October 2002
The Day After: Planning for a Post-Saddam Iraq

On October 3, 2002, AEI was proud to gather some of the world's most eminent scholars on Iraq, including many Iraqi expatriates, to discuss the challenges that will face the Iraqi state after Saddam Hussein is removed from power. While the full series on post-Saddam Iraq will address many issues relating to the future of Iraq, the inaugural conference focused on the prospects for democratization in Iraq, war crimes, oil and the Iraqi economy, and Iraq's international obligations and regional relations.

Introduction

Ambassador Ryszard Krystosik
Former chief of U.S. Interest Section in Iraq

In recent months there has been considerable debate about the external reasons to remove Saddam Hussein from power, but little attention is given to the domestic conditions that mandate regime change. For the majority of Iraqi people, the harsh reality of daily life is in sharp contrast to the wealth and privilege enjoyed by Saddam's elite. As salaries have continued to decline since 1991, the support of the middle class for the regime has similarly fallen. While living conditions for many Iraqis are appalling, a small elite continues to blame sanctions while skimming money from the "Oil for Food" program to maintain their standard of luxury.

Crime has grown unchecked in most urban areas; censorship has become increasingly rigid. Most people only have access to state-run television and its edited news and propaganda. Satellite television and the Internet continue to be available only for official state use and prohibited for the rest. There have been some adjustments in the internal policy of the Iraqi state, but the regime still exerts complete control over the lives of the Iraqi people. The presence of Saddam Hussein is all-pervasive.

Saddam cannot be prevented from rebuilding his arsenal of weapons of mass destruction as long as he retains power, and as long as he retains power the Iraqi people will pay the heaviest price for his continued rule. A successful transition to a democratic system of government, not a rebirth of the present dictatorship under a different ruler, is the only way to ensure improvement in the quality of life for the people of Iraq.

Panel 1: Ambitions for Iraq?

Kanan Makiya
Harvard University and Human Rights Committee of the Iraqi National Congress

Thus far, the debate surrounding the coming war has not risen to the challenge of discussing the possibility of democracy in Iraq. In America, the debate has been focused on the threat to the West; in Europe, on the moral issues of American hegemony; and in the Arab world, on the possibility that regime change will upset the regional relations of the entire Middle East. None of this includes those who live within the grasp of one of the most brutal dictators in history. The people of Iraq believe that military action is the only way to remove Saddam and his regime, and the outcome of any action will depend on the willingness of the United States to involve itself in nation-building in Iraq, not just regime change.

Picturing Iraq post-Saddam and creating a political vision not just for a future Iraq but also for the entire Middle East requires imagination and should not be based on limited expectations. Assuming 1) that the United States proceeds with regime change, 2) that removing Saddam from power does not cause large-scale civilian casualties in Iraq or Israel, 3) that the Iraqi opposition decides to adopts these precepts of democratization, 4) that the United States remains involved in rebuilding Iraq long-term, and 5) that the U.S. agrees to keep a military force in Iraq to guarantee the territorial integrity of the state once regime change occurs, then Iraq has the economic and human resources to become as much an icon of democracy and economic viability as it has been a symbol of autocracy.

Federalism is the best solution to the internal problems of a democratic Iraqi state; it is advocated by almost all of the groups that oppose the current regime, in one form or another. A federal state structure is a mandatory condition for keeping the Kurds in the Iraqi state after Saddam is removed from power. If federalism is to become the founding principle of a new Iraqi state, then it must delineate both the separation and division of powers among the regions. This will reinforce the idea that the rights of the minority should never be sacrificed to the will of the majority, and will likewise indicate that the federal structure cannot be based on ethnicity, on the division between Kurd and Arab.

An ethnically divided state would result in battles over the control of resources and the marginalization of other ethnic groups; therefore the federal order must be based on geography. Each region must receive its share of national resources and revenues based on the size of its population. This will ensure the equality of citizenship for all and the re-definition of the Iraqi state as non-Arab. Arabs will still form a majority, but they will not be in a position to exclude all others from power and influence. Iraqis also need to invent a concept of statehood that gives all religions the opportunity to flourish and that keeps politics and faith separate from one another.

Demilitarization is a key issue in rebuilding the Iraq state. A professional army must be established in the place of the conscript one, its budget limited to 2 percent of the national income and its purpose purely defensive and never for internal use. Just as in Japan after World War II, the Iraqi people must renounce the right to use force as a means to settle international disputes.

A federal, non-Arab, demilitarized Iraq will be a greater opportunity for the Middle East than any since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. This is possible in partnership with the United States, if the U.S. can rise to the creative challenge.

Rend Rahim Francke
Iraq Foundation

The United States must commit to democracy for post-Saddam Iraq. It must make plans for the transition now, along the lines delineated by Kanan Makiya, and not continue to promote anti-democratic tendencies in the Iraqi opposition. The United States has enormous leverage with the opposition, and must not be reluctant about forming a transitional authority to handle civilian affairs in Iraq after Saddam falls. The administration has endorsed not the democratic vision for Iraq but instead the regressive forces within Iraq. Current political thinking within Iraq is based on extraterritorial principles like Arab nationalism, Islamism, and communism. Iraq needs to develop a way to deal with its internal politics; the Bush administration has been slow to realize this.

Siyamend Othman
Expert on Kurdish issues

Iraqis of all ethnicities and religions are skeptical and apprehensive about America's commitment to democracy in Iraq, particularly after the United States left Saddam Hussein in power in 1991. The battle for Baghdad will be won in Washington. If the U.S. really believes that its national interests lie in promoting democracy and human rights beyond its own borders, it must give Iraqi democrats the support to introduce these ideas after Saddam.

Richard Perle
AEI

The failure of the Bush administration to attend this discussion is tragic not because of what they might have said but because of what they might have heard. The challenge of nation-building will ultimately be in the hands of Iraqis, not the administration, and the representatives at this conference prove that they are more than up to this challenge. When addressing the liberation of Iraq, the U.S. must not fear to alter the status quo. It must place the power in the hands of people like those at this table. The Iraqi diaspora will play a crucial role in the rebuilding process and must not continue to be marginalized by the State Department. The Arab world will not align itself with Saddam if we attack, and to assume so is demeaning. Saddam is despised by the Muslim world as well as the West, and he must be removed.

Ahmad Chalabi
Iraqi National Congress

Iraqis have given great thought to their own future. Just because a future leader has not been made evident does not mean that no action should be taken against Saddam. President Bush's speech to the United Nations on September 12 has acted as a galvanizing force for Iraqis because the United States is finally focusing on removing Saddam and his oppressive regime, not just disarmament. The Iraqi people have a long history and want to keep their state together; a provisional coalition government must be formed to take power in the wake of Saddam. This will allow the coordination of emergency relief and defecting units of the Iraqi army. After the war, a constitutional assembly can be called and elections held. Iraq's neighbors fear a successful transition and what it will mean in the region, but the U.S. must follow a vision that agrees with its own values and ideas and not support tyranny over freedom in Iraq.

Michael O'Hanlon
Brookings Institution

A firm multilateral ultimatum must be placed before Iraq before other action can be taken. War will likely still be the outcome, but this will give the U.S. time to strengthen the support of Arab countries for U.S. actions. The U.S. must win the war quickly and be prepared to help stabilize Iraq over an indefinite period of time. The support of European allies will aid in this process.

Points from the discussion:

• The presence of U.S. civilian institutions, both governmental and nongovernmental, will be needed in post-Saddam Iraq. A military presence will be necessary, but should be discreet and limited to maintaining territorial integrity and protecting Iraqi interests from the interference of other regional actors such as Turkey. Much greater efforts to rebuild the police force must be made than have been in Afghanistan.
• Israel must decide for itself how to defend itself in the case of an Iraqi attack, but its defensive capabilities have greatly increased since 1991. The United States has made it clear that no Nuremberg defense will be available for Iraqi officers and soldiers who carry out such attacks, which may belay last-ditch actions against Israel.
• U.S. administrations, whether Republican or Democrat, have largely viewed the entire Middle East as beyond redemption; this has limited the scope of their policy toward the region and is partially responsible for their reluctance to support democracy for Iraq. This ideological block must be overcome in order to mediate positive change in the region.

Panel 2: War Crimes

Feisal Istrabadi
Boesch & Istrabadi

In order for war crimes to be prosecuted in Iraq, the Baathist government must not be replaced by another dictator but by a functioning democracy. Members of the Iraqi regime can be held accountable for war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. The transitional Iraqi government will have the duty, as bound by the Geneva Conventions, to investigate, prosecute, and punish those Iraqis guilty of targeting civilians and individuals; attacking indiscriminately; committing or threatening to commit murder, torture, or mutilation; taking hostages; and failing to prevent those in their command to commit such crimes. If vigilantism is to be avoided in Iraq, the people must believe that the government will bring those who violated the rights of its citizens to justice. The leaders of Iraq could also be charged with treason for waging war against their own people; issues of immunity will have to be addressed.

Many guilty of genocide, the systematic rape of women, and the torture and murder of political prisoners must be held liable under Iraq's domestic criminal code. Trying Iraq's leadership under provisions of both domestic and international law can be very valuable. It will establish publicly that internal abuses of civil and human rights will no longer be tolerated, and it will help Iraqis build domestic political and judicial institutions. Training for lawyers and judges must be supported by the international community. The death penalty must be abolished in order to prevent abuse. In support of the investigation process, the names of informers must be released to the public, intelligence records made public, and the financial records of Saddam and his family disclosed.

Four categories of violators should be held accountable for their actions. First, the decision-makers enacting policies of the Iraqi government that violated international and domestic norms should be fully prosecuted under international and domestic laws. This would include the president and vice presidents of Iraq, members of the Revolutionary Command Council, cabinet members, senior corps commanders, and some other high-ranking officials. Second, mid-level violators, including lower-rank intelligence and military officers, party officials, judges, and prosecutors, will have to be prosecuted based on the severity of the crime committed. Third, perpetrators of ordinary crimes under domestic law must be prosecuted according to the Iraqi criminal code. The fourth and final category represents the need for total de-Baathification. Active participants in the Baath party should be prohibited from holding any office in Iraq. The idea of amnesty should be rejected for all but members of the third and fourth categories.

Justice is more important in Iraq than immediate reconciliation, but justice can only be delivered if a democratic transition occurs. The success of this transition will depend on the manner in which regime change occurs. Civilian infrastructure should not be targeted in the attacks in order to win the sympathy and cooperation of the Iraqi people and transform Iraq into a Western-oriented democracy.

Hania Mufti
Human Rights Watch, London

Evidence of human rights abuses committed by the Iraqi government is considerable enough for the leaders to be held accountable under international law. To truly respect human rights, however, it is necessary to safeguard the rights of those suspected of committing crimes as well as those of the victims; an international criminal tribunal for Iraq may be the best way to ensure fair and timely trials for all of those concerned. Prosecuting past crimes will be a deterrent for future abuses and will help revive belief in the rule of law. Those responsible for the most serious crimes must not be included in the new Iraqi government and no amnesties for these people should be granted, in order to prevent a culture of impunity. International monitoring of human rights can be very valuable and those implicated in past human rights abuses should be prohibited from joining the new military or police forces.

Munther Al Fadhal
International College of Law, London

Delineation between war crimes and regular crimes should be established carefully. Severe crimes against the Iraqi people should be prosecuted as war crimes; regular crimes should be deferred to regular prosecution. It is also important to distinguish between interior and exterior war crimes.

Ruth Wedgwood
Yale University

Iraq remains a member of many treaty arrangements that can potentially be used against Saddam Hussein, such as the Geneva Convention. War crimes can be prosecuted using: an ad hoc tribunal created by the UN Security Council; a mixed tribunal of local and international prosecutors and judges; military tribunals; or local courts. War crimes trials take a long time, and must be done carefully to provide an exemplary process for the new democratic culture. The trials should not become, however, a forum for those of trial. The trials should provide a moral foundation for the political future of Iraq.

Panel 3: Oil and the Iraqi Economy

Patrick Clawson
Washington Institute for Near East Policy

There is little evidence that American policy towards Iraq is driven by oil. Oil is an indirect reason that the U.S. is concerned about Iraq. Oil provides Iraq with revenue that can be used, for example, to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Concerns over WMD, terrorism, and regional stability take precedence at the moment, and energy security--in terms of the international oil supply--has had a very low priority in Washington over the last decade. For example, the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act was renewed by an overwhelming majority despite loud protest by international oil companies, who would prefer the complete de-politicization of the oil industry.

From 1998-2000, the global economy was reasonably prosperous despite the doubling of oil prices. War in Iraq is unlikely to disrupt the world oil supply or the global economy, which is well adapted to fluctuating oil prices. Iraq is a negligible contributor to world energy supplies, producing only 3 percent of global output. Should supply be disrupted, the increasing non-OPEC supply and the spare OPEC capacity can easily replace the missing Iraqi oil. It is unlikely that war in Iraq would influence oil output elsewhere in the Arabian Peninsula. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve can also be used to stabilize oil prices.

After the removal of Saddam Hussein, Iraq, which is second only to Saudi Arabia in oil reserves, has the potential to become a major oil producer, capable of producing 8 million barrels per day within a decade. The role of international oil companies in Iraq is highly disputed. Many Russian, French, and Chinese oil firms already hold contacts for oil development with the Iraqi government, which most other companies would like to see evaporate when the regime changes. Many members of the Iraqi oil industry will also protest international investment. The shape of the oil industry will have to be determined by Iraqis themselves, rather than shaped by outside influence.

Iraq has vast natural and human resource potential, but the strength of the Iraqi economy after Saddam will depend on the economic policies adopted by the new government. At the moment, the Iraqi economy is severely underdeveloped, and many of Iraq's economic problems predate Saddam Hussein, although they were exacerbated by his rule. Nationalist policies have impeded oil development, for which Iraq blames the West. Post-Saddam, the United States and international organizations will be tempted to offer abundant economic advice to open markets and increase foreign investment and trade, but these decisions must ultimately be made by Iraq in order to be viewed as legitimate.

Iraq also has an unsustainable amount of debt (over $100 billion) and war compensation payments, particularly to Kuwait and the Kuwaiti oil company. The United States should set an example by supporting dramatic debt reductions post-Saddam. The focus must remain on developing the Iraqi economy, not unintentionally making them dependent on foreign aid. If Iraq adopts wise economic policies and is unburdened of much of its debt, it can become a prosperous nation within a decade after Saddam is overthrown.

S. Rob Sobhani
Caspian Energy Consulting

The foundation of a post-Saddam economy has to be in the rule of law, without which there will be no capital investment. Iraqi debts incurred under Saddam Hussein's regime should be entirely forgiven when the regime changes in order to jumpstart the economy. Agriculture will become a central aspect of the economy, as it was before Saddam took power.

Iraq's known oil reserves are likely to double once they are explored, putting them on par with Saudi Arabia. It also has extensive natural gas reserves. Production sharing agreements, such as those used in post-Soviet Azerbaijan, could be a good model for the oil industry to rebuild upon. International oil companies can help revitalize the industry much faster than Iraq could accomplish this alone.

Sinan al Shabibi
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

Debt and reparations will remain a huge burden to the Iraqi economy even after sanctions are removed, and the deficit they cause will trigger rampant inflation. Debt and sanctions should be removed simultaneously. In addition to the political and human rights related reasons for regime change, there are extensive economic reasons, including the extraordinary waste of resource potential. There has never been an oil development program in Iraq, which will be an essential component of the post-Saddam economy. The first economic priority must be to restore stability, and then maintain it.

Inflation, the cause of many Iraqi social problems, must be stopped by raising the value of the dinar. This can be achieved by: releasing Iraqi assets and infusing the economy with resources; releasing the unspent balances in the escrow account of the "Oil for Food" program; and helping Iraq re-attain maximum oil export capacity. These efforts can be bolstered if the international community indicates that it is willing to help address the Iraqi debt problem. Foreign direct investment will also be very important to economic revival, which means that establishing the rule of law is crucial. All sectors of the economy must be developed, including agriculture, not just oil alone.

Ibrahim Alolom
Independent analyst

Iraq has the potential to become one of the top three oil-exporting countries in both the long- and short-term. In the future, Iraqi oil can play a much bigger role in oil strategy and the balance of supply and demand. This is contingent, however, upon both political stability and increased access to oil technology. Maintaining a multilateral UN force in Iraq after regime change will help ensure continued social and political change and help attract international oil companies.

Oil reserves exceed current estimates, particularly in the south and the west. Iraq has the human resources to run the oil industry, but it needs better technology to repair equipment and develop new fields. This can only be done with the assistance of international oil companies, who will have to balance their own profits with Iraqi interest.

Points from the discussion:

• In recent years, Iraq has not been actively threatening its neighbors, but this does not mean that the rhetoric and the mindset have evaporated; they are merely checked by the large American military presence.
• It has been suggested that Russia's difficulty constructing viable post-Soviet tax policies, property rights, and contract rights has been due to the government's reliance on large tax revenues from the oil industry. Whether or not this will be true in Iraq remains to be determined, but in Iraq oil also has a cohesive societal effect. The major ethnic groups in Iraq may have difficulties coexisting, but they all want their share of the oil income. Establishing an efficient tax system is important to making the government accountable to the people.
• The means of production must be removed from the hands of the state in order to stimulate a liberal democracy. For the last seventy-five years, Iraqi nationalism has defined itself around the control of oil and resistance to foreign investment in the oil sector. Privatization will be very difficult for this reason, but can be achieved by allowing the Iraqi national oil company to become a partner in shared contracts and eventually selling its interests to the public.

Panel 4: Post-Saddam Foreign Policy & Regional Relations

Bernard Lewis
Princeton University

Iraq's post-Saddam foreign policy and international relations evoke two great fears. One is that the attempt to establish a democracy will fail; the other, greater fear is that it might succeed. The latter is of particular concern to other Middle Eastern countries.

Two opinions currently dominate the discussion of these fears. The first is that the Arabs are incapable of democratic government, which is purely a Western phenomenon and beyond the reach of a country like Iraq. Since these countries will always be ruled by tyrants, our foreign policy should aim to support friendly ones. The opposing opinion says that while it will be difficult to establish democracy in these countries, it is possible with the right help and guidance. India is perhaps the best example of this, as is Turkey in the Middle Eastern and Islamic context.

The projected failure of democracy in Iraq is linked to the fear that the state will disintegrate along ethnic or religious lines when strong central rule is removed. This could destabilize the region, but democracy succeeding in Iraq is a far greater threat to stability. Dictatorships in the Middle East are a modern phenomenon, aided by the modernization of the surveillance apparatus and the weakening of intermediate powers, and will not be impossible to overcome. Concepts of modernization in the Middle East are closely linked to ideas of westernization, which is a source of much of the anti-Western sentiment. There are far older traditions in the Middle East, based on Islamic ideology, of government by law, consent, and contract. This means that there is hope for this region's future.

There is no reason to assume that Iraq's post-Saddam foreign policy will be pro-Western or more sympathetic to Israel; however these two trends seem likely if the government is truly democratic and answerable to an electorate. While dictatorships are dependent on a constant state of war, more democratic forms of government are inclined to seek peaceful solutions to problems, including the Palestinian issue. The larger regional context is also an important consideration, and will likely be dependent on external actors as well as internal factors.

Serif Egeli
Turkish-USA Business Council

Iraq has immense oil and agricultural wealth in addition to a well-educated population. The rise of the Baath party was coupled with the decline of the Iraqi middle class, however, which had a devastating effect on business and development. Rebuilding the middle class is crucial to the establishment of democracy in Iraq, as is the separation of Islamic statute from the law and a government supported by the military. Iraq's well-educated and trained female population will also be an asset to creating a modern, liberal state. The Turkish Republic would welcome improved economic and political relations with a newly democratic Iraq. Iraq should also then be considered for membership in NATO.

Nawaf Obaid
Saudi oil and security analyst

Saudi opinions about Iraq are controlled by three power centers: the royal family, the religious establishment, and the council of tribal leaders. There are concerns about the potential breakup of Iraq post-Saddam, and also about the nature of the regime that will replace him. There is significant doubt in Saudi Arabia that a democratic regime could maintain power.

Olivier Roy
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Iraq's neighbors prefer a weak, united Iraq over a potentially unstable and volatile one. They are driven by security and defense concerns. There are three main issues to be addressed: The first is whether or not the Kurds will take advantage of the downfall of Saddam to vie for independence or real autonomy; the second is that if a strong central government is maintained, there will be little real change in Iraq; finally, democracy in Iraq will likely not be a model for other Middle Eastern countries, where nationalism, and not Islamism, remains the primary driving factor. Each state will have to democratize, if it so chooses, along its own model.

Points from the discussion:

• The restoration of previous monarchies in the Middle East, while not viewed as progress by the West, can represent the best possibility for establishing a stable and decent regime. This also addresses the issues of a regime's legitimacy and succession. A former monarch could also, however, play a role in establishing a democracy. (This question was asked with Jordan's Prince Hassan in mind.)
• Nationalism has, to some degree, waned in the Middle East. This is due to its simultaneous failure and success. Nationalism succeeded in achieving independence, but failed to deliver freedom. This has discredited nationalism among many people and also given impetus to Islamism as an alternative view. The collapse of the Soviet Union has revived Islamism by giving pious Muslims what they perceive as a great victory over one of the world's two great evils. The line between Islamists and secular nationalists has been blurred, but pan-Islamism has no political appeal for most of the people of the Middle East.
• The tradition of strong central government in Iraq will likely hold the state together even after regime change.

AEI research assistant Molly McKew prepared this summary.