American Enterprise Institute

May 28, 2008

[Edited transcript from audio tapes]

1:45 p.m.	Registration
2:00	Introduction:	Danielle Pletka, AEI
2:15	Panelists:	Robert Malley, International Crisis Group
		Hassan Mneimneh, Iraq Memory Foundation Danielle Pletka, AEI
		Lee Smith, Hudson Institute
	Moderator:	Michael Rubin, AEI
4:00	Adjournment

Proceedings:

Michael Rubin:  Without further ado, what I'd like to do is introduce the panel, ask each of our panelists to speak for eight to ten minutes so that we have maximum time for questions and answers and discussion from the floor.  I would like to start in the order in which the panelists will speak, beginning with Hassan Mneimneh. 

 Full introductions and biographies are in the folder, which you picked up when you registered, but Hassan Mneimneh is known to almost everyone in both Lebanon and Washington and for that matter, Iraq.  He is the Executive Director of the Iraq Foundation and Director of Documentation Projects for the Iraq Memory Foundation.  He is also a veteran of American Enterprise Institute panels, as well as other panels around Washington.  Sitting next to him is Lee Smith.  Lee is a prolific writer who has written a great deal from Lebanon and the Middle East and Syria as well.  He is currently a Visiting Fellow at the Hudson Institute. 

 To his right is Rob Malley who is Director of the International Crisis' Groups Middle East and North Africa programs since January 2002.  He is also an old hand when it comes to the Middle East peace process, especially during the Clinton years. 

 And then finally to his right is Danielle Pletka, also a prolific writer, who is Vice President of Foreign Policy and Defense Studies here.  Without further ado, what I'd like to do is turn the floor over to Hassan Mneimneh to give a brief overview and analysis of what just has happened in Lebanon over the past couple of weeks.  Hassan?

 Hassan Mneimneh:  Needless to say that at least today is the scene of confrontation between two propositions, two projects, two [indiscernible].  Clearly we tend to look at it, at least from the vantage point of Washington D.C. in terms of Iran versus the United States or sometimes Saudi Arabia and other Arab governments that are or are deliberately pro-Western versus Iran. 

 But from the perspective of Lebanon, from within Lebanon, this dichotomy or this confrontation takes on a distinctive Lebanese flavor and has very much saw roots in Lebanese history.  I do not want to take you through a whole survey of Lebanese history, but I nonetheless would like to start, however briefly, with a second republic that is born out of the long Lebanese civil war, a devastating war that was anything but civil and in the course of which we have witnessed many scores settled between Arab regimes, between Arab regimes and others, local, regional and international players. 

 This second republic was supposed to be a departure in Lebanese history in the sense that it was supposed to address a long-term uneven development that Lebanon had faced.  Lebanon, up until 1975, can very fairly be represented as having had a center and a periphery.  The center being Beirut and Mount Lebanon, the periphery being, at first, the areas around Mount Lebanon from Accra to the Becka Valley to the south, but also gradually another belt of misery around Beirut that to a large extent represented the mirror image of the big belt of misery, if you would like. 

 However, as a result of the civil war in which many of the grievances that were legitimate were used and abused by a multitude of parties, there was a realization that we had to have a situation in which uneven development that had happened before needs to be redressed and the next phase in Lebanese history had to witness even development.  It did not.  What it witnessed is parallel development. 

 Instead of one Lebanon, one state of Lebanon under the second republic, Lebanon had to endure the emergence of two states.  One we can refer to as Lebanon One is the official Lebanon, the one that was premised and predicated on the fact that the Middle East sooner or later will experience peace.  And therefore Lebanon, traditionally an area not only of diversity and pluralism, but also of education, of health, of tourism, will gain to benefit from this peace to come. 

 This, in a certain sense, was the bet of many Lebanese, but it was also the bet, the peace option, the peace alternative of Hazela Afsed [phonetic] that saw in it – okay, if peace happens, that Lebanese track will be mine given that Syria at that point had effectively had full [indiscernible] over Lebanon and I will use it accordingly.  This is Lebanon One.  Lebanon Two, which has its capital in Beirut South or the southern suburbs of Beirut, was different. 

 It was predicated on the fact that the conflict that the Middle East has witnessed will continue and ultimately, not only Israel will be defeated, but also something bigger than Israel will be defeated.  Whether it's the whole Arab political system, whether it's the whole world system, it remained confused and unclear because of the ideologue of this Lebanon Two deliberately left it as such.  But ultimately this Lebanon Two is the state of Hezbollah.  This is what we end up having.  We have in Lebanon by the time Israeli withdrawal happens in the spring and summer of 2000, Lebanon was not one, it was two. 

 The reason for the second Lebanon to exist, which is presumably resistance, was null and void with the Israeli withdrawal.  New reasons were invented.  The history goes on.  Again, it is not my intent to discuss all of the intricacies of it, but I would like you to understand what is happening today in Lebanon, not as being merely a conflict between one community and the other, but really between two different visions and two different understandings of the place of this small country in the region and in the world. 

 One vision which is really premised and predicated on the idea of freedom and free enterprise and progress and the future and the state of flow is riddled with problems, riddled with inefficiencies, riddled with corruption, at times.  But nonetheless, the kernel of it is there, the kernel and the core of that vision are in place.  They are often, it is often represented by people who have less than a savory past. 

 People who were at times warlords, people who were, at times, involved in the uncivil Lebanese wars that happened, but nonetheless, that seemed to be legitimately and provingly committed to this vision.  Now as opposed to this vision of Lebanon, the freedom, the Lebanon freedom, there is the other vision, which presents itself as Lebanon dignity, karama [phonetic].  But in fact is Lebanon resistance, is Lebanon opposition to surrender and Lebanon continuous strife. 

 Now those two visions do not really have plenty of room for competition in Lebanon if the situation was anything resembling normalcy.  Because the Lebanese people, like any other population, will choose what is rational, will choose peace.  Therefore the atmosphere that we have witnessed over quite a number of years, since 2000 up until today of continuous mobilization and continuous insistence on an enemy that is and an enemy that is not, conspiracies came and went while no conspiracies were there. 

 I mean, if you just follow the propaganda, the information machine that was produced by this Lebanon Two, if you like, you will think that either the Israelis and the Americans are utterly stupid and incompetent, or that they are so devilish that we cannot figure what exactly they want.  But what we know for sure that they are not succeeding, because we keep on winning.  Battle after battle, [indiscernible] in all, battle after battle has been won, plot after plot has been undone. 

 Up until lately, we've witnessed the culmination of that by a total assault on the capital city by an armed group that claimed to be a resistance for all Lebanon against an enemy that was no longer in Lebanon.  A total assault on the city that ends up being portrayed after at the end of the assault as another victory.  Again, what we are witnessing here, the dramatic aspects of what we are witnessing is that we do indeed have these two competing visions and these two visions are competing for the hearts and minds, not only of the Lebanese, but well beyond. 

 When I see in Bethlehem demonstration or actually in the course of a funeral by a Palestinian who was killed by an Israeli squad flags of Hezbollah flying in the course of that funeral and cause for Hezbollah to hit.  We do realize that it Middle East.  It is a matter of what vision of the Middle East we want, a vision that ultimately leads to peace and stability or a vision of perpetual conflict and the distraction of Lebanon being described once again a victory. 

 What we have in Lebanon today on the part of Hezbollah is a totalitarian regime.  It is not just an organization; it is not just a party.  It is a regime.  It is a state.  I wouldn't call it a state within a state because it is a state next to a state.  It has its own educational system, its own health system, its own communication system with the legitimate state being excluded from it.  It is a state in Lebanon that is totalitarian. 

 From the moment that the citizen of this state is born, up until that citizen becomes the martyr that the state prepares him or her to become, that citizen is indoctrinated with imaginary enemies and imaginary allies.  If this is left without being countered and countered not in the form of military action as much as countering it through the proper provision of opportunities for the population that this state controls, while it is not promising.  What we have seen in Lebanon will end up being just the first round in something far more dramatic that will come. 

 The policy now, the declared objective of Hezbollah is to ensure that the next rounds are not going to be between Shia and non-Shia in Lebanon.  They are going to be within the Sunni community, within the Christian community and within the Druse community.  And the tools for such actions are in motion.  I mean, we read in their press, as well as we see in their statements that ultimately up until the defeat of what they consider their enemy, which is their fellow Lebanese who do not share with them that perpetual resistance and perpetual fight against an enemy that is invisible.  Up until that defeat happens, the fight happens at their end and therefore we have to be aware of it. 

 Michael Rubin:  Thank you, Hassan.  Without further ado, I will turn the floor over to Lee Smith who will be addressing how the recent events in Lebanon will impact on the ongoing peace process, especially the recently announced peace process between Syria and Israel.

 Lee Smith:  Thanks, Michael.  The first thing that I wanted to say is I see a lot of Lebanon faces here and so they understand this.  But Hezbollah did not run the board in Lebanon.  They certainly tried to.  They were set back both in the Chuf and they were set back in the north as well.  There are different estimates and interpretations coming out of Beirut, which may, perhaps, be too rosy about the Suleinam presidency and Siniora renewing his role as prime minister.  They may be a little rosy.  However, the important thing to remember is that Hezbollah did not win the board, did not run the board.  The fight for Lebanon is not yet over. 

 However, I think that all of that does need to be understood in the context of the idea that there will be a fight for Lebanon.  I think many people think that Doha, the Doha regime that was merely a stopgap and there will be a renewed round of fighting and that one of the things it will do is provide time for all involved parties to re-arm, which of course is the last thing that Washington wanted for Lebanon. 

 I would say that one thing, I mean certainly one of the issues is going to be, Hassan was talking about intra-sectarian fighting, but there will also be, I believe, a huge Sunni Shia issue.  One of the things to be watching for, I think, will certainly be in the north will be with the Sunni outfits in the north, especially insofar as a lot of people believe that Al Qaeda in Iraq has been soundly defeated now. 

 So what will be sort of the next Jihad front in the region and I think that Lebanon is certainly a likely possibility, as is Syria.  But certainly Lebanon, that seems to be a possible thing that might happen there.  Again, this is the last thing that this administration wanted to have for Lebanon.  They saw it as an opportunity to push back against the Iranian project for the region.  But it wasn't just about Iran; it was also a post-9/11 plan. 

 I think that this administration saw Lebanon as an option to the Bin Laden view of the region, which is based on grievance and violence.  And Lebanon, while it contains the kernel of a democracy – I mean the important thing to realize what's happened here is that while March 14th, and while pro-democracy forces in Lebanon have been under siege by Syria and its allies, they have not fought back.  Their resistance has been entirely peaceful, it's been asking for rule of law and depending on international law.  This was a very important thing for this administration and should still be an important thing. 

 But I think one of the things that we need to realize though, if Lebanon does fall, then that will certainly say – we have to recognize that the administration's Lebanon policy was a perfect example of multi-lateralism.  Built in broad consensus with regional partners like Saudi Arabia and also international partners like France and premised on a series of UN resolutions.  If that fails, then we are going to have to come back and ask different questions about multi-lateralism. 

 I want to come - I do want to talk about the Syria/Israeli peace process, because I want to come back to what this will mean for the next administration.  I think the Syria/Israeli, I know that Mr. Malley has advocated restarting these talks and now that these talks have restarted, I suppose that there is a certain amount of – I think a lot of people feel justified about this.  I think there is no room to move on this and I wouldn't take it so much from the Israeli side.  The Israeli's talk about returning to Golan, whether or not that is feasible, I tend to think it is not. 

 I think what is impossible, I think it's impossible for Syria to meet Israel's demands, which are abandoning Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran.  I just don't see that happening at all.  What that would mean is that Syria would lose all ability to protect power in the region, which would turn it effectively into a second rate Jordan led by an Alouette regime.  I just don't see that that is possible for them to do that.  They have been running an anti-American, their entire policy in the region is based on resistance.  Damascus is the capital of their resistance and rejection to the U.S., the U.S. plan for the region. 

 One of the things, as deplorable as it is for the Israelis to have stepped out on U.S. policy in this regard and certainly the U.S. saw isolation, sees isolation of Syria as a very important thing.  And it's not just the U.S.; it's useful to remember that the Saudis have also played a large role in this.  The Saudis also remove their ambassador from Syria and have not returned him.  The Israelis stepped out on this and this is a big deal. 

 The administration, if the regional policy of this administration were running more coherent, it would probably recognize that this is a very big deal that the Israelis stepped out on this at this point.  As deplorable as that decision is, it illustrates what I think is a pretty useful point, which is that the peace process has come to a dead end, at least for the time being.  I think that despite the efforts of the Secretary of State, there is very little room on the Palestinian front. 

 I think that almost all estimates recognize that an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank would mean that Hamas takes over the West Bank anywhere from one to two years and the Israelis know this.  And so that means that Hamas rockets within firing range of Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Ben Gurian airport, it makes no sense.  For the reason I stated before, I think there is no room on the Syria/Israeli front, either. 

 So what does that mean?  The peace process was a key pillar of U.S. policy in the region.  And one of the things that the peace process was based on, it was based on the idea that the U.S. was taking advantage of conflict in the region, that the U.S. was the power broker.  People had to come to Washington.  The Arabs, if they wanted something from Israel, they had to come to Washington to get it.  Now that that is gone, Washington needs to look for new places to have that and there certainly are plenty of places of conflict in the region. 

 I just – again, I know that Mr. Malley is an advocate of engagement.  The problem that I have with engagement is not so much that we would be dealing with unsavory regimes such as the Syrian regime or dealing with people like Hamas or Hezbollah.  I think that what it does, though, it puts us in a strange position so that people are able to cut deals over our head.  I think the way that we want it is we want people to cut deals with us as quickly as possible. 

 And so I think one of the tasks of the next administration will be, again, to find out where are the points of conflict where the U.S. can use regional instability to its advantage.  Syria may be one of those places, but I certainly don't think it's about Syria and Israel. 

 Michael Rubin:  Thank you very much, Lee.  Without further ado, I would like to turn the floor over to Robert Malley to perhaps look back a little bit and see whether, when we look at the current crisis in Lebanon, whether what the United States could have done ahead of time to try to avoid the crisis from reaching its peak.

 Robert Malley:  If it's okay, I would like to take a little bit of a broader view.  I will start with sort of let's look back at the last few weeks at three processes or three events or beginning of events that have happened and which were touched upon, for the most part, already.  There is the deal in Doha, the inter-Lebanese deal.  There is the restart of Israeli/Syrian negotiations.  And there has been continued brokering by Egypt to try to reach a cease-fire between Hamas and Israel. 

 All three of these were brokered by U.S. allies.  Two of them involved movements at the U.S., not only doesn't engage with Hamas and Hezbollah, but doesn't want others to engage with.  And one of them involved the process that we have not only objected to, but tried to block, the Israeli/Syrian peace negotiations.  And then finally the Lebanese deal involved an outcome that, from everything I understand, is precisely the outcome that the U.S. has been resisting from the start, which is giving Hezbollah a blocking third and not really mentioning the question of its weapons in the agreement. 

 So if you take those three, the three only movements really we've seen in the region for some time, some may dispute how positive they are.  But at least there is movement on these three conflicts – the Israeli/Syrian, the Israeli/Hamas and internal Lebanese.  All three were done either without or even despite the United States and all three involved either actors that we are opposed to or outcomes that we don't like. 

 That should be a wake up call for the few who may still be asleep about what our position is in the region, how much leverage we have, how much credibility we have and an occasion to look back at some of the things that we might have done differently to reach this point.  And I think obviously, the point is brought.  This is not a matter of saying that Hamas has won or Hezbollah or won or Syria has won.  I think the picture is much more nuanced. 

 Again, as the previous speakers portrayed, Hamas remains in a position that I don't think it wanted to be in at the outset.  It has lost a significant degree of its popularity and image in the Palestinian territories because of the events in Gaza.  Hezbollah certainly has suffered.  Even though it has won both militarily and at the negotiating table, it has suffered significantly because it is now being, more than ever before, viewed as a narrow Shiite militia, defending Shiite interests as opposed to what it wanted to be, or at least wanted to project to be, which is a much more Pan-Arab trans-confessional resistance movement.  That seems to have been gone both because of the crisis that has enveloped Lebanon for some time and the role Hezbollah has played. 

 But obviously, more acutely because of the fact that for the first time it has turned its weapons inwards, something it said it wouldn't do.  And likewise, I don't think that the Israeli/Syria negotiations are going to lead to any breakthrough anytime soon for many reasons, if only for the fact that the U.S. is not involved and I don't think that either Israel or Syria is prepared to reach a deal with the U.S. absence. 

 So this is not a matter of saying or a question of saying that our enemies or those who we don't want to see prevail have won.  There is no doubt in my mind that for the United States, this has been an unmitigated disaster and a defeat on all three.  Because we've been absent, we've not been involved, our inability to influence events has been starkly revealed. 

 As a matter of fact, a number of the countries and movements that we have wanted to isolate have been engaged and have come out ahead.  Look at the balance in Palestine.  Hamas hasn't won, but it is still deeply entrenched in Gaza.  It is not going to leave any time soon.  President Abbas and Fatah are not doing any better.  In fact, they may have lost as much as Hamas in the process. 

 The peace process in which we have invested so much not only doesn't seem to be going anywhere, but it's very hard to see how Israel could reach a deal with a divided Palestinian polity which is not in a position to implement and to carry out its side of its obligations.  And meanwhile, as I say, the competing popularity between Hamas and Fatah is still not something I think in which we see a clear, clear winner. 

 So very hard to see how our objectives, whatever they may be, but let's go through the objectives the administration has set for itself on the Palestinian theater.  It's very hard to see that any one of them has been accomplished.  Likewise in Lebanon.  As I say, the crisis for some time, at least politically, had revolved around the question of the government.  We now have in the cabinet a blocking third for Hezbollah and again the question of Hezbollah's weapons has not been resolved and is not even truly being addressed in this agreement.  And, of course – again, the fact that Israeli/Syria negotiations are back is something that the Syrian regime had been calling for a long time. 

 I'm not – I think the main point that I would like to take out of this, and I'm open for discussion, is not so much precise policy recommendations for the future.  I don't think anyone in this room has a good answer to the questions; at least I don't have a good answer to how you deal with Hamas, how you deal with Hezbollah.  It's not an issue of engagement or non-engagement.  I've never advocated U.S. engagement with either one of those movements.  But it is a matter of understanding, I'd say, two or three points. 

 Number one, the policy has failed and I think we have to start from that point because otherwise we are simply going to be turning in circles.  The policy has failed.  And I assume whatever the objectives of the different people around this table, and I believe we have divergent objectives, or at least divergent ways of looking at the region.  I think we would all agree that the policy objectives that the U.S. has set for itself over the past few years, it has not achieved and in fact, many of them have boomeranged.  So that is point number one. 

Point number two is derived from that is we need to have an open mind about thinking about alternative courses.  Courses that could have been taken in the past and courses that could be taken in the future.  And that if we don't have an open mind about thinking creatively, we are simply going to be stuck in the past.  So just to conclude, with some paths for reflection that perhaps we could explore more in the future. 

 Would, in a parallel universe in which we would have acted differently, would things have been different in Lebanon had the U.S. taken a different stance during the 2006 war?  A different stance pushing for a cease-fire earlier, would that have changed things?  Would it have changed things if in Lebanon as well, it had understood earlier that it is better for Prime Minister Siniora to be at the head of a coalition government in which he could be the broker of deals rather than to find himself in a battle with Hezbollah which he cannot win. 

 Hezbollah cannot win either, but neither side can win because one part of Lebanon can't govern without the other.  It has to be governed by compromise.  Would the situation in Palestine, from our perspective, is it better today or would it have been better if Hamas was part of a coalition in which Abbas could be the one brokering the case fire with Israel, brokering the release of Gilat Shalit and brokering the opening of the crossings. 

 Again, I am not suggesting that the answers are clear, but I think it's worth asking whether encouraging confrontation and discouraging deals between the majority in opposition between Fatah and Hamas, whether that is better than the alternative course of action that could have been taken.  I would suggest that thinking along those lines, thinking along the lines of what engagement with Syria could produce, what contact with Iran could produce, that is better. 

 That is wiser and that is a more promising path than the somehow version of history that the Bush administration has serviced that somehow Hamas will be strengthened, that somehow Siniora will prevail and that somehow the region will look like what the administration projected a few years ago.  Thanks.

 Michael Rubin:  Thank you very much and of course there will be plenty of time for the panelists to also discuss among themselves during Q and A.  There are, as Robert Malley said, quite a few divergent views on the panel and I think that will be highlighted in questions and answers.  But before we get to that point, what I'd like to do is turn the floor over to Danielle Pletka to also talk about the region, but if you could also bring in to the equation how Iran plays into it.  Thank you.

 Danielle Pletka:  Thank you, Michael and it's nice to see a lot of friends in the audience, I have to say.  I need to do more events on Lebanon, if only as a cause to bring us all together to talk to each other more often.  I actually want to talk a little bit about something that I think Rob has highlighted.  It is perhaps the other side of the coin of what he talked about. 

 Rob, you said that the policy has failed and I guess that among the divergent views, what you would hear from me is not that the policies have failed, it's that the implementations of the policies had failed.  In other words, it's not that the ideas that underpin a lot of what the Bush administration wanted to do were wrong, it's that the execution was absent.  And this brings me to the question of being in the game. 

 If, in fact, you want to see a transformed Middle East and if, in fact, you hope that first Iraq and then Lebanon can be, perhaps, pillars of that transformed Middle East, then you actually have to be in the game every single day.  And the United States has not.  Rather, we've had a policy of pronouncements that are rarely followed by action.  When they are followed by action, that action isn't necessarily consistent with the pronouncements. 

 And unfortunately, one pronouncement isn't necessarily consistent with the previous pronouncement.  Which brings me finally to the point of what I was comparing, which is that Iran is in the game every single day.  Okay, who is in Beirut today?  Secretary of State Rice?  I don't think so.  National Security Advisor Steve Hadley?  Nope.  Assistant Secretary of State David Welch?  Nope.  I mean, I hope our ambassador is there, but I'm not entirely sure about that, either.  The Iranian foreign minister is there.  He met with Nasrallah; he gave a press conference. 

So the new president is inaugurated on a Sunday, they name the new prime minister on a Tuesday and on Wednesday, we hear from the Iranians and we hear from the Iranians in Beirut and then we hear from Hassan Nasrallah of Hezbollah.  So they are all in the game every single day.  And that, I think, is a very important part of the equation. 

 We can talk about who it's right to talk to, how it's right to play the game, whether or not there are different formula.  But at the end of the day, I think it cannot be disputed that if you want to be part of a different Middle East, you actually have to be part of a different Middle East. 

 Let's look at this from the Iranian perspective, and that's really what I wanted to bring to this.  Because I think that what's been happening in Lebanon has very much been seen in terms of the Lebanon or even just the Lebanon/Syria prism.  And what we haven't looked at as closely is just how well the Iranians are doing.  I think it's fair to say, as my colleagues have, that this was not necessarily a route for Hezbollah. 

 On the other hand, I don't think that, by any stretch of that definition, you can call it a defeat for Hezbollah.  It is true that as some have suggested, even people with whom I normally agree of papers like The Daily Star, it's true that the issue of Hezbollah's arms are on the table in a regional and national way that they have not been better because of the Doha Agreement. 

 But that really is a little bit of a straw to be grasping at given that this has been on the table since the Taif Accords in the 1980s and hasn't been dealt with.  In fact, it is repeatedly laid on the table and Hezbollah has been very successful with its allies at shoving it off the table.  So I don't count that as a victory.  If we look down the roster, what we see apart from Lebanon is that Iran has not been having a terribly good year in Iraq, it's true. 

 But I don't think that we can hold out hope that Iran has been entirely defeated for the reason that I suggested at the outset.  Which is that Iran will remain in the game when we have lost interest in Iraq, unfortunately.  Whether that is sooner after November or later, eventually we have to understand that the Iranians will retain an important, if not decisive influence inside Iraq. 

 Iran has maintained, and I would say expanded its influence in Syria.  They dominate the government there, the Bushara Lasa [phonetic] government.  They have used Syria as a conduit to bring destabilizing forces and terrorist groups and Al Qaeda into Iraq to work against the United States.  Of course, they are the main conduit for Iranian supply and resupply and weapons and contravention of UN Security Council resolutions, not that we seem to care about that, in this instance, at least to Hezbollah.  And, of course, they have been on a nonstop campaign. 

 They have supported Syria's nonstop campaign of assassinations in Lebanon, something that to me, entirely, mysteriously has fallen off the front pages, not just of the American and European press, but I would say even off the front pages of the Middle Eastern press.  Of course, there is the question of their relationship with Hezbollah and again there, I think that we have a allowed, in some ways, some inside of Lebanon or inside Hezbollah, to suggest that the homegrown nature of this movement, the resistance or their opposition, the phrase we've been using more lately, is very Lebanese in its orientation. 

 But as Nasrallah himself and, of course, successive Iranian officials over the last week have said loudly on the front pages of the Iranian papers – this is the arm of the Iranian military, of the Iranian effort, of the Iranian domination of the region or the Iranian battle against the United States.  And they very much have been framing it that way; there are only two powers left in the Middle East, there is Iran and the United States.  And we know who we can chalk one up for in the latest battles.  Of course there is Gaza, which we've talked about a little bit.

 I think that we all know full well that Hamas is not where it would like to be.  On the other hand, it's also not where we would like it to be and I think that we can think the Iranians for their support of Hamas and the continuing sustenance of that organization. 

The other country that has, again, excited little comment from many but got itself very heavily involved in what was going on in Lebanon is Saudi Arabia.  Recently, in the last year, I would say that the United States made an effort to position.  We position Saudi Arabia to stand with the United States as a – quote, unquote – moderate Arab ally against the growing Iranian menace.  Well, the Saudis took on the Iranians in the context of this Lebanon crisis and while we could try and argue that the Doha agreement left Saudi Arabia with some shreds of respectability, I don't think that it really did. 

 In fact, I would say that Saudi Arabia and its allies in the March 14th movement have been kicked in the teeth.  And the Iranians have claimed full credit for that and rightly so.  They were the ones who were doing the kicking.  So as we go down this roster and we look at what the Iranians have been up to in the region, let's not look at it through the prism of AEI or even of the United States; but let's look at it from their own prism.  Certainly we have different views and they are going to color our political approach.  The Iranians, I don't think have different views about this. 

 What you see is that they are speaking with one voice and they are saying we are prevailing in the region and we are meeting very, very little resistance.  The United States and its allies have been defeated successfully in battle after battle.  And while it is true that Maqda Haseder [phonetic] is not having a very happy time of it, at the end of the day, everywhere else the Iranians are chalking up victories.  And that is a serious problem for us because I wonder whether we have even begun to notice.  Thank you.

 Michael Rubin:  Thank you very much.  I very much appreciate the contributions of all of our panelists, which actually all stuck to their allotted time.  What I would like to do right now - and that is a rarity inside Washington.  What is also a rarity inside Washington is during question and answer sessions, when people ask questions rather than give speeches from the floor.  But I am going to insist upon that as well.

 Just a couple of general rules.  Wait for the microphone because not only are there cameras here, but we also transcribe the events.  State your name and your affiliation.  I don't know of anyone in Washington that doesn't have an affiliation.  And then we're going to play Jeopardy rules, which is basically state, make your question a statement in the form of a question.  You can ask as many questions as you want, but I'm going to direct the panel only to answer the first one. 

 And that also goes for multi-part questions; they are only going to answer the first part.  Because what I'd like to do is go around and hit as many people as possible so we can have as much debate from the floor as possible.  So with that, why don't we start here.  Please wait for the microphone and then we will go around.

 Deborah Weiss:  Hi, I am Deborah Weiss and I am [indiscernible].  Can you hear me?  My question is about the patriotic movements – shall I continue?

 Michael Rubin:  Please continue and I will restate the question, so make it brief.

 Deborah Weiss:  My question is about the patriotic movements, relationship with Hezbollah, like I know before the Israeli Hezbollah war in 2006, it had the memorandum of understanding and they were so sure that Hezbollah was going to lay down arms, which obviously they didn't do.  Yet they seem to still be supporting Hezbollah now.  I was wondering if any of you could comment on that.  I don't really understand it.  Like I always think of Hezbollah as a Shiite movement, but a friend of mine who is Christian in Lebanon and one of the Christians that are really supporting them.  So can anyone comment on that?

 Michael Rubin:  Okay, so to paraphrase the question which came from Front Page magazine, the question was to the panelists whether the free – to basically comment on the free patriotic movements, relations with Hezbollah or more broadly, the Christian Hezbollah relationship.  And what I'd like to do is actually give Hassan first crack at this question.

 Hassan Mneimneh:  Hezbollah is uniquely and exclusively Shiite movement.  It does not allow – not only just on Shiites, it does not allow Shiites who do not satisfy its own criteria of what it entails to be a member, to become a member.  So any notion that Hezbollah is trans-confessional or trans-national is really fictional, to say the least.  Now in terms of the alliance between Hezbollah and the free patriotic movement, it is built upon a lot of very local level rivalries in Lebanon, unfortunately, including a lot of egos.  Including a lot of injection of mythology sometimes driven from history. 

 To really boil it down to a very crude level that unfortunately is on the street in Lebanon.  It is addressed to Christian, who is it that you fear more, Sunnis or Shiites?  If you fear the Shiites more who are another fellow minority in this region, you are mistaken.  You have to fear the Sunnis more, even if it so happens that the Sunnis or at least the Sunni leadership is in line with what you have been advocated.

 Unfortunately, as crass as this is, but this is very, very much still part of the propaganda and the underlying propaganda that works.  But really we cannot ignore the fact the General Micheron [phonetic] himself who was in opposition to the Syrian occupation of Lebanon for so long has been playing for the past few years the role of an enabler for not just the reentry of Syrian influence, but also something far more dramatic.  Which is that radical transformation of Lebanon from a pluralistic, diverse society into one that has a totalitarian enclave that is growing and that really runs the risk of undoing Lebanon as we know it. 

 Michael Rubin:  Yes, a question over here?  And don't worry, I see all of your questions.

 Ron Campies:  Ron Campies [phonetic] from JTA.  This week Scott McClellan, the White House spokesman is publishing a book accounting for his years.  And his book appears to represent an increment, a pretty significant increment in the gestalt that is developing, that either the implementation or the policies of the Bush administration have been a failure. 

 And I am just wondering domestically as that gestalt seems to become more pervasive, as it informs the way that the two Democratic nominees are approaching the presidential election, how easy is it going to be to perpetuate those policies, at least the world view, that Hassan described into the next administration?

 Michael Rubin:  Perhaps I will actually turn that over to Dany, Robert Malley and Lee Smith, if one of you would like to begin.

 Danielle Pletka:  I am not entirely sure what the question was, but I'm betting Scott doesn't know what gestalt means.  I am going to paraphrase your question and you nod at me, because as I said, I'm not entirely sure what you're asking.  Are you suggesting that because the Bush administration has basically dug itself into such a deep hole that no matter who the next president is, it's going to be very hard for himself to dig himself out internationally?

 Ron Campies:  It's going to be very hard to [indiscernible] the ideas that actually brought us to this -

 Danielle Pletka:  You know -

 Michael Rubin:  I just want to repeat that for the record.  What Ron Campies has said is that it would be very hard to perpetuate the ideas, which brought us into the situation.

 Danielle Pletka:  I don't think it's fair to say it's going too hard to perpetuate the ideas.  I think it's fair to say that the Bush administration has done a very good job in discrediting those ideas already.  And the real question is will anybody be able to give democracy its good name back.  And of course the answer to that has to be yes, Ron. 

 At the end of the day, I don't see us invading a succession of countries; at least I hope I don't see us invading a succession of countries.  I don't think that John McCain or Barack Obama want to.  What does that mean?  Does that mean that we accept the status quo throughout the region, understanding that that status quo in the region has been at the root of the rise of Al Qaeda, at the root of the problems that we face in our own national security, at the root of the proliferation of nuclear weapons?  Again, I see this as the only plausible response, but it does require a serious implementation, not just a good speechwriter.  I don't know whether Rob, you have any other comments with that.

 Robert Malley:  Danielle, I think, really put her finger on what is probably the best you can make of what I think we both agree is a quite catastrophic situation.  Is it a matter of the policy, or the implementation of the policy?  As I said, I want to have an open mind, including for things that I find hard to fathom, but I think it's worth exploring whether in fact had the administration done more of what it said it was going to do, we would be in a different situation. 

 I think we need to – I would like to hear more from Danielle what, in fact, we would have done in Lebanon, what we would have done in Palestine that could have changed the fact that you have a balance of power in both entities that we really were not in a position to affect through the policies, even those that we were not implementing.  I think that's the key question that we need to look at, which is why I was pointing towards other means, more nuanced, more subtle that don't revolve around either the projection of military force or even the stark contrast.  But rather trying to build on the inherent contradictions in this very abstract alliance between Syria, Hamas and Hezbollah. 

 Now to your question directly, I think it's – part of what you say is a given.  I think the policies of the administration, the administration itself has abandoned a number of them because it found that it couldn't implement them or it wasn't implementing them well enough.  So it has walked back some of its own objectives and I assume that the next administration will do the same. 

 And I think that is particularly true when it comes to states Syria and Iran.  I think there is going to be a slightly different approach to them.  The legacy of the administration, the legacy of 9/11, the legacy of a different way of looking at the War on Terrorism, I think that is going to remain.  So I think we're not going to go back to what existed prior to 2001, but I don't think we are going to simply be replicating the policies of this administration. 

 Michael Rubin:  Not every paper means time is up.  What I was actually writing to Lee Smith is since Robert Malley asked an open question to Dany, I wanted to see whether you wanted to respond before I turn the floor over to Lee Smith or turn it over to Lee Smith.  We are going to be circling these issues for quite a long time during this panel.

 Lee Smith:  Well I will say that particular to Lebanon, you were speaking before about the Siniora government and how it should have been built on compromise.  I mean, there was a national unity government.  There were Shia in the cabinet and they walked out.  I think that one of the huge, one of the enormous problems was that the United States in Lebanon was not prepared to play by the rules that the Syrians wanted to set for Lebanon, which was an enormous problem.  I have heard it before, I have heard it described before that what Syria cannot tolerate in Lebanon is an anti-Syrian government, which is absolutely preposterous. 

 The fact is that it is Syria and its allies who have been picking off Lebanese figures without any support at all from the U.S.  And everyone has known, the Lebanese leaders who have come to Washington, I have prescribed what they needed.  Everyone knows what was needed from Washington regarding the Syrian regime and it was some show of force.  And were they not willing to do that, that was going to be a problem, because those were the rules that Syria had set. 

 Michael Rubin:  Okay, Hassan?

 Hassan Mneimneh:  Just building upon what Lee is saying that has to do with whether it is Syria, Iran or that matter Hezbollah.  And I would even extend it to Hamas, but this is not the topic now – let's limit it to Hezbollah, Syria and Iran.  I think it is a fallacy to assume that this is just an innocent party or at least a potentially responsive party waiting engagement in order for it to show how reasonable it is and to reach a particular compromise.  I think just really looking carefully at the record, the record is consistent. 

 At a time when they feel, whether it's Hezbollah, Syria or Iran, they feel that they are able to win, it's a maximilist [phonetic] demand.  At a time when they feel that they are not able to win, it is let's talk for the purpose of extending the talk up to the point where the administration or the interlocutor, whoever it is, is exhausted or at least up until the configuration of power is rearranged to their interest. 

 We have witnessed in Lebanon from effectively July 2006 up until May 2008 exactly that policy, the policy of basically attrition and depletion of the system through – while at the same time a call on let's talk.  The “let's talk, the moment you agree on the terms that are set, the terms are changed.”  And this is where, indeed, I think there is the major fallacy here.  I mean, when you said what could we have done differently as the United States or what could have Lebanon done differently, it's as if the other party is simply reacting.  The other party is not reacting, the other party is clear in what it wants. 

 When Nasrallah felt that he was winning against Israel, his speech was about contemplating a world without Israel and without the United States.  He actually literally said that.  We are in a position to count the days towards the end of the Zionist entity and the end of the great Satan.  When Nasrallah is in a position, if not of defeat or at least a retreat, we are back to being reasonable and it's back about compromises, it's back about engagement. 

 I think we have to have some clarity here and the clarity is that the other party, whether it's Hezbollah, Syria or Iran, are not interested in conversation, are not interested in dialogue.  And proof to that are the three tracks that you mentioned.  In the case of Syria/Israel, we are at an impasse, an impasse that we could have anticipated.  In the case of Hamas and the Palestinian authority, while this is not the first round, other rounds are anticipated.  And in the case of Hezbollah, on the ground, had it be that they were able to complete what they intended to do, which is a clean takeover of Lebanon with some Sunni allies stepping into action. 

 With the [indiscernible] and others stepping into action, we might not have had even this truce that we have now and we might be now facing a very different situation in which the [indiscernible] is occupied by, I don't know, some Sunni figure that is sympathetic to Hezbollah.

 Michael Rubin:  Yes, a question over here?

 Male Speaker:  Yes, Hussein [indiscernible] with [indiscernible] Newspaper.  My question is to Mr. Malley.  You said that it's bad that the Syrian/Israeli peace talks are going without the U.S., but later on you said that they are going nowhere without the U.S.  And to me, which one is it?  Do we still have leverage over there or not?  Thank you.

 Robert Malley:  I think both things.  I think – I mean, I have been an advocate, at least I've been critical of the administration's effort to try to block the resumption of the Israeli/Syrian talks which I think breaks from decades of tradition and in any event, seems to me to make no sense.  When you have something that we've always wanted is for Arabs to be prepared to sit down face to face with Israelis. 

 It is something that we have fought for in the past and I think, going to my earlier point, would expose some of the contradictions between Iran, Syria and others because many of the others say they would never sit down with Israel.  So I think you are going to see, and I welcome the fact that they are talking, but I think we have to be realistic.  Are they going to reach a deal, a peace deal without the U.S. being in the room?  No.  Right now both sides are doing it for reasons that I think have less to do with the goal of reaching a peace than with other tangential issues. 

 I think it is good for President Bashar to show, to break the isolation, to talk to Israel, despite the cost that that entails and to show that he can take this kind of step.  From what I understand, the reaction of the Syrian public is one of relief, you know, maybe the worst is over, we're now back to talking to other countries.  And for Prime Minister Olmert, I don't need to say why that might help him as well.  And not just now, but even over the past year, the notion of launching another process. 

 So I don't think that either side is doing this thinking that any day soon they are going to reach a peace deal.  They see dividends coming out of this and they are waiting for the day where there is a U.S. administration, whether it's this one, whether it's prepared to operate a U-turn or the next one that is prepared to sit down and be part of the talks.  Because again, both sides need critical assets from the United States in order to convert talks into an agreement.

 Michael Rubin:  Actually if I may also just insert for a second.  What I find interesting and alongside Robert Malley's response is some of the commentary in the Turkish press, which perhaps parallels what is in the Israeli press a bit.  With the Israeli press being quite open that perhaps Olmert is motivated, at least as much by wanting to minimize his domestic troubles.

 There is a great deal of discussion in the Turkish press as well that perhaps Prime Minister Erdogan's mediation efforts on the Syria/Israel track are motivated more by Prime Minister Erdogan's domestic troubles at home with the showdown with the constitutional court and less by, perhaps, a sincere desire to have peace.  It's a broader issue that we can discuss as the panel goes on, but did I see that – Lee?

 Lee Smith:  When you were talking before about the failed policies of the Bush administration and then you just mentioned the decades long tradition of sponsoring Syria/Israeli talks.  I mean, these talks have failed before.  I wonder at what point do we say there is nothing happening on this track, there's a reason they failed for the last two decades.  There is a reason it is not going anywhere now and we just decide to look away and say where else does the U.S. establish its prestige in the region?  At what point does Washington say maybe an Arab/Israeli peace is not the overriding concern.  Not only is it not the overriding concern, but at this point there is no place to establish U.S. prestige with these talks. 

 Robert Malley:  Yes, of course, I mean this administration had decided at the beginning that the Arab/Israeli peace process was not a priority and I don't think they went very far with that track, either.  We could talk at length and maybe we will at some point about why Israeli/Syrian peace talks have failed.  If you read the memoirs of those who were involved with them, depending on the time, they assign blame more to one or the other. 

 I don't think there is anything, I don't think it's easy and I think there are major obstacles on both sides, but I don't think there is anything inherently impossible about resolving the Israeli/Syrian conflict.  And I would just simply add, in terms of whether this is simply motivated by Olmert wanting to get out of his problems, I think that would really be giving him too much of a bad rap.  Certainly the notion of reaching a deal between Israelis and Syrians is one that is backed by virtually the entire military defense establishment in Israel. 

 And precisely the people who have been dealing with the negotiations in the past, who have seen the negotiations in the past, know what the obstacles are, think that they could be overcome, but also think that from Israel's perspective, it would be a major breakthrough if they could reach a deal with Syria.  So I don't think it's simply the personal desire of Olmert to get out of his domestic problems.  It's also a very strong current in Israel that thinks that that is not only the most easily concluded track, but also the one that might carry the most valuable dividends. 

 Michael Rubin:  If I may perhaps ask a rhetorical question for the panel to get back to as we go to the floor for questions.  It raises the old issue about what is more important, the process or the goal of peace?  This was a subject of a lot of debate back in the 1990s with the Oslo Accord.  It is the subject of debate now and it is one of these unresolved debates, which is going to color the future, no matter who is in the oval office come January 2009. 

 So I just ask that rhetorically now, but it's one of those issues that perhaps we can come back to as we work in questions from the floor.  Yes, over here and don't worry, we will have enough time to get to the back as well.  In fact, I will say that we are going to stay on this side after this question, go here and then back to that corner and then in front of the cameras.

 Dan Cover:  Dan Cover with the CATO Institute.  I want to follow up on what Danielle Pletka said about being in the game.  It's not just the Iranian Foreign Minister and Lebanon; it's the Syrian Foreign Defense Minister -

 Michael Rubin:  There is a question in this, right?

 Dan Cover:  Right, it's the Syrian Defense Minister in Tehran followed by Halad Mishal [phonetic] in Tehran.  Question:  What are they talking about, what are they coordinating and what are our options in response?

 Michael Rubin:  That is a single question.

 Danielle Pletka:  Well, I actually count it as a rhetorical question.  I wasn't planning on going through the daily planners of all of these guys but of course you are right, that they are all paying attention, as we are not.  What are they talking about?  I think they are talking about exactly what they have been talking about thus far, which is exactly how Iran coordinates the position of Hamas in Damascus with Halad Mishal who just said Hamas will never make peace with Israel and Hezbollah. 

 They are all meeting, as they do by the way, on a more regular basis than I would say most city councils meet, frankly, to discuss and plan what it is that they are going to be doing.  They are planning what they term resistance and what we call terrorism.  This is the criticism that I made, which is – and you know again, I'm afraid I left my comments very critical of the administration, which I will not in any way step back from.

 But that is not to, I hope, suggest that somehow were the United States better at this, that somehow the good intentions of the parties would have shown through.  Clearly they are all in this – each party is in this to win.  And the only question for the United States is if we have picked and chosen winners, something I firmly believe that we ought to be doing in almost every instance, then what are we doing for the people who we have chosen as winners, because we know that the Iranians have also picked and chosen.  And they are exactly, as you suggest, working at every single day, providing vast sums of money. 

 And by the way, something that we didn't comment on, but something very worthy of explanation is that they are providing vast sums of money and weaponry and they are doing it in a very effective fashion on the ground that I have never seen AID or the Department of State operate.  Something for us to think about in the future, which is how do we compete with these guys on the ground, on the territory where we need to compete rather than talking about how we're going to expedite arms sales and arms shipments to the Lebanese armed forces.  So that instead of arriving there in January of 2009, they will get there in September of 2008 so that they can fight some battle to come.

 Michael Rubin:  Before I go to Tulan, there is actually a two finger response on the other side of the room from Barbara Slavin – a two finger question, I should say.

 Barbara Slavin:  Hi, I just wanted to pick up on what Danielle said about the competing aspect.  I mean, the United States gave more money to Lebanon in 2007.  It gave $570 million, $220 million in military aid.  So it's not that the Iranians are -

 Michael Rubin:  There is a question in this, right?

 Barbara Slavin:  Is it a two finger.  The Iranians are not spending vast sums, it's just they get more bang for the buck.  So the question is, is there a flaw in the U.S. strategy?  Does the U.S. pick the wrong people to support; does it isolate groups that it should not isolate?  Is there a flaw in the strategy, is there a reason why the Iranian partners tend to do better, it seems, than the American ones?

 Michael Rubin:  Okay, and then we will go back to Tulan.

 Danielle Pletka:  It's a fair question and I think re-framed in a way that certainly highlights your perspective, Barbara.  The truth is that the United States is extraordinarily ineffective in doling out its assistance.  I don't think we need to talk about the battles that we're fighting in Lebanon.  We could talk about Haiti or we could talk about the hundreds of billions we've spent in Africa or we could talk about Egypt or we could talk about Jordan or we could talk about Iraq. 

 We could talk about everywhere where we spend money.  We don't spend money effectively and that is a serious problem.  When you are just giving money to buy off the Egyptians for making peace with Israel, that is one thing.  When you are actually in it to try to bolster your allies in the face of an Iranian enemy that actually arrives every day to see that the $10,000 that we spent to paint the school and then paint the flag and then paint the picture of Khomeini or Hamani or Nasrallah on the side is actually there. 

 Then you actually have to be there to make sure that the bag of food that you gave has the American flag on it and it says given by the United States of America and you've got to actually do that work.  And yes, we have to do it and we have to work in schools and we have to do the things we haven't done.  And I would say in a totally non-partisan way, we stink at it. 

 Michael Rubin:  Lee and then Robert Malley.

 Lee Smith:  I just want to respond quickly to the question of what are they talking about when they visit each other.  My guess is that the conversation goes something like this:  The Iranians say to the Syrians please, by all means, go ahead and deal with the Israelis.  If the Israelis want to tie you down in a peace process, by all means do it.  Why?  Because we know it's not just [indiscernible], we know the entire, the fence establishment of Israel believes in this nonsense.  So you go ahead, you waste a whole bunch of time. 

 I'm going to [indiscernible] will start screaming and make a whole bunch of noise, which is part of our public diplomacy campaign, which consists in this.  Our public diplomacy campaign is to keep railing at Israel and to keep everyone focused on the nuclear program in Israel.  And as long as we can take the focus away from the Arabs, it is fantastic.  Because as long as no one is talking about the concern of the Gulf states, if it's just about the Israelis, then we are fine.  It's a great public diplomacy campaign and you have to hand the Iranians credit for that because no one, not the Americans, not the Israelis, no one is calling them on it.  Certainly the Arabs won't; we have to.

 Michael Rubin:  Robert?

 Robert Malley:  Two quick points.  One, in reference to what Barbara said.  I mean, I think it is something to think about, that we have invested in parties that have been losing and causes that seem to be lost causes.  And it raises very troubling questions and I think as Danielle said, even some of our allies, like Saudi Arabia, have turned out to be quite impotent in a number of these crises. 

 So I think that is a very legitimate question to ask.  And why is Israel – Israel is dealing indirectly with Hamas, today.  Let's not beat around the bush.  It's negotiating with Hamas through Egypt because Hamas has what it wants.  It has its prisoner and it has the ability to lob rockets.  It wants to deal with Syria rather than with others because Syria also has a lot of what it wants.  So there is something there about the balance of power in the region that I think is cause for us to question some of our policies. 

 Now on the relationship between Hezbollah, Syria, Iran and others and what they are saying, I really think this is one of the most fascinating geo-political triangles, and if you want to add Hamas, squares.  Because it is marked, as I said earlier, by inherent tensions and contradictions between Iran and Syria.  The three major theaters of operation – Iraq, where one is closer to the Shiites, the other is closer to the Sunnis.  Lebanon where one has invested in Hezbollah and wants to maintain that asset.

 The other one is mainly interested in making sure that the tribunal doesn't come to the fruition and some other goals.  And Israel, where one side says it doesn't want to deal with it and in some cases says it wants to destroy it and the other party says it wants to negotiate and get Islam back. 

 Those are inherent contradictions on the three most important theaters of operation in the region and there are contradictions between Hezbollah and Syria as well.  Yet when it comes to vital needs, each one having a vital need, they all three will stand together.  They will constantly renegotiate their relationship. 

 But when it comes to issues like the tribunal, like Hezbollah's weapons and so on and so forth, all three of them stand together, even at the detriment of their own interests.  And I think we can go through things that Hezbollah has done, which has not been particularly beneficial to its interest, things that Syria has done or Iran has done that ideally, they would have done differently. 

 It leads me to the policy conclusion that we don't know what would happen if you change this mix.  For example, if there were an Israeli/Syrian deal, however improbable it may seem to some, if you had it, what uncertainty and what would it change in this relationship?  Would it exacerbate these tensions to the point where this very smooth and very coordinated relationship would run into trouble?  I think that is an open question. 

 What is not a question that as long as the region is as polarized as it is, as long as those three actors view the U.S. through the same filter as the unmitigated and unreconstructed enemy, then they are going to stick together and band together, despite whatever contradictions may lie beneath the surface.

 Michael Rubin:  Well, we've got six fingers on the panel, two from Dany Pletka first, then from Hassan and finally I have a two fingered insertion.

 Danielle Pletka:  At least we are keeping it civil.  Mine really is two fingered, although I have a silly intervention, which is I think that there is just a huge business to be had in actually trying to do reenactments of what these meetings actually might be like between Hamas and Iran and Hezbollah because after all, we would certainly learn a lot.  But that wasn't my two fingered comment. 

 I think that it is highly disingenuous, Rob, to suggest that because we spend our money fecklessly, somehow we ought to consider that a bad investment and therefore we ought to invest in others.  That is kind of like saying the British and French were losing World War II but the Germans seemed to be doing pretty well – let's try our luck with them, after all.

 Robert Malley:  Don't misconstrue what I said – I never said that.  I said we should question our policies.  It doesn't mean that we are going to start giving money to the Iranians.  Let's not veer into the absurd – I didn't say that at all.

 Michael Rubin:  We have highlighted both sides of the debate, so what I want to do is -

 Danielle Pletka:  I am done.

 Hassan Mneimneh:  There seems to be an overestimation of the points of difference between these three players, which are indeed autonomous players to a certain extent, but interdependent, Hezbollah, Syria and Iran.  There is an overestimation of the points of difference and actually I am not going to go through the items that you listed because I do not see the contradictions as Syrian as you do, whether in the case of Iraq.  Definitely not in the case of Lebanon and Palestine.

 But beyond that, there is also an underestimation of the negative effect that engagement has on the little investment that the U.S. has done in the region, whether in Lebanon or elsewhere.  And actually, I would like to refocus it on Lebanon in the following sense.  It is not that the U.S. had a comprehensive policy and that comprehensive policy had faltered.  Here is maybe where I disagree a little bit with Dany.  But I think it is exactly the lack of U.S. policy towards Lebanon that had allowed the clarity on the other side to implement in a more dramatic way. 

 But what I am saying here, even attempts at reconsideration and attempts at special engagement have also the negative impact while they do not provide any positive result because it is clearly impasse after impasse.  Have the negative impact of being used for propaganda purposes.  Once again as not only you, the 14th of March of those who do not contemplate Lebanon as a perpetual theater of operation against Israel.  Not only you have been agents and traitors allied with the U.S. 

 Look at the U.S. giving you up because the U.S. is talking to Bashard, a great hero and to Hassan Nasrallah indirectly, the great hero.  And therefore on the one hand there is no tangible result because it will not lead anywhere except delaying the situation up until a new administration comes on board.  And this is on the one hand.  On the other hand, you have the tangible negative impact of discrediting people and allowing them to be discredited at the time they are trying to articulate, however badly, a narrative that says no, we do not want to be in perpetual confrontation.

 Michael Rubin:  When I see U.S. assistance, I just want to add two things.  First of all, it would be nice if as we move forward to a new administration there was some way to measure the effectiveness of aid rather than in terms of allocation of money into what that money achieved.  And I am reminded of a panel here a couple of years ago when we had the State Department coordinator for Iraq. 

 We were talking about the Hezbollah model and U.S. assistance and so forth and why, for example, to be quite blunt, the Shaheed al Hefra [phonetic] Foundation, for example, is so much more effective in its aid and assistance inside Iraq than USAID has been.  And whether – there were a couple of options in such regard.  One, shut down the Iranian model, the Hezbollah model so to speak.  Two, adopt the effectiveness of the Hezbollah model. 

 And the response to that, as I recall, is we don't hand out bags of money in the middle of the night.  Implying, perhaps, that was what the Iranians were doing and that also adds into the shadowy nature of we simply don't know how much the other side is spending.  There are lots of guesstimates and so forth.  But at least in the open source, it's unclear.  With that, and perhaps even as a birthday present, I'd like to turn the floor over first to Tulan [phonetic] and then in the back and then in the center.

 Tulan Lu:  Thank you, Michael.  Well, my question goes to Bob Malley, actually.  In your presentation you said that it is more important to understand the situation rather than making specific policy recommendations.  But I believe many in this town understand the gravity of the situation.  Yet maybe there isn't, you know, maybe not enough mind, not the right minds get together or that there isn't enough discussion about what to do next and have to do.  Would you agree with that?

 Michael Rubin:  Again, that is Tulan Lu from The Washington Times.

 Robert Malley:  Well, I wouldn't say it is more important.  But I think as a starting point, and if everyone agrees and I think we are in a better place than I might have imagined we were, if everyone agrees – if we could reach a realization that what has been guiding U.S. policy for the last few years has not worked.  I think you could take Danielle's view and say well, it hasn't worked because it hasn't been implemented correctly and we have to explore that.  Or it hasn't worked, as I believe, because some of its core assumptions have been wrong. 

 And then we need to think, and I've suggested some ways of thinking about it, but what an alternative policy might look like.  But what I am saying is I don't have those answers.  We haven't tried it, so I'm not going to sit here – and one thing, and I hear some people saying it sometimes and I call for engagement.  Yes, I do think that not talking to Syria, not talking to Iran, I don't see the point. 

 I mean, we could debate that, but I think Iran is continuing its policies, its hostile policies, its nuclear program, its enrichment program, its policies in the region, even though we are not talking to it.  I think talking to it, there might be some ways that we could gain from that.  But when it comes to movements like Hamas and Hezbollah – no, I have not said the U.S. as U.S. government should talk to them. 

 But I think we have to think hard about whether our policies, particularly towards Hamas, have made sense.  Our policies and the way we've communicated it to others.  So again, this is not saying that the U.S. should be anytime soon be [indiscernible] serious things have happened needs to sit down with Hamas, because it does give them the legitimacy that they are looking for.  So I would leverage that.  But has our policy towards Gaza made sense, has our policy in terms of what we tell Abbas in terms of national reconciliation, has that made sense?  Those are the questions I think we need to debate. 

 If I had a solution that I was 100 percent confident in, of course I would be out there advocating it.  I think we need to get to that point.  But I think the starting point is recognizing what has not worked and why it hasn't worked.

 Michael Rubin:  Okay, there is a question in the back of the room there.

 Rita Had:  Rita Had [phonetic] and I am interning at the Hudson Institute.  I would like to ask Mr. Malley a question.  You mentioned at the beginning that the U.S. policy failed engaging Hezbollah or Hamas or whatever.  The main question is you have also mentioned the issue of open mind policy or an alternative.  To what extend to you think the Doha Agreement has engaged Hezbollah on the policy now?

 Michael Rubin:  I will restate the question.  The basic question is to what extent has the Doha Agreement, is that equivalent to having engaged Hezbollah? 

 Robert Malley:  I am not sure I understand the question.  Again, as I said, this is not a matter of – the U.S. is going to have to make decisions now about how it deals with the new Lebanese government, which is going to have Hezbollah ministers.  I suspect that it will deal with it the way it dealt with the last unity government and it will shun the Hezbollah ministers.  But again, my point was not the U.S. has to reevaluate whether it is going to engage with Hezbollah, it's more what is its broad policy towards Lebanon. 

 Are there things that it should have been pushing in terms of – let me just take one example.  Rather than focused on the struggle between March 14th and the resistance of the opposition or Hezbollah, whatever you want to call it, or the other things, the electoral law.  I mean, would Lebanon be in a different place if we had a law that was more proportional representation?  Were there policies that could have been put in place to strengthen the institutions rather than to focus on particular individuals?  Again, these are open questions.  I don't have clear answers. 

 But I really would want to stay away partly because it's become so politically explosive, but mainly because I think it's the wrong question, should the U.S. be engaging with movements like Hamas and Hezbollah.  I think there's a dual myth, one that non-engagement is a supreme punishment and there is the other that engagement is a supreme reward.  I don't think that by non-engaging we are making a huge difference.  I don't think that by engaging we would make a huge difference, either. 

 So I think we should stay away from that, it's not practical or realistic in any event.  And the real question should be what is our policy towards Lebanon, what is our policy towards the region, what is our policy towards Syria and Iran?  Those are genuine questions with realistic answers as opposed to this other debate that is going on about whether the U.S. should talk to these movements.

 Michael Rubin:  Okay, we have a question in the back in front of the camera and then we will move forward to this table.

 Male Speaker:  I am [indiscernible] and am a former journalist.  It's been suggested that the second round of this situation is that the Sunnis who are humiliated by Hezbollah may take arms.  I think Nicholas Blanford has an article in The Star today.  And my question is when that happens, what can the United States do to prevent another civil war?  Are we going to rely, can we rely on the Lebanese armed forces to step in?  I know we have given $200 million to the Lebanese armed forces and this was necessary because during the PLO battle, they were being bled -

 Michael Rubin:  You already asked the question, so I'd like to turn the question over to the panel.  Hassan?

 Hassan Mneimneh:  From the moment that Hezbollah turned its weaponry against the Lebanese citizens, effectively what we have is a declaration of a civil war that has taken place.  Either this is intercepted and interdicted or it will actually we will witness further rounds.  This is why the Beirut declaration that is part of the Doha Agreement is supposed to include – it does include the notion that the weaponry of Hezbollah has to be dealt with. 

 And the March 14th movement has announced that that will be part and parcel of the ministerial communiquι, that is the manifest of the government when it is proclaimed and therefore this is going to be on the table.  Clearly this is not acceptable for Hezbollah that considers its weapons to be sacrosanct and therefore we are likely to be heading towards another impasse. 

The role of the army is very delicate because the army is multi-confessional, contrary to Hezbollah, which is monochromatic.  And therefore the army is likely, in the case of a confrontation in Lebanon, to suffer crises all the way to division.  This is why this cannot be allowed to happen.  What we have done in Doha is just taken a couple of pills of aspirin in order to deal with a very intense sickness.  And we have, in what comes next, the time, just the time to start addressing these issues.  These issues remain despite the fact that they are not stated as vocally as they should.  First, the crime that has been committed and dealing with it. 

 There has been an attack, an assault on Lebanese sovereignty on the part of Hezbollah and has to be dealt with it.  The weaponry that has enabled the crime and down the line, and this is not part of the immediate discussion, but something that the Lebanese have to deal with, what vision for Lebanon are we going.  Because ultimately what Hezbollah has proposed and is intent on doing, it keeps on repeating that this is its objective, to transform Lebanon into a society of resistance.  Which means North Vietnam against Israel against South Vietnam.  Is this the Lebanon that the Lebanese want or is it a different Lebanon, one that is premised on peace, on sovereignty, on prosperity, on development? 

 These three levels, dealing with the crime, dealing with the weapons and dealing with the vision remain whether the Lebanese face it or not, the elements that have to be dealt with.  They are all of the international community because you cannot expect either the U.S. or the international community to provide the solution for these.  The role of the international community is to have the clarity of supporting those in Lebanon who say that this is indeed the order of addressing the issues.

 Michael Rubin:  Yes, there is a question at this table and for other questions, please catch my eye.

 Male Speaker:  [indiscernible], Head of a Lebanese political party called the National Liberal Party.  We are members of the 14th of March movement.  I've heard a lot about disarming Hezbollah.  I think one of the main issues, which was declared by Nasrallah himself two days ago is that he wants to free Shaba Farms.

 Michael Rubin:  Sir, I'm going to have to ask you to ask the question.

 Male Speaker:  Why doesn't the U.S. free Shaba Farms before?

 Michael Rubin:  The question is why doesn't the U.S. free Shaba Farms before Hezbollah, to presumably remove it from being a pretext for Hezbollah.

 Danielle Pletka:  Last I checked we weren't engaged in military operations against Israel.  If Lebanon wants to free Shaba Farms, something that is a relic of the Syrian dictat in Beirut, then they should sit down with the Israelis and negotiate an Israeli withdrawal from Shaba Farms.  That is not up to the United States.  Like many, I believe that negotiations between the parties, not negotiations that are certainly not fermented or facilitated by an armed U.S. intervention in freeing some particular disputed territory that holds, I might add, zero importance to either side, as I think we all know here.

 Michael Rubin:  Hassan?

 Hassan Mneimneh:  Actually, the discourse of Hassan Nasrallah is very carefully crafted.  It is Masara Shabawa [indiscernible], the Shaba Farms and the Shuba [phonetic] Hills.  I can see as a result of whatever miracle that might happen, the Shaba Farms removed by Israel, withdrawing from it.  The Hills of Shuba will become the new grievance.  The fact of the matter, Hezbollah itself did not know about the Shaba Farms before May of 2000. 

 Shaba Farms was an excuse that was provided in order to enable Hezbollah to carry its weapons.  Remove this excuse and another excuse will be made available.  Definitely I would like the Shaba Farms to be returned to Lebanese sovereignty.  Definitely I would like even Iraq Fathshuba [phonetic] to be returned to Lebanese sovereignty.  But it is not up to Hezbollah to dictate that it will keep its weaponry up until such and such happens.

 Michael Rubin:  A question in the back and then I will bring the microphone back up.

 Male Speaker:  I am [indiscernible] Rakash, [indiscernible], New Delhi.  When we talk of a policy, whether the policy was right or the implementation is that because the policy failed.  What exactly would be the criteria, because often I feel that when we say that execution failed, we are reluctant to examine the [indiscernible] of the policy.

 Michael Rubin:  To rephrase the question, I think I will get it right, can we talk about – I think what the question is is to elaborate a little bit on this distinction between a failed policy and failed implementation of the policy.  Am I missing anything else?  It will just give the panel a little bit more time to debate on this issue and then we will come back up forward.

 Danielle Pletka:  I hope what I meant was clear.  It is certainly my firm belief that what the President said in the wake of 9/11 and more particularly in his second inaugural about freedom and about a broader freedom agenda was exactly right.  At the end of the day, I think that the fact that over sixty years post World War II, the fact that the United States was willing to recognize and support the dictatorship of a few dozen men, over 300 million Arabs and Persians, is unacceptable.  And that it was in that environment that the lure of Islamic extremist ideas grew and has continued to grow. 

 It is the failure to inject any oxygen into the region that I think has been a big part of the problem.  I hope that no one, Rob, will disagree with the idea that certainly one part of an American agenda, although it should be an American military agenda for sure, should be to help to introduce pluralism, not just throughout the Muslim world or the Arab world or the Persian world, but everywhere that we can use our influence to do so. 

 But at the end of the day, what the Bush administration did, in my estimation, is to talk a great deal about that, to cause a large number of extraordinarily courageous liberals, and I use that in the classical sense of the word, to come out of the woodwork to talk about economic reform, to talk about political reform, to stick their necks out.  And then watched in some bemusement as they had their heads chopped off. 

 We had at this very dais people sitting here on any number of occasions over the last seven years, many of whom have ended up in prison or whose families have ended up in prison with not even a comment from the White House or the State Department.  That is not a policy.  Whether it's Fati al Jami [phonetic] who we always talk about in Libya, who the President himself lauded his release.  He was subsequently arrested only to be left languishing in prison. 

 You know, you can in each instance pick each person and say – well, that is just one example.  But in fact, I think that in each individual case what you see is the betrayal of a larger policy.  And when that is our position, you cannot expect that there will be any change.

 Michael Rubin:  If I may just give one illustration.  June 7th marks the one year anniversary of a conference in Prague, the Democracy and Security Conference in which President George Bush spoke.  And he spoke to an audience of democracy activists and dissidents after which he talked to them privately and made certain promises with regard to various cases.  Over the past couple of weeks, I've been emailing and phoning pretty much the participants with the single question, has there been any action on the promises, which were made to you?  And there is unanimity in response that the answer is no. 

 Anyone else on the panel want to address this question about the difference between failures of policy and failures of implementation, or should we go on to the front – two more questions and then we will probably wrap it up, three more questions and then we will wrap it up and make sure it's a question. 

 Female Speaker:  My name is [indiscernible] and I am an advisor to Mr. Hallili.  About the Shaba Farms, actually nobody is asking – the United States or anybody, to liberate Shaba Farms.  There is a government proposal by Mr. Siniora and it is part of 1701 that the farms will be put under the United Nations sponsorship.  So really it will be under UN mandate until the time comes and there is a peace agreement and then there will be agreement between Syria and Lebanon, whether it be Lebanese or Syrian.  So this would be something that was changed in the Lebanese government and for a change, somebody will do something to give the Lebanese government some leverage over Hezbollah. 

 Michael Rubin:  Thank you for the clarification.  Moving forward, there is a question here and then we will finish up at the other table.

 Male Speaker:  Sir, [indiscernible] and I work for an international development agency.  I am not allowed to mention it, but I am a Lebanese citizen.  If Lebanon comes here and asks if there is – if Lebanon cannot ask for U.S. leverage with Israel, what can it ask for from its ally the U.S., because everything else we can get it somewhere else.  And democracy – we've invented it.

 Michael Rubin:  Okay.

 Danielle Pletka:  Okay, I couldn't have planted a better question for myself if I had thought it up, although I have to say that I am intrigued by the fact that you work for an international development agency that cannot be named.  I really wonder what that could be, but am very excited.  Look, one of my biggest gripes, and I certainly stand on my record as a friend of Lebanon, one of my biggest gripes is the willingness of people inside Lebanon to follow other people's lead in their talking points. 

 Let me just say that if the sole priority of the Siniora government in implementing UN Security Council resolutions is not to extend its writ to Southern Lebanon and to observe and guard the blue line, as indeed the successive secretaries general of the United Nations have explicitly suggested, not just from New York, but also from Beirut, then I think the secondary question or the tertiary or perhaps we could get down to 99 or 100 question of Shaba Farms can be taken up. 

 But in fact, as we all are well aware, this is a priority as was described very nicely, I think by Hassan, this is a priority that has been nothing other than a pretext.  And the fact that it was mentioned in the new president's speech, I think is nothing more than a concession to the powers that be.  Do not expect the United States to stand up more strongly than the Lebanese people are willing to stand up for their own interests and their own national rights.  We should be more willing to stand behind you – don't expect us to stand in front of you.

 Michael Rubin:  And then there is a question at this table over here.

 Laura Freedman:  Laura Freedman from Peace Now.  I wanted the panel to address their reports in the Israeli and the Lebanese press that Israel has negotiated with Hezbollah to release a long-standing Druse prisoner, Samir Kantar [phonetic] and also to release Nasin Masir [phonetic], a Hezbollah prisoner in exchange for two soldiers, or the bodies of two soldiers, who were kidnapped at the beginning of the Lebanon war or what started as the Lebanon war.  And if you could comment on what this means on the Lebanese domestic scene and also what potential implications it might have in terms of Hamas/Israel relations.

 Michael Rubin:  I will throw that open to Hassan and Lee.

 Hassan Mneimneh:  Well, [indiscernible], his release is as a result of the end of his mandated imprisonment.  It has nothing to do with negotiations.  He is going to be released and returned to Lebanon.  This is a Lebanese citizen who, in an odd way, was convicted in Israel of spying for Hezbollah.  It is not clear to me how that works, but in any case, it happened and it is almost over. 

 With regard to other Lebanese prisoners in Israel, if I am not incorrect here, I think there are four or five.  In any case, they are part of a negotiation that is going on, that has been going on for awhile.  We are German mediators and that definitely, Hezbollah has been trying to leverage both internally in Lebanon, but also much more important on the Arab scene in order to assert its bona fide credentials as a resistance movement. 

 The idea here, and this is a very important test for Hezbollah, whether it will accept what seems to be the current arrangement, which is Lebanese prisoners in return for the two Israeli soldiers who Hezbollah captured in Israel, actually.  Or whether Nasrallah is going to up the ante and demand the release of thousands upon thousands of Palestinian prisoners. 

The issue here internally for his own constituency, for his own Shiite constituency specifically, but also for the general Lebanese constituency, it has an interest in accepting the deal that is limited to the Lebanese.  But in terms of its pan-Arab and pan-Muslim constituencies, it has interest in upping the ante.  It will be very interesting to see how he would react. 

 But I mean, here it is also important to underline that for the Shaba Farms that Hezbollah did not know existed back in 2000, Lebanon has been destroyed in July 2006.  And for the four or five prisoners, Lebanese prisoners in Israel which I would hope would return home, 1200 Lebanese were killed in July, 2006 as a result of the reckless actions of Hezbollah and no accountability has taken place.  The whole matter, we have set a precedent, a very dangerous precedent in Lebanon is that the actions of Nasrallah, the actions of Hezbollah, as reckless and as destructive as they are, they go without accountability. 

 The last example of that is indeed the raid on Beirut and the occupation and mistreatment and abuse of Beirut that goes, again, unaccounted.  In order to answer, to go to what actually Dany was saying, and I agree with her, it is up to the Lebanese first and foremost to take the lead.  And taking the lead, Shaba is really a footnote.  Taking the lead is by holding those who are accountable indeed accountable.

 Michael Rubin:  Mr. Malley?

 Robert Malley:  I would just add to the other side as well.  I mean, not only does it enhance Nasrallah's prestige by getting some of these prisoners returned and it is a colossal mistake.  But look at what – after what Nasrallah did to Lebanon, but look at what it does for Olmert as well.  I mean, this man took his country to war, he was unprepared, 134 IDF casualties, I believe that is what the number is, to go to war to get the two prisoners back and now he's making a deal to get the prisoners back after what happened to Lebanon and Israel?  It is pathetic. 

 Michael Rubin:  And on that note, I would like to close this panel.  But before I do, I would like to thank not only the panelists all of whom, I think, very eloquently mapped out the parameters of the ongoing debate.  If only so many debates in Washington could be as civil as this one was, especially on such a tense subject.  But I also do want to thank Caroline Sevier, the Foreign Policy Manager at the American Enterprise Institute and Daniel Rosen with the microphone, my research assistant, for doing a great job at making this panel happen.  So with that, I would like to close the panel and welcome you all back in the future.  Thank you.

[End Conference]

[End of Transcript]