American Enterprise Institute

February 13, 2007

[Edited transcript from audio tapes]

9:45 a.m.	Registration
10:00	Panelists:	Salah al-Bandar, Gulf Centre for Democratic Development
		Abdul Hadi Al-Khawaja, Bahrain Center for Human Rights
		Toby Jones, Swarthmore College
	Moderator:	Danielle Pletka, AEI
11:30	Adjournment

Proceedings:

Danielle Pletka:  Thank you again for braving this just dreadful weather - if you look out the window and the hysteria that always ensues when we have weather of this kind - to join us this morning.  I’m Danielle Pletka; I’m the Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy Studies here at the American Enterprise Institute.  And it is, I think, always useful to focus on things that do not get enough attention; one of them is the case of Bahrain. 

It is really interesting to watch as the Middle East has become consumed by the idea that there is a vast battle ahead, a battle between the Sunni Muslims and the Shia Muslims of the world, and that this is something that the United States has ginned up with our invasion of Iraq, the weakening of Iraq and the subsequent rise of Iran.  I think that is a very convenient political overlay on a situation that is far more complex and far more challenging than many people would like to admit.  Also, the fact that we have woken up now and noticed that there are, in fact, Sunni and Shia in the Middle East is a little bit ironic, to say the least. 

Bahrain is really a case in point, a country that most people, if they know anything, certainly do not know that there is a Sunni minority leadership, that there is a Sunni government, and that country which is - my colleagues may disagree with me - but 65 percent Shia and largely unrepresented in the past and now under-represented majority.  The government has gone to great lengths to ensure that the Shia majority remains under-represented within the government, going so far as to imprison on more than one occasion one of our guests here; another lives now in exile. 

In fact, Abdul Hadi was arrested largely because, I hear, of this conference and your willingness to speak out on these issues -- taken in, held for seven hours, questioned and then charged, and I have a list of some of the particulars here.  You were charged with two other activists with intention to change the country’s governing system, circulating false information and insulting the king and inciting hatred of the regime.  Those are familiar-sounding charges from most dictatorships, and I did not think that Bahrain had wanted to portray itself as a dictatorship to the Western world.  It is a shame that they have done so.  In any case, this presents to us a great opportunity to discuss some of these issues in-depth, in an intimate setting among ourselves today. 

And so without further ado, let me just quickly introduce our guests.  To my right is Salah al-Bandar.  He is the Secretary General of the Gulf Centre for Democratic Development in London, writes on political affairs, is a community activist.  He lived in Bahrain from 1990 to 2006 and actually worked as a consultant in the government’s Cabinet Affairs Ministry and Statistics Agency.  But after disseminating a report accusing the government of fomenting sectarian strife and insinuating, by the way, that the government had been insinuating that the Shia are in league with the Iranians for hegemony in the Gulf, he was expelled from the country. 

Abdul Hadi Al-Khawaja, who I referred to earlier, is a human rights activist, Executive Director of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights.  And I thank you again for making the effort to be with us today. 

Finally, Toby Jones, who also made an effort to be with us today but only from Swarthmore College, is a visiting assistant professor in the History Department at Swarthmore.  And his research interests include state building politics, Shia-Sunni relations in Saudi Arabia and in the rest of the Gulf.  So I’m going to turn down the line.  We are going to go with presentations from the panel and then we will have a little bit of time, I hope, for questions and answers.  Thank you, sir.

Salah al-Bandar:  Chairperson Pletka, and I want to commend, first of all, the AEI for holding this discussion panel about the reforms in Bahrain.  We express our appreciation for this opportunity to speak to you today about our efforts to let Bahrain become a sustainable, striving and stable democracy.   Let me start, ladies and gentlemen, by going straight to the heart of the matter, by saying that work like this which we are having each day should continue to drive for dismantling the structures of social containment, institutional discrimination and exclusion in Bahrain.  I think, of course, it would be in everyone’s interest if conflict could be prevented before it broke out.  Timely preventive measures are far easier and cheaper in political and human terms and efforts to try to stop or slow down confrontation once it has begun.  And this is exactly the situation today in Bahrain. 

Let me say, also, that the Bahrain reform experiment has come a long way since the 1990s despite everything.  The recent elections are one major step forward on the path of democratization in Bahrain.  Yet, the 1990s experiment in terms of violence and counter violence between the State and the people and the movement perhaps is a classic example for the benchmark and merits serious consideration when we talk about democratic change in Arabia in general.  We have to take into consideration the role of the ruling families in the Gulf as a prime source of instability and oppression towards their people.  This is the gist of what we want really to discuss with you today. 

At the moment, the Bahrain experiment with political reforms is facing serious, perhaps insurmountable risks and hurdles.  This progress towards a promised constitution and monarchy will continue to move backwards and become even slower after the 2006 elections.  In my judgment, for the foreseeable future however, we have little else to expect but to witness slow down and even complete reversal of the so-called His Majesty the King’s Reform Project.  Crises sometimes happen to be a turning point in history, serving as an eye-opener that stimulates fundamental reversal of behavior. 

In the case of Bahrain, it reflects a unique reality, always mixing the danger of crisis with the opportunity for change.  As we all recognized and we will see in this room and definitely in our discussions that Bahrain reforms has reached a crossroads.  King Hamad is avoiding the public vision that is well-recognized in the national charter as a bill of rights.  He is doing so by establishing an underground system outside the rule of law, which makes it possible for the Royal Court to avoid legitimate accountability and strengthening outright control of the civic society while maintaining a positive image abroad as a model of constitutional monarchy. 

This in context -- it is possible to speak about the control system consisting of dominant tools over political actors, institutions, and over the rules of the game over the democratic game.  And that reflects itself in four elements which are a central system of governance linked directly to the Royal Court, along with active weakening of all other institutions, including the elected ones.  Control over the Parliament, trade union movements and associations and even the Judiciary; full control over the media in order to govern public opinion; control over all aspects of elected bodies, converting them from being a tool to express the will of the people into a means of legitimizing the decisions made by the regime.  And lastly, weakening the civil society so that it can no longer fulfill its function in the system and being gradually replaced by substitute bogus NGOs that link directly to the government and are absolutely dependent on the system itself and do not have any independent foundation. 

The core objectives of the Royal Court are, first, strengthening the powers of the Supreme Defense Council at the time when the region is facing very serious challenges regionally and internationally, and at the same time, alongside weakening all other institutions, the elected bodies or the appointed ones.  Second, complete dominance and control over the opposition.  And thirdly, ultimate control over the elected Council of Representatives, turning the winning of the opposition of almost 63 percent of the votes from means of empowerment of the people into a means of legitimizing the regime’s decision. 

The year 2006, and I believe the previous four years, is marked by a whole set of failures by the Al-Khalifa regime and brought further changes in the direction of outright authoritarianism.  This indeed is well-documented in all the reports which you see in Amnesty International, the Human Rights Watch, and even in the Department of State publications.  And I think my colleagues here, Dr. Jones and Mr. Al-Khawaja, will elaborate further on that. 

Indeed, with the decreasing support of the regime, we witnessed that in 2001 during the referendum of the national charter, 98 percent voted in favor of supporting the regime project.  At the last election, less than 37 percent of a core political base of Islamists supported the program.  So that is from 98 percent now the government is legitimizing its political will around 37 percent, and that is very serious. 

The 2006 events also pulled off the beautiful public relation masks and revealed an ugly and vicious face.  For the overwhelming majority, it was the real face of reforms.  It showed a regime with an institutional cause of exclusion and outright discrimination against the majority of the citizens.  Of course, many people knew the reality behind the masks and were not quite the same.  But 2006 events, sudden confrontation with that reality was for many people profoundly shocking, including myself, and a challenge to action. 

Bahrain now is firmly in the league of the few states that democracy promotion groups are increasingly confronting, not only outright oppression, but the efforts largely associated with authoritarian regimes, committed to undermining, countering and reversing democratic changes.  And as our two reports by the GCDD showed and revealed the tools of exclusion which are meant to control not only what is happening inside Bahrain.  For us we believe that is going to be across the region because the issue is related to an organizational set-up and well-endowed machinery and strategic plan for five years.  On the other hand, it is reasonable to say that there are three surprising circumstances that are clear now in Bahrain. 

First of all, more radicalization of the democratic forces and in a broader sense, a lot the part of the community affected by the repression is very clear about this awareness and understanding of changes that are confronting; ability of civil society to spontaneously organize around more focused issues and political campaigns and even direct actions; a limitation of the regime’s ability to restrict access to information. 

I will jump and try to remind people about what is going on in Bahrain at the moment where the government is trying hard to link the genuine opposition forces to being aligned closely with what is going on against Iraq and trying to implicate the genuine democratic forces inside the country as being part and parcel and stooges of the Iranian plan to dominate the region.  And on that kind of concept, they would like to sell it to the international community that now they are dealing with agents of Iranian plots in the Middle East, in particular in the Gulf.  I think in May 1996, four Saudi men were publicly executed for bombing the American mission in Riyadh.  That was the first political execution since the takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, which happened 17 years earlier. 

The connection here that at that time, those four men, they were against -- in fact, they were against the Saudi’s corrupt regime.  They were not in any sense part and parcel of any conspiracy against the American interests.  But they managed to sell it by their public relations to the Americans that they are dealing with a terrorist cell which is going to frustrate and count the Americans in the region.  And under that cover they managed to crush the Saudi opposition, and the rest is history for us because since that time, the Saudi opposition in the region is facing very serious problems because the Americans gave at that time the right cover-up for them to crush the rest of -- in fact, five years after that, 9/11 happens; the rest is history.

Today, we are struggling with the same kind of concept at the time when the government is trying to sell to the international community and their close allies here in Washington that they are dealing with stooges of Iranian plot to undermine the situation.  In fact, Bahrain today is considered one of the major non-NATO allies and hosts the American 5th fleet.  And the free trade agreement is already going very well between the two countries.

And the ruling family in Bahrain now, they are happy to be seen as a close ally to the Free World, but in our view that is not a good reason for them -- although the public opinion here in Washington to give them the cover to go and hit the genuine opposition against a corrupt ruling family in that region.  In fact, we are seeing the way that they are trying to project the whole opposition movement as being against the national security of Bahrain, and at the same time, it is against the American interest in the region, and intended to persuade, most of the time, the American administration that they are a victim of a bunch of militant, Hezbollah-like groups in Bahrain -- and fanatics.  In fact, the Royal Court at the moment is urging America and the Free World to keep silent towards the intention of the king to crush the opposition in the near future, possibly by this summer. 

If Washington accepted the Royal Court position, it will have lasting implications for Bahrain, the Gulf region and the United States and beyond.  In fact, there is only one issue which I want here to highlight today, which is not related immediately or directly to what is going on in Bahrain; it is related to why that small island is exceptionally important at the moment for the Free World.  Bahrain is the capital of the Islamic banking system.  From Bahrain, the Muslim brotherhood and the Islamists are running a control of network of 300 Islamic financial institutions in four countries, forty countries including the United States itself. 

And since 9/11, this network is growing by more than 20 percent annually.  Today, they control total assets of more than $300 billion.  Seventy percent of all deposits in the six GCC countries at the moment are now in the hands of these Islamic banks, and by 2013 there will be more than $1 trillion in the hands of these Islamic banks, which is based in Bahrain and controlled from it. 

The political objective of the Islamists in Bahrain at the moment is to fully control the administration of these resources, the sooner the better.  That is why the Sunni Islamist who is controlling these Islamic banks is bringing that sectarian conflict by trying, scaring the West that the Shia is going to take over at the time when they are working harder to control these resources, which is even more important.  It is much easier for a Shia to work as a bodyguard for the King himself than working in these Islamic banks.  They are exclusively run by Islamist, who is running a network of financial services around the Middle East; Hamas, the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, you name it --Sudan, West Africa. 

All these Islamic banks are run from Bahrain and controlled from Bahrain and that is why at the moment, the Muslim brotherhood and the Islamists, they are trying to align themselves with some factions of the ruling family and trying to say that the Shia is going to take over Bahrain at the time when they are working harder to control those resources.  I think it is important to mention here it is much easier to deal with the conflict as being a sectarian conflict. 

At the moment, I do believe it is a fight around very significant resources, run by a network of Islamists in the Middle East based in Bahrain.  In fact, the political construction process since the 2001 reached its end by December 2006.  Five years of political tension and setbacks were exposed rather than diffused by the 2006 elections.  In fact, Bahrain at the moment faces many challenges before the democratic government is secured.  The current diplomatic efforts by the Royal Court to win Washington approval, actively or passively, to enact oppressive measures against the civic society, should not be allowed.  The American administration must continue to be engaged positively with the development in Bahrain and protect the fundamental rights of the people if the factors contributing to its instability are to be proactively solved. 

So what is waiting for us in 2007 and beyond?  Looking to the future, what is being done today to inspire trust in the path towards democracy?  The most critical issue is to inspire the confidence of the people in the integrity of the recent elections and believe that voting is worthwhile.  The second most critical is not to allow the King to use the current regional tension as an excuse to crush the democratic forces in Bahrain. 

We need to be very careful in setting that clear separation between the elements who are working in very close coordination with the Iranian Guard or intelligence or whatever, who is working against -- and definitely are working against the American interest in the region between the genuine democratic forces in that country.  Indeed, the government of Bahrain will continue this policy to do more than block all the possibilities for the elected opposition member at the moment to achieve anything. 

It will continue, also, its policy of marginalizing and controlling the role of the trade union movement.  Interestingly, the trade union movement in Bahrain has more membership than all the other political societies in the country.  And that is a neglected element as well because it is connected closely to the issues of wealth -- the distribution of wealth in Bahrain.  The fact remains that a stable Bahrain would require a serious effort from the international community to support the civil society, reject all measures of control and force the cooperation of the Royal Court in that.  With the set of past laws, an extensive security network and the mercenary forces at hand of the Royal Court has turned the whole political system to -- like a pressure cooker.  Indeed, by insisting on implementing their blueprints in controlling the civil society, that will turn the heat up. 

But there is another threat to Bahrain reform.  As we have all indicated in this, one that could kill it immediately is the silence of US about the outright problems that were well-reviewed and documented in the Department of State’s 2005 annual report, and the one which is due next month.  What is critical here is not just listing a set of breaches of international standards and agreements and stopping the issues of civil rights and attacking civil society and abusing the system itself.  For the Department of State to compile those kinds of very detailed abuses of the current regime and keep silent is a case that needs a very serious review. 

Indeed, an action is needed as soon as possible even to secure the situation.  Bahrain needs badly an American engagement that will strengthen the detailed reform process, empower civil society institutions and provide a measure of accountability for facing the serious challenges and dangers that lie ahead.  The rule of law must improve.  Transparency and hands-off approach by the Royal Court, if the people were to have confidence on what is going on in Bahrain and participate in a peaceful, democratic institutions.  That is the only road towards democracy. 

A lack of success in these areas will undermine the credibility of the democratic process and may risk demoralizing the aspirations of the majority of the citizens and jeopardize their ability to actively shape and strengthen the representative government and institution.  Then this is an obvious threat the American interests in Bahrain; nothing else.  If America ignores the Saudi case which I mentioned earlier by just giving the sanction for that corrupt regime to crush the opposition forces, and at the guise of being a threat to American interests in the region, if the current administration repeats the same in Bahrain, then, sadly, that will be very serious for the stability, and the regime will collapse. 

The political reconstruction process since 1990 reached its starting -- and by 2002.  And I think four years after that is going to be even more serious.  I do believe that political transformation is a gradual process.  Nobody will dispute that, and this is an argument all the time we listen to this corrupt regime saying it is going to be gradual.  But it requires more than just free elections.  It requires just and fair elections, and that is what is absent in Bahrain at the moment.  Civil liberties, the rule of law, independent judiciary and effective horizontally accountable institutions, and that again is missing in Bahrain and even in all Arabia. 

Free civic societies, including the media, and more importantly, civilian control over the military and the security forces.  That is what is important, and I think that is what the Americans should really work with the communities to secure it.  Bahrain has a long way to go.  What is going on in Bahrain today makes a mockery of democratic norms and values.  Miss Chairperson, ladies and gentlemen, let me finish by saying old attitudes in Gulf states die hard.  The ruling families have always been suspicious and often are frightened of that non-reliable, alien and unpredictable form of people participating in managing power and resources.  Thank you for listening.

Danielle Pletka:  Thank you very much for that presentation.  Dr. Jones?

Toby Jones:  Thank you very much.  I will keep my comments brief so that Abdul Hadi will have more time.  I am sure he is one of the two stars of the day, right?  So, I will attempt to provide some general commentary and some synthesis that may have a degree of repetition from what you hear from both Dr. al-Bandar and from Abdul Hadi. 

Let me start by saying, as a response to what Dr. al-Bendar said, the opposition in Bahrain, to be clear, is not Shia exclusively; it is actually mixed Sunni/Shia.  And the fact that we talk about it almost in exclusively sectarian terms today as a result of a prolongated political crisis there, we do not recognize other space of Sunni activists in the region. 

Bahrain is something of a paradox when it comes to political reform.  On the one hand, it is on the cutting edge of democratic and political transformation in the Middle East.  It was among the first countries in the region to institute free elections both at the municipal and parliamentary levels.  It certainly allowed for a degree of free speech in the country, with the exception of two arrests on the part of my colleague sitting in my right here. 

There have been -- even in spite of the arrests of Abdul Hadi, there have been a series of very confrontational, very provocative exchanges between the press, between the activists in Bahrain.  And we would argue, I think, and agree that there is a degree of political freedom with respect to what can be said, although Bahrainis are learning the hard lesson that there is accountability for what ultimately is expressed. 

On the other hand, in addition to being or -- and sort of in contradiction to being at the cutting edge of this political reform process in the region, Bahrain is also at the cutting edge of figuring out how to roll back the reforms that it instituted a little over five years ago and coming up with imaginative and creative ways to use the issue of political reform in the institutional changes that it has put in place to actually strengthen the hand of the Al-Khalifas’ authoritarianism.  The grip on power has been tightened in recent years, and reform elections, the creation of new institutions, has often served to expand the central grip on authority. 

At the heart of a lot of this, particularly increasingly, are sectarian tensions and anxieties.  They are both at the heart of the political process in Bahrain and at the heart of the paradox of how Bahraini political authorities have proceeded with the issue of democratic reform.  And the example of Abdul Hadi again is a powerful indicator of where the government stands - on the one hand, allowing a degree of speech, and on the other hand, cracking down quite severely when they perceive that he crosses the line or expresses something that is particularly sensitive. 

The primary problem facing the government, at least in the way it perceives its own interests and its grip on power, is that it is unwilling to move past the fear of the Shia community and its demographic weight in the country.  It refuses to engage seriously with various reform needs precisely because it perceives itself vulnerable to sectarian demographic patterns in the country, in which, I think, as we learned early on, the Shia represents somewhere between 60 and 70 percent of the island; depending on who you talk to, you will get a higher or lower number. 

But there is, really, very little dispute that they the overwhelming majority.  And most of them - I would say a good 80 percent of Bahraini Shia - are actually indigenous to the island, although there is a large expatriate community that has been there anywhere from one to three generations that have crossed form Iran's side of the Gulf.  The idea that there is a -- that they basically represent a migrant community that has no natural or indigenous roots in the island itself were fabricated and basically untrue.  In fact, the Al Khalifa -- the arrival of the Al Khalifa dates much later than most of the Shia community in the island. 

There is a groundswell in the region in the last couple of years, largely as a result of the disintegration of Iraq and the rise of Iran as a regional hegemon, or the resurgence of Iran as a regional power, of anti-Shia sectarianism on the part of governments that have Shia communities like Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, Kuwait, and even from governments that do not necessarily have a direct interest on whether or not there is Shia power in the Gulf, including Egypt and Jordan, both of whom have expressed a great deal of -- Mubarak and King Abdullah have expressed sectarian anxiety in the last couple of years, interestingly enough on both occasions after recent trips to the Gulf and meetings with the heads of states in those countries. 

One of the things that becomes clear if you spend any time in Bahrain, however, is that there is a long history of sectarianism, and the role of sectarianism as a political instrument in the country has been around for quite some time.  I would argue that it probably dates most clearly to -- as a result of Iran's revolution in 1979.  Anti-Shiaism became an instrument of political response on the part of Bahraini authorities to counter what they sensed were revolutionary and Shia political movements as a way to undermine their political credibility and integrity in the island itself. 

And the most important claim, as Dr. Al-Bandar mentioned, was to suggest that Bahrain's own Shia community really was primarily irredentist in the sense that it would -- preferred nothing more than to have joined forces geographically in terms of the institutions of the state and politically with Iran.  And it has been the common refrain, basically, ever since.  For those of you familiar with the island's history in the 1990s and before this current question about reform, the ‘90s were rife with violence that was primarily sectarian, the fact that it was Shia against the government -- although it was not necessarily expressed in those terms.  It was, I think, better understood as a social and political movement. 

And this gets us to the heart of the matter about what the current reform process is about, what it has claimed to be about, and what it is that Bahraini activists are after.  And I will describe this very briefly and then I will sort of end with an accounting of where I see both the reform process and where it stands today and where it could be headed.  In 2001, the new king of the newly declared kingdom announced by way of this national charter a commitment to democratic reform with the creation of the institutions that I mentioned earlier.  And yet it was clear early on that he was unwilling to part completely with any kind of significant political authority. 

So, for those of you familiar with the Bahraini political system, there are two chambers of the national legislature.  One is elected and one is appointed, so you have an upper and lower council.  The lower council has 40 members as does the upper council, although the upper council is sort of unique in the sense that it is exclusively appointed by the king and his supporters in the cabinet. 

To call it a legislature, to call it a parliament would be, frankly, misleading.  The elected branch of government has no ability to draft legislation or to enter legislation into discussion on the floor.  And even if they could, their power is ultimately checked by the upper parliament, which has equal authority to determine the outcome of whatever legislative issues are before the body as a whole. Which is to say that the upper parliament appointed by the king -- the upper house of parliament appointed by the king acts as a natural institutional check on the elected body. 

Complicating the situation of legislature, more generally -- of legislation more generally is affected -- only the cabinet and the king can introduce any new measures before the parliament for serious consideration.  So any legislation that is introduced for vote actually comes from the executive branch altogether.  A vote is held, and then that legislation goes back to the executive branch for approval. 

So, it would not even be fair to call Bahrain's parliament a rubber stamp; it is simply a mockery of any kind of parliamentary institution at all.  It functions very little.  It has become, to use a refrain common a few years ago, little more than a debating society in which members can basically accuse one another of various levels of political scandal and to seek, again, various levels of patronage from the government itself.  In addition to the problems with parliament, its actual -- sort of the thrust of -- or the crux of political frustration in the island has to do with the fact that the Shia are disproportionately under-represented within the institution itself. 

So if the institution was to have any political credibility and power, the primary Shia opposition movements argue that it would have to actually reflect the demographic weight of the community, overall.  So, if the community represents 65 percent of the country, they actually today hold fewer than -- I think they hold 16 seats in the parliament -- 18 seats in the parliament.  So, less -- 17 plus Abdul Aziz, yes, who is actually Sunni.  So, one of their partners from the opposition is Sunni.  So they hold 18 seats out of 40 when they represent 65 percent of the island's local population. 

So, you get a sense of the kinds of mechanisms that are put in place, that have historically been put in place to act as a check on the Shia political authority and power in the island.  Now, the ideological framework for justifying all of this is not -- I do not want to suggest that it is largely mythological because what it comes down to, as Dr. al-Bandar mentioned, is the implication that the island Shia community is preternaturally disposed or inclined toward Iranian politics and Iranian sensibility. 

There are close connections between Bahraini Shia and Iran, but they are not exclusively or even primarily political at this point.  But they may have been 25 years ago, although even then I think that is subject to some discussion and contention.  But today most Bahraini Shia pursue a decidedly nationalist politics.  The two objectives are the amelioration of social and economic grievances.  Bahrain is a country that is characterized by high rates of unemployment in spite of great financial wealth and open markets.  There is greater than 15 percent official unemployment.  I mean, I think the unofficial figures are probably close to 30 percent in the island.  And overwhelmingly, it is the Shia majority that bears the preponderance of -- or that is overwhelmingly unemployed in proportion to their position in the country. 

So, I do not know what the -- maybe Nabeel knows what the actual unemployment rates are within the Shia community.  But this has been consistently a social and economic crisis that persists within the community and has done so for the greater part of three decades.  And so, Shia political activism, at least since the 1990s, has been driven in part, at least, by the desire to see much of this ameliorating by the government where they perceive both the financial resources and the political will to make such things happen. 

The other issue, the other major element of Shia political activism in the island, at least since the early part of the 21st century, has been a commitment to political and democratic reform.  Now, of course it is in their best interest to -- I mean, it is within the Shia communities' best interest to promote an open political system, one that reflects the realities of the island's social and demographic make-up because that would give them a great deal of political authority within at least the parliament. 

And so, there is no getting around the fact that calls for -- the urgent demands for democracy would empower the Shia community at least within the elected branch of government.  I am not suggesting that that is a bad thing, but it simply is -- that sort of explains why there is a heavy emphasis on democracy as a specific form of government in Bahrain as opposed to other kinds of political reform.  But the key thing I want to emphasize is that what Bahrainis are arguing for, I mean, particularly within the Shia community is not the overthrow of government or the elimination of a constitution that would effectively guarantee institutional fairness, but simply a place within the political system that would assure that those things function the way that the government says it wants them to function. 

So the second prong Bahraini-Shia political activism is a call for a kind of political justice that creates space for them within the existing institutions and maintain some sense of fairness about how they operate.  In 2006, in November, the largest opposition society in Bahrain, the Shia organization, called Al-Wifak, ended, or led the end, of a boycott of the country's parliamentary elections.  In 2002, as a backdrop to this -- in 2002, Al-Wifak, along with three major Sunni groups refused to participate in the elections precisely because of the imbalances that they detected within the system along with the set of secondary grievances.  They ended the boycott in 2006.  Al-Wifak won 17 seats, one member -- actually one non-aligned member of the opposition, Abdul Aziz, a member of the former constitutional committee, were elected to parliament. 

Now, as a way of getting to a discussion or sort of shaping a discussion about where we might see or detect the-- sort of how reform is going to go and specifically to ask questions about the future of stability in Bahrain is to figure out what role Al-Wifak sees itself as playing in this new parliament.  Ending the boycott was intended to produce political pressure on the government in order to accommodate the demands of both the society and the opposition, more generally. 

But the reality is that it has achieved very little in the few months that it has been in parliament.  And it probably -- and its members probably understood that it held considerably more power as a potential threat to walk out of the parliament and cripple the institution at some later day.  And those are threats that the society does not necessarily make openly, but also does not refute openly either.  So, if the perception proceeds or if Al-Wifak determines that the parliament is not functioning the way it would like for them to do, or is not addressing concerns such as political scandals known as “Bandargate,” it simply has acknowledged or has implied that it will walk out of the institution and paralyze it, and quite possibly generate greater instability within the Shia community. 

All of this does not particularly bode well for the future of political reform and it is certainly is an inconsistent -- I do not know that the government would necessarily see this undesirable.  This has become clear in the last two years that the government has less concern about the future of reform and has attended more carefully to strengthening its own authoritarianism. 

There is one final comment I will make about the future of Shia politics - those outside of the parliament.  A great number of the Shia community is not necessarily interested in the future of these political institutions.  They have abandoned hope that these things will actually function in any way that serves their interests, either addressing social, economic or political concerns.  And what you have seen in the last two years -- and when I wrote the international crisis group report two years ago, we predicted this.  What you have seen is an erosion of traditional forms of political authority in Bahrain. 

So if the ulama, or if the powerful clerical community in Bahrain that has typically called the shots with respect to how Shia politics will be shaped, was true just two years ago, if this group and some of its hangers-on, were powerful just two years ago, they are considerably less powerful in shaping and managing how the Shia community will respond to what they determine to be political crises in the future.  On the one hand, there are a group of activists who follow the Bahrain Center for Human Rights - Abdul Hadi and Nabeel Rajab - who are not necessarily violent, although they will take to the streets in order to press for what they believe is redress of political and social concerns, such as the release of Abdul Hadi from prison. 

On the other hand - and I also believe that holding Hezbollah as a kind of a model terrorist threat from within Bahrain is overstated - there are clear signs that there are restive members of the Shia community that may feel as though they have no choice but to lean towards more confrontational and violent kind of politics down the road.  And that is certainly not a key to maintaining stability or even pursuing reform in the island. 

I do not suggest that we are at a point where violence is imminent.  I think -- or at least not sustained violence.  I think what we will most likely see are episodic outbreaks of Shia-Sunni tension, particularly between Shia activists and the government itself, which has made clear that it has very little interest in pursuing the twin issues of reform or community redress. 

And finally, on the issue of Bahrain's regional significance and the implications of all of these more broadly, Bahrain is very much open to movements of people from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Iran.  People come in and they leave.  So it is a fertile crossroads within the region for the movement of people and ideas.  I mean, if Bahrainis perceive themselves to not being served by national politics, there is no reason to believe that there would not be influence from outside, or there might be political models from outside.  And that could certainly be problematic for stability in the region. 

But I want to emphasize that this is -- would be a dramatic reversal, of course, from the kinds of politics that the community has pursued steadfastly over the last five or six years.  And if that was the course that was taken, it would be largely as a response of the absence of political will on the part of the government to see through the changes that it has promised.

Danielle Pletka:  Mr. Khawaja, please turn on your mike.  Thank you.

Abdul Hadi Al-Khawaja:  Thank you.  Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.  I'll try to skip some paragraphs, not to repeat what has been said and not to bore you with details.  When the British government decided to pull out from east of Suez, including the Gulf region in the late ‘60s, the United Nations sent a fact-finding mission to Bahrain to find whether the people of Bahrain wanted their land to be a part of Iran or to be an independent state. 

As a part of a campaign to encourage the Shia majority in Bahrain to choose independence under a democratic rule of Al-Khalifa family, the ruler of Bahrain at that time, which was the father of the current king, visited Iraq and paid a special visit to the Grand Shia religious leader Shahid Masinal Hakim at that time at his residence in Najaf.  The outcome of the UN mission was an independent Bahrain and that was in favor of the rule of the Al-Khalifa family.  Following its independence, Bahrain had its first constitution in 1972 and elected its first national assembly in 1973.  However, the ruler Sheikh Isa Al-Khalifa and his brother Sheikh Khalifa Al-Khalifa, the Prime Minister, dissolved the parliament in 1975 - only three years of semi-democracy - and ruled the country by decrees for 25 years, leading to political disputes, disturbances and gross human rights violations. 

When Sheikh Hamad became the new ruler after the death of his father in 1999, he created a new mood for change and reconciliation by declaring general amnesty, abolishing the security measures and halting, at least for a few years, the implementation of restrictions on civil liberties, paving the way for promised reforms.  Then he introduced a national charter which declared him as a king in a constitutional monarchy while acknowledging democracy and the rule of people and promoting freedoms and human rights.  In order to secure popular support for the national charter and  the referendum, the new ruler maintained good relations with opposition figures and visited - again, repeating what happened in the early 70s, - Shia religious leaders at their residences, promising to restore the 1972 constitution and respect people's rights and equality for all citizens. 

In a unique historic event, the Shia religious leaders gave their approval for the national charter.  For it is rare in Shia history that their religious leaders give approval to any political regime, especially when it is non-religious and non-Shia.  As a result, the national charter was agreed upon by 98 percent of the voters who participated widely in the national referendum.  However, the newly-declared king introduced a new constitution which gave him absolute power, and issued various decrees which marginalized the participation of Shia and opposition groups who, as a result, protested and boycotted the election in 2002, as my colleagues mentioned, but participated in the election in 2006 last November with a feeling of humiliation and that they were deceived by the regime. 

Since 2002, the country has been in an awkward situation.  Election takes place in an absolute rule.  Civil liberties are restricted and human rights are violated, but in new fashions.  Political and sectarian tension is growing.  The new constitution provides that the king is head of executive, legislative and judicial powers.  He appoints all members of the Judiciary Supreme Council.  He appoints all members of the Constitutional Court and he appoints 40 of the 80 members of the National Assembly.  And no legislations could be passed without the king's approval.  The king's Royal Court has participated exclusively in granting citizenship, distributing public lands and playing a major role in the main political issues. 

In December 2006, the king has re-appointed his uncle, Sheikh Khalifa Salman Al-Khalifa, as Prime Minister, who has been the powerful head of government since the independence of Bahrain 36 years ago.  So he has been a prime minister for 36 years.  The Royal Family now occupy 12 out of 24 positions in the new Cabinet, including the prime minister, the first and second deputies, the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of interior, the minister of defense, the minister of finance and the minister of justice.  The new Cabinet includes six Shia ministers who are carefully chosen from families known to be loyal to the ruling family.  Nevertheless, these appointed Shia ministers are less than 25 percent of the new government or the Cabinet.  It is the least representation of Shia majority since independence. 

The Bahrain Center for Human Rights publicized a report in 2004 revealing that Shia occupy only 18 percent of 500 highest positions in the government.  In the election of council of representatives, the government succeeded to block Shia and liberal political societies from having the majority in the new council.  This was by enforcing an unfair sectarian constituency districts and using general voting centers and subjugating the soldiers to vote to particular candidates.  The government also used the votes of tens of thousands of non-residents, Saudis who were naturalized on sectarian basis and were granted the right of both candidacy and voting. 

On the other hand, the government secured the majority in the new council for loyal groups who belong to Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis, meaning Sunni fundamentalists.  As far as the appointed Shura Council who shares the legislative power with the Council of Representatives, they are only appointed on the basis of their loyalty to the ruling family.  Nevertheless, the Shia ratio is within 45 percent of the composition of the Shura Council. 

In regard to general condition of human rights in the country, the US Country Report on Human Rights Practices released last year reported the following human rights problems:  inability of citizens to change their government; political parties are prohibited; impunity problem; restrictions on civil liberties and freedoms of speech, assembly and association; lengthy pre-trial detention; lack of a judicial independence; allegation of corruption in the judicial system; discrimination based on gender, religion, sect and ethnicity; infringements of citizens' privacy rights; restrictions on freedom of religion and movement; violence against women; trafficking and restrictions on labor rights. 

In regard to economic rights, poverty, low income, and the lack of adequate housing continue to be a problem for more than 50 percent of the population.  Despite the rise in the national income as a result of the rise in the prices of oil, corruption and unfair distribution of the national wealth will continue to be main reasons for violations of economic and social rights in Bahrain. 

As a human rights organization, the Bahrain Center for Human Rights took two main roles in the past five years: addressing the sensitive issues and empowering the people and disadvantaged, believing that would secure genuine change.  As for addressing the sensitive issues, the Bahrain Center for Human Rights during 2002 until 2004 highlighted issues such as privileges enjoyed by members of the Royal Family, discrimination against Shia, restriction on liberties, political naturalization, impunity, trafficking, the right of foreign workers, poverty, and corruption. 

On those issues, the Bahrain Center for Human Rights produced many researches and reports, organized seminars attended by thousands of people, campaigned through the press and members of National Assembly and led campaigns on national, regional and international level.  That led eventually to the closure of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights in September 2004 and the detention of its executive director, along with a wide defaming campaign against the BCHR and the national media.  However, the strong support from the people on the streets and from international actors proved the popularity and effectiveness of the work of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights. 

In regard to empowering the people, especially after its closure, the Bahrain Center for Human Rights helped in creating several popular communities, or committees, on issues like unemployment and low wages, inadequate housing, the release of detainees, et cetera.  These committees used peaceful protests as a part of their work.  The authorities reacted by implementing the restrictive laws and using excessive force and arbitrary detention and unfair trials.  In many cases, that policy provoked violent reactions against security forces.  However, the issues related to economic rights have become the main priority for the government opposition and public opinion. 

Besides arrests, physical assaults, unfair trial, threats and defaming campaigns, members of the BCHR - Bahrain Center for Human Rights - were denied the right to organize public seminars, access to the press, and the Bahrain Center for Human Rights website has been blocked in the country.  Unfortunately, actors such as the UNDP office in Bahrain and foreign embassies, including the US Embassy, have participated in that boycott. 

In conclusion, I would like to bring out a few remarks.  First, because of the unconditional support for the undemocratic suppressive regime in Bahrain and in the region, the US is losing the hearts and minds of the people and eventually harming the interest of the US. 

Secondly, Bahrain and other countries in the region is in great need for real reforms, real sharing of power and implementing effective regime of balance and checks.  While cosmetic reforms do not serve security and stability, neither do the PR image campaigns. 

Third, the Bahrain government’s new policy to empower Sunni Islamist groups, such as Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis, in order to marginalize Shia is a very dangerous policy. 

Fourth, outrooting sectarianism could not be achieved without maintaining equity among citizens in relation to political, economic and social rights. 

Five, when the suppressed people live in disappointment, despair, and humiliation, and find out that the way of peaceful means for change is blocked, they will revert to violence. 

Sixth and final, as for us, the BCHR, the Bahrain Center for Human Rights, our struggle for freedoms and human rights will continue despite difficulties. 

Thank you all for your attendance and patience.  And thanks to the American Enterprise Institute for organizing this event, and thanks for my colleagues for organizing the whole thing.  Thank you.

Danielle Pletka:  Very good.  We are going to turn to the audience for questions in just a moment.  I would like you to explain something, though, that you just said.  You said that the UNDP and the US Embassy have participated in the boycott of the Bahrain Center.  Could you just explain exactly what you mean by that?

Abdul Hadi Al-Khawaja:  Yes.  At the time of the work of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights when it was active and it was registered, we maintained very good relations with foreign embassies and UNDP and especially, actually, the American Embassy in Bahrain.  They had been visiting our center and they had been inviting us for different meetings and everything.  But when the Center was closed, they just cut the whole thing.  And it is very strange.  They say that it is a kind of problematic matter since the Center is closed and is no more registered.  But for the US Embassy in Bahrain, which is very powerful-- and they contact different groups, different actors, nobody will buy that.  But I think it is the change of policy of the administration or the embassy.  I do not know.

Danielle Pletka:  They deny that, but yes, the evidence seems to be contrary.  If I could ask everybody to just adhere to our rules, which is to raise your hand.  I'll call on you.  Wait for a microphone which the young man over here has and identify yourself.  Do not make a statement or I'll interrupt you.  Ask a question.  Simon, did you have a question?

Simon Henderson:  Simon Henderson, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.  I wanted Mr. Al-Bandar to repeat and clarify something he said.  He referred to an attack in Riyadh in 1996 in which four Americans were killed; and it was not clear to me who he blamed that attack on.  And he made some sort of reference to the -- it is giving impetus to the Saudi opposition movement.  If you could clarify what you said, I would be very grateful.

Salah al-Bandar:  Well, I'm trying to find the connections in the way that, although it was organized by a splinter group, well-known terrorist group inside Saudi Arabia, the Saudi government used that terrorist attack on the American mission as a pretext to condemn the whole Saudi opposition, and crushed it under that pretext.  But that does not really secure in any way the security of the land or the American interest in the region. 

Just down the line, five years after that, 9/11 happened.  And what I’m trying to say, the rulers -- the corrupt rulers of Arabia and the Middle East in general use this kind of actions by making a wholesale denunciation of the political forces against the regime who is peacefully trying to organize people to protest against their tyranny by labeling them of being part and parcel of terrorist groups.  That is what I'm trying to say; taking that kind of PR connection or propaganda and condemning the whole genuine opposition groups against those regimes is a very dangerous strategy.  At the moment, Bahraini government is trying to do the same by labeling the whole opposition force as being stooges of Iranian plots and being part and parcel of a kind of a sectarian hype. 

At the moment, we are -- my colleague here explained that opposition in Bahrain is not Shia community.  In fact, the Sunnis have their own historical opposition to the ruling family in Bahrain.  So using few elements here and there and trying to mix the bag and denying the legitimate peaceful political opposition, the role under the guise of combating terrorism is something which we need again to learn from that.

Chris Schaeffer:  Chris Schaeffer.  Thank you for your presentations.  I also wanted to -- Mr. Bandar, if I could ask you one other question, a clarifying question related to the Islamic banks you talked about.  And if I understood you correctly, you were suggesting that the leading Islamic banks are headed and run by a sort of Salafi extremist.  Could you explain why you feel that way or what that is based upon in the particular financial institutions you are speaking of?

Salah al-Bandar:  Well, it is very interesting that after 9/11, most of the Islamic banks which used to have their operations in the Bahamas, Switzerland and the rest of it moved slowly to be based in Bahrain.  At the moment, in fact, the banks of the Islamic banks, if I might say, the organizing body, the regulatory bodies of Islamic banking system moved to Bahrain slowly and quietly.  And at the moment, in fact, Bahrain is the capital of Islamic banking system. 

Interestingly, all of these banks are controlled by well-known Sunni Islamists, belongs to Muslim Brotherhood across the region and Wahhabi groups.  And I can name them.  I will start by the-- the one which we mentioned in our secret report, the one where the secret organization, which the GCDD report revealed that deposited money in one of that banks.  It is not necessarily the bank is giving this money, but the bank itself is controlled -- established, controlled and operated by Kuwaiti Islamists, Muslim Brother Kuwaiti Islamists, the Shamil, the Al Baraka, the Faysal Bank. 

All of these banks, they are working now glove-in-hand, or the other way around, with Islamists in the region.  In fact, I will give you an example.  The whole amount of money of the intersection and interference between the Islamic banks and the international monetary system, there is some amount of money, which is -- they call it the interest money, which is according to the religious Fatwa is non-Islamic.  All the profits are generated and deposited in Bahrain.  Then this group now is using that amount of money to support front organizations across the region, from Palestine Hamas group, Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, in Sudan, Algeria, Morocco, you name it.  They give this money because -- to charitable foundations.  Those charitable institutions, all of those charitable foundations are linked to Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, Sunni or Wahhabi groups in the Middle East across the region. 

What I'm saying, the way that now there is this kind of marriage of convenience between the minority Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi and Wahhabi in Bahrain and some factions of the ruling family to combat and control the majority community because the issue now is not only elections or political change.  The issue now that there is more than $300 billion of Islamic banking deposited and controlled from Bahrain. 

For the first time, Islamists across the Middle East, they realize the importance of Bahrain for them and they are looking for political muscle to protect those interests.  This issue has not yet surfaced.  A lot of people across the Western hemisphere here who are very much interested in the way that all these front organizations, Islamists, terrorist groups funded by millions of dollars, they are not really looking to what is going on in Bahrain, and treating it separately. 

What we are trying to highlight here -- Bahrain is exceptionally important at the moment because there is a lot of funds around there.  We need accountability.  We need the international community to look to the way these Sunni Islamists are hyping sectarian problems in Bahrain to try to camouflage their true interest to control the country.

Danielle Pletka:  I'm sorry.  I want to just press you on this because these are quite profound accusations that you are making.  You say that you have issued a report that details and has actual evidence of the fact that these Islamic banks based in Bahrain are, in fact, funding front organizations that are supporting Salafi extremism?

Salah al-Bandar:  Indeed.  The reports -- I have it here on my bag and I can show it to you after this.  What we are saying now, these are findings.  We ask the government and the international community to organize a fact-finding mission and to go and investigate who is paying the money for these sectarian Sunni groups in Bahrain and region from Bahrain and bring the facts.  In fact, what we are saying -- what we told and documented in our report is not the fact.  We said, “This is our findings,” and we urge the government and the international community to form an investigative committee to go and investigate that.

Hillow Weinberg:  Hillow Weinberg.  I wonder if I could ask Prof. Jones, who I do not think touched on the Salafi issue, to comment on your observations on the internal role of Salafis in Bahrain at this point.

Tony Jones:  Yes.  For me, I think that Bahrain represents or fits into a regionwide trend in which we see that pro-government political movements that are primarily ideologically financially-oriented toward the Muslim Brotherhood have established themselves in positions of political authority.  The parliament, for example, in Bahrain -- it is true also in Kuwait, as well as in some of the other Gulf Emirates.  It is consistent also with Saudi Arabia where the winners of the municipal council elections in 2005 were members of the underground Muslim Brotherhood. 

So if we want to detect sort of a region-wide trend, this seems to be how Sunni politics is playing itself out in the Gulf and elsewhere.  I mean, obviously, the Muslim Brotherhood is different from place to place.  But in terms of its organizing ability and capacity, it is having quite an effect. 

Now, I think that ideologically, it is more difficult to figure out where they fit in this broader spectrum from sort of what we might call “moderate secular liberalism” to Salafism, either social or political Salafism.  It is difficult to say with any consistency that either in Bahrain or throughout the region that these Muslim brothers are all unified or represent something homogeneous.  I think what is more important is to say they see themselves - and this is perhaps the key identifier - they see their interests as being served by being tied to existing regimes and, increasingly, by appropriating sectarian discourse as a central part of their political platform.  But I do not have any specific insight into the financial operations.

Male Voice:  [Inaudible], GW.  One gets the impression listening to you - I'm relatively new at this - that there is concern with democracy because it is a Shiite issue.  So my question is, once the Shiites do achieve inclusion, is it over, or does the commitment to democracy continue?  And number two, what about the Sunni opposition?  Is the government manipulating sectarian issues so as to completely neutralize any Sunni opposition?  I mean, there was mentioned that there is such a thing, but nothing has been said about it.

Toby Jones:  I think that the Sunni oppositionists -- there were four political societies that emerged in 2001 - three Sunni and one Shia.  And two of the Sunni groups were particularly prominent and played an active role.  So along with Al-Wifak, they formed a unified opposition.  Ideologically, in terms of their politics, they were aligned principally around the issue of promoting and pursuing democratic reform. 

There is a whole of series of social issues that they do not agree upon, the most important of which is the rights of women.  The most conservative elements within Al-Wifak absolutely do not want to see the creation of equal space for women, particularly the creation of a kind of institutionalized legal reform that might speak to women's issues or provide fairness with respect to inheritance, divorce, child custody and that kind of thing.  So they often fall apart around the issue of family law; but in terms of their political orientation, they mostly agree. 

And I would say this, that, yes, I think a democratic Bahrain would be a Shia Bahrain, at the least in terms of its elected institutions.  But the best indicator we have that that would not necessarily be a bad thing, if you are willing to look past the challenge of women's rights and gender, is that in the face of a great deal of push-back from the government, they have not radicalized.  They have continued to insist and find ways to operate.  They ended the boycott in order to participate within the system. 

I think that the window of opportunity is perhaps closing in the medium to long-term where they may pursue a more radical politics.  But we are not quite there yet.  I'm not really concerned about what would happen if they were elected, politically at least.

Salah al-Bandar:  I think the commitment to the issues of democracy, that is what brought us in the first place here.  We would like to urge all the freedom-loving people around the world that the issues of democracy in Arabia in general and in Bahrain in particular is not related to the issues of sectarianism.  In fact, democracy is going by default.  Bypass the issue of sectarianism by providing the machinery or at least the operational aspects of functioning fair democratic system, which will include the rest of the people. 

That is what -- I am a Sunni.  I belong to Sunni.  Majority of our operatives in Bahrain are Sunnis.  They are not Shiite in any sense.  I'm not doing this as a Shia by all means.  Our commitment in general to the terms of equity and fair share of wealth and power in that region in Bahrain or the other five GCC countries.

Dwight Bashir:  Thank you.  Dwight Bashir with the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom.  I had a couple of questions.  I'll be very brief.  First for Mr. Al-Khawaja, you mentioned this new policy which has been touched on to empower Islamists and Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and so on to incite sectarian tensions and the like.  Do you have -- is there anything in terms of –- are these findings of a report, or do you have anything that the government has said or written, or is this just a process that has been going on?  I'm kind of trying to get my head around and understand because the government itself controls mosques and funds mosques -- Shia and Sunni, and so on.  What do you mean by inciting sectarian tensions in terms of -- is it the political system, is it -- I'm just really trying to get my head around that. 

And secondly, do you see any Saudi government support for these groups?  Or is this just simply private or transnational groups, so to speak, in terms of coming in and influencing the banking system and other organizations?  Does the Saudi government play a role in terms of directly funding?  Is there any evidence of that?  Thank you.

Abdul Hadi Al-Khawaja:  Well, this question is linked to the previous question about – actually, I was speaking about democracy, or we are speaking about the right of Shia in Bahrain.  Actually, either this or that; either we have a real democratic system in Bahrain - one man, one vote - and equity among citizens; let them be Shias or Sunnis or any other sect. Or what will happen especially with things happening in Iraq and around the region that people will stick to their sectarian relationships. 

So, what the government of Bahrain is doing -- they are a minority government.  They are tribal Sunnis and that brings them to a very small minority; not only Sunnis but tribal Sunnis.  They are not religious.  The regime in Bahrain, the family in Bahrain is not -- the ruling family is not known as a religious family like the Saudis.  It is sectarian.  But it is using sectarianism to protect their power.  They think that as long as there is a threat from the majority Shia, because if we implement democracy - one man, one vote - then they have to share power with Shia and the opposition.  And until now, they are reluctant to do that. 

So what they do is to give the support of the minority Sunnis by saying and practicing things to give the impression that they are protecting Sunnis.  And everybody knows in Bahrain how Sunnis are occupying high positions everywhere.  And even the outcome of the election.  How the Sunni Islamists, not only any Sunnis, but Sunni Islamists -- they are 55 percent of the elected council. 

Now, Sunni Islamists are in the Royal Courts.  They are very influential in Royal Court, the government and everywhere.  And the finding of the so-called al-Bandar report, there are a lot of details about the influence of the Sunni opposition.  Does that have anything to do with Saudi Arabia government?  No, I do not think so.  Because it is completely a Bahrain regime agenda and Saudi Arabia is already in problems with Salafis and some of Salafis.  So I do not think there is any direct connection between the Saudi regime and the Islamists’ agenda in Bahrain.

Danielle Pletka:  Did that answer your question?

Dwight Bashir:  [Speaking far from the microphone] Yes.  I guess, just a follow up with this idea of trying to bring in Sunni Arabs in terms of demographic manipulations.  That has been claimed.

Abdul Hadi Al-Khawaja:  Yes.  Actually that is what happened with the naturalization of Saudi tribal Sunnis.  More than 15,000 people.  They are not residents in Bahrain; they are residents in Saudi Arabia.  They give them citizenship and now they are naturalizing other Arab Sunnis to make demographic change and to manipulate the so-called democratic system.

Danielle Pletka:  This is going to be our last question right here.

John Cruise:  I'm John Cruise.  Am I on?  Okay.  I'm John Cruise from the House Armed Services Committee.  A question for Prof. Jones.  If the Al-Khalifas continue their current dilatory pace of reform, do you see them still in power in 10 years?  And if you could give Sheikh Hamad one piece of advice on one important reform to enact to stave off disaster, if that is your assessment, what reform would that be?

Toby Jones:  That is a great question.  I think they will be in power in 10 years.  I do not think Bahrain is a weak state.  I think that they are sharpening their authoritarian toolkit, which is what authoritarian regimes do.  Under pressure, they give ground; when pressure recedes, they reestablish central authority.  And the Bahraini government has proved very adept with that.  The one reform would be to create realistic voting districts that do actually represent the demography of the island.  It has to do absolutely with the issue of representation.  And that one weak institution that Bahraini people actually can shape, that does not change the imbalance of power elsewhere but it would certainly be -- it would be a gesture of good faith that I think the Shia community would see as a departing point for talking more seriously about other issues.

Danielle Pletka:  I'm going to close out.  I want to ask our Bahraini participants one last question, and you just give me a yes or no answer.  If there were a democratic election in Bahrain tomorrow, would the elected government have the same view of the United States and the same willingness to host the Fifth Fleet and the same willingness to be an important part of our non-NATO allied structure as it does now?

Abdul Hadi Al-Khawaja:  Yes or no?

Danielle Pletka:  Yes or no.  That is an important question for you to answer.

Abdul Hadi Al-Khawaja:  It is very important but I cannot answer it with a yes or no.

Danielle Pletka:  All right, one sentence.

Abdul Hadi Al-Khawaja:  Yes.  Actually, it depends.

Toby Jones: If I can speak to that very, very quickly.

Danielle Pletka:  Okay.

Toby Jones:  In 2005, I talked to a group of Bahraini youth from Sitra, which is a sort of site of some radicalism at times.  And they had just organized, and it was not you guys.  Maybe it was you guys.  But it just organized a 50,000 to 70,000-person march calling for reform.  And one of their great symbolic gestures was they carried the Bahraini flag.  So, rather than carrying Hezbollah banners, they carried the red-and-white national flag of Bahrain.  And I talked to them within days afterwards.  And one of the things that I said going out, I said, “What can the United States do, or what should the United States do to engage the issue of political reform?”  And they all look and they said, “Well, how about if we hold another rally next week and we will carry the American flag instead?”

Shalah al-Bandar:  I think it is very important.  Everybody is recognizing the critical American interest in the region.  The American Fifth Fleet is there to stay for the coming 25 years.  Nobody disputes that.  I have been there for the last 30 years, not the last 15 years.  I have never really seen any political party in Bahrain or a group or a society said for the Americans to go out of Bahrain.  People are seeking genuine partnership.  They know the Americans are there to stay.  They know part and parcel of their interest is to protect the interest of that region.  They see it as partnership.  This is number one. 

Number two, I think it depends on the way that the American administration -- that is what I'm urging them.  If the Department of State keeping compiling an annual report about this defunct non-democratic authoritarian ruling family in Bahrain without taking action, then that will hurt at the end of the day the American interest definitely.

Danielle Pletka:  Let me thank our audience - oh, it has stopped snowing - and our participants in particular for having traveled far and wide to be with us today.  This was most interesting.  With that, we are adjourned.  Thank you.

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