Since Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh and President George W. Bush set forth their bold vision to “transform the relationship between their countries and establish a global partnership” in July 2005, the two governments have negotiated specific agreements on bilateral investment, the transfer of space technology, and deeper military-military ties. But they have yet to secure Congressional approval for Bush’s plan to supply fuel and technology for India’s civilian nuclear program. Will the U.S. Congress approve legislation to permit the sale of atomic fuel and technology to a country that has refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty? How will the outcome of the nuclear agreement affect the broader global partnership between the United States and India? Will these two countries successfully transform their common interests into an effective partnership? On April 21, AEI held a full-day conference on these and other questions related to U.S.-Indian relations.
PANEL I: THE NUCLEAR DEAL AND NATIONAL SECURITY
Selig Harrison
Center for International Policy
India has made remarkable progress in recent years, but there is trouble ahead. It has to electrify its countryside and give hope to hundreds of millions of people living below the poverty line. The agreement between the United States and India is about energy, poverty, and stability. It has nothing to do with India’s weapons arsenal.
The argument that this agreement would result in China selling to Pakistan more civilian plutonium reactors that could be converted into military use is incorrect, as that requires an exception from the Nuclear Suppliers Group. India has support for such an exemption and Pakistan does not. This will likewise not impact Iranian proliferation.
A strong and a stable India is critical to U.S. national security. We have shared democratic values, compatible market economies, growing technological interdependences, and a congruence of geopolitical interests. A strong and stable India would advance the U.S. objective of an Asian balance of power in which no one nation is able to exercise overwhelming dominance.
Keeping pace with its energy needs is India’s primary national challenge, and Delhi views U.S. help in meeting this challenge as a litmus test of American sincerity for building a strategic partnership. The alternative to such a partnership could be the emergence over time of a Gaullist India that could play an unpredictable role in Asia, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf, with uncertain consequences for U.S. security in the decades ahead.
Henry Sokolski
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
There are certain issues of concern regarding the agreement with India. First, because of India’s uranium stockpile, some Indian strategists have explicitly discussed how the nuclear deal will allow uranium imports to fuel the civilian program while domestic uranium is devoted to military uses. Second, Pakistan is building its own enrichment program to keep pace with a predicted increased Indian output. And third, electricity from nuclear power is expensive and difficult to deliver to the poorest people when India still requires basic infrastructure investments.
In terms of the Capitol Hill debate, the White House would like to take away the requirement that Congress vote on and pass this agreement with majorities in both the houses. The nuclear deal is a “nonconforming agreement” under the rules of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act because India is not a member of the Nonproliferation Treaty and does not have all its facilities under international inspection. In this situation, a majority in both houses have to vote on it. One reason the White House wants to avoid this type of vote is because it has not shared the details of the agreement--in part, one suspects, because the details are still not ironed out. And it is not clear that the Nuclear Suppliers Group will approve the deal even if it survives the Congress.
One of the arguments raised by critics is that the Congress party may fall. But we are also told that the United States is entering this agreement because India is a democracy and that the deal has nothing to do with the party in power.
In short, the U.S. should get the deal right, and so far it has not.
Dan Blumenthal
AEI
While it is certain that India will not be a strategic competitor or challenger to the United States, it is not clear that it will be a strategic partner, and the nuclear deal does not guarantee that outcome.
The shape of a strategic partnership would include cooperation to safeguard the sea lanes from the Persian Gulf to southeast Asia. Also, the United States should eventually expect India to join a formal defense architecture in the Asian Pacific centered on the U.S.-Japanese alliance, as well as other nations like Singapore and Australia. But these goals have not been pushed, although they would benefit the United States. It is also not obvious that the U.S. would gain guaranteed access to basing in India in the event of a conflict with China.
Washington should also be clear about the fact that India will not back out of its very tight relationship with Iran. The Indian and Iranian navies cooperate and do joint exercises, and it therefore behooves us to be careful about the kinds of technology we pass on to India. These factors have to be kept in mind before the U.S. opens up advanced defense technologies to India.
India can be a strategic partner, but when the United States enters a relationship with India, it has to be clear about the issues that are important to Washington as to what it gets in return and not let the relation be beneficial to India alone.
KEYNOTE SPEAKER
Philip Zelikow
U.S. Department of State
In a decade or more down the line, the south and central Asian regions will emerge to be a focus of the world economy. Based on this, the decisions of how the United States wants to relate to that area of generational dynamism are being made now.
India is on the path of international and domestic development. It will define itself and make decisions accordingly. This presents a challenge as to how the United States participates in these decisions. And for this it has to take a long view of its geopolitical interests.
The United States is right now open to, first, full partnership. Second, the U.S. is seeking greater opportunities for better energy and environmental development in south and central Asia because of new options that do not rely solely on fossil fuels and hydrocarbons. And third, The U.S. wants to create a much stronger nonproliferation regime in which India becomes part of that community and part of the solutions, instead of distancing itself from them.
Some critics say that the deal damages the cause of the nonproliferation regime. It has to be understood that the nonproliferation regime can be an enormous asset in regulating the international system and setting a steady state equilibrium in which these judgments are made. But the nations that are currently proliferating are doing so for reasons lying in their local politics and what they perceive as the international environment. They do not make these decisions by looking principally at the NPT framework.
It also has to be noted that the circumstances of the Indian program are unique. China and other factors forced India to build its nuclear capabilities, which is why it performed peaceful explosions in 1974 and 1998. It has been transparent about its intentions and accepted the political responsibilities and consequences of becoming a nuclear state. But Iran and North Korea have not done the same. It is justifiable to have double standards because democracies that are true and transparent of their intentions should be treated differently from dictatorships, rife with lies and cheating.
If we tried to kill the deal now, it would leave India halfway in house in perpetuity. It is not possible to make India give up its nuclear weapons program, no matter which political party rules in India. Therefore one must have a practical way of handling this issue that normalizes relations of the international community with India.
Critics also say that the deal is unfair to Pakistan. But India and Pakistan are different because their commitments to the nonproliferation are different. They have to be judged using their own merits and circumstances. Pakistan may not get everything that India gets and vice versa.
It is advisable to ask India to cap its fissile material, but that would lead to a nuclear freeze on part of the Indian government. India will not give such a commitment to the United States or to any other country, for that matter, irrespective of its plans regarding its nuclear arsenal because China and Pakistan are building theirs. But more important is the fact that India is willing to join the multilateral agreement for the Fissile Material Control Treaty.
India is beginning to realize that being the head of the nonaligned movement is not so important after the Cold War. It is realizing that it is becoming a power on the world stage and it should define itself and shape its institutions accordingly. The challenge that now faces the U.S. is how it can get India into this community symbolically and directly so that it can be part of shaping the future in the right way. This has to be done directly, and that is why the two governments have made their decisions and are trying to make this deal.
PANEL II: THE PROSPECTS FOR STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP
Danielle Pletka
AEI
As was made clear by the first panel, there are a range of opinions on the nuclear deal with India. The problem with the deal is not that it is with India, but that it raises clear issues from a nonproliferation standpoint. It is surprising that the terms of Indo-American relations have always been dictated by New Delhi. The relationship should really be an economic relationship rather than a political or strategic one, and the future of the relationship can best be viewed in this way. This is an area in which reforms and conversation are most needed, and is the area in which India and the United States are the most compatible. From the economic perspective, unlike China, India has nothing but potential, and its future appears promising and predictable. In the areas in which there appears to be less potential, interest groups on both sides applying pressure to the Indian government will open the door for more change.
However, the economic component has not been the key part of the relationship. Part of reason for that are the infrastructure limitations, particularly electricity. However, unlike what many American government officials are saying, the nuclear deal is unlikely to yield widespread electrification.
The idea of a strategic partnership is not unique to this nuclear deal; it is a notion that has been used with reference to several past Indo-American agreements. The prospects for strategic partnership are huge, given significant shared interests. While the opportunities for a partnership are countless, it is questionable whether any of these will be realized. For example, with Iran, it is clear that there will be little support of the American stance from India. Despite all the threats Iran poses to India, the two nations are doing joint military exercises. The United States had to use significant political capital to get India to vote with the United States in the United Nations.
It is clear that India is not prepared to support the United States in a conflict with China. India also recently entertained a visit from a Hamas official much to Israel’s dismay. It would be expected that India, at least once in a while, would be willing to align itself with the United States, given shared interests, but this has just not been the case.
The real question is not whether there is room for a strategic partnership, but whether there is a willingness on the part of the Indian government to actually align itself with the United States in the future.
Thomas Donnelly
AEI
The global power landscape of the mid-21st century is essentially going to be marked by the enduring superpower status of the United States, the continuing rise of China, and the potential rise of India as a great power, as well. It is likely the Bush doctrine will remain, meaning it is not that the United States wishes to preserve a great power balance, but rather that it wishes to create one that favors freedom, including supporting radical political change in the Islamic world.
There is evidence that China’s rise is not going to be completely smooth, and China is already making strategic partnerships with many noxious regimes around the world. There are concerns about North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan. With these as long-term strategic concerns of the United States, the problem of making grand strategy is a real challenge. Making the kind of world the United States would like is possible unilaterally within its power, and this certainly will be more challenging if the United States must create ad hoc alliances of the willing at every crises.
The United Nations lacks the means to do anything of great effect. American traditional allies, to a certain degree, can be of assistance, but the reliability of American continental European allies is unclear. The United States needs new allies--ones who share American goals and values, and who have the capacity to use force to achieve them. This leads the United States to India. This is not a perfect relationship and will not be without moments of conflict, but the United States needs to make this relationship into a functional strategic partnership. Without it, the tri-power dynamic that appears to be emerging is likely to be unstable, making this alliance necessary to maintain peace and world order.
Stephen Blank
Strategic Studies Institute
Aside from the nuclear proliferation discussions, India is becoming more important to the United States in regional terms. This administration takes India and the subcontinent very seriously, and has tried to reorient central Asian affairs toward south Asia. India’s value to the United States is not only that it is the largest democracy in the world and an awakening economic giant, but its value is derived as much from the geostrategic perspective as it is from values. The United States is not trying to use India as part of a China containment policy because India is already a check on Chinese ambitions in Asia on its own. All American allies in Asia have made it clear that containment is not going to work as a strategy in Asia.
India is important to the United States because it is an increasingly self sufficient regional power in Asia, and a power that is determined to continue to project its power in central and southeast Asia. India would do this on its own, regardless of whether or not it had a strategic partnership with the United States. In reality, India has plenty of options, and if it were not able to find common ground with the United States, it would not have any trouble finding other strategic partners who may be opposed to American interests.
India has also been able to project itself into regions where American limitations are clear: the Gulf (particularly Iran), central Asia, and southeast Asia, particularly in its ability to counter Chinese ambitions in the area. This is not going to be a match made in heaven, but it is not going to be dysfunctional either.
There are already areas of active cooperation. In Afghanistan, Indian and American interests are very similar. Energy is one issue certainly driving Indian policy, and if passed, the nuclear deal will help India to secure its flanks, balance Chinese influence, suppress Islamic terrorism abroad, and obtain reliable energy access. India is going to pursue its interests whether or not the nuclear deal passes through Congress, so it is important that the United States and India establish a strong functioning relationship. The fact that India is a democracy makes it all the more important that the United States support India and secure a strong relationship, and hopefully encourage a trend of democratization.
India is also in the midst of a substantial military reorganization, and it is clear that the United States should be able to compete with regard to the equipment India would like to purchase. American entrance into this market may squeeze the Russian defense industry into making desirable reforms while giving the U.S. firms business. This will also strengthen Indian military capabilities at home.
Cooperation in Afghanistan should demonstrate what both countries can accomplish through cooperation and should strengthen civil-military ties. A strategic partnership with the United States would also help moderate tensions between India and China.
If the United States does not go through with the agreement, other countries are more than willing to supply India with the nuclear energy it wants, and countries like France and Russia will be happy to provide India with what it needs. Therefore, the U.S.-India accord is not just about nuclear assistance; rather, it signals to India that the United States is serious about technology transfer, and accepts the fact that India is a real world player.
The United States needs India as much, if not more, than India needs the United States.
AEI interns Anne Siarnacki and Shivani Kota prepared this summary.
