American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research
After the Elections
October 6, 2005
[Note: Panelists are mostly non-native English speakers and sometimes hard to understand and who also speak German words. Unclear and foreign words are indicated as “indiscernible.”]
Radek Sikorski: Order, order. Ladies and gentleman, I’m Radek Sikorski, the outgoing executive director of the New Atlantic Initiative. It’s my particular pleasure to be seeing in such numbers for what is my penultimate New Atlantic Initiative event. What is better than the subject of the most important economy in Europe, Germany? We all know why we’re here and your numbers indicate how important you think the issue is. We have the bios of our speakers in the printed material, but we have almost the full spectrum of the leaders of the German foundations based in Washington. Unfortunately, Conrad Adenauer couldn’t be with us for purely technical reasons. But I nevertheless expect both sides of the political divide in Germany to be well represented. Who better to start our five to seven minute presentation than someone who’s been very close to the outgoing chancellor of Germany, Dieter Dettke. Dieter, please, the floor is yours.
Dieter Dettke: Radek, first of all congratulations to you for being elected clear victory – no question about it, no uncertainty, great. Polls get this one right. Even the pollsters, by the way, they could figure out what’s going in Poland. Ours couldn’t do that. But I have to say, there’s a little presumptuous because we don’t know yet, maybe tomorrow we’ll know a little better. Your hopes might come true. Who knows - I don’t. But that’s a different story.
Thanks for inviting us. I think it’s a great opportunity to try to use our well, shall I say, insider knowledge a little bit to talk about these elections. They were really a big question. I guess this Latin title here, Quo Vadis Germania is indicative too, and because of pisa [sounds like], of course, and our declining educational standards, we thought it was good to put some classic Latin into this picture here to make it sound at least more profound. That’s important.
I guess we have to look very carefully into these election results. They are not easy to interpret. Not easy to understand. So, it is a legitimate question to ask – why this happened, what happened really and where all this is going to take us. Back to Wymar? As the economist surmises, away from the Aventic Alliance [or Atlantic??] and the West’s former Ambassador Coates believes. And also to a further weakening of a German and European economy, the same author who believes that this is going to be weakening.
Let me say first this. I think here is another example of what Wagner’s music is all about, and as Mark Twain would say, it’s not as bad as it sounds. If you don’t like these election results, I can tell you you’re not alone. Eighty percent of the Germans believe this is terrible what happened; 93 percent of the CDU voters say it’s terrible. I understand, of course. Everybody expected Angela Merkel to win and yet, almost 90 percent would vote the same way if elections would be held tomorrow. What should we make of all this?
First, I think it’s important to point out here Bonn is not Weimer, and also Berlin is not Weimer and certainly not the Berlin Republic. I think that should be said at the beginning.
Second, the West appeared to be less united and even split before the German elections. I can’t see anything in these elections that would or even could make things worse. It can only be better. I think a lot of people are working on this. Maybe we will have some success. I’m sure we will because it’s a serious effort here and there.
Third, the Grand Coalition we all know that’s the only solution out of this electoral tie, has only one chance to justify its existence. That’s to push through economic reforms. I want to emphasize that. Reforms will be pushed through. Grand Coalition, by the way, ruled Germany in essence since 2002. Most of the 2010 agenda reform projects have been – well joint reforms in many ways, CDU supported it and the Bundestag [??] where they have a majority. And I want to add, these reforms began to work. Not in an optimal way, certainly, but they began to work and you can tell. Corporate profits are up – dramatically up, by the way. The question of unemployment is certainly a painful one, but we will work on that too.
The most important issues for the future are obvious. I think it’s budget deficits, public finance, back to Maastricht in principle. Back to Maastricht - I want to emphasize that. Reform of the federal system. Too much blockage in our federal system. I think that needs to be done and the Grand Coalition will work on that issue very, very seriously. Education. I mention that again. Research and university reform. And we need more competition in our educational system and it has to do with federalism because that’s where it is. The lender, the states have the most important responsibility for our education system and for learning and research.
And last, but not least, labor cost. I emphasize labor cost and labor market reform. I believe this is possible without crushing the House of Labor as the FDP would like to have it, if it’s in power. I don’t think it’s necessary to crush the House of Labor in order to push through economic reforms. You can let labor exist and live and be strong and still have reforms. They are participating in it. If you look into the issues closely, you’ll see that they favor reform too.
Now, why and how could this surprising election result happen and prove almost everybody, pollsters and the media wrong. First, the fact that both center parties, CDU and SPD, folks [indiscernible], the Germans would say, lost. Seventy percent for both. It used to be more than 80 in the past. So, you could say the center is shrinking in Germany and there is some truth to it. The vital center is smaller, shrinking. The Greens too lost, 0.5 percent.
Second, and I think that’s essential, I’ll come back to it, is the fact that both the FDP, the free Democrats and the Left, Oskar LaFontaine and Gysi, the dreadful combination, gained substantially - four percent for the Left and 2.4 percent for the FDP. I’ll leave the extreme right here aside for the moment. That’s the dog that didn’t bark. We have to watch it because on the lender level, they increased their votes too. We have to watch it because the Grand Coalition could give the smaller parties, of course, including the extreme right, a better chance to grow in the future.
I’m afraid we are moving into a more diverse party system, to put it mildly. We can talk about this in discussion, of course, and maybe we should. So, the question is what is going on here. I believe we have to look a little bit beyond the shorter Merkel drama. I think what you can observe in Germany is a growing heterogeneity and polarization – I use that word polarization – of the parties and of the electorate and of the impact of globalization.
That’s for me a shorthand for what might be called a post-industrial knowledge society with winners and losers. What you have seen for the FDP and for the linker [phonetic], for the Left is that the winners of globalization somehow begin to crystallize around the free Democrats. They are the party of the winners of globalization, managers and [indiscernible]. The losers of globalization join Oscar LaFontaine and Geezy and their false promises. But that’s what’s happening in the east.
Not untypical that this is happening in the east. As I said, the center parties, CDU and SPD, feel the pressure of heterogeneity. And look at the parties objectively. Parts of the CDU CSU membership and the electoral clearly are in favor of reform, and parts are more traditionalist and resisting reforms. Look at the SPD and you have a similar make-up, a diversity, heterogeneity. You have the traditional Tertullianists and workers. And you also have what I would call innovators, young entrepreneurs, more on the Left. Social engineers on the other. So, these two trends are within the big parties.
Greens is similar. They stagnate under the same social and economic pressure as I see it. Some want to join the new forces. Some want to resist globalization. That’s why I believe the parties are really unable to produce issue majorities. That’s my last point, Radek. I understand time is short.
What you see is that if you look at the seats, we have 320 seats and the majority on the Left – if you put SPD, Greens and the Linker, the Left, together. And yet, look in a different way you can say that reforms have a majority. If you take the reformers of the social Democrats, the Greens, the FDP and the CDU together, you would have a majority for reforms. That corresponds with public opinion polls that confirm the view that Germany A, needs the reforms and B, the majority supports reforms.
The problem is we don’t have a political majority for that. We can’t put that together. That’s the issue. That’s the problem that we have to deal with and that’s why we have as the only solution, I think, the Grand Coalition. As I said at the beginning, it’s not as bad as it sounds. Trust me. Thank you.
Radek Sikorski: Uif, what does it look like from Bavaria from the CSU perspective? Prime Minister Stoiber did so much to achieve this election result.
Uif Gartzke: Thank you very much, Radek. First of all I’m very happy to note that there’s at least one European conservative sitting on this panel here who [inaudible] in last month’s parliamentary election. So, once again, congratulations to you.
Now, turning West and going to Germany, I would say from the conservative’s point of view, this was definitely a mixed-bag elections. I mean, there’s good news and there’s bad news. Let me start with the bad news first. The bad news is that unfortunately the CDU SU, along with the FDP did not master the kind of majority that we wanted to achieve to implement meaningful economic and social reforms, which [indiscernible] as we would argue.
The second bad news so to say that there is currently a Left wing majority in the German parliament. If you add up the SPD, the Green and the Left party together, they are currently at more than 51 percent. So, again, this is a vote against reforms and that’s something that we’ll have to deal with in the future.
Now, turning to the good news. The over arching good news is that the current [indiscernible] Green government got voted out of office. There is no denying it. [Indiscernible] Green did not get re-elected and that is, of course, good news, I would say, for everyone who believes in economic reforms and also people who believe in trans-Atlantic relations and at least strengthening them and to move forward.
The second good news is that the CDU/CSU managed to become the strongest group in parliament with currently a four-seat advantage and roughly 500,000 more second votes than the SPD, for example. So, there’s a clear advantage for the CDU/CSU vis- a-vis the SPD, and based on this advantage we would argue is CDU/CSU should take the lead in forming a future German government.
Now, turning to Bavaria in particular, you mentioned Minister President [indiscernible]. On the one hand again, there is also good news and bad news. I mean, when you look at the CSU, we lost quite heavily, minus 9.3 percent, compared to 2002. We went down from 58 MPs to 46 MPs. Again, very disappointing, but to put these results into perspective it’s important to note that in 2002 we scored an exceptionally good result. I mean, we had this so called Stoiber effect of Bavaria responding to take over Berlin and the Bavarians liked it and said oh, we should support him.
So, in 2002 we won all direct seats in Bavaria. This time, we’ve won all but one. Again, the CSU on the one hand lost votes to the FDP, for example. We also lost votes to those who simply stayed at home and said, well, this time there’s no Bavarian and we’ll simply stay at home.
At the same time, it’s also, I would say, important to note that the CSU’s results back in 1990, also 1994, were slightly above the 50 percent threshold. But we are, in 2005, still well above the election result that we got in 1998, which was about 47 percent. It’s also important to point out that if you compare the votes that the direct district candidates, the CSU candidates got with the votes that the voters cast for the populace, there’s a six percentage point difference. So, overall if you look at the various CSU results, we got 55 percent of the first votes, but only 49.3 percent of the second votes. That indicated a number of CSU voters made a last minute switch to the FDP for strategic reasons because they wanted to avoid the Grand Coalition.
So, also to point out that obviously the CSU again pushed the CDU about the 30 percent threshold. In a way, you could even argue that the CSU’s weight overall within the CDU/CSU has even increased. I guess that is also important to note. But there is no denying, I mean, the elections didn’t turn out the way that we had hoped they would and that is something we have to take into account.
Radek Sikorski: Since the Conrad Adenauer couldn’t be here, we’ll treat you as an honorary representative of the entire CDU/CSU coalition. Let me therefore ask you was it wise to run on a ticket on the sort of grand theme of the campaign, as I understand it being, you don’t like the Schroeder reforms. We promise you even tougher reforms that you will like even less.
Uif Gartzke: Yeah. Well, I guess [inaudible] CSU made from the beginning a decision to run a very honest campaign, which I find very, very attractive. We told people upside front, people you need to make more sacrifices. The economic situation in Germany – it’s rather disastrous. And once again, it is good news that [indiscernible] Green got voted out of office because obviously the economic situation deteriorated since 1998. So, we felt that we had to present people with a drastic choice. Obviously there was some parts of the campaign platform, like the VIT tax increase, which was highly controversial among the population.
Unfortunately things got taken out of context so we didn’t get our point across in the sense that we said, oh, we’ll take the two percent VIT tax increase to lower non-wage labor costs. But in the heat of the campaign, obviously, the SPD and the Green feast on that, the SPD in particular. Essentially ran what we call an unksbar [phonetic, German word] [indiscernible]. They try to scare people and unfortunately it worked rather effectively. The fact that we had a very, very high share of voters who didn’t make up their mind until the very last minute, helped them again.
So, in that sense again, we ran a very honest campaign and unfortunately, maybe too honest and people in the end said, well, rather than going for the really bitter medicine, we’ll stick with the kind of haphazard measures that the SPD and the Greens offered and maybe we can prevent further cuts in the future. But in the end, I guess it was a very short sided policy or a very short sided approach.
Radek Sikorski: Helga, would it be fair to say that they didn’t win, but you lost?
Helga Flores: Yeah. Red-Green lost and Merkel and the liberals [indiscernible]. I think that’s the fair – Red-Green was not a majority anymore, but Merkel and the liberals didn’t have any trust, so there we are. And the question is what does that mean really? I was during the election, last week of the elections I was in Germany and after that – I’ve said it before, but I left the day after and I went to Belgrade. I left with a feeling, well we have an interesting result. And then I arrived in Belgrade and I had many friends with very preoccupied faces asking me about Germany. So, I started really thinking, well is it that bad that the Serbs have to worry about Germany. [Laughter]
The question is I don’t think so. I don’t think so and I’m going to try to tell you why. I think the result, first of all, reflects that we are a country in transition. Germany is not a post-conflict country, but we are a post-unification country. Fifteen years after unification with globalization going on, we are going through really massive needed political, social, economic reforms. I think the result shows no less than that. There’s insecurity, that’s normal. There’s also fear how these reforms will go on. But I think that’s better to lay this open instead of trying to continue the dream that unification can be done without changes, European union can be done without changes. This means Germany has to change and there it is for everybody to see. That’s not bad.
Secondly, the large parties have lost their binding power. Dieter was saying this and he said, I don’t think this is very negative. In the past we had the two parties gathering almost 90 percent of the votes. Now it’s almost 70. From the perspective of the smaller parties, this is good. But I do believe that also from the perspective of German society is good. The social Democrats and the Christian Democrats cannot take their voters for granted. This is really a competition for the best answers to the challenges we have now and they have to deliver. If there’s any other party or smaller parties delivering these, I think this is a fair competition and it shows also that we need that.
Third, there is a weakening of the blocks which I think it’s very positive. The campaign, as you follow it, it was really run it’s yellow, black against Red-Green. It’s Merkel against Schroeder. It was really always raised the question asked against them. That’s of course not very useful for the reforms we need to do. I think what the voters in Germany did, they put really an abrupt end to these blocks. None of them has a majority anymore and that’s okay. After this election it seemed almost any coalition was possible and that’s good. The parties will have to re-think also this very polarized and rather dull block thinking.
Fourth, the right has no majority. It has been said before. One used to think in Germany, we used to think that the Red-Green Coalition 1998 was really an accident because you didn’t have a majority in society. Now we see that in parliament at least there is no majority for the conservatives. There is a Left majority, but I caution to what this means because the real conflict is not between Left and right. In Germany the real conflict is who wants to go forward, who wants to modernize Germany, and who wants to stick to the past and suggest we can continue all our privileges without changing. I think this is the dynamic we have to look for.
The fifth aspect I think it’s interesting. It’s the east. The east remains not integrated. The large support for this Left party shows that they still feel treated badly and differently to other post-Communist countries, we haven’t managed to integrate the post-Communist parties and the society itself. So, this will remain a problem.
Let me just lastly say the campaign was really remarkable. What happened there was really interesting. Why I say that because from the moment Schroeder declared elections, that same day Merkel was seen as the sure chancellor and she started also campaigning as the sure chancellor. Not as the challenger, but as the incumbent almost telling her proposals and they were scrutinized as if she was already chancellor. Schroeder managed to be the underdog on this campaign, which is amazing. I think something similar happened to Kerry and Bush, but not as bad I would say as it happened in Germany. That’s really what’s interesting what Schroeder managed to do there.
At the end, he campaigned really on himself. He never say why should he be elected. What does he want to do if he was going to be elected. He campaigned on Schroeder against Merkel. So, I think we can talk a little bit more about this campaign during the Q&A, but for me, it’s really you can summarize this campaign under the title, on the one hand, How to Lose a 20 Point Lead in Six Weeks.
[Laughter]
And on the other hand, How to Campaign on Zero Content.
[Laughter]
So, we were there on September 19th. We waked up and we had six parties in parliament, or factions, four possible coalitions and two chancellors. To this day, we still have two chancellors. Two parties then. To this day, we still have two chancellors. Probably my feeling of course is that probably we will have a Grand Coalition. I don’t think it’s the solution to the problems. Reformers will go on, but mostly rather slow rather than bold. Of course, the CDU will be leading this coalition. The question is if Merkel would be the person to lead it. I’m not sure if that’s really finalized the conflict within the CDU/CSU.
At the end, let me just say it was a shake-up. I think it’s a good shake-up and the parties need to come up with good ideas and how to continue any reform in Germany. It would be really bad to just blame the voters for this.
Radek Sikorski: Excellent. Thank you very much. And last but not least, Claus Gramckow, Friedrich Naumann Foundation, SPD.
Claus Gramckow: I was over there also on election night in Berlin with a group of Americans. We went to the FDP election party. The Americans were, of course, as puzzled as we were and one of the Americans succinctly noted, “This is like an S bleep success looks like.” Because the FDP had two goals. One was to defeat Red-Green and the other one was to get the majority for the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition and it didn’t happen. So, it’s really a mixed bag.
What is also interesting, and I agree with Helga, is all the options that are floating around. It’s really interesting. All of a sudden there are terms coming out of Germany you never heard before. We all knew about the streetlight coalition, but we’ve never heard of the Jamaican Coalition or the Israel Option. There had to be a lot of explaining to do in that regard. So, the FDP won 2.4 percent. For Americans that’s not a lot, but for a German political system, it is significant specifically for a party that has been – or the newspapers and other people have written political obituaries of the FDP for the last 15 years, more or less specifically in the late 90s and the early 2000s, that the FDP is at the end of their political existence in Germany. So, this was, in that regard, it was a very great success.
Why the success? And again I’m coming back to what’s said before, there are basically two gainers -- I wouldn’t call them winners – but two gainers in this party. One is the FDP and the other one is Linkspartei. Why is that? I think it is because both of them had the clearest program and the clearest direction. The FDP was the one with the clearest reform agenda and the Linkspartei was the clearest anti-reform campaign. Getting back to the CDU, just to give you an example, you can start a campaign by increasing the value added tax by two percent and then when you name your shadow finance minister, you appoint a person who’s very well known in the academic and economic field for proposing flat tax.
Voters don’t buy that. So, I think there was a big disconnect. And, of course, Chancellor Schroeder, the good campaigner he is jumped on that and basically rode it home. If you went to an SPD campaign event in the last two weeks, that’s all they were talking about. I again agree with Helga, it’s amazing how this campaign turned out because in the end, it was not the question of what Red-Green didn’t do in the last three or seven years, but what might the next coalition do.
The one thing that strikes me right now in the discussion about forming coalitions, and of course it all looks and the indications are that we’re going to end up with the Grand Coalition, but the discussions is not about it should be about the issues, where is this reform going. The discussion you are seeing in the German public is about the persons. Who should be the chancellor? I don’t think that’s very helpful.
Also, I don’t think it’s very helpful for the public to see because I think there shouldn’t be just discussion among parties because of the arithmetic of the results, but of what they want. I think that is not happening. This might happen in the future until they have figured out who’s going to be the chancellor in this coalition.
I don’t want to go directly into what Dieter said. I find it interesting your point about the winners of globalization. I don’t necessarily think that. I think that there is a niche in the German political sphere for a party that proposes something different than the rest of the 80 percent majority. Because as most of you know, Germany is a very social, demoprised [sounds like] society and the approach that the FDP has, I think has a good niche and has an increasing niche. Because it’s very important that this country goes forward and it only can go forward, at least in our point, with dramatic reforms. We’re not going to crush the labor market. We’re going to loosen it and we have to loosen it. Of course, the unions and just today the Ekay Boule [German, phonetic] threatened to boycott companies who were just touching the collective bargaining agreement. I don’t think that’s the culture of discussion we should have in this situation. I think this is not very helpful.
So, Grand Coalition. Nothing grand about it. I think in the end they will muddle through. I think their reforms they will pass. I agree with Dieter. They will address certain issues. Basically the issues with the lowest common nominator. It’s like the health reform two years ago. Everybody said at that point it was going to last two years until we have to re-visit it again. And we are at this point. It has to be re-visited. This is the same what happened in the Grand Coalition and we’ll see how that works out.
The FDP is resigned to end up in the up position and I think feel very comfortable in that because the other result was very positive that we came out as the strongest of the smaller parties. I think that’s something that we can work with. Thanks.
Radek Sikorski: Thank you. Before I open the floor to discussion, let me abuse the privilege of the moderator. I put to you, Dieter, the point that was made by Uif, namely that there’s been a Left wing victory. Why does anasama [German, phonetic] on the first Communist, the FDP has cordial relations with first Communist parties of Central and Eastern Europe, including some very nasty former Soviet stooges. So, why not deal with [indiscernible] post-Communists. If one were of a suspicious cost of mind, one would say what’s good enough for the Poles is not good enough for the Germans.
[Laughter]
And why doesn’t Chancellor Schroeder, who is known for his, shall we say political flexibility, why doesn’t he take advantage of this chance of staying in his job?
Dieter Dettke: [audio stops and restarts] I’m pretty sure why the big difference is, of course, in East Germany or in Germany, the Left is not in power, but in other countries in Eastern Europe, they have power. So, you somehow have to deal with them. You don’t necessarily have to deal with someone who is not in charge in Germany - you can’t form a coalition. Now, let’s be serious about this. You can’t form a coalition with Oscar LaFontaine, who split off from the SPD. Just add the numbers of votes that the Left won in addition to what they used to have before and Red-Green would have had a majority if that potential would have stayed within our political family. He is a traitor in many ways for many social Democrats. You don’t enter a coalition with a party that cannot put together a government program. That much we know.
Schroeder is a reformer. Let’s face it. That’s his legacy for the social Democrats. That’s why he came out as strong as he came against all odds, against the German press, against the international press, against the pollsters. You name it. There is no substantive program that can be put together. That’s a tragedy in German politics, but it happens. We have to live with that. You’re not going to talk me into forming a Left coalition and believing that it would help Germany. It would not. It would really drive Germany into a situation of an economic basket case and it would be bad for German foreign policy. It would be bad for German economic policy. We have started reforms. They begin to work and the only way to complete this is to find another coalition.
I think the more important question about it would be why are these guys here, left to me, the FDP. Not in a position to form a reformed majority. The traffic light coalition could be a very effective reform coalition. It would bring in some new potential and energy from the neo-liberal side. It would push the reform efforts of the SPD and the Greens. It would have been a great coalition.
Let me also say the other way around. Why aren’t we flexible enough. Why do we behave like a bloc [sounds like] partied [phonetic] suddenly. [Laughter] And why is it not possible to test a Jamaica coalition. I understand the concerns of . . .
Radek Sikorski: For the benefit of everyone here, could you explain the Israeli and the Jamaica coalition.
Dieter Dettke: Okay. The Jamaica Coalition, very easy is a fleck of Jamaica and is green, black and yellow like a Caribbean bird. This would be a reform coalition too. Let’s not forget that. It’s a possibility but, of course, I understand the Greens have concerns and the, again, the FDP also for fear of losing too much of their image and their clientele. Because as I said, they represent the winners of globalization and if they are in coalition with somebody else that is less energetic for reforms, then they feel this can only be done with CDU.
And that’s strange. I think for our party system would be important really to gain a little more flexibility, FDP and Greens too. I wouldn’t mind that at all. Or – and I say that here because I thought about this. I don’t want to start a discussion about the German electoral system, but if we move into a six – depending on how you count – or seven party system if you add the CSU – seven party system and you put into calculation that the extreme right might make it one day, then we might, if that lack of flexibility continues, then we might have to consider a electoral law reform in Germany. If you can’t put together majorities – I don’t want the Grand Coalition to be in power for eternity. That’s can’t be the case. Shouldn’t be. So, either more flexibility or we have to think about our election system. Thank you.
Claus Gramckow: Can I directly answer the question, Traffic Light coalition. First of all, [indiscernible] in the FDP campaign clearly for a government with the CDU/CSU and against Red-Green. That was clear. After the election, the FDP made quite clear that the partner they want to go into coalition is the CDU/CSU. Then they told the CDU/CSU, if you will be able to work out your difference with the Greens, so the Greens work out the difference with us, come back to us and we’ll talk. The Street Light coalition – Dieter, you’re a member of the arguments of the FDP being the oompha la partei [phonetic] – the party that always flips after the election when they made announcement on position and then came actually after the coalition, and they basically turned around and said, oh by the way, we didn’t mean it. That label in a large part of the media just waiting for this to come.
Also, structurally. I mean, there was a social liberal coalition in the 70s and early 80s. That was a different FDP than it is now. I don’t see the culture in the FDP right now to go into a coalition with an SDP that is still strongly dominated by unions. I don’t think that’s going to happen in the short-term. I have to defend the Greens a little bit. For them to go into a coalition with the CDU/CSU is also a cultural step forward that hasn’t been done on the state level yet. And that’s the same like in the U.S. When you try something, you first try it on the state level, and its never been done. So, to ask them to do this on the federal level is also in a way not realistic.
But I wanted to see a headline if Guido one day would say, by the way we’re going into the Street Light or Traffic Light coalition. That would be the end probably of him and also probably very much the FDP. And don’t forget, a lot of people voted for us because they didn’t want a Grand Coalition and they definitely didn’t want us in the SPD Coalition.
Radek Sikorski: Helga, and then we’ll open the floor.
Helga Flores-Trejo: Just very short because it was really interesting to see how just the idea of such a coalition with the Christian Democrats, the liberals and the Greens be so cold. Yamika [German, phonetic] really gained so much support in Germany. Where really I think the idea behind is because it would break exactly these political camps and probably people would – I think that might be the case – that would see that such a coalition would be more dynamic and to what they want to do instead of having a grand coalition that will be blocking each other probably all the time.
So, this was interesting, I think. For some reasons, it was difficult for the Greens, but rather because of the campaign that was done before, such a polarized campaign. But also because it would have meant that America would need to draw the right conclusions also from her not winning. This means what kind of reform do you need to do. How do you manage the market liberalism with the social and this balance to get it right?
I think in many ways culturally the conservatives have come a long way. In Germany there was not an issue. Things like gay marriage, for example. I think such things show also there has been a closing of the gap on cultural things. The biggest problem would have been the question of immigration and integration which seems still ideologically the CDU that conservatives have not realized that we need an immigration society also to be economically successful.
Radek Sikorski: Gentleman over there. If you could introduce yourself, please. And be brief.
John Rothrock [phonetic]: Yes. I’m John Rothrock. I’d like to ask specifically Dieter in particular, to characterize for us the Left party, and particularly to what extent it has any seriously to be concerned about [indiscernible] from the SED.
Dieter Dettke: Thank you, John. The Left is two parties. It’s one Western branch called the Voter Alternative for Social Justice. That’s leftist, trade unionists and maybe a little bit of, if you look at the [indiscernible] of Germany, a little bit of an old Communist tradition there. But in the East, of course, and in many ways the Left has now become the party of the East, of East Germany – or former East Germany I should say. It is of course part of the old SED tradition, but also those who lost out in the unification process.
The big question in my view is whether this party is there for the long-term or whether as unifications issue become resolved in many ways and domestic unity really sets in, whether they have a future or not. I doubt that they have a long-term future, but I have been wrong before and I might be wrong on this one. They could become something of a CSU of the east. I would not exclude that. I hope that’s not the case, but I wouldn’t exclude it.
So, in many ways of course, it’s a heterogeneous party too - Eastern/Western cultural differences. You have this Communist tradition, and you have a reform Communist tradition in there. There are many different facets in there and then, of course, this character LaFontaine who left the SPD and needed some sort of vehicle in order to gain power. He probably couldn’t have done that on his own, but he needed a vehicle and he got it. He and Geezy are quite a powerful duo there from their perspective. I don’t like what’s happening there.
Now the Left wing in Germany is split two times, if you wish. In many ways, the Greens is a split off too of a more social Democratic orientation in the past. The splintering process I think is not something that I welcome very much because it would, if it goes on, indeed trigger what I hoped would not happen, and that is that we have to change our electoral system. Thank you.
Radek Sikorski: Thanks. Gentleman here.
Michael Backfish [phonetic]: Michael Backfish, Germany Business Daily Handelsblatt. A question to Mr. Gartzke and Mr. Dettke. During the campaign, Mr. Merkel made some very bold announcement, at least for German standards. She wanted to increase value added tax, she wanted to freeze employers’ share for health insurance, she wanted to make labor law more flexible and she wanted to allow companies to opt out of the national pay rules. In the Grand Coalition, what will be left or would we end up with a huge wishy-washy compromise.
And the same question actually to Dieter Dettke, you said reforms would be pushed through, but what reforms. Where do you see some leeway or where would you say there are the [indiscernible] and not with us?
Uif Gartzke: Well, first of all, I guess I have to make use of my prerogative as an honorary CDU representative here, but very, very good question. I mean, I would say if you look at the [indiscernible] coalition talks – and I guess everyone who has access to a computer right now has better insight than I do – should see that at least today, I mean, CSU had Stoiber [indiscernible] that the key priorities for potential grand coalition would be one, the balancing of the budget, two, reform of the federalist structure and then c was creating [inaudible] and making Germany’s economy more competitive.
So, I would personally assume that in a grand coalition, many of the bold proposals for far-reaching labor market deregulation would have to be watered down due to the SPD's opposition. At the same time, I guess it would make sense for everyone here to look at the results of the so-called job gap fill. The so-called job summit which was convened by Chancellor Schroeder and the CDU/CSU had back in March, and there you already had some kind of an agenda for how CDU/CSU and the SPD could cooperate in making Germany’s economy more competitive.
There the focus, for example, was on lowering Germany’s corporate tax rate from 25 percent to 19 percent, cutting the what I guess conservative, he would call the death tax or the estate tax for people who are transferring their small and medium enterprise to their sons or daughters. You could also look at more, let’s say, flexibility in terms of short-term contracts. But again, this would not be the kind of full-blown reform program that CDU/CSU, along with the FDP had in mind when we ran this campaign. But again, I would refer to the job gaps that I guess that already provides some kind of indication of where CDU/CSU government, along with the SPD would go in a future grand coalition.
Dieter Dettke: Yeah, Mr. Backfish, I have to preface my remark to say I don’t know where the coalition agreement is going to go. That’s going to be the foundation for the next years – I don’t know whether it’s four years or less, if it’s the Grand Coalition and what they can agree on. But it is obvious that given our finances, of course, they have to talk about how to raise money and VAT is an option. I don’t know whether that’s going to be agreeable for the social Democrats, but it is an option. It was part of the CDU program and therefore you have to consider it. You can’t spend money twice and you have to generate funds if you’re short on funds in the budget. The budget situation is dismal. So, something has to happen there.
The next issue is labor market reform where not enough has happened so far. I don’t know exactly what’s going to happen, but what they have to address aggressively is labor costs. The VAT was meant, in Miss Merkel’s sense, to reduce the labor costs and somehow generate funds to finance the cost of labor. And you know how expensive German labor is. Practically 40 percent, if you include the employers’ side, of every earned dollar goes into social security and unemployment benefits and so on. That has to change because it makes Germany less competitive.
If you look at the Danish model, you’ll see that Denmark pays all these costs out of their budget – the taxpayer pays it. And other countries do the same. Britain is an interesting model too. They have a different nationalized health care system. We have to, I think, look seriously at the Danish model and try to finance our social security, unemployment benefits and all that in a different way so it doesn’t burden labor as much as it does now.
That’s the issue. Again, I don’t know what they’re able to work out or not, but in my view that would be the direction in which this has to go. What’s not going to work and what was in the CDU program is to tinker with co-determination. I think it is watered down enough in order to not prevent business from doing good business. American companies that go to Germany and work with co-determination are just as successful as other companies. I don’t see that to be the most important obstacle for our economic success. It is not. We can improve things a little bit. That’s fine.
And also, what we don’t have to do is dismantle the whole collective bargaining or regional collective and industry-wide collective bargaining system. It is already being eroded in many ways because the unions realize, of course, that companies have to have more say in collective bargaining. You can’t somehow, in many ways, legislate wage levels on a large basis. You have to be more flexible. Incidentally, some of the unions, in particularly [indiscernible] and the energy union they are very flexible in that respect too. Respect individual companies and their specific situation as far as new wage demands are concerned. So, it’s moving in that direction already and you don’t have to dismantle everything that Germany ever achieved in order to guarantee our economic future. I think we can without dismantling everything.
Claus Gramckow: Can I immediately slip in the position of an opposition party here? What is talked about the increase of the value added tax, for me it’s all star drama and politics. The answer to all the questions regarding budget problems is increased taxes. There should be a serious discussion that they should take a serious look at subsidies and also at the tax code. I know it’s hard to compare, but I think Germany should go through a 1986 tax reform as the U.S. did 20 years ago. And then, if then maybe the numbers add up, we can maybe talk about it, but again, the first thing they do is talk about increase of taxes. That’s the worse thing the German economy right now can handle. I think that’s unfortunately that’s what the Grand Coalition’s going to be decide, but I don’t think that’s going to help.
Wayne Mary [phonetic]: Wayne Mary. I would like to ask the panel to comment on an issue that Dieter raised which is potential for restructuring the electoral system itself and why this should not be part of the agenda for a grand coalition. ‘Cause Germany has a rather curious hybrid mechanism of translating voter intentions into parliamentary seats. This was an ad hoc compromise between the Allies and Germans in 1949 who worked fairly well in the Bonn republic, but the Berlin republic has very different realities and requirements. I’m wondering why, given the results of this election and even in the context of the results of the previous election, it would not be part of the task of a Grand Coalition to seriously look at other models for how to structure the way in which voters intentions are translated into abundah stuck [German, phonetic]?
Dieter Dettke: I want to be very careful here. I don’t think it’s an immediate problem. I want to see first whether Germany can develop something that works in this country, too, and these are automatic correction mechanisms. Maybe voters are going to draw their own conclusions from these election results. Maybe we can continue to use our electoral system and make it work as people decide in a different way how to cast their vote. It’s a complex system, but only if nothing else works would I point in that direction. I don’t think it’s something for the immediate situation and for this coalition to address. We have a little more time to work with and see what’s going to happen. Maybe there are correction mechanisms that might work and maybe parties begin to be a little more flexible in the future and you will be able to forge majorities.
Radek Sikorski: Uif, then Helga.
Uif Gartzke: Thank you very much. Of course, a UK style electoral system would come handy for the CDU/CSU because we got roughly the same share that Tony Blair got. He received a sizable majority in parliament, so point well taken, but I would agree that, I guess, when you talk about the reform of Germany’s political system, the main focus will be on the so-called reform of our federalist structure.
We have 16 different states and each state has its own parliament and its own administrative structures. That slows down the overall decision-making procedures in Germany. That will be a major focus of a future grand coalition. Again, Edmund Stoiben, Franz Muntefering, the CDU/CSU and SPD chairman respectively worked quite well in the federal commission. Unfortunately some of the key issues, like whether we should rearrange the lenders, merge some or whether we should have a closer look at the current system of so-called finance [indiscernible] where weaker lenders receive a disproportionate share of stronger lenders, which in turn encourages the weaker ones. Not necessarily to implement reforms in which weakens the stronger ones, of course, these questions were taken off the agenda in the previous federalism reform agenda, reform commission. So, again, that would be the kind of reforms we are looking at, but not necessarily a whole restructuring or revamping of our electoral system.
Radek Sikorski: Why do I suspect that Helga is going to be less enthusiastic for a [inaudible] system.
Helga Flores-Trejo: Reconstruction of their solution. Very easy. Independently that we don’t want that on-going. But, really, I mean the problems of Germany – the lack of reform – it’s not because of the voters and how they decided in the past. Really the key is what Uif just mentioned is the federal reform. The two chambers and the possibility that every time any major reform needs to go through [inaudible], and you have different majorities over there. It was a very good system that included everybody and made all the difference, all the interest groups were included in this system. But now for Germany, it doesn’t work anymore. It’s hampering the reforms. It’s hampering the real serious structural changes. So that’s a problem.
[Audio stops and starts]
[indiscernible] NTV Channel. Something on foreign policy. While Merkel's views are well known on Turkey and the European union, now how would a grand coalition shape Germany’s overall new position on Turkey? Would it dampen Merkel’s position or will these social Democrats be forced to change their position?
Radek Sikorski: Great question. Dieter.
Dieter Dettke: The issue is really out of the hands of the German government now. The EU. It’s in the hands of the EU. Negotiations started the day before yesterday, last Monday. Sorry? Yeah. They met Monday evening too. The dinner was [indiscernible] a decisive one was on Monday. I know that.
Claus Gramckow: By the way, this is how the Grand Coalition looks like.
[Laughter]
Dieter Dettke: That’s a coalition to have. It’s not a grand coalition. So, in the hands of EU, the process is going to take place there and then it’s a question on how the Grand Coalition is going to deal with the issue in their coalition agreement. Maybe if you give me a chance – the coalition agreement, again, is the decisive policy document. And the real leaders of Germany, I know for sure, in a grand coalition are the two parliamentary leaders.
So, if Miss Merkel stays in parliament and remains parliamentary leader and party leader, she’ll be in a very powerful position. Franz Muntefering, if he stays in his position, parliamentary leader and party leader, will be in a very powerful position up to a point where they could say we don’t care who’s chancellor under us. Yeah. That’s how the system works. Definitely. So, the question is how this is going to be addressed. I think it’s out of the box now for the CDU to really impose their position on that issue.
Now, I realize, of course, that additional – it’s not only Merkel’s position on Turkey. There are additional difficulties. We have to realize that. And that is public opinion in France and Germany is drastically decreasing and declining. We have to make sure this is going to work. I’m in favor of this great, mind you, important attempt to integrate Turkey. I think it’s more important to have Turkey inside than if you would leave Turkey outside – you wouldn’t solve any of the problems that we have. So, Schroeder and the SPD stand behind integrating Turkey and one should try to do that. I’m sorry. [Cell phone rings]
Radek Sikorski: You can tell a great deal about people by the kind of message that they have. Uif, Turkey in?
Uif Gartzke: Yeah. I mean, definitely a key question so far in any exploratory discussions because they have not yet formed the coalition talks. I guess foreign policy has been deliberately left out. But I would agree. I mean, in principle even if CDU/CSU FDP government would have been bound by the previous decision taken – calling again – would have been bound by the decision taken by the [indiscernible] council in Brussels on December 17th. I guess the fundamental difference that the conservatives have with the SPD is that we say, well, it should be an open-ended negotiation process at least in terms of the actual result. That’s my personal opinion.
Unfortunately, the Austrians had to back down and they didn’t manage to put it into the negotiating mandate that they could also be something short of full EU membership. Namely what we would call a privileged partnership. So we have intellectual flexibility, but I would agree. In the end, this is something that the EU and also that Turkey has to move on right now and the ball is definitely in the Turkish court. We have to see how this plays out.
Radek Sikorski: Gentleman over there.
Bo Miller: Bo Miller, Joint Military Intelligence College. Question primarily for Dieter and Helga and that is, even though Dieter doesn’t want to talk about this, if the response or reaction to this election is not a restructuring of the electoral system and so forth, what does the SPD think and have in mind to do to try and recoup its grandchildren, or Bonn’s grandchildren if you will, from the Left and from the Greens? And is that something that the party can reasonably expect to do, particularly in light of the fact that instead of being all on the outside, united in opposition, you have the biggest party in the government.
Dieter Dettke: Well, the SPD I don’t think is going to regain all its lost sheep. It’s not going to work. So, down the line, is a coalition on the Left possible. People like Franz Leider [phonetic], respected party researcher believes yes, there is a possibility in the future. But there’s so much hope for the future and so little in the present. So, I wouldn’t exclude it that things move in that direction. That you could, out of this, develop a clear system of alteration and change – not alteration, changing coalitions between Left and right. But it all depends whether on the issues you can put together the political majorities.
As the great philosopher Walter Shields [phonetic] says, the issues always have a majority. It is the parliamentary, the political majority that’s missing and that we need to provide. Argumentally, yes. I don’t want to exclude a changing electoral system, but it’s not a question for today.
Helga Flores-Trejo: I think that would be a little misunderstanding of the Greens. Let me tell you. An editorialist in Germany wrote that in the next German Bundestag in parliament there will be three parties to the right and three parties to the left. In the parties to the left were the Social Democrats, the Left party in the Green. And the parties to the right, the more marked liberal side would be CDU/CSU, the conservative Christian Democrats and Christian socials, the liberals and the Greens, too. I think this description really fits perfectly what the Greens are. I think the vote and what the Greens have is they rather are now in the center of the political spectrum.
Now being the coalition over, it gives the opportunity for the Greens also to keep their distance and offer their coalition possibilities to other sides. Important will be if the modernizing idea within the Greens will win, I think at the end the Greens are very well positioned right now even though they were going to go to the opposition. They received so many votes. For the Greens now in their position will mean they need to continue working on ideas and concepts and so on to modernize Germany. So, I see the Greens more in the center in keeping the balance to both sides and keeping the balance between marked liberalism and social ideas.
Radek Sikorski: Gentleman over here in the white shirt.
Steve Sylvia [phonetic}: Yes. I’m Steve Sylvia from American University. I wanted to ask a question. Since it looks like we’re going to have a grand coalition, what do each of the panelists see as the opportunities and the pitfalls looking forward in either governing or being in opposition with that. This is particularly in light of the fact that the SPD, the Greens and the CSU very well may have different leaders. Stoiber’s hard to say if he’s going to go to Berlin what that means – but particularly a post-Fischer Greens, a post-Schroeder SPD.
Dieter Dettke?: The opportunity is clearly to push through reforms as I would see it that would help Germany to get back on a normal course of action, economic activity. It’s coming back and we need to improve. We need to improve finances. That’s an opportunity for the Grand Coalition to initiate.
The pitfalls are, of course, how do we come back to a normal situation of change. If you have two big center parties occupying that center, how do you come back to normal. I mean, look at the Austrian model. For a long, long time they lived with this grand coalition and it wasn’t pretty, particularly at the end. It was ugly. I wish we could somehow avoid that pitfall to end up in eternal molasses. So, keep it short in many ways, the Grand Coalition now. Be precise on the program and, I think they’re smart enough to figure that one out. Then make sure that we come to a normal situation of change and a good balance of power between left and right and working coalitions in the future.
Claus Gramckow: Advantages and pitfalls. Opportunities I would see a little difference. I think what’s lacking in Germany and I think it has shown in the campaign is first of all the resolve reflects the strong, the German society is still a consensus society. Obviously the voter wanted a grand coalition because they were afraid. They had ungst for the reform. But I think one of the reasons why they had ungst is because there was not real political leadership for the reforms. I mean, not somebody who was in front of the movement, but more or less trying to figure out where it’s going and what it wants. I think that, in my view, could be an opportunity. I don’t necessarily see this because of the mechanism of a grand coalition in the way German politics works.
Pitfall I already mentioned – not enough reform. Reforms not deep enough. And here’s the other big problem with this is, as I would say the cruelties have to be done early because next year you already have three state elections. So, we are still not even clear if it’s going to be a grand coalition. They are saying their figure this out over the weekend. On the 18th the parliament will be constituted. We’re not going to elect a chancellor at that point. So, we probably are not going to have a working government until maybe end of November. Maybe middle of November. I would say this is a positive thing. And there they already have to do it immediately. They basically – all of the things that are going to be hard to sell for both parties on their rank and file have to be done in that period of time because in May you have the first state election [indiscernible] and campaign starts in March. So, that is, I think, a huge problem for both big problems.
Male Voice: [inaudible] on his prediction.
Uif Gartzke?: Well, talking about the benefits of a grand coalition I would argue almost anything is better than the current Red-Green government short of a red Re-Green coalition. But I mean, definitely you’ve also seen some benefits in terms of internal security policy and kind of anti-terrorist corporation, the CSU and the SPD are much, much closer on that area than we are with the FDP or with the Greens, for that matter. So that is one potential area where you can see synergies in a grand coalition. The pitfalls, of course, as Claus mentioned, this would potentially be a lowest common denominator government and that is kind of well, let’s say, short of what we would liked to have achieved in a CDU/CSU/FDP coalition. But again, it is an improvement over the current one.
Now, coming back quickly to the election campaign and also coming back to Turkey. I mean, you could argue that due to our focus on economic issues and due to our focus on running a very, very honest campaign, many people who could have been mobilized by issues such as Turkey’s EU membership, stayed at home or simply voted for another party. That is something that we’ll have to love at very, very closely once coalition talks are over. That is something that we will do very, very acidiously, but again, the campaign focus was on economics and that’s what we had.
So we didn’t have any other let’s say, mobilizing issues, 1994 the Red Socks campaign, oh the PDS could enter the parliament. Or like Turkey, we had a rather clear position on Turkey and the majority of the German population would support us on this. But it was not front and center in the campaign.
Then, your final question, I mean regarding the personnel involved, I guess even if Mr. Stoiber went to Berlin he would still remain chairman of the CSU. We are currently figuring out who would succeed him. In Munich that’s a different story, but he would definitely retain his current chairman position.
Helga Flores-Trejo: Maybe just very short. The decisive question for the Grand Coalition is whether they want to have success together or are they going to be watching their backs. At this point I don’t think they will find common projects and want to see them through and bring it to success together. At this point I think it’s going to be a function of they are stuck to it and they will try to do whatever, to go through, muddle through. And this is bad for Germany because I mean the world will not wait for us. The [indiscernible] have to be done economically and in all other aspects. So we will need to move ahead and in this sense, I don’t see right now a very positive picture.
Radek Sikorski: I recognize Michael Grave of AEI.
Michael Grave: Thanks. I just have two brief questions. I don’t this is the SPD of reform uniformly. If you look back at the north [indiscernible] elections, there was the agenda 2010 party and then there was the party of locusts. Is it completely crazy to think that agenda 212, or whatever you want to call this program for the next years, will put the SPD under such enormous strain that you may see a USPD, at which point it will really look like varma.
The second question is I don’t think too many people expect this construct to have enough common ground to govern for the whole four years. So, what’s the most likely scenario. That people explore different coalition arrangements all the while, while this is going on, or is it that we’re going to have to have new elections. And please let the answer be no.
Radek Sikorski: Could someone explain to us what the party of locusts is?
Dieter Dettke?: Unfortunately I can.
[Laughter]
Dieter Dettke?: It refers to an earlier debate that Franz Muntefering started and he called these new hedge funds that go to Germany and buy cheap and buy companies and all that, locusts. I don’t think it was particularly helpful. It was a debate, part of the electoral campaign where you have to use a sledge hammer from time to time. And he did. A sledge hammer gives you certain advantages, but you have side effects too. What we are talking here is the negative side effects and it wasn’t helpful in the debate. I mean, these hedge funds and Franz Muntefering was told, look, not every hedge fund produced unemployment and took away jobs in Germany, but added jobs. I guess he didn’t repeat it. He learned a little bit from this intervention and I guess we are back to normal.
So, the SPD is committed to reforms by the way, in its programs. And don’t forget in Germany we take programs seriously, believe it or not. Members of the party take it seriously; they hold their leaders accountable. We produce majority. Schroeder produced majority for these agenda 2010 reforms. And yes, it is difficult because the SPD is certainly also a party with a good share of workers and middle income people and low income people. That is going to produce in effect, well, prevent any effort to go through with neo-liberal reforms as a liking of the FDP. We’re not going to comply with that.
But reforms of the health care system that has been mentioned here, have been extremely successful even under an SPD led government and the Greens. Right now the health care system is in much better shape, in good shape. It is in the black again. That’s already an enormous progress. It went into the direction of more participation of the individual. Not only the government providing health care. There is participation. This will increase. That thinking is long – I mean, part of SPD policies.
So far Schroeder has been a beneficial effect for the social Democrats. Believe me, without him the party would be much more backward in many ways and Schroeder pushed the party into a new SPD in many ways. Unfortunately the whole third wave was a failure. I wish we had kept a little more contact with Tony Blair. What he was doing was new labor. That somehow was a failure in Germany. But step-by-step and little by little we are moving in that direction. Even from the membership of the SPD, it’s not a workers party anymore. If you believe it is a workers’ party, not true. Workers’ are probably 15 percent or so.
So we have a much more complex membership, electorate and the party has to live up to it and has to formulate an appropriate program for these days and not for something way in the past. We don’t want to mention any names.
Uif Gartzke?: Three quick points. One, you mentioned the [inaudible] essentially ran on [inaudible] which would have reversed his previous economic reforms and that is exactly why he had such a strong finish because he ran this kind of ungst [indiscernible]. Again, one hand they are arguing for economic reforms and then in the campaign they actually reversed gear and said, oh, we would reverse some of the economic reforms that we implemented. That, of course, made them very, very attractive to some of the voters who were afraid of further economic reforms.
The second point, I guess from the CDU/CSU perspective, we are definitely committed to a four year term. However, it should be noted that the SPD is more vulnerable than the CDU/CSU because they have a party to the left of their base and they have always I guess, some SPD MPs could actually defect if it comes to key votes and major economic reforms. Then that is something, I guess, the SPD has to watch because they could further lose voters to the Left party if things don’t go well.
Claus Gramckow?: I would give the Grand Coalition maybe two years. I think that’s in Berlin right now the speculation. What happened after that, nobody knows.
The answer to new elections. There is no grounds filling in Germany right now for a new election. Nobody has appetites. None of the parties have appetite for new election. Because as mentioned before, the outcome would probably be the same. If we vote in January and we have the same numbers, we are back at square one - and nobody knows this.
One footnote to what Dieter said and about the SPD. Schroeder came in on the third wave, but the difference between him and Tony Blair was this was not a new SPD. It was the old SPD. Tony Blair had basically first reformed his party before he came into power and the other way around it never happened in the SPD. I think that’s one of the problems Schroeder faced on May 22nd because it came back to haunt him. Because in the history of Germany – and you can talk to, if he would still be alive, Conrad – I don’t know or Helmut Schmidt. You only can stay chancellor if your party is behind you. The moment you lose that support, you lose the chancellorship even if you still have our [indiscernible] coalition.
That’s also going to be a problem for Angela Merkel. She’s going to be the next chancellor. What’s going to happen to her party in the Grand Coalition. Let’s go to the next big state election in Baden Wurttemberg and the [indiscernible] will lose. The pressure on her will be tremendous. So, in that regard, it’s going to be a temporary phenomena because there are so many forces that are going to try to break that up again. I mean, I agree. It’s not my view, but it’s the view that I got out of Berlin. Give it two years, and then we’ll see where we’re at.
Radek Sikorski: Thank you. Our last question – gentleman over there.
Seth Leland [phonetic]: Thank you very much. Seth Leland, Library of Congress. I have a question about nuclear power. The current government set a deadline for phasing out nuclear power plants. What would a grand coalition do given that the Greens would be in the opposition and what would this mean for Germany’s economic future?
Uif Gartzke: Very good question. CDU/CSU ran on a campaign platform which would increase nuclear energy. We are committed to build new nuclear power plants. You’re right. I mean, the Re-Green government implemented a policy which would phase out all of Germany’s nuclear power plants I guess by 2030. Much, much earlier than would normally be required under reasonable technical standards. It should also be pointed out that German nuclear plants compared to other nuclear power plants in Europe are much, much safer.
So, again for us, it’s a rather short-sided anti-policy. I guess possibly it would be easier with the Greens because I guess for them it’s an article of faith to phase out nuclear power plants. Possibly it’ll be easier with the SPD. But I guess it’s also important to look at the bigger picture. At the same time that the Red-Green government [indiscernible] is trying to phase out nuclear power, they struck a number of energy deals with Russia making Germany increasingly dependent on gas and oil imports from Russia and other countries. I guess we should have a closer look at one, how can we achieve reasonable energy independence and two, how can we meet few too targets and I guess nuclear power should be a serious option and I’m encouraged that the United States also looking into that option at this stage.
Claus Gramckow?: My prediction would be that it’s going to be the status quo. They are not going to change anything. The long line is going to remain and the Grand Coalition as of now is not going to address the issue. It’s too toxic.
[Laughter]
Helga Flores-Trejo: And really the attitude of the CDU/CSU changed also when they were looking for a Jamaica Coalition, all of a sudden, the question of at home was not that important any more, especially given the fact that at the end the industry has been prepared for this and is prepared to do it. The serious question behind is the energy question that we are facing. This is not only the gasoline prices here are nothing compared to the gasoline prices in Germany and the whole energy mix. That’s where our government needs to offer serious solutions. That won’t help if you always try to convert environmental issues against economic issues. I think you have to feed both of them together. I would suspect the CDU will accept the reality there.
Radek Sikorski: Thank you very much. Let’s give our panelists a big round of applause.
[Applause]
Radek Sikorski: Thank you also to the New Atlantic Initiative staff. Next meeting is next Thursday at 1. We’ll be debating the future status of Kosovo, but to those who don’t passionately follow the Balkans, I’d like to say thank you very much for coming today, but also for coming to so many events with me over the last three and a half years. I’m very sad to be leaving.
Dieter Dettke?: Thank you from all of us for your service to this city, this country and to Europe too in spite of these spicy discussions that you started. I congratulate you.
End of Audio
