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Home >  Events >  The Mexican Elections: Why They Matter >  Summary
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May 2006

The Mexican Elections: Why They Matter

The 2000 Mexican presidential election marked the end of nearly seventy years of control by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). This July, Mexicans will head to the polls again. The presidential race is hotly contended by three major parties with markedly different platforms. Currently leading in the polls is Andrés Manuel López Obrador—the leftist Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) candidate, known as the “Mexican Chávez”—who has earned his political notoriety as the mayor of Mexico City. Although Obrador denies any ties to Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez, his criticisms of U.S.-Mexico relations and his populist proposals bear Chávez’s anti-American tone. Felipe Calderón of the National Action Party (PAN) has built his campaign around the unfinished legacy of current president Vicente Fox. PRI candidate Roberto Madrazo hopes his party can regain power by modernizing itself. Madrazo has taken to using only his first name in headlines of campaign materials to distance himself from his tainted last name and previous incarnations of the PRI. On May 3, 2006, AEI visiting fellow Roger F. Noriega hosted two panels to discuss what the Mexican presidential elections will mean to relations with the United States. The first panel briefly described the candidates, their latest polling numbers, and the potential outcomes of the election. The second panel looked at the election's larger implications for Mexico and the rest of the world.

Mario Villarreal
AEI

July 2 marks both presidential and congressional elections in Mexico, with over 70 million registered voters, of which 56 percent are under forty years old. Although there are five registered presidential candidates, only three are serious contenders. Furthermore, these are single-round elections, meaning that the winner will likely win with less than 50 percent of the electorate. Putting the parties or candidates on the traditional left/right spectrum, the PRD/PT/Convergencia and Andrés Manuel López Obrador are furthest to the left, the PRI/Green Party coalition (Alianza por México) and Roberto Madrazo are center-left, and the PAN and Felipe Calderón are center-right.

Felipe Calderón, the conservative candidate, boasts a long history within the PAN and wants to position himself as an honest candidate (an important point for the Mexican electorate) with an emphasis on equitable economic development. His platform features the linked concepts of fostering rule of law and preventing crime, promoting competitiveness and employment, and supporting sustainable development and accountable democracy. Andrés Manuel López Obrador started his political career in the PRI, but later was part of the movement that created the PRD. His campaign platform includes fifty commitments, some of which include renegotiating the free importation of corn and beans under NAFTA, modernizing the energy industry without privatization, and maintaining macroeconomic equilibrium, the last of which has been a major concern of critics. More generally, he focuses on a greater role of the state, a concern for social and economic justice, and the importance of minority rights. Roberto Madrazo, like Calderón, has a long history with his party, but he is attempting to signal the rebirth of the PRI, especially in the areas of political responsibility, accountability, and transparency. He places special emphasis on social democracy—namely, access to social services such as better education and better health services to break the poverty cycle.

Luis Rubio
Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo, A.C. [Center for Research and Development]

Mexico is currently undergoing significant political change, and Mexicans are unsure about their plan, let alone where they are in this transition. This situation means that the dynamic of the elections that we observe have much more to do with history than with the current problems that the country is facing. As such, these particular elections demonstrate three important features. First, they are not typical in that we see two candidates and one movement; the two candidates are fighting for the life of their respective parties, while Obrador’s candidacy is considered a movement that reflects Mexico’s general concern about whether or not it approves of the political change process. Second, while most of the institutional structures of the old PRI system remain (most notably its corporatist nature), Mexicans are pleased with their country’s new democratic legitimacy and do not want to damage it. Finally, these elections are less about the candidate or party and more about how Mexicans feel about the status quo. Because the political class does not respond to the needs of average Mexicans (facilitated by a growing informal market and growing emigration), Obrador has been able to capitalize on this frustration as the source of his popularity.

The elections are Obrador’s to lose: although he was strongly ahead in the polls, his style has recently proven to be a hindrance, as Calderón is now ahead (although within the margin of error). The real question is whether Obrador would recognize the electoral results should he lose--a situation which might demonstrate the weakness of the Fox administration and of the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). Should Obrador win, he would likely pursue a radical restructuring of the role of the government as an economic promoter with possible retractions on the previous trade regime. Calderón, however, would likely attempt to accelerate economic growth through integration with international markets; nevertheless, his ability to push for such a course is in question, as he is the least experienced of the three candidates and would have to create a coalition government, which might anger party members. Madrazo will likely push for reform as well, but he has powerful vested interests from within his party in his way. The question at the heart of this debate is the ability of Mexican institutions to deal with the results of the elections; the fact that they may not be strong enough to do so should be the real focus.

Armand Peschard-Sverdrup
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Mexico is a relatively young democracy that is gradually reforming: the Federal Electoral Institute and the Federal Electoral Tribunal have recently gained credibility, the first presidential debate took place in 1994, and polling was not used extensively until the 2000 elections. The media were previously controlled by the state, and although they continue to exhibit subtle biases, they do play a role in questioning candidates. After sixty-seven years of a rubber-stamp Congress, Mexico has enjoyed a Congress with a true legislative role since 1997, and this is likely to continue. Finally, political parties are in flux, and we are seeing important divisions, including within parties.

Seventy years of one-party rule in Mexico have shaped both institutions and a political culture that continue to affect governability, although Mexico is making progress. However, two important situations continue to frustrate governability. First, political parties must submit the names of Congressional candidates well in advance of the elections. Parties pre-select candidates who can win the presidency, not according to ideology, which means that any successful candidate will be stymied by party members that do not necessarily support the party agenda. Furthermore, the very health of the current party system is in question, as evidenced by deep divisions within the PRI. Obrador or Calderón will likely capitalize on these divisions and draw priistas out. Finally, Obrador and the PRD have proven successful based on polling data and media coverage and have established a candidacy based not on doctrine, but on representing the “have nots”--a fact that weakens the party.

Francisco Acuña
ManattJones Global Strategies

Change in Mexico goes beyond who becomes president, because a broad political pact is necessary to enact the reforms necessary to economically modernize Mexico. The main challenges (fiscal reform, energy reform, educational reform, labor reform, and rule of law) are the same challenges that Fox faced during the previous presidential elections. Without these reforms, Mexico will continue to struggle with a large informal market, a state-owned oil industry that is not self-sustainable, and a weak tax base until these reforms are addressed.

Furthermore, it is important to point out that Mexico is bifurcated into two economic realities: an increasingly competitive north that in many ways resembles the border towns in the United States and a lagging south that more resembles the economies of Central America. Also, monopolies and oligopolies in important sectors such as banking and transportation hinder the country’s growth potential. Mexico has fallen in the world in terms of its competitiveness and as a recipient of foreign direct aid. The president himself is not able to bring about the necessary changes; all political parties must commit to reform, preferably through a national political pact.

Arturo Valenzuela
Georgetown University

The United States has vital interests with Mexico. That Mexico is one of our largest trading partners in the world, that immigration has affected both populations, that drug trafficking and crime are a reality, and that the United States and Mexico share a 2,000-mile border make our countries inextricably linked. As such, it is important to remember that Mexico is going through one of the great transitions in the world, and its stability will greatly impact the United States. The good news is, we do not see either intense polarization or authoritarianism; however, there are important problems discussed in earlier presentations (such as state capacity, representation, accountability, and governance) that challenge this transition. These barriers are mainly institutional and not a result of a given political culture; that there is no reelection of congressmen demonstrates the lack of incentive structures for cooperation, for example.

In Washington, D.C., we do not even think about Mexico’s transition. Because we do not think about Mexico strategically, we make shortsighted policy decisions. For example, in the immigration debate, we need to keep in mind that the United States serves as a safety valve for Mexican labor, and that we gain as an aging society. Furthermore, $20 billion in remittances from workers are greater than the entire foreign aid assistance of the United States in the world. Immigration, therefore, should be considered in the context of our strategic relationship with Mexico.

These elections will probably mean little for the relationship between the United States and Mexico, in the sense that Mexico needs to have a good relationship with its neighbor, and all candidates know this. The United States should concern itself less with the individual in power (contrary to general strategy) and worry more about the institutions that ensure stability and governability.

AEI research assistant Megan Davy prepared this summary.

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