American Enterprise Institute

Tuesday, June 6, 2006

[Edited transcript from audio tapes]

11:45 a.m.	Registration and Luncheon
12:00	Introduction:	Danielle Pletka, AEI
	Panelists:	Abdul Salam al-Majali, Jordanian Senator
		Sai’d Kan’an, Center for Palestine Research and Studies
		Bernard Lewis, Princeton University
		Rami Nasrallah, International Peace Cooperation Center
	Moderator:	Michael Rubin, AEI
2:00	Adjournment

Proceedings:

[Note:  Some speakers are non-native English speakers, and with their accent and poor grammar, make the transcription slow-going.  Also, it makes it difficult to make an accurate transcript.]

Danielle Pletka:  Hello.  Can I ask everybody to sit down, please?  Oh, good job.  Thank you.  Good afternoon, everybody, and welcome to AEI.  We are going to close the doors and settle in.  Thank you all very much for your patience.  We’ve got a big crowd here today. 

I’m Danielle Pletka.  I’m the Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy Studies at the American Enterprise Institute.  Before I give my introduction, I’d like to just make one brief housekeeping note, other than – it’s a little hot in here, so let me tell somebody that.  Yes?  It is a little hot in here.  We will take care of that.

I’m thrilled to see such a big crowd here today and I’m sorry to see that we have people hanging from the rafters.  One of the reasons that we do, if I may make a summertime note to people, is that there are lots of terrific young people who come to Washington for the summer to do internships and to learn all about our great way of life here.  Please can I ask them to register for our events in the future?  We would love to welcome you but we would also like to make room for you so you don’t have to actually sit on the windowsills. 

With that housekeeping note, let me turn to the event of the day.  It’s really a great pleasure for me to introduce this group.  We have some of the most eminent thinkers on Jordanian, Palestinian, and Middle Eastern issues here with us.  This isn’t really a new discussion that we are having.  To the contrary, it’s one that we’ve had for many, many years, even for decades.

But since 1988, the idea that Jordon could, in some way, be a Palestinian homeland or form part of a confederation with the West Bank has largely been dormant.  Still, there are few other options.  It is clear that Palestine, while not yet a state, has in many ways failed.  It hasn’t failed because of the Israelis, nor yet because of the Palestinians, but because of rotten governance, insufficient respect for institutions, and – at least in this new Palestinian government – excessive respect for the power of violence. 

Right now, terrorists govern in the Palestinian authority.  A civil war is brewing between Fatah and Hamas, and the Palestinians who voted in this government in the hope of less corruption and more attention to their own needs are left holding the short end of the stick – again. 

Perhaps it’s time once again to consider the options.  To do that today, we have an eminent group of people.  I’m going to allow AEI’s own Michael Rubin, our resident scholar in Middle East studies, to introduce everybody.  Without further adieu, if you would do that, Michael, thank you.

Michael Rubin:  Thank you.  Before I do that, I just want to take a moment to thank everyone who made this event possible today.  It’s no mean feat to get people from far and abroad all together, to coordinate schedules.  A lot of background work went into it, a lot of other assistance.  The people, in many ways, are too numerous to thank at this point in time; however, many of them are in the room, and they should know how grateful we are to them.

Also, before I continue, I just want to make sure that everyone has switched their cell phones off at this point in time.  Once we get started, this is a very important discussion, a very important debate, and it would be great to be able to remain focused on it, rather than have everyone stop, turn, and look at you.

Without further adieu, just one last bookkeeping note:  you will see on the program that Sai’d Kan’an is listed.  Unfortunately, Sai’d Kan’an was not able to get a visa for the United States processed in time, so he is unable to join us today, but we are thrilled to have Nasser Yousef who, until recently, was the interior minister of the Palestinian authority, and who is sitting right over here. 

I also want to introduce Rami Nasrallah, who is the head of the International Peace and Cooperation Center (IPCC).  Between 1993 and 1996, he was a political advisor and Israeli desk officer at Orient House Special Unit, and he helped coordinate the group of experts who were focusing on the final status of Jerusalem. 

My last two panelists hardly need any introduction.  Abdul Salam al-Majali has been most recently served as the vice-speaker of the Jordanian Senate.  He’s also, many times, a former prime minister of Jordan.  We are thrilled to have him here today.  And of course, our old friend Bernard Lewis, who, if I may, just celebrated his 90th birthday, has turned 39 all over again.  Happy birthday, sir.  And he is the Professor Emeritus of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University.  From all my time in government and outside of government in academe, I don’t know of any one scholar who does not have at least several works of Bernard Lewis in his own personal library, let alone the university libraries. 

So with that, what I would like to do is open this important discussion by turning the floor over first to Rami Nasrallah, then following Rami, His Excellency Abdul Salam Al-Majali will speak, then His Excellency Nasser Yousef, and today Professor Lewis will be playing clean up.

Rami Nasrallah:  I accept the challenge to do it in 5 minutes.  I’ll do it in a very [indiscernible] way.  I have 2 messages.  First I would like to comment on the convergence plan from a Palestinian perspective.  In a way, the Israeli unilateral action and the continuity of the unilateral thinking in Israeli is a demographic security arrangement plan.  It is not in any way a territorial compromise.  It is far from any peace and future peace perspective.

In a way, the convergence plan is trying to solve the Israeli problems of today by getting rid of the Palestinians and to put them in demographic concentration areas, just to avoid the possibility of a bi-national state from an Israeli perspective, but for the medium- or long-term, it will not bring security and stability for the region.  So the question is, what would be the solution?  It is not unilateral, and we usually are not [indiscernible] partners.  As irrelevant partner in many cases, even in the period where President Mahmud Abbas was elected in January 2005, so he is still not recognized as a partner.

The rethinking of the unilateral track also requires rethinking of the bilateral negotiations, because the bilateral negotiations also did not work in the past.  We need to rethink the whole peace process – the whole Oslo notion of peace-making, which did not contribute to Palestinian stability and development.  It did not bring security to the Israelis.  My proposal is not a proposal, but it is more trying to restructure the bilateral relations between Palestinians and Israelis, which should be based on a combination of four processes.

The first process is a unilateral action that forces political institution-building and economic reform in the Palestinian authority.  My belief is that without a viable democratic Palestinian state, there will be no future for Israel.  This is the only guarantee for Israel to exist and to co-exist with Palestinians and with the whole region, if Palestine would be a viable, democratic Palestinian state.  This is the issue.  It is all about this issue.  You can talk about the nuclear weapons in Iran or the military threat all around, but we, Palestinians, are your neighbors – I’m addressing the Israelis.  Without solving the problem with the Palestinians, there is no future perspective of instability in the region.

Second, we need to implement a new plan that removes all physical and political barriers to enhance the chances of establishing this viable democratic Palestinian state.  This is also an Israeli responsibility.  This is also the responsibility of the international community, and it should be addressed.  Usually Europeans and international community partners would focus on peace-making, getting the Palestinians and Israelis to be seated in nice hotels and to talk.  But it has never been about any positive move to any peace-building or to get the Palestinians out of the relief mentality and the donation mentality and into development and reaching a viable Palestinian democratic state.

My third point is to launch a negotiation to reach a final peace agreement that includes mechanisms of implementation and a scheduled for moving forward, because a political perspective is highly important.

My last point is to create a region of security and economic cooperation that would serve as a support system to all those processes, especially with Jordan. 

For me as a Palestinian, I can point to 4 priorities, for the time being, which would lead to a final status negotiation, a peace agreement.  The first one is a serious reform and anti-corruption campaign; second is the rule of law ending the different militias and the militia mentality in the Palestinian territories; three is Palestinian economic development; and four, a future perspective of peace.  These four priorities should work together.  Thank you.

Michael Rubin:  Thank you very much.  I’ve asked the speakers to keep their remarks fairly brief to serve more as introductory remarks so that after everyone has spoken, we can get into some real back-and-forth discussion.  With that, what I would like to do is turn the floor over to Dr. al-Majali to speak next about this issue.  Dr. Majali?

Abdul Salam Al-Majali:  Thank you very much indeed.  I start by thanking Mike for inviting me to share my personal vision of the Palestinian-Jordanian relationship.  Here I put with a lot of lines the future of this relationship.  Unfortunately, the lady who introduced us started with certain remarks that were not very helpful for the start of the talk, because here we are looking toward the future.  We do not want to go deep into history and try to argue about the history, because all of us have had enough of it.  We have to look to the future.  This is very important.

The Jordanian-Palestinian relationship is as old as history.  In fact, the origin of saying Palestine and Trans-Jordan and then Jordan was just after the First World War.  But these relations were not institutionalized.  They were from one institute or one entity to one entity.  It was just movement of people or families from one place to another because of drought or because of trade or because of violence – or any other reason until some sort of relation, institutional or semi-institutional, was formed in 1950 out of the 1948 events, which culminated into the union of the West Bank with Jordan and of the name certainly that was at that time the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

This relation, as I always say, it has been all the time misty.  It has never been absolutely clear.  I believe, personally, that it did not help to settle this relation for good.  Back in 1988, I was the president of the University of Jordan.  I was not a prime minister or even interfering in politics.  I went to see His Majesty King Hussein and to talk to him about the future.  What could be the future?  Certainly, this came after he tried his best to negotiate the return of the West Bank to Jordan through the Americans, through leaders, Israel, and so on.  Whenever it came to almost the final conclusion, unfortunately, for one reason or another, it did not come through. 

So I said to him, we must try and put a formula whereby Jordanians, Palestinians, Israelis, Arabs, and even the Americans or the West, find 95 to 100 percent of what they want in this problem.  It is impossible to try to find a formula where everybody has 100 percent of what they want, so one has to think of accepting each other.  Again, we have to accept the idea that peace is a state of mind.  Unless the state of mind of the parties in the area comes to it in that way, it is very difficult to force peace.

The idea was this way, that a Palestinian state could be established of the 1967 border with all the [indiscernible] estate type of establishment – parliament, government, president, what have you – and this would-be kingdom of Jordan would join together into what I called the United Arab States or United Hashemite State or whatever the name may be, but it is some sort of confederate/federate type.  It’s not a federation.  It’s not confederation alone.  It is both, because in this formula I tried to treat the aspirations of all parties. 

So this union would have a parliament with an upper house and lower house.  It would have a government looking out for the economy, defense, and foreign relations.  The head of this state at that time was the late King Hussein, not in his capacity as the king of Jordan but being the descendant of the prophet.  In other words, it is not that the kingdom has gone, and I call it a president, not even a king, although he is a king.  This new state has two powers:  legislative power and executive power, being the prime minister or the speaker of the house.  These two places would exchange between a Palestinian and Jordanian every 4 years, whenever there are elections, and either the prime minister is a Jordanian and the head of the legal side of parliament is Palestinian.  After 4 years it would change.

The two most important things in this is the nationality.  The nationality of these people living on both sides, as United Arab States or United Hashemite States, between two brackets [sounds like] under the word Palestine or Jordanian, would be very much like what the European Union now is doing, but this was a bit early in my time.  This is very important. 

Certainly, such a thing is a framework.  A framework where we find the Jordanian would be accepted, I hope, because the first complaint is that the Palestinian has taken the shares of life, economy, politics, and so on, and wanting to be in the parliament and so on, so there is no more for all this.  The second thing is there are two types of Palestinians who are now in Jordan.  I can group them into two groups. 

One group I call from West Bank and Gaza.  Most probably, these people, over 95 percent of them, will opt to have Jordanians under this nationality type.  Those from the West Bank will take Palestine between two brackets, while those who come from Jaffa, Haifa, Nazerat, etc., I think they will opt to have Jordan, because if he is not going back to Jaffa and Haifa, he certainly has much more than he would have in Hebron or Gaza.  Again, that type of voting or demography, so to speak, would be helped to be solved.

Now, the Palestinian should find in such a thing that they have integrity, their name, [indiscernible] with others, a depth with Jordan – which has a lot of relations, especially economic relations – and relations with the rest of the Arab world.  Israel, I feel, should like such a solution as this, because first, they are going to have a democracy.  In my vision, this state is a democratic state with a parliamentarian government from the government elected and so on.  On that basis, that would be very helpful. 

The second is the nationality, which those of the two sides are going to take to solve this problem of which they are suffering.  Again, the depth of this sort of a state is not militant, because it would join with others so the reasons to be always militant would disappear.  Lebanon, especially, should be very happy, because they have about 400,000 refugees.  They cannot absorb them because that would upset the balance they have, but these people would carry a passport or a nationality of the United Arab nationality or the United Arab States or the United Hashemite State between two brackets Palestine.  And they are just like everybody else:  they work in Lebanon if they find work; if they come back to Palestine or if they come back to Jordan or anywhere else, the door is open for them, so they should be pretty happy with that.

This is in a nutshell the framework I hope for the future.  When I talked to His Majesty, the late king, he said, This is what I have in mind, especially after I have failed with my negotiation to bring back the West Bank, so this is the best way and soon you will hear something.  A few days later, he declared the disengagement of the West Bank from Jordan.  That was a real milestone.  And he said, When the day comes when a Palestinian entity is created, certainly we will be ready to go into this, because he would not be willing, again, to sit and negotiate on behalf of the Palestinian, which is a must and which I have faced. 

When I negotiated with Israel in 1991, I had the problem and I proved to them that it is not in Israel’s interest or the Palestinian’s or Jordan’s interest that I negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians.  In fact, in those days, I said to Ambassador Rubinstein, even if you give me Jaffa and Haifa on a gold plate to present it to the Palestinians, they won’t accept it from me.  He asked me why, and I told him it’s because they think if they negotiate they may get Tel Aviv.  It is their business.

It is their business.  That is the principle of the idea.  And I just leave it at that.  Thank you.

Michael Rubin:  I’m going to next call on Nasser Yousef, until recently the interior minister of the Palestinian authority, to speak.  I’m going to slide over because we’re going to do a translation.

Nasser Yousef:  First of all, I would like to thank you for inviting me to this important workshop.  Right now, we are having this workshop after 20 years of Jordanian-Palestinian disengagement and after more than 10 years of the Oslo Accords.  I do believe after 10 years from Oslo, we have to reevaluate the situation where we committed mistakes and where we have been incorrect in our way forward. I do believe that Oslo was serious at the time being of Yitzhak Rabin, and after Rabin some Israeli parties were really opposing Oslo and did not want Oslo to go on.  These parties deal with Oslo in other ways that did not enhance Oslo to move on as a treaty. 

Today, we are not really searching for those responsible on that.  Right now, we are thinking of how to find a way out for the Palestinian-Israeli relationship and for the whole region.  No doubt, after the Intifada there were very important things happening to the confident relationship between both sides, Palestinians and Israelis, so there is a minimum range of confidence between both sides.  There were no joint activities neither on the political level or the security level. 

I did not witness any progress on this relationship, which revealed the difficulty of the confident relationship between both sides, and I do believe that both sides, Palestinians and Israelis, are in real need for a third-party intervention so as to make them able to move on in the peace process, which is important for the security of their future, and which will provide the Palestinians confidence in their political future.  This third party must present a bridge to improve the confidence between the two sides and make the two sides able to move forward for peace.

Israelis, within the Intifada, started moving into convergence and trying to find the unilateral steps forward.  I do believe that the Omlert’s convergence plan will make things more difficult; it will not enhance stability or confidence.  Therefore, we need to find a firmness that will give us hope and a future of mutual joint work together.  I truly believe that to improve the Palestinian-Jordanian relationship for many reasons; the geographical extensions and cultural relationship will enable us to move forward as two sides together.  This relationship might be on two tracks – the political track and the security track. 

On the political level, it might be a confederate relationship.  On the security track, it might be a federal relationship with the Jordanian Army.  I do believe this relationship will be important because the Jordanians are unwilling to negotiate instead of the Palestinians.  Such a unique relationship between the two peoples – the Jordanians and the Palestinians – and goes with the Palestinian National Council resolution which accepts the confederation relationship between Palestine and Jordan. 

There are other main issues, which are mutual between the Jordanians and Palestinians, and Jordan will be part of the negotiation on these.  These are refugee issues, water issues, and security issues.  With no doubt, there are security difficulties for the Palestinians, and there are geographical and economic difficulties for Jordan.  Therefore, such a relationship is a very important relationship between the two sides.  Palestinians will achieve their hopes with such a relationship in building a Palestinian state, which will be related to Jordan in a federal relationship as the Palestinian National Council decided. 

It will also provide the Israeli side with a secure future as a state.  Then we will leave the issue for the future and progressing the relationship between the two sides.  The two peoples will decide the nature or shape of their relationship after reaching the final status solution for the Palestinian-Israeli issue.  They will also decide the kind of relationship that will be held between Jordan and Palestine.  The Palestinian situation has reflected itself on the regions in general, and if there is no movement forward, I believe that the whole region will be affected by the situation.  This is an idea that we are discussing and we will see in the future what will happen.  Thank you.

Michael Rubin:  Thank you very much.  With that, what I would like to do is turn the floor over to Professor Lewis, who will give remarks on what we have heard here today.

Bernard Lewis:  Is this working?

Michael Rubin:  Yes.

Bernard Lewis:  Good.  Thank you.  I’ve learned by better experience always to make that inquiry first.  My colleagues on this panel have spoken mostly about the future, and that is, of course, what we are all primarily interested in.  But I feel that perhaps my most useful contribution at this point would be to say something about the past, partly because I’m by profession a historian and partly because by personal status I am something of a historical relic myself.

[Laughter]

This is a region with a great deal of history.  I think it may be useful if we look at one or two of the issues that have been raised in historical perspective.  One of them is the inevitable question of frontiers.  If you look at the map of the Middle East and North Africa and look at the map of Europe, you will see a striking difference between them.  On the map of Europe, there are lines that go up and down and in and out, the lines resulting from a thousand years of struggle to decide where is the dividing line between the French and the Germans, the Germans and the Poles, and so on and so forth. 

The lines on the maps of the Middle East and North Africa are mostly straight lines, line that were drawn with pencils and rulers on maps and mostly by foreign, more specifically British and French, statesmen.  It’s a different kind of frontier with a different kind of context and a different kind of impact.

Getting down more specifically to the frontiers of the area with which we are concerned, people have been talking a great deal recently about going back to the frontiers of 1967, that’s to say those that existed at the end of the war in 1948-49 and were ended by the war of 1967.  To be precise, there was only one frontier before 1967, and that was the frontier between Israel and Lebanon. 

The armistice signed at Rhodes, one of several between Israel and Lebanon, has a clause reaffirming the old international frontier as the frontier between Israel and Lebanon, the old international frontier being that agreed between the British and French governments as mandatory powers for Palestine and Syria.  All the other agreements without exception have a clause defining the line and saying that this is a cease-fire line and no more than a cease-fire line; it is not to be interpreted as a frontier, and it is agreed by both parties without prejudice to the subsequent settlement of the Palestine question. 

At the time, that clause was included on Arab insistence, since the Palestinian organizations, such as they were, were excluded, the adversary that the Israelis fought was the Arab governments, and all those parts of mandatory Palestine that were not included in Israel were occupied by one or another of the neighboring Arab powers.  That was obviously the basis for this clause. 

Since then, the frontiers between Israel and Jordan and between Israel and Egypt have been agreed, more or less along the old lines.  The frontier between Israel and Syria remains open.  The question of whether or not to return to the mandatory frontier is also open, since the Syrians as well as the Israelis had plans to change the peace settlement.  The frontiers between Israel and whatever may be the Palestinian entity does not exist at all, has never existed, except as I said as a cease-fire line, and is therefore very much a matter of negotiation and one may say a very difficult negotiation for a number of reasons.

Let me turn from the first question up front here to that of the entities which the frontiers enclosed.  We all know that the Middle East is the region of the most ancient civilizations known to human history and memory.  It is all the more astonishing that the entities into which much of the Middle East is divided at the present time are 20th Century inventions.  The names on the map, for example, let’s start with Palestine/Jordan:  the name Palestine was first used as an adjective in opposition to Syria – Syria, Palestinian, Greco, Roman usage – meant that part of greater Syria, which was inhabited by the Philistines.  It became the official name of the country in the 2nd Century, then disappeared after the Arab conquests and reappeared for the first time when the British mandate was established. 

The first time that there was a separate entity in that area since antiquity with the solitary exception of the Crusader interlude and the first time since Roman times and since early Arab times that the name Palestine had an official status.  Mandatory Palestine had frontiers agreed between the British and French governments as the prime beneficiaries of the partition of the Ottoman Empire.  Palestine initially – that is to say, British mandatory Palestine – included both banks of the Jordan.  The eastern part was known as Trans-Jordanian Palestine.  Then they dropped the Palestine so that it should not be included in the Balfour declaration and shortened the name to Trans-Jordan, which later became Jordan.

So we are dealing with two identities that are recent, in a sense alien, and artificial, which yet have become extraordinarily powerful and persistent.  This is not confined to this region.  We find most of the other names on the map of the Arab world are modern, usually alien creations.  We find the same persistence there, too.  We find the same unwillingness to combine into larger entities.  In spite of the widely-held belief in pan-Arabism, the idea of a greater Arab union, as the various states became fully independent, they turned away from pan-Arabism, and any attempts in that direction failed.

I mention all this because I think it is relevant historical background to the negotiations that are going on.  Obviously, the historical experience of those included in what we now call Palestine and those included in what we now call Jordan is very different, although these are new, modern, and in a sense alien and artificial entities, they have become very powerful.  One reason is that there are very strong regional sentiments, and these are all old.  Curiously, the really powerful regional rivalries were not between east and west or between north and south. 

Palestine and north Jordan had more in common with each other than either did with south Palestine and south Jordan.  Wouldn’t you agree?  It seemed the other way around, I think.  I think it’s necessary to bear all this in mind in considering the difficulties and the problems that confront anyone trying to work out a solution within the Arab territories, let alone the other, greater problem of reaching some sort of agreement with Israel.

We seem to be agreed, my impression from listening, that the idea of a single state including both Israelis and Palestinians is not seriously on the table.  Generally speaking, it is sort of a polite equivalent for the liquidation of Israel, which it would certainly achieve if accepted.  The question is, what kind of state with what limits on both west and east, and that is very much the matter of our present concern.

The leadership of the Palestinians has changed greatly over the course of the time, most radically, of course, after the last elections.  We still don’t know where that will lead and what will result from it.  There is now a proposal to hold a referendum.  The Hamas government does not like it, but they may be obliged to accept it all the same – I don’t know.  This is not clear.  At the moment, I would say probably that the Hamas-Palestinian government constitutes a greater danger to Jordan than it does to Israel, but that’s as may be.

The other vital problem is dealing with the other neighbors, needless to say the Arab neighbors:  Lebanon, Syria, Iraq – with all its problems, Saudi Arabia – all of which have vital concerns in what happens in Palestine and have their own ways of, shall we say, attending to those concerns. 

On that I would conclude with a story that I remember being told in Amman at the time of the negotiations, which eventually produced the Israel-Jordan peace treaty.  I tried to ascertain whether there was any truth in this story and I got evasive answers from both sides. 

The story ran like this:  during the negotiations there was a coffee break and the Israeli and the Jordanian were chatting informally over the coffee.  The Israeli, as is the way of Israelis, said, “You people don’t understand our problems.”  He said, “Our situation is uniquely difficult, uniquely dangerous.  On every side but the west, we are surrounded by implacable enemies.”  To which the Jordanian replied, “You are quite mistaken.  Our position is more difficult, more dangerous.”  And the Israeli said, “I don’t understand.  What do you mean?”  The Jordanian said, “On every side but the west, we are surrounded by friends, allies, brothers.”

[Laughter]

Remember the story?  Thank you.

Michael Rubin:  Thank you very much.  What I would like to do now is throw open the floor to questions and answers.  Just a couple of rules:  some of you know that I can be a pretty strict moderator, and perhaps even some people have accused me of having a pretty short temper as well.  What I want to do is say that if you have a question for the panel, please begin by saying for the record what your name and affiliation is.  I have never known of anyone in Washington who doesn’t have a name and who doesn’t have an affiliation.  So please introduce yourself very briefly. 

Then you can ask as many questions of the panel as you like, but I’m going to instruct the panel only to answer the first question.  So don’t get up and say you have 8 questions, which has happened before, or even 2 questions.  We are only going to answer the first question; that way as many people as possible can have a chance to ask questions and if we have time, I will call on you again.

Lastly, keep your questions brief and in the form of a question.  It’s what I call Jeopardy rules.  I think everyone in the audience has been in many, many panels where people get up and make statements.  This is for questioning the panelists and for having a back and forth.  There are any numbers of other forums in which people can make statements, so please just keep it as a question.

With that, let me throw open the floor to questions.  Last, please wait until my assistant Jeff Azarva comes by with the microphone before you start talking.  Yes, in the front here.  Jeff?

Nat Sieden:  Hi, I’m Nat Sieden [phonetic] supporting the Navy but asking a question for myself.  Can you explain a process whereby there could be a referendum held on the West Bank, and what do you think the results of such a referendum would be, whether to align with Jordan or stay with Gaza?

Michael Rubin:  Thank you.  I’m actually going to turn that over first to Nasser Yousef and to Rami Nasrallah about how the Palestinian voice can come out and either say yes or no to such plans, such ideas.  Rami, would you like to start or should Nasser?

Nasser Yousef:  I do believe that President Abu Mazen must adopt a document for Palestinian interior dialogue, and as you know, the dialogue was between all Palestinian organizations, parties, and civil society associations.  He provided them a time to reach a formula so as to bring the Palestinian situation out of the interior crisis.  If they did not reach a formula of understanding between the organizations, then he will bring this document to a referendum.  In my assessment, I do believe that a referendum can be held in West Bank, but I do believe it would be difficult to have it in Gaza because of the security situation. 

As you know, two-thirds of the Palestinian are in West Bank and one-third are in Gaza.  It might be held in two phases and can first be introduced in the West Bank.  I do believe it is a smart way out and an important plan so as to take Hamas out of its crisis.  Although we are waiting, there might be a referendum.

Michael Rubin:  Okay, I would like to address the same question over to Dr. al-Majali, specifically, I think, this was the case of if there was a proposal for some sort of federal relationship between Jordan and the West Bank, how would the Palestinians determine whether or not they approved of such a relationship as opposed to the referendum that is being discussed by Nasser Yousef, which is a more contemporary, pressing problem?

Abdul Salam al-Majali:  Part of the answer is that the present one is not about federation or confederation; it is about the inside Palestinian problem as such, which, as he said, came from the prisons as a working paper.  To answer your question, whether such a confederation or federation with Jordan thrown to the Palestinians would be accepted, personally I believe they will in a big number.

Michael Rubin:  Could you elaborate on why you think they will?

Abdul Salam al-Majali:  First, I have visited several times.  I have talked to a lot of them, and I get the feeling with even those of Hamas, because neither Hamas nor the Muslim brotherhood accepted the disengagement of the West Bank from Jordan in 1988, which means that it is still in their brain to join, but the idea that Hamas will be more dangerous to Jordan than Israel I do not accept at all.  Unless we have to go back again to history and find who sponsored Hamas in the middle of the late 1980’s.  It was Israel, so they can stand in front of the PLO. They sponsored them.  Whether they are with or without, I don’t know.

Michael Rubin:  Yes, the question two rows behind the previous gentleman.  We have plenty of time, so if people keep their questions short, I will be able to get almost everyone.

Harvey Feldman:  Harvey Feldman, Heritage Foundation.  If I understood Nasser Yousef correctly, I thought he was saying that a confederation with Jordan might be contemplated, but only following the creation of a Palestinian state.  Is that a correct understanding?

Nasser Yousef:  I don’t believe that we can talk about a confederated relationship unless we define the characteristics of Palestinian land within the future.

Harvey Feldman:  So the answer is yes?

Nasser Yousef:  Yes.  The future of the Palestinian land has to be clear.

Michael Rubin:  Dr. al-Majali?

Abdul Salam al-Majali:  My answer to this question is that I think it is very unlikely.  I said what King Hussein said in 1988 – that after the creation, because this is the dilemma, who is going to negotiate with Israel?  Is it the Jordanians or the Palestinians?  This should be very clear.  It is to be done there, but not in the complete sense.  If such framework is going into a center like this one or any similar place to be discussed, with the attendance of Israelis, Jordanians, Palestinians and Americans, I think everybody will see in this a light at the end of the tunnel. 

I believe Israeli needs such a thing.  Israel needs two things most importantly:  security and they should be part of the Middle East.  These two things will be secured by such a future.  It is just to look at the future – possibly that would help the negotiation between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

Nasser Yousef:  On both sides, there must be some clarity about the future of the Palestinian land.

Michael Rubin:  Thank you.  The gentleman in the second row?

Dan Diker:  I’m Dan Diker.  I’m part of the Confederal Working Group at the International Peace and Cooperation Center.  My question is perhaps to his Excellency al-Majali.  The frameworks that you speak about – would there be a possible discussion in terms of a pathway to progress to a final status discussion between the Palestinians and Jordanians?  If in fact, on a security basis, a federal relationship might be created in order to solve the problem of the roving militias and warlords in the West Bank which have prevented any kind of security there, would this framework lead in stages to a confederal relationship and independent sovereign Palestinian entity?  Is it possible in that pathway to ask their Jordanian brethren for help in a formal way to create federal security and economic links to show a pathway progress that would create confidence for all those in the region?  Thank you.

Michael Rubin:  Dr. al-Majali?

Abdul Salam al-Majali:  Well, understanding - I always use this - the psychology of the Arabs is very difficult.  Straight away they will be tarnished; that they have come to betray the Palestinians, the others, and so on.  I believe this is the best way for such a framework to progress into a proper discussion at an academic center, for instance. Israelis feel this is the future.  The Palestinians feel that this is the future, and the Jordanians also feel this way.  Just that will ease the negotiating between Israel and Palestine, especially even with the dark days of Hamas. 

Now since Hamas came to be government, they have kept the truce of no violence from them, but unfortunately the other side did not keep it.  Anyway, they are ready to keep quiet until they figure out what the future is.  The main thing is to put a light at the end of the tunnel for everybody, because then the road map could be pretty quickly done, and both sides would feel easier about it.

Michael Rubin:  I would like to work down that side.  I see one, two, three questions before moving in.  Yes?

Sean Silanto:  Sean Silanto [phonetic], Washington.  An obvious criticism of some sort of a federation or any sort of a union between the West Bank and Jordan would be the possibility that certain parties within the Palestinian territories are trying to almost circumvent the ongoing political process in order to use that union as a way of attaining power.  I am wondering if, keeping that possibility in mind, do any of the panelists have any thoughts on, given that possibility of a union, which parties would actually benefit from a union with Jordan?  Who is winning and who is losing in that case?

Rami Nasrallah:  Who is going to benefit out of what?

Michael Rubin:  Out of the possibility that [inaudible].

Rami Nasrallah:  I think there are two answers to this question.  One is how it will change the dynamics of the Palestinian political, social, and economic life, which is highly important and should be the first priority.  Second is the political future and this is a later stage.

Abdul Salam al-Majali:  I believe it helps putting the lights up so that everybody walks in the light of things if this happens.  I believe most of the parties of which I know – for instance Fatah, Hamas, Muslim Brotherhood – they, in principle, want such a thing because they see this as a better future for everybody.  This may help ease the tension from the Israeli side about security.

Michael Rubin:  Nasser Yousef?

Nasser Yousef:  The Palestinians and the Jordanians will benefit from such a relationship.  The region itself will benefit from such a relationship.  The Palestinians will re-engage themselves with their Arabic neighbors via Jordan.  This will put into the Israeli occupation.  This will make an extension of the public relationship between Palestinians and Jordanians.  This will create a market of at least 10 million.  Jordan will benefit from the stability.  Palestinian capital will be invested in Jordan in a good way.  Jordan will have a seaport on the Mediterranean.  This economic look will benefit both the Jordanians and the Palestinians.  Stability in the Palestinian territories will reflect itself on the rest of the region.  This will enable the region to have time to rethink or reform the construction of the region.  Therefore, there will be no losers.

Michael Rubin:  Okay, moving back along the row...

Joel Rosenberg:  I’m Joel Rosenberg, author of The Last Jihad.  I want to pick up on Professor’s Lewis’ comment.  The Hamas-Palestinian may pose more of a danger to Jordan than to Israel.  Dr. al-Majali disagreed with that.  Even prior to some type of confederation or federation like this, what would be your view of Jordan’s risk right now from al-Qaeda and Iran?  Of course, there have been number of al-Qaeda picked up in Jordan, and there was the large, almost terrorist attack two years ago.  What kind of risk is Jordan’s government in right now?

Bernard Lewis:  My point was that Hamas is one of a number of movements of what one might call radical Islamism.  Jordan as a Muslim state – I would have thought it would be more vulnerable than Israel.  For Israel, it’s a security problem.  For Jordan, as for any other Muslim state, it is something much more profound than that.  That’s what I meant when I made that comparison.

Michael Rubin:  Dr. al-Majali.

Abdul Salam al-Majali:  Well, we have to remember that Hamas is the daughter of the Muslim Brotherhood.  In the belief of the Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan and Palestine are places almost sacred, not to have real violence.  Our experience with the Muslim Brotherhood for a long time was that they never participated in violence.  Violence of talk, yes, but violence arms and so on are not there.  This is the belief.  Again, we got used to it and they are a participant.  Hamas is part of the Muslim Brotherhood; it’s not the other way around.  We’ve got the mother, so to speak, already.  I don’t think the daughter would be that bad.  The struggle of Hamas is not against the Palestinians; it is against the occupation.  That’s a different outlook altogether.

Michael Rubin:  Okay, let’s go further back.  Adam Garfinkle?

Adam Garfinkle:  Thank you.  I’m Adam Garfinkle of the American Interest.  This is a question for Dr. al-Majali.  I was delighted to hear Palestinians and Jordanians talk about this idea of a confederation.  They seem to think it is a prospect and a good idea.  Back in the 1980s, there were people in Jordan who didn’t think this was a good idea at all.  The term was created for them was the Jordanian Likud.  It wasn’t necessarily a term of endearment, but it was a term of description.  In the 18 years since the disengagement decision of 1988, what has happened inside of Jordan?  It may be that Palestinians want a confederation, but how many East Bank Jordanians want one?

Abdul Salam al-Majali:  With any new thoughts, you have to accept there will be people to oppose it, whether they don’t understand it or they have a different political view.  It’s just like everybody else.  In Israel, the Likud has one idea; Labor has another idea, and Peretz has another.  It’s a different outlook.  Even inside Palestine, I do not imagine that 100 percent is going to agree, unless we are angels.  We are not angels.  There will be some differences.  There are some people who do not accept this because they wonder why should we get into this hot water.  We will burn ourselves.  We’ve suffered enough from this Palestinian cause. 

Why not get away from it?  As you remember going back to a bit of history, most of the Arabs insisted on King Hussein to disengage with the Palestinians.  They insisted.  We have a good number of Palestinians now in Jordan – something about 41 percent.  You cannot forget them.  You do not forget their future.  These are what you what would call the Jordanian Likud and they have to think what you will do with these people.

Michael Rubin:  Of course.

Bernard Lewis:  Could I add a brief historical footnote on this one, too?  Let me remind you that in 1948-49, when three-quarters of a million Palestinian Arabs became refugees in the neighboring countries, the Jordanian government passed a law conferring citizenship on them – not only those who were in Jordanian areas, but also those who went to other countries, if they chose to apply for it.  This was in marked contrast with all the other Arab countries to which the Palestinian refugees went, where they were and have remained stateless aliens to the fifth generation.

Michael Rubin:  I noticed that some of the Washington-based Diplomatic Corps is being uncharacteristically silent at this meeting, so perhaps I will press for some ideas, comments, and questions from them in a second, but I had promised Mr. Gerson.

Allan Gerson:  Allan Gerson, Gerson International Law Group.  This is in keeping with your remark about the Washington diplomatic community.  My question is:  is this discussion, important and innovative as it is, essentially a trial balloon, or does it really reflect diplomatic activity that has been going on?  That is to say, does the idea that we have been discussing have the sanction or the endorsement of some kind of either the government of Jordan or aspects of the government of Palestine, and has the idea been broached with American and European officials?  Or are we just hearing this at its genesis?

Abdul Salam al-Majali:  Thank you.  First, as I said, I started this idea of this type.  In fact, before that, this did not just come out of the blue, it was even the government of Jordan before.  After 1967, they suggested what they called the United Arab Kingdom as a kingdom, which was opposed by Egypt, for instance, and the Palestinian PLO at that time did not accept it, because they thought that Jordan wanted to put their hand on this.  That’s the reason I called it a different name, to avoid these sensitivities altogether. 

This idea is a personal idea, and I’ve been talking informally – off the record, so to speak – in many places, with the Americans, with the high officials of the American administration and the previous one:  Mr. Baker and a lot of people I had talked to in order to see what their response would be.  Do they accept this idea?  Is it a good one?  I did the same thing with Palestinians, Jordanians, and so on. 

It is not the government of Jordan’s view, neither is it the king’s view.  We hope that once it has been done in a proper way and with all of the details of it, it will appeal to everybody.  It is most important, again, to appeal even to the Israeli administration, to the Israeli leadership, because they have to see the benefit, and they are powerful.  You know, power and justice does not go together in many places, in fact, very rarely, but they are powerful and they’ve got the power to withdraw or not to withdraw, to give up this, or to give up that.  Once they feel that the future is secure with this depth and strategy, it will go. 

In fact, through my negotiation, I negotiated the peace treaty and I signed it personally with the late Rabin.  I remember through the negotiation, we were given a paper to look into it as a first draft, so to speak.  There were 5 articles.  If we accepted them, we are cut off from the entire Arab world, completely, that this treaty with Israel is supreme to any other relation with the rest of the Arab world.  We tried to negotiate it diplomatically.  Then, at the end, I looked at my opposite member and I said, “Look.  This hand is stretched to you.  This hand is part of this body.  If you cut this hand from this body, what is the use to you?”  So he went and consulted and these 5 articles were dropped.

You want the body.  You want the person.  We are talking about peace, about the future, relations, diplomacy, trade, even the borders, which our professor said the borders again become a little bit easier because we are thinking of the future something like the Benelux between Jordan and Palestine and this new entity and Israel.  Even Egypt will get into it.  Even the Syrians and the Lebanese will get into it.  Once the peace comes, it is for everybody.  But you have to give them the security, the feeling of security.  If they feel the security, they want to be part of the Middle East.  You can’t have Israel away from the Middle East.  It has to be a part; unfortunately, they have built a wall to be away from the Middle East.  We hope that this will change and that they will be part of the Middle East.

Michael Rubin:  I am going to put Rami on the hot seat for a second.  As someone on the panel who is not a former official and works a great deal in grass roots activism, I would be curious to hear your perspective.

Rami Nasrallah:  I think both the Palestinian politicians and the general public are prepared to discuss seriously this idea – and it’s not a new idea, by the way. In 1985 there was the Amman Accord agreed between the PLO and the Kingdom of Jordan, so this idea has existed for a long time, and I think it has got the consensus of the Palestinian political leadership, even the current Hamas government. 

I want to add another aspect that is highly important:  that Jordan, for certain, has an important role to restructure Palestinian Authority institutions, especially the administrative and the security institutions.  I see this as part of the Palestinian institution and nation building, which was missing during the whole Oslo process.  This niche has never been important, but this is crucial for getting a free, democratic Palestine, which is the only solution.

Nasser Yousef:  First of all, I would like to add one remark to this.  The first agreement between Palestine and Jordan occurred in 1986.  Then there was an agreement on having joint Palestine-Jordanian delegation under the head of Dr. Majali within the Madrid and then in Washington.  Dr. Majali, at that time, was heading the process for both delegations.  Searching for a Jordanian-Palestinian relationship is not new here.  What is new now is looking toward the future in search of a peace process for stability and security in our area.  It is like brainstorming. I hope that the future will form the basis for the futuristic relationship between Palestine and Jordan.

Michael Rubin:  Thank you very much.  Keith, all the way in the corner?

Keith Schulz:  Thank you, Michael.  Keith Schulz with USAID.  I need a little bit of clarity here.  The panel is entitled “Jordanian-West Bank Alliance” but some of the discussion here seems to be based on a Jordanian-Palestinian alliance, so my question is, does this include Gaza, this concept?  If it doesn’t include Gaza, the obvious question is then, what about Gaza?  What becomes of Gazans, other than they become isolated behind a wall and probably a failed state?

Michael Rubin:  Okay, good question.

Abdul Salam al-Majali:  Yes, it includes Gaza.  Gaza is part of the Palestinian territory.  Now they have withdrawn from it.  I think it is essential because you do not want another pocket very densely done. By the way, some time ago, even on the Israeli side at one time they thought of confederation between Israel, Palestine, and Jordan.  At one time, there were some thoughts but it never matured.

Nasser Yousef:  Sure, the federation would include Gaza.  Nobody can take Gaza out of this relationship. And the political track will not work if Gaza is excluded.

Michael Rubin:  Okay, I saw another question over here.  Can you stick up your hand, sir, so that Jeff can find you?

Phillip Jolie:  Philip Jolie [phonetic] with the French daily, Le Figaro.  By adding this Jordanian factor to the current equation of the peace process, aren’t you suppressing one of the basic requirements, that is to create a viable Palestinian state within the limits of the West Bank and Gaza.  With Jordan being already a viable state, how would it impact the decision of Israel to withdraw from more territory?  Thank you.

Abdul Salam al-Majali:  I think this is one of the reasons, because Palestine completely staying alone is not going to be easy and viable.  Not easy.  You have to have great powers for all sorts of things to make it that way, and still you have the problem of refugees from outside – whether they are in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, or anywhere – their aspiration is there.  The area is not able to take all these people.  In other words, you will have this thing boiling all the time.

But once you have this depth, it is going to be more viable.  The Palestinian state as a state part of the confederation will be more viable than on its own.  This is my personal point of view, I may be wrong.

Michael Rubin:  I am going to ask a question from the panel addressed to any of the panelists who want to address it.  I often at American Enterprise Institute get accused of spending my time in the weeds and looking too much at the details, but I am going to do that with this question.

What I would be curious about is what impact the Hamas victory and the crash of the Palestinian economy, especially in Gaza, has had on some of the Palestinian elites in Nablus, Ramallah, and so forth.  How are businessmen and the middle class, what any viable state needs to be built upon, handling this equation?

Abdul Salam al-Majali:  My answer is quite simple.  Either the Mossad and the Israelis and the Americans predicted Hamas is going to win so they know what is going to happen or they did not, which is bad.  They must have predicted this. 

There are two theories about this Hamas business.  Whether it is the making of, if you want to take the idea of intrigue, that the Israelis and the Americans brought them to power so they have to make decision, either they go into peace or they are going to have a revolution on their hands.  This is if you want to take seriously this intrigue business.  Or, it is just simply that they came to power, that they were not expected to win, and I believe they were not expecting to win as much as they did, but because of the type of law and because of the propaganda that came from the West against the Palestinian Authority – that it is corrupt and what have you – has helped.  In fact, just a month before the election, the media came up with that the Americans paid the Authority so much money so that they can win the election.

Now the psychology of the Arabs does not accept this.  In fact, when I was crossing the bridge to go as an observer for the Palestinian election, on the bridge I had an Israeli officer who said to me, “What do you expect to happen?”  I said, “In Jerusalem, all will be Hamas, including the Christians.”  So he looked at me and he said, “How?”  I said, “Because of the way the Israelis treated them.  They assassinated so many and they prevented them from having propaganda and what have you.  And this media about the Authority getting money from America to win the election, they are going to win.”  And it happened.  Even the two Christians from Jerusalem, they won on the Hamas ticket, because of the psychology.

This is the problem.  Again, straightaway, before they even took office – I don’t like to call it blackmailing – but the pressure and the threatening came from all over Europe, the United States, and Israel, that we are not going to give them money.  They have to recognize Israel.  They have to do this and they have to do this.

De facto, they accepted to have a truce is a recognition.  To go into election in the municipality, it is a de facto recognition.  To go into the parliament, again it is de facto.  However, they do not say it clear-cut and put it in a big notice, because this is almost the card they are putting in their pocket.  If they are given the time, they are going to change, just like what happened in the Likud in Israel.  All of you know what their opinion is, so on and so forth, about the peace and the negotiation and what have you, and then we’re fine. 

There is a change.  And I think the Hamas people will change.  There is no way out.  But whether you push them to do this, the Arabs do not like this.  In Arabic it is called “nechus” [phonetic].

Michael Rubin:  I had a slightly different question.  I’m actually going to throw the question out to Nasser Yousef and Rami Nasrallah.  My question was – just a second, please.  The question was, given the Hamas victory and given the crash of the Palestinian economy, how is that playing onto perceptions of Jordan and any issue of federation?  With that, I would also like to throw the floor open to Nasser Yousef and Rami.

Nasser Yousef:  There is no doubt that there is Palestinian-Israeli relationship is highly tense right now and there are a lot of efforts made in these issues so as to bring it down.  We all see that there is a Palestinian national dialogue.  I do not believe that Hamas coming into power will be an obstacle for there being a Palestinian-Jordanian relationship.  Because in addition to the historical heritage of the relationship between the two sides, it was decided by the Palestinian National Council and it was approved by all the Palestinian organizations.  I do believe that Hamas will influence such an issue.

Rami Nasrallah:  I think you are talking about two different Hamas extremes.  One is the daughter, which is prepared to go to the mother, and this is the Palestinian Hamas within the occupied territories.  They are more pragmatic and they are more willing; and then there is Khaled Meshaal and the external leadership of Hamas based in Damascus.  I think they are unwilling to have any positive interaction with Jordan, at least for the time being – I don’t know about the future.

Michael Rubin:  I always like to end the panels on time, especially to give people in the audience time to give up and privately talk to the panelists.  So that is what I’m going to do right now.  I do want to give a very warm thanks, not only to our panelists – Professor Lewis, Dr. al-Majali, Nasser Yousef, Rami – who have come from very long distances each to be here – but I also do need to thank my former research assistant Suzanne Gershowitz [phonetic], my current research assistant Jeff Azarva [phonetic], who have not only put up with others involved in organizing this, but much more importantly, have put up with me when organizing this.  I do want to thank some people who have asked to remain anonymous, who helped put everything together and put everybody in touch, figure out schedules, and so forth.

I do find it rather ironic that in Washington we are very good in the Foggy Bottom and elsewhere in the U.S. government to try to create ideas and impose them upon the rest of the world as if they are a template, and sometimes we tend to ignore the ideas that percolate up from the grass roots level in these regions.  Allan Gerson, who is no longer here, asked where did this came from; are you just making it up?  No. 

We heard this bubbling about.  It has been discussed quite a bit in a lot of the Arabic press, in the Palestinian press, in the Jordanian press.  Sometimes we pay a little bit too much attention, perhaps, to the New York Times and the Washington Post, who tend to source each other’s anonymous tips, rather than paying attention to what is going on in the field. 

When I say that sometimes the best ideas begin in the region, I also remember what everyone said was impossible with regard to Anwar al-Sadat and some of the ideas that originated in the region and surprised Washington at the time.  On the other hand, sometimes when Washington comes up with its own ideas, we get rather curious situations of, for example, supplying nuclear technology to a terrorist-sponsoring state.  So sometimes it’s good to listen a little bit more to what’s going on in the grass roots as these issues are discussed at any numbers of levels in the Middle East and also in Washington.

With that, I want to give a warm round of applause to our panelists.  Thank you.

[Applause]

[End of transcript.]