American Enterprise Institute

December 12, 2006

[Edited transcript from audio tapes]

8:45 a.m.	Registration
9:00	Panelists:	Mohebat Ahdiyyih, Open Source Center
		Mehdi Khalaji, Washington Institute for Near East Policy
		A. William Samii, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
	Moderator:	Michael Rubin, AEI
10:30	Adjournment

Proceedings:

Michael Rubin:  Okay, I would like to welcome everyone here today.  We are going to get started as we wait for our third speaker to come.  He is on his way, stuck in traffic right now.  My name is Michael Rubin.  I will be moderating the panel today in lieu of Danielle Pletka.  I’m a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and editor of the Middle East Quarterly. 

I would like to introduce our guests so that we can get to the substance of this panel and the meat of this panel without any further ado.  First of all, speaking first is going to be Bill Samii who is well-known throughout Washington and, frankly, throughout the world as the “Iran Report” writer for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.  He is now on a leave of absence from RFE/RL and working at the Center for Naval Analyses.  And sitting immediately to my right is Mehdi Khalaji, who is a visiting fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a Shiite theologian by training.  He studied in the seminaries of Qom and written for a number of Iranian publications inside Iran.  And then our third guest who will be here shortly is Mohebat Ahdiyyih, who is the senior Iran analyst at the National Open Source Center, which is better known to most people as the former FBIS, the Federal Broadcast Information Service. 

What we are going to be discussing today are the elections which are going to be held in Iran later this week.  We have two elections being held simultaneously, both the municipal elections across Iran and also elections for the Assembly of Experts.  What we are going to discuss today on the panel which has been organized by my colleague, Omeed Jafari, standing over there, is looking at the impact.  What will the municipal elections, for example, mean for Iranian politics now?  What will they mean for the constant discussion of the power struggles among various factions in the Iranian government?  Is Ahmadinejad up or down as what will this mean for Mesbah Yazdi?  What will this mean for the Revolutionary Guard?  What should we interpret from these municipal elections? 

Perhaps of greater controversy will be discussion relating to the Assembly of Experts elections.  I got in my e-mail box just yesterday -- Mehdi Khalaji had written a policy watch for the Washington Institute entitled “The Significance of Iran’s December Elections,” in which he says that historical experience shows that the Assembly is not a powerful body and perhaps implies that Iranian voters do not expect much from it and therefore perhaps it is not as important as some analysts believe it is.  I’m going to leave that as open to debate on the panel.  I’m going to turn things over right now to the first speaker, Bill Samii.

 William Samii:  Thank you very much, Michael.  With that intro, I’m not going to tell you why it is really important, and you should all pay a great deal of attention to the voting on Friday.  I may even convince you of this.  So, what I’m going to do is, first of all, tell you why the Assembly is important, both in terms of its formal duties and in terms of its informal powers.  Then I’ll go over the Assembly’s role in consolidating clerical power over the years since the 1979 revolution.  I’ll discuss some of the controversy surrounding Assembly of Experts elections and I’ll wrap up with a discussion of the current race for the Assembly of Experts. 

Now, what are the formal duties of the Assembly of Experts?  It is really pretty straightforward; the Assembly is tasked with… and this is all enshrined in the Constitution, you can look it up yourselves.  Its formal duty is to supervise the performance of the Supreme Leader.  If he leaves his post or if, because of that supervision, his performance is deemed unacceptable, he is kicked out of the job.  The Assembly of Experts will then select a new Supreme Leader; and then it is also members of the Assembly of Experts who are involved with revising the constitution should that be necessary. 

Now, what are the informal powers of the Assembly of Experts?  That is what I think is more significant in terms of this election.  First of all, Iran has a consensual decision- making process.  Yes, there is a formal apparatus, sort of you can follow line charts and so on, and things are written out in the constitution.  But, really, it is a process in which a number of top officials have an input and then a consensual decision is reached. 

Now, the Assembly of Experts, because it stands above the Supreme Leader, and because many of its members serve in other government offices, whether it is the Legislature, the Expediency Council, the Guardians Council and so on, they can actually influence the Supreme Leader; they can exploit this combination of positions to pressure him.  Another source of influence relates to the Supreme Leader Khamenei’s dubious religious credentials whereas the Assembly of Experts, the men serving on it, are some of the country’s top clerics.  And so in a way, they can influence the Supreme Leader accordingly. 

Now, symbolically, I think the election is also very important.  And I think that is what is relevant today.  As fundamentalists or [indiscernible] as they are termed in Persian, who are associated with the President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, are trying to gain the last elected office in the country that they do not already dominate.  These fundamentalists are neo-conservatives, as some have termed them, have won the municipal council elections in 2003, the parliamentary elections in 2004, the presidential election in 2005.  There is just one post left for them, and that is the Assembly of Experts. 

If they win all four of these, it really will convey the impression that this is an unstoppable political juggernaut.  I think it would really be the death knell, if you can have -- I think there have been a lot of death knells for the reformists but this is the real death knell if it takes place.  What has in fact happened is that through the vetting process, most of the candidates, whether they are these fundamentalists or an [indiscernible] or the reformist, have actually been ruled out of the election, so you do not have too many fundamentalists or pro-reform candidates.  I think this represents the older generation of older conservative traditional clerics trying to hold on to power just a little bit longer and to guide the revolution into a course that they wanted to pursue rather than that course that the Ahmadinejad types really wanted to take. 

Now, let me roll back a bit to 1979; in March of 1979, there was a referendum in Iran – Islamic republic, yes or no?  And there were no other choices; 98.2 percent of the public - about 20 million people - voted “yes,” that they wanted an Islamic republic.  This set the scene for what we have now.  An Assembly of Experts was created to work on the constitution.  And what that Assembly of Experts did, it actually did have some non-clerics and women in it, but they were pretty much -- I do not think “emasculated” is the right term, but they really did not have much power in this process.  And so, what happened was you had a constitution that came out in the December of ’79, and there were 21 million voters.  This constitution that came out was subject to a national referendum; and, again, 99.5 percent voted in favor of the 1979 Constitution. 

Now, what are some of the controversies surrounding the Assembly of Experts?  And I think these controversies relate very much to, first and foremost, how people are found eligible to participate as candidates in the Assembly of Experts elections.  If you look at the numbers, there is sort of a direct relationship between candidate eligibility and voter turnout.  So, in 1982, 77.38 percent of the voters voted for the Assembly of Experts; in 1990, 37 percent; in 1998, 46 percent. 

This is a general downward trend; not a straight line but generally downward.  And so, what has happened over time is that the standards for eligibility have grown more stringent.  Initially, only those who were capable of interpreting Islamic Law or performing ijtihad and were therefore capable of recognizing religious sources of emulation were eligible as candidates.  And this would be determined by some of the seminary professors.  The only people who were exceptions to this were people for whom Ayatollah Khomenei had vouched.  By 1990, the regulations were made more stringent and the circle of selectors was reduced. 

At that point, it was decided that only the Guardians’ Council would be able to select members or determine the eligibility of candidates for the Assembly of Experts.  The actual requirements were made more restrictive as well; so, what happened was that only 62 out of 178 applicants failed the eligibility requirements and seven others withdrew. In some of the constituencies in Iran in 1990, there was only one candidate.  New rules were introduced in 1998 making it even more restrictive.  At that point it was decided that not only did you have to pass these religious requirements and standards, but you also had to pass, or the candidates had to pass standards for sort of political compatibility with the system.  At that point, the Guardians’ Council accepted fewer than half of the 396 applicants, rejecting eight of the nine women who applied and the ninth woman withdrew from the actual contest. 

Now, the concerns about eligibility rules have persisted and the standards have grown more and more restrictive.  In the most recent election, the one coming up, candidates… they had to declare their candidacy.  People whose candidacy or qualifications were questionable were invited to take a written and oral exam.  The end result was that 495 people signed up; then it was reduced to 492 when it turned out that the three guys signed up twice. 

An initial exam of their credentials determined the 60 were in no way qualified, and then this was ramped up to about 100 people who withdrew their applications.  The Guardians’ Council spokesman said that all the female applicants failed the written exams, so they were not asked back.  The son of Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, Ali, reportedly flunked the written exam.  A number of incumbents were invited to take the written and oral exam, and they withdrew in protest.  So, initially 144 candidates were approved; this is about 30 percent.  This was increased to 163 a few days later, so 33 percent of the applicants to be candidates were actually approved as candidates.  Now, there is proportional representation.  So you have got 86 seats in the Assembly of Experts; what this means basically is that some of the seats will have no competition for them, that people are going to be -- just because they are candidates, they are going to get a seat in the Assembly of Experts. 

Now I will summarize one of the other major controversies about the Assembly of Experts, and that is the lack of transparency.  This is supposed to be one of the most important bodies in the country.  Its members are chosen through public elections but no one actually knows what the assembly does during its meetings.  And there have been complaints about this not only from the media but from some members of the assembly.  One of them, Majid Ansari, who has complained about this lack of transparency repeatedly, was actually invited to take the written exam this time around and he withdrew in protest. 

I will just give you one quote about this.  In September 2000, Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, who is deputy speaker of the Assembly of Experts, said after the meeting it was agreed that in the future the Experts of the Nation will be able to exercise greater supervision over the country's affairs.  He said there was concern about the enemy’s entry into the arena “in a bid to destroy the Islamic essence of our political system.” The unnamed enemy’s hostility exists because their civilization propounds “secularism, antagonism, or apathy towards religion."  He went on at some length about this. 

In more recent times there have been allegations or claims by members of the Assembly that they are discussing national security issues and that is why their meetings have to be held behind closed doors.  The question was raised as to, first of all, why are you discussing issues that are outside your formal powers?  But they said, basically, it is important and we are going to do it anyway. 

Michael is about to tell me to wrap it up.  I see where he is tearing up the paper, so let me just wrap up why I believe the current race is significant.  Basically, I think this election represents a conflict between the first and second generations, post-revolutionary generations, the first generation being this older more conservative clerics, traditional ones who reached political maturity, one, through their opposition to the monarchy; and two, in trying to guide the Islamic Republic in its first two decades. 

The second generation, I believe, is symbolized by President Ahmadinejad.  These are people who may have had some involvement with opposition to the monarchy but they really, I believe, achieved political maturity.  And the event that shaped them, the crucible that shaped them, was participation in the Iran-Iraq war, and then in growing through the political system in the 1990s. 

So, who symbolizes these two sides?  One, you have got Hashemi Rafsanjani, who, according to his enemies, is a symbol of corruption.  His allies have been targeted with prosecution in an effort, I believe, to weaken the informal network that supports them.  Commentaries in “Parto-e Sokhan,” which is a weekly coming out of Qom, which is closely identified with Mesbah Yazdi, has been very critical of Hashemi Rafsanjani. 

Now on the other side is Mesbah Yazdi, who symbolizes the younger generation.  The accusations that are leveled against him are, one, that he was a member of Hojjatieh Society, which is a banned religious-political institution.  And another complaint against him or accusation against him is that he failed to resist the monarchy.  A spokesman for the Executives of Construction Party which is identified with Hashemi Rafsanjani said that Hashemi is a cleric politician who has had key roles and determining roles in the past 40 years of the struggles.  He fought the previous regime for a long time and he was a political prisoner.  Mesbah was a cleric who accepted the struggle for a short period and did not accept it for a longer period. 

While considering Imam’s struggles ineffective, there are major differences between these two figures, meaningful differences; and everyone knows this.  And as I have said earlier, there are conflicts within the clerical community, conflicts within the political parties; and all these things I believed they are being played out in the Assembly of Experts race.  And the final point I would like to make is that there been suggestions that this is the assembly that will select the new Supreme Leader.  I think this is premature.  Now, there is a rapid turnover in leading Shiite clerics in early 1990s.  When Grand Ayatollah Abolqasem Khoi died in 1992, the guy was 97 years old.  Grand Ayatollah Golpayegani died in 1993 at the age of 96, and Grand Ayatollah Ali Araki died in 1994; he was more than a hundred years old. 

Now, Khameini would only be 75 at the time of the incoming assembly’s term of office when it ends.  Now there are allegations that Khameini is at death's door and that he is addicted to opium for pain relief.  But I been hearing claims like this since a least in the mid-1990, so I take him with a grain of salt.  Thank you.

Michael Rubin:  And, also, I should point out that Iranian television was full of pictures of Khameini the other day greeting the Hamas premier, looking anything but hospitalized.  With that I'll turn the floor over to Mehdi to explain why Bill is wrong.

Mehdi Khalaji:  I am very happy that I am talking after Bill because I am not that much optimistic as Bill was.  I think I explained in my policy watch, which came out last night, that this Assembly of Experts theoretically can be considered the most important political body in the Islamic regime.  But practically, it is the most disabled body and institution inside the Islamic Republic. 

As Bill said, the main mission of this Assembly of Experts is to supervise the supreme leader’s performance and dismiss him if he violates the law or being unable to carry out his responsibilities.  But the historical experience in the last two decades shows that this institution could not do its job, and the main achievement of this Assembly of Experts was to appoint Ali Khamenei into the leadership.  I have to make the distinction between two Assemblies of Experts; one was the Assembly of Experts for the constitution. 

In that Assembly of Experts, members of this assembly, there was not necessary to be a cleric or an Islamic jurist.  But in this Assembly of Experts, which is formed in 1984, all the members should be an Islamic jurist.  They tried -- when Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of Islamic Republic, was alive -- they tried to appoint Ayatollah Montazeri as his successor; and they did.  But at the last year of Ayatollah Khomeini’s life, Ayatollah Khomeini himself, not the Assembly of Experts, dismissed Ayatollah Montazeri.  It was not the right of Ayatollah Khomeini to do this.  It was out of his formal power. 

So this Assembly of Experts was unable to dismiss the successor.  In his last year, Ayatollah Khomeini ordered the revision of the constitution.  According to the original version of the constitution, the supreme leader should have the highest religious authority, should be a marja.  According to this constitution, somebody like Khomeini, who is not a marja, who is a middle-ranking cleric, he could not be a leader.  So they tried to modify or revise this constitution when Khomeini was alive, but this revised constitution can be official only after public referendum on it. 

During the process of this revision, Ayatollah Khomeini died.  And then, the Assembly of Experts appointed Khamenei before the referendum taking place for the revised constitution.  So, Khamenei, the current supreme leader, became the leader according to law, which is ratified after his leadership.  So, his leadership has taken place in very illegal conditions.  It shows the dysfunction of this Assembly of Experts.  So, the main achievement of this Assembly of Experts was appointment of Khamenei as the leader in an illegal condition. 

This Assembly of Experts hold meeting once per year behind closed door.  Nobody knows what they do.  And in fact, they do not do anything important.  I talked with many of Assembly of Experts members, and it is just general speaking about the current situation in Iran.  They do not have any right to interfere or have influence in domestic policies or foreign diplomacy.  And the mechanism of these elections is very important.  As you know, according to Iranian Constitution, in any election, candidates should be qualified by the Guardian Council.  Six key members of this Guardian Council are appointed by Ayatollah Khameini.  So this is Ayatollah Khamenei who indirectly qualifies or disqualifies the candidates.  So, this is him who qualifies the candidates for the elections of Assembly of Experts. 

So this vicious circle allows him to have full control on any election, including the election of Assembly of Experts.  So the people who come into the Assembly of Experts are the people who are neutral.  It means that they are disabled already to have any supervision of the Supreme Leader’s performance.  So theoretically, this Assembly of Experts can provide the Islamic Republic with democratic legitimacy; but practically, it does in a very ritual way, not in a very real, democratic way.  That is why the participation rate in the last three elections of the Assembly of Experts was the lowest rate in the history of elections in Islamic Republic because the people, they do not expect much of a change by this election; they know that Ayatollah Khamenei has enough means to control the composition of this Assembly. 

And as my colleague mentioned, the Guardian Council this time disqualified many of the reformists and many of the hardliners, including the son of Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, who is the ideologue of Ahmadinejad’s faction.  Ayatollah Khamenei, by disqualifying some of the people in Ahmadinejad’s faction, sends a very clear message to them: “I have full control over this assembly and nobody can bypass me, even hardliners.”  So, we have now more than 160 candidates for Assembly of Experts.  They are competing for 87 seats.  Any of them get elected, no change takes place.  And the composition of this, the future Assembly of Experts, would not be different than the current Assembly of Experts.  So, this is Ayatollah Khamenei who tries to keep the same composition of the Assembly of Experts and make it disabled to do any real and effective job. 

This is my argument for saying that this Assembly is not that much important.  And this is not this Assembly who appoints the next leader.  It is very important to pay attention to this point because even in the last Assembly of Experts, after the death of Khomeini, there were only 12 people who decided for leadership of Khomeini, not the Assembly as a whole body.  The influential persons who are in this Assembly or they are outside of this Assembly, for example, the marjas, the religious authorities, they are much more influential in appointing the leadership than the ordinary members of this Assembly.  So, the appointment of leadership is a job which is much more important than being -- within the ability of this Assembly. 

I think that after the death of Khamenei, whether he is 90 or is 100, I think that this is not this Assembly who can be able to decide for his successor.  But there are many factors playing a role outside this assembly.  I was very short, yes?

Michael Rubin:  Yes.  Very good.  Because that way we can turn the floor over to Mohebat for 8 to 10 minutes to discuss whether he thinks the significance of Iran… whether the December elections are going to be significant and also, so far we have only talked about the Assembly of Experts.  Feel free to chime in on the municipal elections as well.  Can you turn on your mic?

Mohebat Ahdiyyih:  Yes, in fact coming through the highways from Virginia and going through toll booths there, it reminded me of Iranian election… local council elections, of course.  Because I heard a long time ago when I came to this area that people who manned the toll booths in Virginia get their jobs after elections, that this is reward for individuals who support certain politicians.  So local council elections in Iran, or the municipal, have kind of the same rule; it is kind of rewarding the grassroots for their support.  Although once in a while, it has happened that what we thought is not important turns out to be very significant. 

For example, in 2003 the local council elections became very important, especially in Tehran, because a new group emerged, called Abadgaran; Ahmadinejad was campaign manager for this group.  He became the mayor, and then you know what happened after that; he eventually became President.  So that example has intrigued politicians and people in Iran, that maybe the same thing could happened again; maybe this election at the local level, especially in Tehran, would lead to changes.  At this point, the groups that are competing, at least in Tehran, because in most provinces, candidates have been disqualified, actually, reformist candidates, three hundred thousand candidates, by the way, wanted to participate.  A lot have been disqualified by -- unlike Assembly of Experts, the vetting process for councils is done through a combination of different institutions - Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Intelligence, Majlis Supervision Commission; they are all involved. 

And, of course, Basij is increasingly becoming siege forces, very much involved at grassroots in vetting process.  And of course there are worries.  Reformists have expressed it publicly that the Basij forces may actually be involved on the ground guarding the voting places, which could have implications.  It looks like only in Tehran reformers really have a chance.  Now, it is a mystery how they were not disqualified; they allowed them to run in Tehran.  It is possible that this is to give a sense of legitimacy to this election, having some reformers run rather than disqualifying them everywhere.  So they pin their hope on this and they think out of this they may be able to rescue themselves, but I seriously doubt that that could happen. 

The whole situation, the elections in Iran, in fact, I often think it is like -- it is amazing how they go through this whole process to just show that they have elections.  I mean, all this energy that could be spent in a constructive way, if it is already decided who is going to be there, as explained, the Council of Guardians, for Assembly of Experts, for Majlis and for council elections, again, in this case, conservatives.  Now, the laws of election are actually changing.  They are contemplating making it even more controlled by the hardliners.  In fact, Basij may become officially part of the formal supervision and running of the elections in Iran. 

As we know, Ahmadinejad calls his government a Basiji government; officially he has declared that.  In other places, he had said “Jihadist government,” but considering the fact that the hardliners’ grip on power is becoming almost complete, there is doubt that reformers have any more chances.  For the longest time, there were kind of two governments in Iran.  It was what we would see, and then there was this secret one that has the real power, and it seems like the two are becoming one gradually now.  That is, by taking over two elections that they helped through a vetting process, that the two governments may become one eventually.  In some ways, that may be actually more helpful than having two voices, especially for international community that it is always confusing, like when reformers say things, “Is it real?” 

And then we find out afterwards that this is just intellectual exercise, what they have been saying and what they envision… they like to do; the real thing is something else.  The genius of Iranians - generally speaking, Shiites and, to some extent, Sunnis - for coming up with ways to control the masses is historical.  Over the course of Islamic history, over a million Hadish [phonetic] traditions have been fabricated, mostly through a combination of clerics and politicians to legitimize whatever power was there over the past 1400 years.  So they are very skilled in coming off with ways to make things work to their advantage. 

At this point, the groups that are running in Tehran - they need to focus on that actually because everywhere else, it looks like reformers have no chance - are supporters of President Ahmadinejad, and they have come up with this wonderful name for themselves.  They are called [indiscernible], which means “the pleasant scent of service;” that is the name of the group.  Iranian sense of poetry comes into play everywhere, including politics.  “Pleasant scent of service…” the phrase is taken out of a speech or remarks by the Supreme Leader when he addressed the performance of Ahmadinejad six months into his service when he was the mayor.  He said he inhales the pleasant scent of service because Ahmadinejad was the mayor now.  And so they have taken that phrase and that is what they call themselves. 

In the last council elections, Abadgaran or developers - the closest word we can find for translating that - were the ones who drove Ahmadinejad to power and other hardliners supporting him.  Now, Abadgaran is still there but kind off a group has broken off from Abadgaran called Abadgaran–i Javan, that is, the young Abadgaran.  It seems to become younger and younger.  In every Iranian election is a new generation that is coming up.  And these Abadgaran–i Javan are actually aligning themselves with Ghalibaf who is the present mayor of Tehran, who is a rival of Ahmadinejad. 

So in a way, the main competition in Tehran is now between the mayor Ghalibaf and supporters of Ahmadinejad who want -- the rumor is that -- to have the campaign manager -  remember, Ahmadinejad was campaign manager in 2003 -  to be the next mayor of Tehran, and his name is Bas Posh [phonetic], “someone who saw seats.”  All these names are so fascinating.  So he saw seats as he goes around; that is his name, Bas Posh.  And then, the chair of the council, the rumor is that is going to be Ahmadinejad’s sister, Parvin [phonetic].  So, in a way that is the vision they have now, Ahmadinejad’s supporters for the next council in Tehran. 

Now, the one reason that the hardliners won the election in the last council was low turnout; that always helps them.  And from some reports… I mean, they are so conflicting, you never know exactly which one to believe.  But some reports said that last election of Council in Tehran, the participation and maybe even nationwide, was 20 percent or less.  The first one in 1999, there was great enthusiasm about Councils because it was in the original constitution.  And even before constitution, Khomeini has started discussing councils in France before coming to Iran.  The documents were drawn out for that.  So the initial Revolutionary Councils were kind of the beginning of these Councils that Khomeini had in mind, but, later, laws were drawn; it was never implemented, and it just continued until Khatami’s time actually, when the first council elections took place. 

Now, what is at stake is that if indeed this Local Council in Tehran becomes important again, that would be relevant to the 2008 Majlis election, the next election of the Parliament, and 2009 presidential election.  So if reformers do not win, which looks like that… in fact there is very little public opinion survey done, but one that came out, and God knows who did it… but it took wide coverage.  Just individuals, support for individuals, this represents then support for the groups; because in these elections in Iran, you know it is always a list.  The groups give a list and someone goes to the booth and votes for a list rather than individuals. 

So according to this survey, Ahmadinejad’s popularity is at 47.3 percent; the next person, Rafsanjani, 6.4 percent, according to this.  Ghalibaf, who wants to stay the mayor, is 5.2 percent, and Karrubi, who has his own political party now and is participating in the elections, his people, is at 3.3 percent.  And I feel even if they are lying about it, it is kind of the distance between first and second person is so vast that it does not look like a good lie; it is a bad lie, from 47.3 percent to 6.4.  So, there may be actually some truth to it, that is what I’m saying.  And in which case, it means Ahmadinejad may actually -- his supporters may win and they may have actually more control of power by then. 

Now, of course, I focused more on council elections because I had been told that the gentlemen are going to address the Assembly of Experts.  But if there are any questions in relation to both of them, I would be happy to answer.

Michael Rubin:  Okay, with that let me open the floor to questions.  Just the four basic ground rules for the questions: Number one, wait for the microphone; number two, identify yourself and give your affiliation.  There is no one in Washington that does not have an affiliation.  There are plenty of people in Washington that might want to hide it.  Number three, questions usually end with a question mark and they are not preceded by a long soliloquy.  Let’s play jeopardy rules. Form your statement in the form of a question.  Fourth and lastly, you can ask as many questions as you want, but I’m going to direct the panel only to answer the first one. 

And with that, why do we not start here?  Please wait for the microphone.

Chris Shay [phonetic]:  Chris Shay for Sino [phonetic] Resources.  Thank you for your very interesting presentations.  I’m going to hope to sneak in two questions because one is…

Michael Rubin:  Please, I’m serious.

Chris Shay:  Notwithstanding your important point about the vetting process having eliminated so many candidates for the Assembly of Experts - that is what I’m talking about - can you discuss what the ballot looks like?  Do you sort of go in and then choose someone in your region?  What is the actual mechanics of it?  And there are these 86 positions; then are you… you choose to vote.  What does the ballot looks like?

Michael Rubin:  Who wants to address that?

Mohebat Ahdiyyih:  Well, you are talking of somebody [audio glitch] I assume?

Chris Shay:  [speaks away from the microphone] the name or how many names…?

Mohebat Ahdiyyih:  Yes, every election districts and there are… in fact, I do not think there are even enough candidates at this point that you would have competition in every district, so at some places just one name.  That is all the choice you have.  You go there and, I guess, mark the name or write the name down.  But most places, it may be actually two, at least, or maybe more, and you choose the names.

William Samii:  In the previous Council, in the previous Assembly, some provinces had only one representative, so I think, Semnan, Ilam, Sistan, and Baluchistan, some of the other provinces had only one representative, and each province gets its representation based on the size of the provincial population.  Now, the size of the population has increased;  there are more provinces in the country.  But if you look at the list of candidates and you can just go to IRNA, ILNA, ISNA, and you would find the list of candidates.  It is not 144, as some journalist said the other day; I could not believe it.  It is 163 and you have got 86 seats. 

So as Mohebat said, there are not going to be enough candidates to compete for every seat.  Eighty-six times two is 172; it is not 163.  So, that is the way it works, and the mechanics of it is that you vote for people in the province.  So, every province has at least two candidates but not every seat will have competition.

Michael Rubin:  Okay, other questions in the back and then we move to this side.

Hillough [phonetic]:  Thanks.  Hillough [audio glitch] of the Hudson Institute.  I guess my question is really directed to Bill Samii, but it is in relationship to what Mr. Khalaji said.  Do you agree that the Assembly of Experts is a very diminished institution?  But even if you do agree with that, do you think it is still important, as you said at the outset, or there is a very strong desire on the part of Ahmadinejad’s group to make a strong showing there?  For if for no other reason -- symbolic purposes -- but that would -- I address that question to you…

Michael Rubin:  One question…

William Samii:  I agree with Mehdi that when you get down to the technicalities and the letter of the Law, it is a diminished institution.  It is supposed to supervise the Supreme Leader, but every time it has a meeting - and it usually has biannual meetings.  The minimum is one meeting a year and it usually has two a year - you get this boilerplate statements about,”We discuss the Supreme Leader’s performance; he is doing a great job,” and then they go on and talk about, “We have to be cautious of the enemy’s cultural assault against the Islamic Republic.” 

You know, vague, boilerplate statements like that.  They are usually tailored to fit the event of the day.  In the past, they praised Iran’s nuclear pursuits.  Why a bunch of clerics is discussing this, I do not know.  So, its actual powers are diminished in terms of symbolism, which is what I was talking about, and in terms of political momentum.  That is where I think it is quite significant. 

One other area in which -- not just this election, but the reason why Iran loves having elections, the regime loves having elections, is that it claims that the people support the regime.  And so, they always trot out the numbers on how great participation in the elections has been.  I find it a very telling sign that Interior Minister Pour-Mohammadi said on the 27th of November, “We are going to have 63 percent participation in this election.”  Now, if the number turns out to be near that, I would not be surprised.  And the problem is that Iran does not allow independent observers into the country to tell the rest of the world how legitimate the election is. 

And it is also telling that in the last presidential election, observers from political parties were actually prevented from observing in some polling places.  In one case, an interior ministry official in at least one case was actually locked up in a closet by Ahmadinejad’s supporters when he tried to intervene in the vote-counting process.

Michael Rubin:  Okay, I’m going to take some questions on this side starting in the back and working my way forward and I have seen some other questions over there and we will have time for a second round, of course.  Just while we are waiting, I do want to add that I remember recently an election in Tajikistan; they were very proud that 109 percent of eligible voters had cast their ballots in one of the districts.

Vladimir Kara-Murza:  Thanks.  I’m Vladimir Kara-Murza with RTVI Russian Television.  What would you expect the US administration’s reaction to be to this election?  Usually, when there is a foreign election, the State Department or the White House Press Office comes out with a statement.  What do you expect the official US position to be towards the Iranian elections?  Thanks.

Michael Rubin:  To say very briefly, I do not expect that there will be much of a statement, if anything.  Basically, if the United States develops a coherent policy towards Iran, I would be happy.  But at this point, it does not seem to have one, generally, let alone with the precision that would require to have such a statement.  Yes, moving forward.

Pete Paraschos:  Pete Paraschos, ITTA.  There is some discussion in the Iranian Parliament about advancing the 2009 presidential elections to February 2008.  I would wonder if anybody would like to take a crack at that and tell us where that stands and why it is significant.  Thanks.

Mohebat Ahdiyyih:  I will just make a quick comment about that.  In fact, we looked at that very closely to see if this represents a significant challenge to Ahmadinejad by trying to reduce his term.  Although, there were some comments by some Majlis deputies that pointed in that direction, like the scenario was the Majlis would pass a bill that would reduce the president’s term so that elections could be concurrent in 2008, that is, Majlis and the presidential election, and then the Council of Guardians is going to turn that down, reject that and then the bill would go to Expediency Discernment Council, which is headed by Hashemi Rafsanjani. 

So, some people were really excited about the prospects of something like that happening, and Rafsanjani actually deciding whether Ahmadinejad is going to serve his full term.  It turned out that may not be the case.  They said most probably if that happens, they would increase Majlis' term to coincide with the election of the president.  It looks it is going in that direction if that happens.  The threat is not completely removed because the comments made in Majlis, specifically whereby some that it could go either way; either the president's term would be reduced, or Majlis' term would be increased.  So, that is where we stand now.

Michael Rubin:  Thank you.  Moving forward, why do we not take one in the front row and then -- actually two in the front row.

Rafam Hostatin [phonetic]:  Rafam Hostatin, Voice of America.  When dealing with Iran, especially US and countries of the West, they deal with the situation that [phonetic] had talked about, that there are hidden decision-makers and something public.  Potentially, this Council of Experts, if they have potentially that power to select and oversee the performance of the leader, do you think the ingredients of that Council, the people and their backgrounds, would change the dynamics of the relations between Iran and West, particularly the United States?  This question is for anybody who wants to answer.

William Samii:  I think a lot of institutions have, if not a formal and direct role in the decision-making process in the country, they still have an influence.  That influence is sometimes wielded not through -- over public statements -- but just through discrete discussions or by family connections, educational connections, whether they trained to the same seminary, whether they are from the same town, things like that.  So, the informal processes are very significant.  It is really difficult to track or to really -- I do not want to say “quantify” but do any sort of systematic study of that, but I think it is very significant.

 Bill Royce [phonetic]:  Bill Royce, Voice of America.  My question is a more general one.  It is directed first to Mehdi and if anybody else has a comment.  You know, the shadow of Rafsanjani is behind everything in observations from the West.  But from observations in Iran, I do not see him as being very significant; I might be wrong.  He lost horribly in the elections.  He is very low on the polls.  It is constantly spoken about why is he considered so important, in the West, especially?

 Mehdi Khalaji:  Rafsanjani became a political myth in Iran.  You know that in Iran, election is first of all a decision which is going to be taken by the government and then people participate in the election.  They can make the election seen in a way that the people who wanted to be elected can be elected.  If Rafsanjani has lost in the last two elections, it was because Khamenei did not want him to be elected.  It was because he lost his power inside the Revolutionary Guard and other political organization and economic foundations.  Because before losing the social popularity, he lost his places inside the power structure in Iran. 

So, that is why Rafsanjani cannot be considered an influential political figure in Iran anymore; and people in Iran, they do not rely on him.  But, unfortunately reformist, as they calculate, always rank.  At this time, they try to use Rafsanjani for their purposes.  They try to save themselves through Rafsanjani, which I think cannot work out for them.  And as Rafsanjani betrayed his followers and his loyalists before, he cannot betray them again.  But it is very important to know that in Iran, the power is not in the hand of one person.  It is true.  But, more or less, power is centralized, and the final decision maker is Ayatollah Khamenei, the Supreme Leader. 

It is true that there are many sources of influence in Iran but it is Ayatollah Khamenei who can decide at the end.  And the Iranian constitution, which is, I think, one of the paradoxical constitutions in the world, allowed him to exercise his absolute power.  If you look at the constitution, there are some articles which looked like very democratic articles.  But they can be overruled by other articles which are not democratic.  This constitution allows the Supreme Leader to have control even on the religious authorities, rather than only political authorities.  In analyzing Iranian situation in every moment and every instance we have to keep in mind that this is Ayatollah Khamenei who is the final decision-maker.

 Michael Rubin:  Why don’t we take some more -- I will come back to the VOA contingent in a second.  Why do not we take a question right up here and work back this side again.

 Derrick Mitra [phonetic]:  Derrick Mitra, Iran Analytical Report.  There have been a couple of recent announcements; one, that Hashemi Rafsanjani has disavowed his affiliation with the reformists and, one, that Mehdi Chamran, who, as widely been reported, is leading the Ghalibaf support group has also disavowed his allegiance to Ghalibaf.  I was a little puzzled by these developments.  I was wondering if you had any thoughts on them and what they might signify.

 Michael Rubin:  Thank you.  Who wants to take that?

Mohebat Ahdiyyih:  Well, I do not know.  It may be true everywhere with politicians, but they can speak from both sides of their mouth and it serves different groups.  I mean, on the one hand, they could have one of their spokesmen say that “I am for Ghalibaf” until the other one says “I'm not for Ghalibaf.”  So that is not unheard of in Iranian politics.  To keep the balance, so, that is, Chamran, over-passed a few months even since Ahmadinejad was elected, has been showing signs that he is not happy with Ahmadinejad as much as he expected in helping him.  You know, he was the chairman of the… he is the council in Tehran.  Who was the other person you mentioned? 

[Inaudible]

Mohebat Ahdiyyih:  Yes, Rafsanjani.  Of course, Rafsanjani is the ultimate politician.  In fact, going back to Bill's question about why Rafsanjani is being talked about so much is I think my colleagues may have more comments about it.  Generally speaking, with the advent of this movement, Ahmadinejad, hardline secularists and whatever else they are called… at least, I do not know you agree with me, I see a decline of clerics as a whole.  Not all the clerics, the traditional ones.  The so-called pragmatists.  There is a select group of clerics, the extremists, including Mesbah Yazdi and the supreme leaders, representatives in different institutions; they may be winners out of this whole process.  But the traditional clerics, in fact, some Ahmadinejad advisers have cited traditions, a thousand-year-old tradition pointing to the fact that the hidden imam is going to slaughter the clerics.  I mean, this actually has come out in public in Iranian media.  So, there is a tension there between secularists and clerics going on right now in Iran.

Mehdi Khalaji:  Not only between secular and religious factions, but there is a competition.  The real competition is now going on between the hardliners and religious authorities.  As my colleague said, now we do not have any secular faction active in Iran.  Even secular intellectuals, they do not find any chance for speaking loudly or publishing their books or articles or be culturally active.  But the competition now is going on between two religious trends - a hardliner trend and a moderate trend, or traditional trend. 

As my colleague said, the cultural adviser of Ahmadinejad, he publicly said when the hidden imam comes, he is going to behead some of ullamah, some of the clerics.  It means that they claim that there are two claims to a competition which is going on over the authentic interpretation of Islamic text and who is the real representative of Islam.  Ahmadinejad claims not to be only a political leader but the representative of real Islam, the original Islam, the authentic Islam; that makes clerics very angry on him and that makes a very harsh competition between traditional religious faction inside the political order and hardliners.

William Samii:  Just one thing that was being discussed.  I think a very interesting point.  I was speaking with an Iranian scholar about one month ago and some research that he has done in the country in the last year finds that what is becoming very popular, especially among these younger fundamentalists… something called the Mada [phonetic], which is not a formally trained cleric or religious leader but an informal one.  And the claim is that these people, such as Ahmadinejad himself, [indiscernible] people like these are the Madas.  What this symbolizes to me, anyway, is that if this younger generation is turning to these religious leaders who are not formally trained, what they are doing, therefore, is rejecting the more traditional and formally trained religious leaders.  And that I think that is pretty significant.

Michael Rubin:  Yes, sir?

Stanley Kover [phonetic]:  Stanley Kover with the Cato Institute.  This follows up logically.  In the Soviet area, we use to talk about a cult of personality.  And I’m wondering as I read the Iranian press whether we are not seeing the emergence of a cult of personality around Ahmadinejad; I see Mr. Khalaji nodding.  I have been struck by two things in particular:  One, the amount of press attention on Ahmadinejad gets.  When there is an important announcement like the nuclear program, it is Ahmadinejad; and the pictures that accompany the announcements are extraordinary to me. 

And second, his visits to the provinces -- if you wanted to solidify your base electorally, this would be a way to do it.  He goes there; he shows “I’m sympathetic to you.  We are listening to you in Tehran,” and I’m not sure if this is getting the attention it deserves.  So, this is the question:  Are we seeing a cult of personality developing around Ahmadinejad?  And if so, what are the implications for the Iranian political and even constitutional system?

Michael Rubin:  Thank you.

Mohebat Ahdiyyih:  In fact, confirming what you said that a lot of these things are happening in Iran is a book that came out about Ahmadinejad.  The name of the book is Miracle of the Third Millenium.  Now, of course the surprising thing is actually using Christian millennium to connect Ahmadinejad and that is very unusual.  But on the other hand, this buildup of Ahmadinejad, as Bill said, these madas, which are kind of -- almost close like lay clerics in that sense.

Mehdi Khalaji:  The mada, they are religious [indiscernible].  That is it.  They do not have any religious knowledge.  They do not get any religious training.  What is striking is that mada are replacing clerics.  They are the people who do not have any religious background or education.

Mohebat Ahdiyyih:  Actually that is what the word “lay” indicates there.  That is the fact that the grassroots, these are in neighborhoods, mosques, people who praise the Ashura, the events of Kabbalah, and all of that, and what revolves around that.  So, there is a rise, in answer to your question, to that movement for cult of personality.

William Samii:  One thing I was going to say about the cult of personality and the reason we see such extensive coverage of the president… this is what the regime wants.  In August of this year President Ahmadinejad’s press adviser stated very specifically the media should be pro-government.  It should support the government.  Newspapers that are not sufficiently supportive of the government have been closed down.  Journalists have been threatened with arrest or dragged into trials.  I mean, this is what the regime wants and if you look at Iran Newspaper, the official government newspaper, it is just typical.  They closed this thing back in May on the pretext that it caused ethnic riots.  They wait until personnel [indiscernible] as they looked for jobs.  When the newspaper resumes publication about five or six months later, it is just a government mouthpiece.  You compare Iran Newspaper now with what it used to be, and really, it is just [indiscernible] press statements one after another.

Michael Rubin:  Yes?

Suzanne Yanci [phonetic]:  I’m Suzanne Yanci from State Department - Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.  I thought I had read a press report and all of the press reports have been coming out regarding the reformists actually starting to organize themselves into a cohesive unit, particularly for the municipal elections.  And I was just wondering if you could speak a little bit to that.  I know that this is one of the biggest criticisms that they got from the 2005 elections.

Michael Rubin:  I’m not sure whether the press release was coming from Nick Burns’ office but if any of you want to take that question?

Mehdi Khalaji:  Reformists have lots of problems in this election because many of them who were very active during Khatami’s period, like Abbas Abdi or [phonetic], they do not believe that elections is an effective means to change anything in political atmosphere in Iran.  So, there is discourse of boycott in Iran which is held by some of the reformists.  A great part of these reformists, they have many internal discussions about making or forming a coalition. 

And they have lots of problems because many of them, they believe that “We do not have to trust Rafsanjani and his team.”  Part of them believe that “We can use Rafsanjani and his team in order to get the lost power, in fact.”  So, they do not look very powerful in this election.  And we have to keep in my mind that reformists, whether they get elected or not, they are the losers of this election because they were the winner in the first city council elections.  In that council, they could not do any great job.  They had lots of dispute.  They did not resolve any urban problems.  They appointed Malekmadani and then Morteza Alviri as mayor of Tehran and they were one of the worst mayors of Tehran and incapable to deal with the problems of this big city.  So, they have not shown any good performance, and, always, they justified their incapability by the force of conservatives. 

And many people now ask them if conservatives, they do not allow you to work, why are you participating in the election and why are you trying to get elected?  If you get elected, you are going to confront the same problems and repeat the same experience.  So, if you get elected, you cannot work.  And if you do not get elected, you prove that you have lost your popularity and social legitimacy.

Michael Rubin:  Okay, I am going to go back to Hillough [phonetic] and then the gentlemen from CNO and then we move to the other side.

Hillough:  Thank you.  My question is directed to all three panelists, but it is probably most easily stated directed to Mehdi.  As you described the situation at present, Khameini has the power and utilizes it to constrain a variety of different forces, but including Ahmadinejad’s people.  [Audio glitch] you or your colleagues understand that constraint as based on any ideological difference, or simply a question of personal interest?  Yes, that’s the question.  I do want to make one observation about elections.  They have many uses, and in the case of Iran they permitted the former Deputy Secretary of State to inform the US Congress that Iran was a democracy which had, presumably, some uses for Iran.

Michael Rubin:  Okay.  To the question now.

Mehdi Khalaji:  When we talking about Khameini, I think it is very difficult to make distinction between personal interest or public interest or political or ideological interest.  It is very difficult.  According to the constitution, the exclusive source of interpretation of the constitution is the Guardian Council.  And Guardian Council members are appointed by Khameini.  So, this is Khameini who has the right to interpret the constitution. 

According to the theory of absolute power of absolute authority of jurists or Velayat Faqih, Ayatollah Khameini has the right to overrule even Shari’ah or Islamic Law.  But if he sees that it is in favor of the regime and by safeguarding this regime, we can overrule even the basic orders and duties of the Shari’ah and Islamic Law.  This is the authority of Velayat Faqih, or the Supreme Leader.  If he has such an absolute power, how can you make distinction between personal interest or public interest?  Ayatollah Khameini knows very well. 

First of all, he is the most experienced political figure in Islamic Republic.  He was the Member of Parliament.  He was a president two terms.  He is the leader of Islamic Republic for about 17 years and he knows everything about military forces, intelligence services, and he has a representative everywhere.  He has the largest network in the country.  The people in Iran are joking and saying that he has representative even in the tomato sauce factory. 

So, everything is under his control and he knows this factionalized structure of politics in Iran.  He knows everything about the various factions inside the Revolutionary Guard, inside the army, inside intelligence service, inside parliament, inside executive power, inside judiciary power.  He knows these factions and he is trying to play with them.  Sometimes he is provoking one faction against another one, sometimes trying to make the role of somebody who reconcile between them.  And he uses all this factionalized situation or composition in his own favor. 

That is why I say that it is true that the power in Iran is fragmented; it is factionalized.  But the final decision-maker is Ayatollah Khameini.

Kurt Shea [phonetic]:  Kurt Shea for [indiscernible] Resources, thanks.  I wanted, if I could, just to pursue a bit further the question of Ahmadinejad’s power base.  Stanley had pointed out this sort of idea is that he has gone out to the provinces but he also made a lot of promises on those early road shows.  And I am wondering, is he able to deliver on them?  Is his power base solidifying itself, or is it fragmenting?  So, how should we understand right now Ahmadinejad popularity?  And I want to cite the New York Times article today.  It might just be a one-off but it highlights a frustration by students about his decisions to make changes in these institutions.  Is that just sort of a one-off or is that an end-in-sight to frustrations, broadly?

William Samii:  I thought it was interesting that the students were demonstrating against Ahmadinejad because they demonstrate against Khatami, as well.  And so what this indicates to me is that basically they have a tradition of voicing their objections.  And just as this time you had a pro-reform kid burning a picture of the president and sort of brawls breaking out, the same thing was going on when Mr. Khatami was president.  The hardline students would sort of shout them down and then more interestingly perhaps was that later on it came to be that the pro-reform students were complaining about the president, too. 

At this point, I do not think you are having previous supporters of the President shouting him down; that is not happening yet.  In terms of the Ahmadinejad road show, I think one scholar compared this to sort of the medieval court going out through the land and distributing wealth right and left.  What the President is doing is he is helping people on an individual basis.  He is not really implementing systematic improvements to what is going on in the provinces.  That is significant.  What he is doing also to sort of build up his power base is not so much this common populist touch that helped him win office, but he is replacing top officials and he is reorienting the way the bureaucracy works, the way money is distributed to the provinces. 

So, there is talk about his decentralization and he promoted decentralization when ran for office.  Well, what he has really done is send officials closely identified with him out to the provinces as governors-general, and he has also taken some of the powers of the management and budget organization and transfer that to the interior ministry that is run by his associates.

Michael Rubin:  Two last questions.  First in the back right there, and then in the front.

David Sands [phonetic]:  Yes, thank you.  David Sands with the Washington Times.  Are there substantive differences on domestic or foreign policy issues between the conservatives that you talked about and the hardliners behind Ahmadinejad, or is it all just religion and ideology in power?

Mohebat Ahdiyyih:  You mean traditional conservatives and hardliners?  Is that what you mean?  First and second generation. The word “pragmatist” has been often used to describe those traditional conservatives like Rafsanjani.  They believe in negotiations, in talking to the West to some extent; and although Hassan Rohani, the head of the previous nuclear negotiating team said openly at the US’ negotiation mechanism to actually gain time, that is what we do.  But they do talk about that, practical ways of kind of solving the problems that Iran has.  Hardliners emphasize the pure fundamentalist principles that they believe in. 

And I think in this whole discussion about Rafsanjani, Khameini, all of that, one thing we should really pay close attention to in months to come is the role of IRGC, Islamic Revolution Guard Corps.  That is really where the main power lies.  Ahmadinejad is a veteran of IRGC; Khameini is the commander-in-chief of IRGC and Mesbah-Yazdi does a lot of indoctrination work and training for IRGC and the Basij forces, so that is really were the hidden hand is that we all need to follow and find out how that would work in months to come.

Michael Rubin:  Thank you.  I apologize that the neo-cons caused the glass to fall over.  Up front.

Dominic Valone [phonetic]:  Hi, Dominic Valone, Voice of America Persian service.  I will take another tack on an earlier question.  What is or what should be the United States’ interest in these upcoming elections?

Mehdi Khalaji:  The United States State Department, if I remember correctly, issued statements for last parliamentary elections.  And they called it “unfair” as an election, which is not free.  And they wanted to influence or support reformists in Iran by these statements.  I think a new statement about election in Iran, which is theoretically, the most important election in Iran and, theoretically, is capable to give or provide the regime with legitimacy, it is a good idea.  And say that this election is not a free and fair election and is unable to give legitimacy or democratic legitimacy to such a government.  And make distinction between populism and democracy; and say that it is a populistic theater but not a democratic election.

Michael Rubin:  Thank you very much.  With that I do want extend my thanks to everyone that helped, especially Omeed Jafari who put this panel together.  I want to take our panelists who came in through Virginia traffic and elsewhere.  And I at least found that -- and I do not often say this is -- those of you who are repeat attendees at these conferences, now I found this is one of the most informative discussions that I have heard on the subject.  It is nice sometimes to get into the weeds and to talk about the nuts and bolts.  So, I want to thank all three of you for making that possible.  Thank you.

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