The Road to War . . . and Beyond

March 21, 2003

UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT

8:15 a.m.	Registration
8:30	Briefing:	Richard Perle, AEI
		Thomas Donnelly, AEI
		Bill Kristol, Project for the New American Century and the Weekly Standard
		Michael A. Ledeen, AEI
		Radek Sikorski, AEI's New Atlantic Initiative
10:00	Adjournment

Proceedings:

MR. DONNELLY: I'd like to welcome everybody to--I don't know what number in this series of briefings that we've had this is. But certainly this is the most timely of all of them. And there's a huge number of issues to try to get through, and we have a really very distinguished panel, and I would like to get to your questions surely as fast as possible. So I'm going to just say that the batting order will be, first, Richard Perle, then Bill Kristol, Michael Ledeen, then Radek Sikorski, and then I'll give a very brief attempt to frame some of the military questions.

The breadth of expertise on this panel is really almost breath-taking, so let's have me be quiet and get to the meat of the matter.

Richard, if you will make some brief opening remarks, I'd appreciate it. Thank you.

MR. PERLE: It's difficult to add to what we are all seeing in the television coverage of the war. My impression is the same as I imagine most of you have: that this war is going well, that the resistance has been minimal. That doesn't surprise me. I think it doesn't surprise our planners. We've been saying now for a very long time that there are very few people who were prepared to fight for Saddam and even fewer who were prepared to die for Saddam. And there's a certain irony in, as far as I could tell watching the television news this morning, there are more demonstrators in San Francisco than there are people prepared to fight for Saddam in Iraq.

I hope attention will turn now to what this means for the people of Iraq, which has always been fundamental, even when it was considered ill-advised to talk about regime change, because we were so focused on the international legal mandate which was closely associated with Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. And so we went through a rather long period in the runup to this war in which we stopped talking about or largely stopped talking about what this war is really about.

It's not just about ferreting out and destroying weapons of mass destruction, although that will happen in due course and we'll settle once and for all the debate about whether Saddam has these weapons or not.

This war is about liberating a country that is--whose population has been subjected to a measure of brutality that is almost unimaginable. And I think the world will be shocked when we have the firsthand testimony of Iraqis who have not been free to talk about what life has been like under that regime.

And so I'm rather optimistic that all of these divisions and debates in the United Nations and elsewhere will be resolved in a general recognition that high moral purpose has been achieved here: millions of people have been liberated. The task of reconstruction will be a difficult one, a long one, no doubt. I don't believe it will entail a long occupation. The Iraqis are going to show, I believe, that they are far more capable of implementing a humane government than some people have believed.

And when this is over, I hope we'll look back, look back at the theories that were advanced in the course of the debate about whether we should go to this war, look back at the estimates that were made about what we be getting ourselves into if we got into it.

All of these remarks I've just made may be a little bit incautious. This war is still going on, and it would be foolish to assume that it will go to the end as smoothly as it appears to have gone up until now. And we have had, sadly, some few casualties already. But, by and large, it now seems clear that this regime of Saddam Hussein is finished by a coalition of more than 40 countries--and the number is growing, by the way. I expect we'll be adding countries right up until the last minute, maybe even after that. In fact, I'm sure we'll be adding them after that, which gives the lie to the argument that this is unilateralist, that we are going it alone.

In Europe, for example, there are rather more countries on our side and participating in the liberation of Iraq than there are opposing the liberation of Iraq.

My colleagues have lots of interesting things to say, so that's all I want to say by way of introduction.

MR. DONNELLY: Thanks.

Bill?

MR. KRISTOL: Thank you, Tom and Richard.

I'd like to say a word about presidential leadership. First, looking backwards, a lot of headlines over this past weekend, diplomatic failures on the part of the Bush administration, UN process, disaster, et cetera, et cetera. I think it's not true, and I just--though we're now in a new phase, it is worth just trying to set the record straight on this.

Six months ago, basically the end of August, beginning of September, the President decided to go to the United Nations and to deploy troops to the Gulf. If you had said on Labor Day that we would have the following situation in early/mid-March, the successful and uneventful deployment of a quarter million troops to the Gulf, a rise in public support for the President here at home, with the successful passage of a congressional resolution with about half the Democrats and all of the Republicans authorizing war, passage unanimously by the UN Security Council of a resolution demanding that Saddam disarm, and the failure to be able to pass a second resolution because of the French but, still, enough progress in the UN to actually help the President here at home--I may not personally think that the UN matters much, but a certain number of the American people do. And it's perfectly clear that among some swing number, 10, 15 percent of Americans who were uncertain about the war back on Labor Day, they were reassured by the President making a good-faith effort at the UN and ended up blaming the French for the fact that that effort fell short at the end, not the Bush administration.

Tony Blair, in great political trouble, survives and, in fact, survives quite well, probably because we were willing to go the extra mile at the UN. We did a very good job of rounding up support among Arab governments, apparently, seem to have pretty much all the cooperation we need. No big problems from the Arab street. Problems with Turkey that maybe--I don't know if that was avoidable or not, a new government there, et cetera, but that would be, I suppose, the one diplomatic bump in the road that the administration didn't navigate successfully. No terror to speak of, knock on wood, over the past six months directed at American--at the homeland or at American troops in the region. And, indeed, great progress in the war on terror, some apparently with the--especially with the capture of Shaikh Mohammed. Great progress, apparently, in the war on terror at the same time as we have the buildup against Iraq.

Now, if you had said--now, for all the messiness of the UN process, for all the bumps in the road, for all the zigs and zags and, you know, should we go for a second resolution or shouldn't we, and can we get the votes of Cameroon and Guinea or can't we, and who mishandled Chile and Mexico, for all of that nonsense, if you step back and look at the administration's conduct of its overall grand strategy in the six months running up to the war, it's pretty impressive. Bush did everything he needed to do. He strengthened--he got the troops there. He strengthened himself at home. He got the foreign governments he needed. He saved--he didn't save. He helped Blair survive politically and survive quite well. And I think in the rift in Europe, he rallied many European governments to his side--or they rallied to his side, to be fair. And the rift with the French and the Germans I think was unavoidable given the platform Schroeder had run on and given the genuine French view of the matter.

So I think it is worth just setting the record straight that if one steps back from sort of did--you know, gee, Bush said that everyone should play their cards, and then he backed out of a vote at the Security Council. He stepped back from that level of micro analysis and say as a matter of political leadership over six months in laying the groundwork for greater chances of success in removing Saddam as opposed to less chance--fewer chances of success. It's a pretty impressive performance.

Second point, related, in the conduct of the war obviously we don't want to--it would be foolish to judge anything at this point, but, of course, what is most striking is that, as with the diplomacy before the war, this is George Bush's war. And he did not go with the automatic sort of--not automatic. That's not fair. He didn't go with what would have been the easiest, I take it, military plan to go with, the much touted "shock and awe." Aren't we a little sick of that phrase by now? It's really gotten a little ridiculous. He's held off on that at least up until now, and the reason he's held off on it is that he seems to understand, better than many Presidents, I would say, the lesson of our friend Eliot Cohen's book of about a year ago, "Supreme Command," that political strategy should drive military strategy. And the political strategy is that this is a war of liberation and, therefore, we would like to remove Saddam's regime with as little destruction of the Iraqi infrastructure and as few--obviously as little killing of Iraqi civilians as possible. And, therefore, if we can do it with the threat of the all-out attack, but, in fact, with much more limited strikes against leadership positions in Baghdad and with ground troops going up into Iraq, so far not, you know, opposed--not too vigorously opposed, if we can hold back from the all-out military assault, that's, of course, a better way to win the war.

And this--obviously General Franks, I would take it, deserves credit for structuring the options for the President in a way that he had these options. He didn't just have one plan that he could sign off on, on, you know, the execute order two days ago--he signed the execute order on two days ago. But the President deserves credit for presumably insisting on having these options, and one gathers for calling (?) two days ago in the Oval Office and deciding to hold off on the all-out attack.

Additionally, with the initial attack on Saddam, presumably, and his sons, and then even as of now, I guess, as of last night, at least, holding off a second day on the all-out attack with the hope that, I take it, with a lot of work being done to try to topple the regime without such a great use of military force.

Now, whether it works or not, we don't know. Maybe there are costs to be paid for holding out, holding back on the all-out attack, though it's hard to see what they are at this point. I mean, we still could have--we could still launch the thousand missiles and drop 3,000--attack 3,000 targets, you know, tonight or tomorrow night if that's what has to be done. It's hard to see that any cost has been paid for holding back a couple of days, and the advantages, if this works, are really pretty immense, I think, in terms of the overall political strategy of the war.

So this fundamental point that Eliot makes in his book, that, you know, political strategy has to drive military strategy and that the civilian commanders, the President and the Secretary of Defense, need to work closely with the military but not simply, you know, accept the easiest, let's say, most simple military option, I think the President--the President was seen with Eliot's book in August in Crawford, Texas. I don't take any credit for this, but I would say that presciently I blurbed Eliot's book and said that if the President were to read any book this year, he should read Eliot Cohen's book. And I don't think that's why he read it, but--and I don't know that--he says he read it, so I trust that he did.

But, no, seriously, as a matter of political presidential leadership, both in the runup to the war and so far in the conduct of the war, this is a pretty impressive performance.

MR. DONNELLY: Thank you, Bill.

Michael, would you continue, please?

MR. LEDEEN: Just a handful of scattered thoughts.

First is Arab street. I hope by now we're past the myth of the Arab street, which is a part of the very widespread racist approach to the Arab and Muslim world, the tacit assumption being that these are people incapable of understanding what freedom and democracy are all about, will never embrace it, cannot support it, and left to their own devices, will riot in the streets against civilization, and if they can't kill us, will kill one another.

That's nonsense. Those are ideas held by people who don't know anything about the history of Islam, the history of the Middle East, and who just simply think that there's something that's gone wrong in Arab or Muslim DNA which renders them incapable of civilized behavior. And I think we'd all do very well to banish the phrase "Arab street" from public vocabulary.

Two, is it possible to wage the war on terrorism and bring down Saddam Hussein at the same time? Well, we did it. That is, when we struck that compound and bunker in Baghdad Wednesday night in an attempt to decapitate the regime, we willy-nilly wiped out Lieutenant Al-Baz (ph) of the Palestine Liberation Front. This information comes to you courtesy of the Palestine Liberation Front itself, which issued a press release yesterday from occupied Lebanon, Syria and occupied Lebanon, explaining Lieutenant Al-Baz was killed in that attack.

Now, the Palestine Liberation Front is an organization that you probably don't recognize, but I do, and we all should, because it is the group headed by Abu Abbas that hijacked the cruise ship, the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro, I think it was 1985, then segregated the Americans from the Europeans, and then segregated the Jews from the non-Jews among the Americans, and then selected the toughest target, Leon Klinghoffer, an elderly paraplegic in a wheelchair, and pushed him overboard.

I was already enthusiastic about attacking Saddam's bunker, but I was even more delighted when I heard that Lieutenant Al-Baz had been killed, and it's a pity Abu Abbas wasn't there, at least so far as we know. Maybe we got lucky and he was there, too.

The point being twofold: In the process of fighting and bringing down the regimes that sponsor terrorist organizations, we will just in the normal course of events get a lot of terrorists, because the two worlds--the two things are inseparable. They are one and the same thing. The terrorist network cannot survive without these people, and these people, the nature of these people is such that they support terrorists. And so you always find them together. You find them together all the time.

And in case you were wondering, Abu Abbas had gone to live in the Palestinian Authority for a while, but then got frightened of Ariel Sharon and went back to Baghdad, where he'd been living all along. So someone should tell the Democrats' Senate leader that actually you can do both at the same time and that this war is going rather better than a lot of people expected.

That said, I have insisted from the beginning that the two moments of maximum danger to us in this war would come before and then after the military operation itself. And the military operation is going well, and what impresses me most about the military operation, which few commentators have mentioned so far, is the astonishing ability of our armed forces to do an about-face on a dime and change strategy. Everybody--we all know how hard it is to get any bureaucracy to change strategy, even over several months. Imagine what it's like for people--I mean, the big war, the big assault had obviously been studied, analyzed, criticized by all the smartest people for months and months, and then drilled and practiced and rehearsed and coordinated and so forth. Then all of a sudden, an opportunity comes by, and full marks to the CIA for, A, finding it and, B, recommending it. And all honor to the President for accepting it and taking the chance and going for it. I mean, that's what we want from our leaders. We want people who want to win, not people who are always bound by caution.

But then the ability of our military commanders to say, okay, we're not going to go for the big war, we're going to wait to see the effect of this strike to see if, in fact, we have decapitated them, and if, therefore, a different strategy is called for. So I'm enormously impressed with that.

And my final caution, again, as I've said from the beginning, is that this is a battle in a longer war. Iraq is not the war. And the war is a regional war, and we cannot be successful in Iraq if we only do Iraq alone. And I think that the terror countries bordering Iraq, namely, Iran and Syria, know that. I think that Saddam's plan was to disappear into Syria, as Osama bin Laden disappeared into Iran at the end of--in the middle of the Afghan war. I think that the Iranians and the Syrians fully intend to do everything in their power to destabilize our efforts in Iraq once the war is over and once we're in stable positions on the ground. And there are two models for that. One is Lebanon in the 1980s and Afghanistan today. You probably noticed that at the same time the war is going on in Iraq, we have launched many hundreds if not thousands of soldiers in attacks against Iranian-sponsored terrorists in Afghanistan, who are trying to make sure that we don't have success there.

MR. DONNELLY: Michael, thanks very much.

Radek?

MR. SIKORSKI: First of all, I'd like to pass to my fellow panelists wishes of victory from a country, Poland, that is fighting in this war along with American troops. May your military be more subtle and more effective than your diplomacy.

[Laughter.]

MR. SIKORSKI: Europe is already paying a high cost for this conflict. Europe has split down the middle, roughly into two halves, with a European Europe led by France and Germany opposed to the war, and an Atlantic Europe--Britain, Spain, Denmark, Holland, Italy, and almost all of the post-communist Europe supporting it.

The crisis is so severe that at the European summit just yesterday and the day before, the discussion of drafting those parts of the European Treaty Convention which were to deal with common foreign and defense policy, discussion has been postponed for fear of ridicule.

Europe has split, and I guess that's better for the United States than Europe uniting on an anti-American basis. But it's still not good news in the long run. It's not good news because I certainly personally believe that fundamentally there is still far more that unites us than that which divides us. There are at least two important tasks that Europe and America should perform together. One is to clean up the debt which was left by the Soviet empire, to stabilize the post-Soviet space, and, two, we should act together to democratic the greater Middle East.

But Europe has not been helpful in this to the United States. We know about France and its Foreign Minister doing the rounds of Africa to lobby against the United States.

This morning I came into the possession of an apparent German diplomatic telegram in which the German Ambassador to the United Nations, Herr Pleuger, advocates the entrapment of the United States at the UN. He says that if we force the United States to go into this war unilaterally, they will have to come back on their knees to the UN afterwards to be helped. These are not the sentiments of a good ally.

But I hope that there may still be a silver lining out of this whole crisis and out of this war, namely, that even on an issue as controversial as this--because let's be clear, this war is not popular in Europe--it should be absolutely clear that the United States has enough staying power and enough friends in Europe to prevent the continent from uniting against itself.

That means that those who want to build European unity should now understand that we can either have a united Europe, which I think is a good thing, or we can have an anti-American geostrategic challenger to the United States, but we cannot have both. And I'd rather have a united Europe that is a partner and an ally of the United States.

Thank you.

MR. DONNELLY: Thank you, Radek.

Actually, it would appear that the strategy of containment has actually returned, gone to France and Germany. If you add Italy and Spain to your list of the axis of freedom in Europe, we've got a pretty good ring around those two.

I want to go really briefly through the military situation, as best we understand it, and sort of maybe sketch out what the move toward Baghdad might be like. This is based not just on my speculation but upon a plan that was--a contingency plan that was created at the end of the first Gulf War but never executed, but the basic geography and the facts of the situation are essentially the same.

Also, before I begin, I want to underscore a theme that's been running through my colleagues' comments, and that is that the performance of the American military and the performance of President Bush and his leadership team is really almost unprecedented in history. To be able to divert from obviously a hugely rehearsed and highly detailed initial strike plan to capture this target of opportunity is both, as Bill said, a credit to the President and to General Franks. Reprogramming a Tomahawk missile is not something you can do simply by punching a couple of buttons and having the 117s on stand-by to hit the targets. Again, obviously General Franks was responsive to direction from above, but he made sure that the President had options that he would not have had otherwise.

Real quickly, another fantasy moment for me, here's the region. We can, I guess, get a little bit closer to what's actually going on. And I'll do this really quickly. Maybe I can get a laser pointer.

Obviously the Marines are very close to capturing Basra or may already have done so by the time I'm speaking. They've sealed off the Al Faw peninsula where a lot of the oil terminals are. The important maneuver almost certainly is the maneuver of the 3rd Infantry Division, 5th Corps, and the 101st Airborne, which is now approximately, according to press reports, about 100 miles into Iraq, right about here, and very soon they're going to be facing a decision about which road to Baghdad they want to take.

The initial thing is to get across the Euphrates. There are three potential sites for doing it: one is at Nasiriyah, which is about here; the second is about halfway up at Samawa, which is right about here; and, finally, at Najaf, which is right about here. And there are pluses and minuses to both. The one that's farthest away has the most immediate access to this essentially military highway, six-lane highway that runs directly to Baghdad and was the main resupply route for the Iraqi army during the Iran-Iraq war. So for the ground forces, the armored forces--and this is a huge formation. It is technically a single division with some attachments, but already you're talking about thousands and thousands of vehicles, hundreds of tanks, hundreds of Bradley fight vehicles. It's really quite a powerful force. And, of course, you have the air mobility of the 101st Airborne.

There are also some options about where, if you wanted to, encircle Baghdad, which is, I think, the first step. There are essentially five major routes around Baghdad that you want to block off. So you need--the plan in 1991 was to put a brigade-size force on every one of those exit routes. And, again, if you can establish an operating base for the 101st Airborne near Najaf, the town of Najaf--this is what the plan was last time--then you can synchronize the movements of all these units and surround Baghdad very, very quickly.

So based on the progress that this ground force has made thus far, we could see ourselves in position to move on Baghdad I think within a matter of days. And we could be on the outskirts of Baghdad by the middle of next week in large force. And the decision obviously will be whether--you know, in many ways, what we've seen over the last couple days is virtual shock and awe. We haven't had to drop the bombs, but the effect on the Iraqi command structure and on Saddam's lieutenants has been functionally the same. This is clearly a regime and a power structure that's paralyzed and, you know, perhaps functionally destroyed if not physically destroyed. So in many ways, although we haven't had to actually kill so many people to do it, we've been able to achieve the effect that we set out to do.

Again, shock and awe is in effect in the mind of the opponent, and, again, who knows exactly what's going on inside the bunker in Baghdad. But based on the Iraqi inability to react to anything that we've done so far and the suggestions that the house of cards may be on the verge of collapse pretty immediately, I would say we have achieved shock and awe in terms of the effects that we've had on the Iraqi military and on the Ba'ath party.

So at that point, I'll also stop and turn it over to the audience for questioning. I would mention that Bill's got to go about 9:30, so at this time especially, please make sure when you ask a question, you do ask a question. Identify yourself and please keep your question brief because we've got a lot of folks who will no doubt want to ask questions.

Right here in the front row, please?

MR. : Jiya Shamdeen (ph), Kurdistan regional government representative in Washington. My question is: Where does Turkey now stand with regards to the present situation after the voting in the Turkish parliament about allowing them to come in unilaterally into Iraqi Kurdistan?

MR. PERLE: I notice I was advertised as addressing this issue, but I should have read the advertisement before I started to speak.

As I understand the current situation, the Turkish parliament has indeed voted both to allow U.S. overflight of Turkish territory and they have voted themselves the approval their constitution requires for operations outside Turkey.

We do not yet have overflight access, even though it has been voted by the parliament, because that will not be granted until the government, which has the authority to grant overflight, takes that action and they have not yet done that, unfortunately.

With respect to Turkish forces on Iraqi territory, I can only express my own view, which is that I think it unlikely that Turkish forces will take aggressive action. I know there are fears and concerns that they will, and it is a difficult, intense situation, and there is always the danger of a skirmish, a miscalculation. But I don't believe that Turkey will do some of the things that have been suggested in the press like seize or attempt to seize Kirkuk or Mosul.

We would be adamantly opposed to any such action if it were attempted, and I think we've made our own views as a government known to the Turks. And as I say, I don't expect that they will take any aggressive action. They say they are concerned about possible flows of refugees and the like, but given the way in which the war is unfolding, it seems to me quite unlikely that there will be the kind of humanitarian catastrophe that we've had in the past when Saddam attacked Kurds directly and created the problem of refugee flows.

MR. : Michael, did you have anything you wanted to add?

[No response.]

MR. DONNELLY: I thought I saw a couple hands back here. Yes, sir?

MR. WALLACE: David Wallace with Edelman Public relations, formerly of AEI. A question for Richard. What is your opinion of, I guess, the delay in the shock-and-awe phase of the bombing? Do you share your colleagues' opinion that it should be delayed? And who do you think that we're talking to as far as leadership or, I guess, alternative leadership is concerned?

MR. PERLE: Obviously if we can win this war with a minimum application of force, that would be a very good thing indeed. We shouldn't use a single bomb more than is necessary to accomplish the objective. And the objective is to remove Saddam Hussein's regime, to nurture its replacement with a decent and humane regime, to find the weapons of mass destruction that we know are there and remove them, with the cooperation of what will be a new government in Iraq. And so no one would wish to see us use a capability simply because we have it, although we do have it. And depending on how the campaign unfolds, it may be necessary to do rather more than has been necessary to do up until now. So I certainly wouldn't want to rule out the use of precision bombing to destroy military units and military facilities that might otherwise either help to sustain Saddam in power for a few days longer or inflict damage on coalition forces.

One of the things we are seeing and will be seeing is the extraordinary impact of advanced military technology that has been developed in this country and to a lesser degree in some other countries in recent years that relies significantly on important breakthroughs in communications technology. The kind of choreography we have been marveling at, the ability rapidly to change a plan and execute a new plan, and to do so in real time would not be possible--has not been possible in the past, would not be possible without the ability to collect information, analyze and disseminate information very rapidly.

This is changing the face of warfare, and I think we will never again have to fight in the way we have fought in the past. And it means tremendous economies of force--force applied with great precision only where it is necessary and only when it is necessary. This has a lot of implications, including humanitarian ones. It's no longer necessary to destroy vast infrastructures in order to deal effectively with the ability of an enemy to inflict damage on us.

It's the beginning of a revolution in military affairs. It is what the debate about transformation, military transformation, has been all about. It is an appreciation that Don Rumsfeld took with him to the Department of Defense and struggled for a while to get others to accept. I think the acceptance and transformation now will be about as rapid as the advance toward Baghdad. At least I hope so, because nothing settles these debates like a real encounter. And the real encounter is demonstrating the enormous utility of the transformation capabilities that we already possess and that we will possess in even greater degree as we make the investment necessary in the transformation of our capabilities.

MR. DONNELLY: Bill, do you want to--

MR. KRISTOL: Obviously none of us is in a position to really judge the tactics at this point, nor is the President or the Defense Department. They'll keep reassessing, so I want to make clear that I very much--I am very much impressed by the President's and the Secretary of Defense's willingness to lead, to rethink, to revise, but whether the particular decisions that have been made are the right ones or not, we can't know yet, though it's hard to see at this point what price has been paid for putting off the full--the all-out assault.

One thing that occurs to me is I suppose this will be called by the historians the Second Gulf War, but it's going to be misleading in the sense that it is in so many ways so different from and almost the opposite of the first Gulf War. I was in the Bush White House in the first Gulf War, and there was a pretty massive bombing campaign. It was what we had to do. We didn't a technological choice at that point. And we did try to spare civilians and has some successes, had some failures there, too.

But if you put together the fact that you had to have or we thought we had to have four or five weeks of bombing before going in on the ground, and you put together the fact that we had or thought we had to have the limited aim of expelling Saddam from Kuwait, and you put together the fact that we chose not to intervene--not to go into Baghdad, and then chose not to intervene when there was the popular uprising against Saddam, we sat by and let Saddam slaughter the Iraqi people, you have almost the opposite situation here. And I would--Michael made fun of the Arab Street, and correctly, I think, but to the degree--or minimized, let's say, the conventional wisdom, debunked the conventional wisdom here about the Arab street. But to the degree there is a legitimate complaint in the Arab world about the U.S., it would not be unfair to say that in 1991 we went in, we restored the Emir of Kuwait to his throne, we saved the Saudi oil family. Those were necessary to do. You couldn't have Saddam controlling, you know, half the world's oil supply, with all the implications that would have for the world economy, for geopolitical stability, for his wealth and ability to get even more weapons of mass destruction even faster. So it was a just war.

But we did not actually--we secured the oil supplies and stabilized the region and didn't actually help Arab people as they rose up against the dictator, and we sat by and let him repress the--suppress, and quite brutally suppress, the rebellion. This is a very different war. So we shouldn't sort of assume--the second Gulf War is almost, I think, more different from than similar to the first Gulf War. It really will be a war of--is a war of liberation, is being fought as a war of liberation. And, therefore, I think the implications elsewhere in the Arab world could be quite significant and quite stunning.

We paid a pretty big price for sitting by in '91 and letting Saddam suppress the Arab people. It was plausible to say that we didn't care, that we did have a certain view of the Arabs, that, you know, they somehow didn't have--weren't entitled to the same human rights and the same effort by us to help them that other peoples elsewhere were. It was certainly a good recruiting talking point for Osama and many others. And the ultimate consequence, I believe, of the failure to finish off Saddam in '91 was not just his continued threats and fomenting of instability through the '90s, but the rise of Al-Qaeda in the '90s and a general sense of American weakness and irresolution, both weakness, lack of awe, as (?) like to say, which is always a bad thing in the Middle East, but also a certain contempt for America but also a certain dislike for America for not caring enough about the well-being of the actual Arab people.

And I don't think that--I think the consequence of this second Gulf War will be almost the opposite, which does, it seems to me, open up a pretty hopeful--not a utopian prospect, but a hopeful prospect for real change among the peoples and the regimes in the region.

MR. DONNELLY: Michael?

MR. LEDEEN: Yes, I mean, history advances through paradox, right? And one of the paradoxes is the greater the power you have and the greater your advantage over others, the less likely it is that you're going to have to fight really bloody wars because superiority is so clear.

Second is when you have the right mission, it's easier to achieve great results, and what was wrong in '91 was that our mission was not to remove Saddam Hussein, and not having to remove Saddam Hussein restricted our strategic possibilities in a funny way, whereas now--I mean, my favorite line from the President in recent weeks is when he--in his war speech the other night when he said this will not be--there will be no half measures here, we're not going to settle for anything less than victory.

Well, I mean, that's what America is supposed to be all about, and that's really what the use of military power is supposed to be all about. Because if you're not interested in victory, you probably shouldn't be going to war in the first place.

And so the first Gulf War I think was just conceived wrongly and waged wrongly and ended wrongly in a million ways. And I agree with everything that Bill has said.

MR. DONNELLY: Two things. The one thing that I wanted to say is that this is a very delicate moment for the decisionmakers. We've had huge initial success, but we haven't achieved the victory because--defining victory as the rooting out of the Saddam Hussein power structure. It includes the senior elements or the army, the Ba'ath Party, and if we're now figuring out the balance between how many people must be killed, how violent the war must be from here on out to achieve that, the temptation will naturally be for any democratic leader, for any humane person to say, Do I now really want to go forward with the destruction that may still be necessary to achieve what have defined as victory?

And we were undone by the ease of our success a bit in 1991, and I would say we are possibly at a moment now where the temptation to stop short, to do something that may seem initially to be the humanitarian thing to do, again, may be sowing the seeds for long-term discord.

I'm sorry, Richard. Go ahead.

MR. PERLE: It's certainly hazardous to guess this early in the campaign, but I believe this war will save lives, and that the protesters who in good faith are protesting because they abhor the loss of life should look at the arithmetic. Lives will be saved by the successful removal of Saddam Hussein from office if we count only the people who would likely die at his hand in his own country. And you can approach the numbers any way you like. You can take the average over his tenure in office. You can take the last five years. You could put a team of statisticians on it. And I promise you, lives will be saved by removing Saddam Hussein.

MR. DONNELLY: Let's see. Right here in the middle, and then we'll go here.

MR. BAXTER: Michael Baxter, German Business Daily, Handelsblatt. It was said that this war against Iraq is only the first step in a larger war in the region, that countries like Syria and Iran might be next on the radar screen. What does the administration want to do to convince countries which are critical toward this war, like France and Germany? And isn't there the danger that the rift deepens and in the end we have huge collateral damage on the diplomatic side?

MR. LEDEEN: Well, yeah, maybe. But that's because countries like France and Germany insist on shoring up tyrannical and oppressive regimes like Iran and Iraq. If they would join the democratic side, then we wouldn't have to have these disputes.

And, furthermore, following Iraq--the case of Iran, for example, is not a war. It doesn't require the use of military power. Iran is a country where, according to their own internal polls, more than 70 percent of the Iranian people hate this regime and want to see it ended and want--and are ready for democracy. If we looked at the satellite pictures of that part of the world in the last couple of days, you would see bonfires in every major city in Iran going on for the last several days. Why? Because this is the celebration of Persian New Year, Nowruz, forbidden by the regime, and, therefore, celebrated by the entire country as a sign of contempt for what the regime wants. Millions of people have been in the streets of every major city of Iran for the last several days.

How it is that countries like France and Germany refuse even to speak of the legitimate desire for freedom on the part of the Iranian people is really quite beyond me and one of the most appalling parts of the disagreements that we've been having recently. They seem to have totally forgotten the lessons of their own recent history.

And so I certainly hope that Iraq is just one battle in a broader war. I think that President Bush was right--on September 12th, was it?--when he said we're not going to distinguish between terrorism and the countries that support it, because that's certainly right. And if you're going to be serious about that, then dealing with Iran and bringing down the regime in Iran is the central act because Iran is the world's most dangerous terrorist country. It's the mother of modern terrorism. It invented jihadism. It created Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad. I mean, Iran is the centerpiece of the war.

So why it is that you dread this surprises me. Everybody should welcome it. People who want to see terrorism defeated should welcome it. People who support democracy should welcome it -- [tape ends].

-- where more than half the population is below the poverty line, where the single most common word used to describe it by foreign travelers is "degradation." I mean, we certainly need to do that, don't we?

MR. DONNELLY: Radek?

MR. SIKORSKI: I have been contacted by Iranian students who want to know how we formed Solidarity and how Solidarity worked to overthrow the communist regime. Therefore, I think Mike is right. Our sympathies should be with the Iranian people, and both France and Germany have excellent historical experiences of overthrowing tyrants and carrying out liberal revolutions. So I don't see why there should be any difference on this with the United States. In fact, it should be our joint task. Let's not forget that the Middle East is closer to Europe than to the United States. If Iran, as it seems to be bent on, develops nuclear weapons, then they will be much more threatening to Europe than to the United States.

MR. DONNELLY: Very briefly, I'd like to address the presumption that France and Germany are going to be so incredibly relevant to the post-war world order. Look, if anything has been demonstrated over the last couple of weeks, it's that the French and German ability to actually practically do anything about it is very small. And part of what we are trying to do is turn Iraq back over to the Iraqis. I cannot imagine that French oil companies or German chemical companies or diplomats from either Paris or Berlin are going to be especially well received by the free government ruling in Baghdad. Likewise, the UN's humanitarian record will be set against its function as a tool for delaying the liberation of Iraq.

And to the degree that there may be a new order in the region that's in the process of being born at this point, I think the burden of proof is very much on France and Germany and the United Nations to demonstrate that they can be relevant to the process as it goes forward from here.

The quote that Radek read--from the German UN Ambassador, was it?--is not so much that it's insulting language, it's just terrible calculation of international politics at the current moment.

Yes, sir?

MR. : Dieter Detger (ph), (?) Foundation. Let me ask you about Iran and what you say about Germany. If it's true what you say, why--

MR. DONNELLY: I think the microphone is not on or--okay.

MR. : Closer now? If it's true what you state about Germany and Iran, why is it that the opposition of Iran is living in Germany? Many of the opponents of the regime live in Germany. Is that somehow than accurate? I mean, how is it possible? Okay. But that's just a side point.

Let me ask you about this vindictiveness that I sense against Europe, against old Europe in particular. Is it really necessary, justified, and is it smart? Necessary, just one point. Germany, that you put in the opponent camp, in the opposing camp, is doing much more than many of the allies that you quote as supporting the United States in this war against Iraq. How is it possible that Germany does so much logistical aid, much more than, again, many of the countries that you count as allies and friends? I think it is just appalling to talk down a country that has done quite a bit and took a different position in, I think, a legitimate disagreement with the United States.

But, furthermore, the UN question and how to rebuild Iraq after war, if you insist on doing it all alone, rebuilding the region, rebuilding Iraq, I guess nobody is going to stop you. But I want to ask you: Can you do this without raising taxes?

Thank you.

MR. KRISTOL: Michael, could I say--

MR. DONNELLY: We've got a big line-up on this one.

MR. KRISTOL: I want to say a word--

MR. DONNELLY: Let's just go down the table.

MR. KRISTOL: Okay, because I do have to run.

Well, I'm actually not vindictive, and countries are entitled to disagree with each other and we're entitled to say we disagree with them, and we're entitled not to paper over the disagreements.

Two points. I would actually distinguish--and this is speculative--Germany and France. I do not believe Germany ultimately has the same view of America, of America's role in Europe, of America's role as a world leader, as France does. And I think a smart, intelligent American diplomacy, which may be too much to hope for from the State Department, would look to split Germany from France now. France is not interested in the world that I think America should seek to shape. And I think that's fine. They're entitled to have their view. And we're entitled to think of all kinds of diplomatic ways to work around them, as, in fact, the Bush administration has done pretty effectively, I would say, over the last several months.

I don't think that's actually true of Germany. I think Germany--from an American point of view, you know, if the election had gone differently by 0.01 percent, we would be in a different situation. I think the German people want--value the Atlantic alliance. I think a smart diplomacy, as I say, could not only work out different arrangements with different European countries and work, where appropriate, with Europe as a whole, too, we cannot limit ourselves to working through the EU or to giving Germany and France a veto on our relationships with all the other nations of Europe.

I'm practical and pragmatic about this. It's not theological for me. I don't want to punish France and Germany. I don't want to insist, on the other hand, that everything has to be done with all 19 or 26, or whatever they are now, nations of the EU. It's a practical judgment for American diplomacy and state craft, and I think vindictiveness would be foolish, but cravenness would be foolish, too.

As for the United Nations, there's a letter that I signed, Tom signed, several people at AEI signed, a bipartisan letter, Republicans and Democrats, saying we do need to rebuild Iraq. We need to stay there. It's a real commitment, both military but also civil. We need to work with international institutions and allies to do that. And I strongly believe that. I'm not a unilateralist because being a unilateralist in many cases won't work. We may have to do it sometimes, but working through international institutions does not mean working through the UN.

One of the great achievements of the Bush administration, maybe slightly inadvertent, in the last six months has been to demonstrate that you can put together alliances and coalitions without going necessarily through the UN, that there are many multilateral institutions in the world and the UN is one of them, and the UN may not be the best of them. And, indeed, again, this to me is not a theological issue. People have to show me as a practical matter that UN reconstruction is better than NATO reconstruction. And then they would have to show me that NATO reconstruction is better than an ad hoc coalition that could reconstruct, help reconstruct nations. And they would have to show me that the UN is better than various regional alliance structures one could imagine. And they would have to show that working through the EU is better than, let's say, working through various subgroups of Europe, which the President has done pretty effectively, I think, in the last few months and which you could imagine other groupings--Eastern European groupings, (?) et cetera.

So, you know, this is a very fluid moment, I think, for this new world order in the Middle East and elsewhere, and I think creative American diplomacy should really be genuinely open-minded about how to move ahead. We shouldn't assume that all the institutions we've inherited from the past are worthless, but we certainly shouldn't assume that they're sacrosanct either. And we shouldn't defer to them. And I think you really misread--I mean, there's no--it really is not the case that anyone much in the U.S. is sitting around worrying much. This is Tom's point. No one's being vindictive towards Germany and France, and nor is the Bush administration. This is a total bum rap. The Bush administration went to the UN. They tried to get the support. They couldn't get the support. They said, fine, you chose not to support us, we're going to go ahead and get the allies we can and do what we think is necessary. There's nothing vindictive about that. I don't think a single senior U.S. statesman has said a single nasty thing about Germany. France is slightly different.

[Laughter.]

MR. KRISTOL: I'm serious. I'm serious. Compared to what the--I mean, I don't really care about this, but the offense has been almost entirely on the other side, that is that what Schroeder said was so remarkably unprecedented in the post-war era, that, in fact, the American response has been fairly mild.

France is a different story because France actually led a campaign to undermine the U.S. ability to wage what we thought was a war necessary for our security and for our interests. And that is unprecedented behavior by a nation that claims to be an ally. For a nation to step aside and say we don't agree with this, we don't believe in this, we choose not to participate in this, let's talk again when it's all over and see how we can work together and help, and meanwhile we're working together in Afghanistan, that is a totally legitimate view, in my position and my view, for an independent sovereign nation to take.

The French position I guess is legitimate, but it's really different in character from that of Germany, I think. And I think U.S. policy should look to liberate Germany from excessive deference to France--

[Laughter.]

MR. KRISTOL: --over the next several years.

MR. : I was in Munich at the time when a certain high-ranking U.S. official compared Germany to Libya and Cuba, and I can tell you that they would not agree with your assessment that nothing insulting has been said.

MR. DONNELLY: Richard?

MR. PERLE: That high-ranking official is my friend, and let me--

[Laughter.]

MR. PERLE: Let me say that what Secretary Rumsfeld said on that occasion--he ran through a list of how countries were aligning themselves, and it included those who were giving us faint support, those who were giving us solid support, those who appeared to be neutral, those who were mildly against, and then there was a last group that was adamantly against and unequivocally against. And, unfortunately, Germany happened to fall into that last group along with Libya, Cuba, and I don't remember who else.

About six or eight weeks ago, I said in a seminar similar to this one that France was not the ally it once was. And that was an occasion for news. It was reported. I don't think that would be considered newsworthy today as we've observed French behavior, particularly in this situation. And I agree entirely with Bill that there is an important difference between France and Germany.

I think Germany slipped into its current position in the heat of an election campaign, and there is, to be sure, an abhorrence of war in Germany, and that's a good thing.

There wasn't much leadership to lay out the issues in this war for Germans, and so it's not surprising that German opinion wound up where it did.

I'd like to think the Germans will reassess German policy in light of the results and that when they see free Iraqis, they will ask themselves were they on the right side. Was the country that did what it could to help free Spain from Franco and Portugal from Salazar, would that country still consider that it was right not to free Iraq from Saddam Hussein, even if force had to be used? And, of course, we never asked Germany to contribute force. Simply standing aside would have been sufficient.

You're quite right to observe that we're getting logistic support from Germany, and we're grateful for that. Things have moved through Germany on the way to this campaign, and that is, I think, as it should be among friends and allies.

I don't think we're vindictive. I really don't. And the issue isn't going to be American vindictiveness. The issue in terms of reconstruction, in particular the warmth of the welcome for French and German businesses wishing to participate in the reconstruction, will be decided by Iraqis. And you could forgive the Iraqis in this situation for being vindictive, free Iraqis. As they see it, France to the very end, even today, resisted the liberation of their country. So they're not likely to be grateful to France or well disposed toward France, and to a lesser degree, I don't think they will feel they owe a debt to Germany.

So there may be some vindictiveness, but it will come not from Americans but from Iraqis.

Finally, the United Nations. I think the United Nations has been dealt a serious blow by Saddam Hussein, because when the moment came for the United Nations to enforce its own brave words, it failed to do that. It failed to do that perhaps not simply because of the French veto, although we'll never know about the dynamics of voting within the Security Council. But we will not have a debate, at least in this country, and I think in other countries as well, about the relevance of the United Nations in this world in this century. It's an institution that was conceived in the aftermath of a war that was marked by invasions across national borders. And it was designed to prevent invasions across national borders in the future. It was never intended to protect us or others against the threats we now face, threats that can begin within a country that one could argue is contained but is, nevertheless, capable of becoming more and more menacing.

The UN structure doesn't allow for action in the absence of aggression across national borders, and yet that's the threat we now face. So it's not that there's an objection to the United Nations. It's simply that time has passed by the current structure of the United Nations as a security institution. Now, for world health and agriculture and other things, it's fine, and for peacekeeping, it's fine. And I think we need it for those purposes. But we mustn't ask the UN or expect the UN to do things that it is not constituted to do, that it is not capable of doing. And so we need either new institutions or a radically reformed approach to the United Nations if the UN is going to be relevant to the security concerns that we now face.

And I would think that we would begin now a debate about revising the UN Charter. The UN Charter today is simply not up to the task for defending people in a world of terror.

MR. DONNELLY: Michael? And, Bill, thank you very much.

MR. LEDEEN: Well, that's the least of (?) vision. We're going to have to get France off the Security Council.

Well, with regard to what Bill said about one of the great accomplishments of the Bush administration showing that we don't need the United Nations for serious international operations, actually it was Clinton who showed that because that was Bosnia. Right? The UN voted against Bosnia, and we went ahead and did it anyway. Sometimes we seem to forget that, you know, as if Bush acting, as the rhetoric puts it, in contempt of international opinion and the United Nations is something new. It's not new. The only difference is who's supporting it this time and who supported it last time, and so if some of the people who supported it last time don't support it this time are acting as if this is something new. But it's not. It's just part of a vast global hypocrisy which criticizes the liberation of Iraq in language that just as well could have been used against operations in which a lot of the hypocrites participated in the recent past.

I mean, look at France. Look at the United Nations. France has for the last couple of months been conducting ongoing military operations in the Ivory Coast. Unilateral. Never asked anybody's permission. Never went to the United Nations. The United Nations never said a word. Are Africans unworthy of self-determination? Are these great lecturers over in Europe from Minister Fischer to Minister Villepin only solicitous of the rights of people they like but not black people in Africa where France marches in and marches out as she chooses, when she chooses? What's that all about?

Richard doesn't think Americans are vindictive. Well, I hope he's wrong.

[Laughter.]

MR. LEDEEN: I'd just remind you of Professor Corey, who was the nightclub comedian who was the world's greatest expert on this subject some years ago, who was asked what he thought about love. And he said, "Love is wonderful, because love is the opposite of hate, and without hate, revenge has no meaning."

[Laughter.]

MR. LEDEEN: And then, last, I would just like to make a general point about a lot of the anti-war demonstrators who have reached really new lows in disgusting-ness with the kinds of things they're throwing around the streets of their own cities. And, that is, you know, I'm a lifelong contrarian and demonstrator, and I love a good demonstration, and even a good riot. But it's hard to take these people seriously because where were they and where are they when the Iraqi people are being slaughtered by their own regime, or when Iranians are being slaughtered by their own regime?

I mean, it would be fine--I have not the slightest problem with people demonstrating against American military action. That's a legitimate position. But they can't do it now in the name of peace and the well-being of these people when they didn't do it then when these people were being slaughtered. You can't have it both ways. That's a total definition of hypocrisy.

MR. SIKORSKI: I think Michael and I differ here. It was an American half-European Winston Churchill who advised in victory magnanimity. And I think it should apply not just to Iraqis but also to some of the European relationships.

But, also, if I may say so, the most threatening words in this crisis have come from Europeans, from President Chirac, who has threatened to delay or block enlargement of the European Union against those countries who dared to express solidarity with the United States. And I think those are unacceptable threats and hostility as well.

MR. DONNELLY: I think there was somebody down here who's been very patient. Sorry, this gentleman over--okay.

MR. DREYFUS: Hi, I'm Bob Dreyfus from the American Prospect. I was just wondering if people on the panel each could say a little bit, a few words about the shape of the next Iraqi government and who might comprise the government and how the American occupying forces will reach out or struggle to come up with people who would take over from the United States once the occupation is over.

MR. PERLE: Well, I don't know that it's possible to get very deeply into this now. I have a personal preference, and it's for the Iraqi National Congress and its leader, Ahmed Chalabi, who has fought this battle all these years, has worked very hard to bring unity to differing groups in Iraq, in the belief that a free government of Iraq should be broadly representative of all the people of that country, should be democratic, should renounce weapons of mass destruction, and should support a peace process in the Middle East. It's as good a platform as you're ever going to get, and I hope that in the rough and tumble of Iraqi politics that will almost certainly now ensue, that the leadership of the INC winds up with the broad approbation of the Iraqi people.

The Iraqi people are going to choose their next government after some interim arrangement to permit that to take place in an orderly fashion.

MR. DONNELLY: I'll toss in a footnote to that. It's been quite remarkable, the performance of all or almost all the Iraqi opposition elements. The PUK in Kurdistan in the runup to the war, one could not ask for a better political performance by the leaders of that party.

One of the things we haven't talked about much today is what the situation in northern Iraq is, and obviously it's very tense. But you have to say it's gone okay so far.

I think Richard's fundamental point that these are people who have earned the right to determine their own leaders is sort of unexceptionable, and that what is beginning now is a political process that Iraqis themselves--so there will be all kinds of people who have struggled outside Iraq, inside Iraq, people of whom we know nothing who will emerge as natural political leaders in a much more representative political process. And, again, it's not for us to dictate who's going to run Iraq.

All the way in the back, sir?

MR. : Earlier this week--my name is Pat Corton (ph). Earlier this week, on the very day all of this was beginning, the Russian Foreign Minister said at the United Nations, growled that it was impermissible for the United States to invade a sovereign country like Iraq.

Is there any chance, when this is all over, of formulating some notion of sovereignty that includes some measure of legitimacy rather than simply the ability to exercise effective control over a piece of geography? Or are there simply too many illegitimate regimes in the world to make that practical?

MR. DONNELLY: Radek?

MR. SIKORSKI: I personally think it was the original sin of the United Nations that it was an outgrowth of World War II in which one tyrant was fought with the help of another tyrant, but because the other tyrant--Stalin--was on the victorious side, when forming this organization, which is an instrument of conferring this kind of legitimacy--if you're a member of the UN, you're a sovereign country, right? It was that that prevented a democratic standard from being included in the UN Charter. And I think that kind of standard should be something included in a new charter, if we have one, as Richard was suggesting.

MR. DONNELLY: I'll resist the temptation to speechify except to say that Americans' notions of legitimacy have always been formed, from our founding, from the idea that the government's business was to protect, sustain, enhance individual political liberties, not control of geography, not even the form of democracy, but at the core of the matter was does the government protect the individual. And we have been perhaps sometimes more insistent on that in international politics and sometimes willing to overlook it. But certainly in this case, as Richard suggests, the old order, which has not achieved this goal, cannot be sufficient to achieve the goal that, again, Americans are dedicated to.

Yes, right here.

MR. : [inaudible] -- Iraqi rebuilding issues that have come up, not only the process end itself but some of the criticisms that have come out about the administration providing contracts, private contracts, and things of that nature.

MR. PERLE: Well, I don't know that I'm familiar with the criticisms to which you refer. Some of the immediate post-war reconstruction and ability, for example, to extinguish oil field fires and the like, I think have been handled by private contracts, so that we would be ready to deal with those situations.

The longer term, it remains to be seen how that is going to be structured, how it's going to be financed. I don't think there's any clear judgment about how to do that.

Iraq, fortunately, has a continuing revenue stream from the production of oil, which should go a long way toward financing the reconstruction of the country. And whether there will be private financing, to make that money available immediately against future revenues is one way to do it, or by international contributions, I don't know. I don't know that there's any judgment on that.

But private companies will end up doing the work almost certainly, as there is simply no other way of doing it.

MR. DONNELLY: We have time for one more question, and the lady in the back?

MS. McMENAMIN: Eileen McMenamin from CNN. Mr. Perle, I was wondering what you think we should do following the Iraqi situation. What is your opinion about Iran? Should we send troops into Iran?

MR. PERLE: I very much agree with Michael Ledeen's view on this, and he was among the first to observe what was going on in Iraq and to report on it. It went unnoticed for too long.

The people of Iraq--I mean, sorry, the people of Iran are understandably unhappy with the Mullah's regime in which every aspect of their lives is dictated by people that they never selected, they never elected, and whose policies they largely disapprove. So I think that Iran has a very good chance of taking care of itself; that is to say, the people of Iran demanding regime change. And I think there's a reasonable chance that the fall of Saddam Hussein will be an inspiration to Iranians who would like to see the Mullahs in their country toppled.

So I'm rather optimistic that we will see regime change in Iran without any use of military power by the United States.

MR. DONNELLY: Michael, final word?

MR. LEDEEN: No. Richard, as usual, put my ideas better than I could.

MR. DONNELLY: He has that annoying habit of doing that for us all.

On behalf of AEI, thank you to the panel and to everybody who came today.

A quick reminder that we're going to do our usual Road to War series again on Tuesday, so we look forward to seeing you all then. Thank you very much.

[Applause.]

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