Now, going back to international law, we believe as Ambassador Bolton has pointed it out that 1244 reasserts the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Serbia with Kosovo.  We also think that the ruling of the Badinter Commission that was mentioned here preserves that sovereignty because the Badinter Commission when Yugoslavia was dissolving basically made the borders of the republic sacrosanct, not the provinces. 

So I think this is another precedent in the European ruling.  This will certainly be detrimental to the democratic forces in Serbia as Ambassador Bolton has said, to which I’m proud to say I belong, being very involved in the overthrowing of Milosevic for 10 years.  But what I want to also say is that, there is a negation, in a way, of multi-ethnicity as a concept of Europe by the formation of Kosovo’s independent state.  It is very difficult for Serbs in Kosovo to say, to acknowledge, and accept that the Albanians will give them all these rights when they are saying, “We do not want to live with the Serbs in Serbia proper.”  There is a big contradiction for them in their minds that -- and I hope that they will stay and will not feel threatened, which is the responsibility of the international community. 

Now, what I would also like to point out is that I agree that from the Serbian perspective these negotiations were predetermined with a deadline, and if you set up a negotiation like that it is bound to fail.  I have tried to voice this view many times in the State Department and other places in Washington, as have my colleagues elsewhere.  It was bound to fail.  We do not accept that we were intransigent in this process.  We have bent over backwards giving practically internal independence in these negotiations.  The other side did not have any, incentive to leave their major position of independence or nothing or independence now. 

There is also an implicit threat of violence along this time.  A lot of the rationalization why this has to end was we can’t keep the situation under control, which in a way then -- in a way not that far removed, actually says that violence and threats of violence can influence an international negotiation, which is not the way things are supposed to be. 

Now, what are we going to get on Monday?  We are going to get an independent State of Kosovo, probably recognized by many including, I guess, the United States.  We are also going to get --that country is not going to be recognized by many.  Serbia will not recognize it.  It will not probably get into the UN; it will not then - not being in the UN - get into the World Bank or the Monetary Fund, or some other international financial institutions.  And in itself, independence will not be a panacea for economic development as has been argued by my friend Bruce Jackson here. 

Down the road, this leads to a greater Albania.  And why should not then Kosovo vote to be part of Albania and have unification like the Germans have done?  And who is going to prevent this?  Will the international community say, “No, you cannot go further and become part and create a greater Albania in the Balkans?”  Will its status give it anything, really, in terms of economic development?  I come from -- in a previous life, I was a professor of Economics and what I would like to say is that if this was an economic calculation, the rational way would be for Kosovo to stay within Serbia as a complementary economy with a greater chance of reaching the European Union than on its own. 

So I think that the major arguments for independence are not really valid; they’re very thin.  But I know and I realize that this whole process will go forward.  My question is how do you see independent Kosovo five or ten years from now and how do you see this playing out in the region?

 Gary Schmitt:  I would like to add the question:  How do you see Serbia five or ten years from now to that as well.

 Bruce Jackson:  Ambassador, those were exactly the questions and the concerns, and I tend to agree with John; this is a little unknowable.  There is no empirical data on this and this should be -- I guess I have a hope for Serbia and a hope for these outcomes.  You know, at the end of the day this judgment is you got seven million or seven-and-a-half million people in Belgrade; you got two million people in Kosovo. 

First objective is get them both into one lifeboat and get them to Europe.  And if they won’t get into the lifeboat together, you have to consider two lifeboats.  And that is basically what it has come down to - that they will basically have a better chance of addressing their issues and their history from these two perspectives.  And that is just a little bit more than an act of faith. 

I’m a little bit persuaded by this.  Every major politician, with the exception of radicals, will tell you privately in Serbia that they know that Kosovo is never coming back.  Well, if we know that, why don’t we act on that knowledge?  I mean, it’s not as if we’re doing them a favor by perpetuating this, perhaps.  It basically expressed -- we know that this is going to happen; we know it’s the right idea, and the reason we don’t tell you is we can be shot.  I mean, what can happen to Dindic because he thought of these kinds of things could happen to us--and they say that. 

So whereas we might be complaining this was done to us, we were aggrieved. I mean, at the same time probably people are saying, “Just decide it and get it off of our politics.”  And maybe I’m misled and talking to the wrong people but it seems to me that we are in a position on Friday night that this is going to start happening.  We should just hope and pray that this benefits the people who have been victims either of themselves or each other for so long.  This does appear to be the way we are going.  I’m sure it will be painful in the first few months, but we will have to see.  I mean, so I guess -- and I will come back and apologize if my advice was absolutely wrong.

 John Bolton:  Well, I’m all in favor of hope and prayer in international relations.  I just like to have a little bit better balance in the cost-benefit analysis of the likelihood of instability and the consequent negative effects of that.  And I wouldn’t discount the utility of the situation coming out the way it does to the Russians, who are given one more weapon to play around with in eastern and central Europe and, indeed, in their relations with Western Europe. 

You know, they have used in Security Council diplomacy tactics that I haven’t seen for many other permanent member.  We were negotiating what became Resolution 1701, the ceasefire in the war between Israel and Hezbollah when we were at the same time having a dispute with Russia over visas for people from Georgia to come to the United States.  And I suddenly found myself negotiating with the State Department--of course, that part is nothing new--But negotiating with the Russians about something completely unrelated because they were prepared to threaten a veto of a Georgia-related resolution and tie up our negotiations over 1701. 

So the Ambassador mentioned Kosovo not joining the UN.  Of course, it won’t as long as Russia is determined to exercise a veto.  I’m sure at some point the Russians would be happy to trade it for something and I just want to know what that trade is going to be because it may well be something that at that time is going to cost a very high cost to have to be paid quite apart from the ability that the Russians will now have to fish in troubled waters in the region.

 Bruce Jackson:  Just on that point:  If we’re avoiding giving Russia instruments or sticks with which to beat us, then we shouldn’t give missile defense to the Poles and the Czechs.  .

 John Bolton:  But Bruce, that’s just not right.  The point here to me is the way this outcome is being handled and the assistance that it’s got to be handled.  Now, that’s the stick you’re giving them.  I don’t have a brief one way or in the other whether Kosovo ought to be independent at an appropriate time.  What you’re doing is by imposing the solution or allowing the Kosovar Albanians to impose the solution is to create conditions that are going to come back to haunt us.  And that is something that in terms of American interest I think is very different from discussions of missile defense or other related matters .

 Bruce Jackson:  It goes on a long time but it seems to me Russia asked for an extension and the Germans took over this process.  We did do another three to four months; it didn’t help the politics of Serbia.

 John Bolton:  But, seriously, do you not accept that the Germans were determined that Kosovo was going to be independent?  There was not the slightest doubt in my mind that’s the outcome they wanted.

 Michael Polt:  May I?

 Bruce Jackson:  I’m dying out here.  You better get out and help me.

 Michael Polt:  John, I really don’t think so.  I think the Europeans were honestly looking for a different way to handle the situation to make this palatable to the Serbs.  I don’t think they were out there and saying, “Let’s beat up on the Serbs to see how much more pain and victimization complex we can cause in Serbia and amongst the Serbian people.”  There was a clear recognition that this would be a much better outcome if it could be a mutually agreed upon solution.  There is no mutually agreed upon solution; there isn’t one.

 John Bolton:  But, Mike, it’s not a question whether their motivation was to cause pain and suffering to the Serbs.  I would just agree with you for the sake of argument that was not their motivation.  But the inevitable consequence of their action, however, was to create that and undermine, I’m afraid, the democratic forces inside Serbia.  So the issue, it seems to me, for European diplomacy was to find a more artful way, if it was inevitable -- and I’ll take,just assume, your position on that as well. 

Over a nine-year period they were unable to find a way through this that would not result in risks of the kind of instability we’ve been talking about today.  And that’s why the insistence, I mean, at a minimum, of having independence right now seems to me to impose a cost on the overall context in the Balkans that it’s just not going to be worth the risk we are going to run.

 Michael Polt:  Leaving Russia out for a moment as an actor who will always find a way to go ahead and cause us trouble when it can under the current context, I do not believe that there will be an increased risk of instability in the region because of this action.  I think what Bruce said before is he is not the only one who is being told that.  All of us have been told that by one player or the other in Serbia in private,  and that is, “Please take this yoke off our back.” 

The fact of the matter is, I was confronted for three-plus years with the issue of, “You are stealing 15 percent of our territory.”  And my answer always was, “Your focus ought to be on the other 85 percent.”  The best guarantee for stability in the region, the best guarantee for stability in Europe emanating from that region, is a stable, secure, and democratic Serbia, which after the independence of Kosovo it has a best chance of achieving.

 John Bolton:  Okay, but the assumption there from those who undoubtedly were saying to you seriously and sincerely that they wanted this taken off the backs of the Serbians, that having this deus ex machina would relieve that internal problem relies on those who are irreconcilable on Kosovo independence letting it drop as well.  And if they don’t, then the people who were saying that to you are, quite possibly, the first victims of what comes next, number one. 

And, number two, that doesn’t speak at all to what happens when Kosovo becomes independent flying the same flag of the Albanian people, or at least some of them are going to fly as are flown in other Albanian regions.  And the dynamic then among Albanians -- leave the Serbs aside--to me the risk of instability comes not only from the threat to democracy in Serbia but the risk of ethnic instability in the Balkans and the risk of external forces taking advantage of that instability in Albania.

 Jelena McWilliams:  My name is Jelena McWilliams and I’m here in my capacity as a private citizen.  My question ties in with the discussion about instability in the Balkans.  Many commenters have commented in the past months that Kosovo may or may not set a precedent.  And if we look outside of the Balkans [audio glitch] so I take that it will.  But if we look on a micro geopolitical level inside the Balkans, you will have -- inside of that independent Kosovo you will have a Serbian minority; inside of the carefully balanced Macedonia per Mr. Jackson [audio glitch] will have a very large Kosovo-Albanian population. 

In the south of Serbia without Kosovo, you have a large Albanian population.  Bosnia is a trapeze artist doing a very carefully balanced act; it will take very little to tip it over towards one side or the other.  And in the end you have a large Serbian population in Croatia.  What kind of precedent is the independence for Kosovo through violence in many respects and terrorist actions in others and illegal UN resolution [audio glitch] disrespect of international law going to set on a micro level outside of -- not to mention outside of the Balkans -- for the Balkans and those other ethnic groups and other ethnic minorities?  Thank you.

 John Bosnitch:  Thank you.  My name is John Bosnitch.  I’m a journalist that was based in Japan for a long time and I covered the wars in the region.  I’m also the president of the Serbian Unity chapter here in Washington, D.C.  If I may, I will make a couple of comments and then two direct questions.

 Gary Schmitt:  Please, we are running out of time so go to the questions, please.

 John Bosnitch:  All right.  Directly, I guess the American Enterprise Institute is one of the most unusual places to ask Lenin’s question, which is “What is to be done?”  I’m not at all ready to accept that this is a closed issue and we now have to start crying about what’s going to happen after.  I’m more concerned obviously about the Kosovo issue and I don’t think it is lost at all.  I’ve written a recommendation to the president’s office in Serbia that the president, the prime minister and the patriarch proceed to move to Kosovo, to take up residence there and to conduct their business from within Kosovo and, ideally, before any declaration is made by the Albanians in Kosovo. 

The question then is, given that everybody recognizes that 1244 is still in effect, would the EU policing mission have the legal ability to arrest and deport the president of Serbia, the prime minister of Serbia, and the patriarch of Serbia from Kosovo?  That’s question number one to Mr. Bolton and to anybody else who wishes to comment on it. 

And number two, you’re far more experienced than I am in the intricacies of diplomatic power plays.  What other tactics beyond what I’m suggesting could be used by Serbia and its ally, Russia?  For example, some have suggested a so-called super veto in which Russia vetoes every act, every motion at the Security Council until international law is reestablished.  In other words the Security Council is closed; the United Nations is closed until United Nations reestablishes international law.  Any other ideas? 

So two questions:  Could they arrest them and deport them, and B, what other tactics could Serbia use before we start wringing our hands and saying it’s over?

 Bruce Jackson:  With regard to the precedent, yes, there will be minorities all over the place but I think your argument is with Schumann and Monet, not with me.  It seems to me this is the nature of the European peace.  There is French minorities all over Western Europe and different countries and, frankly, this is the normal course of where ethnicity goes across borders and sovereignty is shared, and it is uniquely the vision of the Treaty of Rome.  And frankly, what is happening in the Balkans is nothing different than what every other country has gone through - France and Germany, the Czechs and Romanians and Hungarians. 

I mean this is the natural outcome of essentially an ethnic divided Europe and merging into a modern 21st- century Europe.  I haven’t seen it this painful before.  Other countries seemed to come out of World War II and do it naturally.  I guess the retardation effect of Yugoslavia basically held them back for fifty years and now they’re doing what their western neighbors have been doing for the better part of more than half a century.  Frankly, I don’t see that as threatening.  I don’t see -- ethnicity is not the significant factor in the rest of European politics.  And I think over time and over integration it won’t be so in southeast Europe. 

With regard to the “It ain’t over ‘til it’s over” argument, I think what you really are going to see is that the European Union is going to take cognizance of this region in a positive term in terms of integration.  But, also, they are now committed to supervising and ruling out actions that are dangerous, such as maybe creating new countries.  Greater Albania, if that were probably their view that it is dangerous. 

With regard to encouraging sort of agit prop attacks on this transition, one, President Tadic has made it clear that he is unhappy with this outcome; he is disappointed with this outcome.  But he certainly rules out violence or aggressive behavior of any sort.  I mean, you can still continue to discuss under the parties which to agree tomorrow to change things; they can do that.  I mean, nobody is telling them they have to stop negotiating.  They can continue to discuss and, indeed, as neighbors they will have to continue to discuss.  So I guess, that’s it .

 John Bolton:  Well, I have to say with regard to the ethnic piece that is broken out in Western Europe, you know, I suppose that’s true, unless your name is Theo van Gogh and you make movies that some people find undesirable.  And in any event, the issue is not whether at some point the Balkans will make it to the sunlit uplands of Western European stability.  The question is how many people are going to die in the short term, given the animosities and hostilities that continue to exist.  As this gentleman was suggesting -- and I’m sure these are some of the more pacific alternatives of sending the leadership of Serbia into Kosovo; that or some other things.  I think this is a very precarious period that can be inflamed very easily and will be outside the power of the European Union to control. 

I mean, what we saw at the breakup of Yugoslavia beginning in the early 1990s was something that leading opinion in Europe said could never happen-- ethnic cleansing on the face of Europe:  ‘We’re past that in Europe.  We’re past that; never going to happen again.’  And it did.  So what’s to say in the short term that hostilities - and potentially hostilities quite damaging to numbers of civilian populations - couldn’t erupt again?  

And that doesn’t take into account, I think, the risk of a state in Kosovo, assuming it remains a separate state, not subject to the possibility of outside intervention, particularly, given the financial resources that some countries could bring to bear there.  All of which is not to say at some point there might not be a perfectly legitimate, independent, and stable Albanian state.  Why does it have to happen on Sunday?

 Gary Schmitt:  We’re going to take one more question and then we’re going to break for the day.  Please --

 Male Voice:  What I’m hearing here is a difference in the assessment of the balance of power.  Ambassador Bolton referred to a concept known as linkage, in effect, saying Russia has some leverage now.  Realistically, you have got to take account of that.  I’m not hearing any sort of accommodation like that from Mr. Jackson.  It is just a sense that we have the power; we can impose what we want.  But at the same time there is an underlying tone that while we have these assurances nothing will really happen.  But what we have found is sometimes we do things and there are consequences worse than we expect.  NATO is now scrambling to put additional troops in Afghanistan.  If these assurances turn out to be incorrect, if things go worse than we expect, what is the balance of power?  What are the reserves that we can call on now at this time, given the other requirements that we have?

 Bruce Jackson:  Okay, I would like to think what I was saying was not as capricious as that.  I mean we spent two years on the Balkan Commission going to every single one of these countries--and there were forty something people, most of them, almost all Europeans, there were only two Americans on it--We studied thisreasonably exhaustively, but the conclusion was that the status quo was disastrous and the long-term situation continued to deteriorate not only in Kosovo, but also in Serbia and the surrounding states.  And we had no prospect of lifting up the region overall. 

As a result of that conclusion, the risks of trying to settle the status issue seemed to be justified in the possibility of making improvement and the success of countries like Croatia, actually, Albania.  And its discussions in Macedonia seemed to confirm that these structures would make other things possible.  That is an assumption; we cannot prove it.  But it was the judgment of these forty-two people that was worth trying.  And then it was looked at again by Kai Eide and Ahtisaari; it was roughly the same conclusion, roughly for the same reasons.  That’s the reason why the international community is trying to make these status determinations at this point.

 Gary Schmitt:  Well, that concludes our panel.  I want to thank John and Bruce for laying out different views in a very coherent and thoughtful way.  And you can rejoin us in three months, six months, a year, and we’ll see which set of facts actually fits those descriptions.  Again, thank you for coming. And, again, thanks, Bruce and John.

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