October 2005

Remaking Iraq: Success, Failure, and the Foundation of a New State

In October 2002, AEI began a conference series entitled, “The Day After: Planning for a Post-Saddam Iraq,” which raised vital questions about preparing for democracy in a new Iraqi state. Three years later, many of the original participants in that conference series hold leadership positions in the new Iraqi government. As the struggle for a free Iraq continues, the debate over the shape of post-Saddam Iraq roils on. Democracy in Iraq under a constitution that successfully codifies and guarantees the rights of the Iraqi people could serve as a model for other Middle Eastern nations. But are we expecting too much? Will the new constitution bridge the sectarian divides that have deepened in Iraq since the collapse of the Baath Party? What about the role of religion and Islamic law? Could Iraqi women lose the few rights they enjoyed under Saddam Hussein? On October 5, AEI hosted a day-long conference to discuss these and other challenges to Iraq, the shape of a new Iraq, and the Iraqi constitution. 

Panel 1: The Definition of Federalism and the Structure of Government

Kanan Makiya
Iraq Memory Foundation

Many critics have questioned what went wrong with the U.S. engagement in Iraq. But the same can be asked about the engagement of Iraqis in post-Saddam Iraq. Iraqis must start asking themselves what went wrong. In answering this question, four areas of failure must be addressed: federalism, demilitarization, de-Baathification, and democracy. In establishing a viable post-Saddam Iraq, civic federalism, although the best option for a sustainable state, has been undermined in large part by the Iraqi people themselves. As a result we have now, and most likely will have for a time to come, an ethnic federalism dividing Iraq into Kurdish, Shia, and Sunni parts. Likewise, we have failed when it comes to demilitarization. Although demilitarization remains an important aspect of reconstruction, its implementation has had serious flaws. While demilitarization should have been a gradual process, it was done in a hasty manner, creating more enemies than it should have. The third area of failure has been the process of de-Baathification, which is crucial to the reconstruction of Iraq. The U.S. and Iraq’s most serious error, however, was underestimating the strength of the Baath Party and its reach. While the party was defeated in the liberation of Iraq, it is now fighting back with force that few expected. Finally, a democratic Iraq requires both American and Iraqi leadership--the United States cannot be expected, nor should it attempt, to lead Iraq on its own. Iraq has not yet seen any viable Iraqi leadership that is willing to sacrifice its own self-interest for the greater good of the Iraqi people.

Rend Rahim
Former Ambassador-Designate from Iraq to the United States

The Iraqi constitution, written in a hasty manner under tremendous outside pressure, contains a number of serious flaws. First, the constitution is strongly devoted to the devolution of power from the federal to the state level, creating a virtually powerless center. As a result, the areas of federal authority are extremely limited, and too much authority is given to the states. Likewise, the constitution leaves the relationship between the central government and the states relatively ambiguous. It creates fields of overlapping authority, assuming that the states and the central government will reach a consensus, which, in light of the current situation, seems rather far-fetched. The third major flaw concerns the constitution’s treatment of the country’s institutional structure. The constitution creates an all-powerful parliament and a powerless president. The only institution theoretically able to balance parliament is the Federal Supreme Court, which is ill-defined in the constitution. Finally, as a result of the weakness of the federal government and constitutional provisions allowing states to have their own regional guards, the government has very limited power to enforce federal laws within the states, creating a law enforcement vacuum that bodes ill for the country’s future. The constitution, as it stands, is not a document that will last into the future as it contains seeds for even greater disaster.

Qubad Talabany
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

Iraq has embraced federalism because a centralized system failed to provide for the Iraqi people. The system failed not only because of its inefficiency and incompetence, but also because of its lack of proximity to the regions.

The development of stronger central institutions in Iraq will rest not only on constitutional provisions, but also on factors such as time, leaders, and a population that is willing to participate in the political process. Crucial in this regard is that Iraqis develop trust between their different communities--Shia, Sunnis, Kurds, and Christians. Iraqis must make a concerted effort to include the Sunnis in the political process, explain to them that federalism is in fact a system that can protect them, and explain that the constitution, with its system of checks and balances, will protect the Sunni minority from the dominance of the majority.

Munthir Al Fadhal
Constitutional Commission

Since 2002 Iraq has seen many important events taking place. For the first time in its history, Iraq will have a permanent constitution. This constitution will establish a federal Iraq and reject the one-party system which has been a failure in every Arab state to date. As a system of shared power, federalism is the solution both to the problems of Iraq and the Kurdish problem. The constitution must protect the rule of law, guarantee basic human rights, and establish the role of religion in politics. As long as clergymen play a role in politics, the political climate in Iraq will remain volatile.

Judy Van Rest
International Republican Institute 

The current Iraqi government’s actions have often been disorganized, chaotic, and lacking in transparency. While some Iraqi leaders have emerged, the problem often lies with the rank-and-file members of government who lack basic skills.

Given the current situation in Iraq, however, the government has done surprisingly well. Not only are laws being passed, but a constitutional draft was also concluded. While imperfect, this document must be seen against the backdrop of thirty years of totalitarian rule. The implementation of the constitution will help mediate issues relating to the overlapping authorities between the central and regional level.

Mustafa Safwat Rashid Sidqi
Independent Election Commission of Iraq

The role of the Independent Electoral Commission for Iraq (IECI) is to manage and supervise the elections. The IECI is responsible for the elections’ preparation and organization and is authorized by law to take all necessary measures in order to guarantee the elections’ integrity and freedom.

Panel 2: National Defense, Security, and the Role of Militias

Colonel Frederick R. Kienle
National Defense University

Two big missions lie before us: local military development and local police development. Iraq has a very strong military tradition, and Iraqi soldiers are looking forward to receiving training. The day after the elections in Iraq, 10,000 candidate soldiers reported for duty. Coalition forces have dedicated 2 percent of their total capacity to the training of Iraqis, and the training program itself lasts eight weeks. The progress is slow, but there is genuine progress.

Entifadh Qanbar
Deputy Military Attache

The biggest threat to Iraqi citizens is terrorism. It is very important to distinguish Baathists from Sunnis because the former want us to believe that both groups are one and the same. Some Baathists have accepted the new Iraqi reality--most of them, however, are terrorists. Moreover, Syria plays an important role through its support for the Baathists. It is critical that Iraq’s soldiers receive the best training available. On behalf of myself and my fellow Iraqi citizens, I am enormously grateful for the sacrifice of brave and generous Americans so that my people may live in freedom.

Panel 3: The Role of Religion

Sheikh Al-Gaylani
Darul Qadriyah International 

The role that religion plays in a state has always been a difficult question, and its role in post-Saddam Iraq is no exception. However, the concept of an Islamic state is great when we are ready for it. In order for an Islamic state to be successful, there are three pillars that must be put into place: Islamic law (sharia), Islamic religious scholars (alamah), and the informed consent of the people. The most important pillar among the three is the role of Islamic scholars, who interpret the law for the people. The alamah provide a bridge between the law and the people. They must be educated and competent enough to interpret the law and understand the role that Islam plays in modern society.

The success or failure of our interpretation of Islam and its role in this new government will be felt mostly by the people. What the people think of Islam is the most important factor, and their support must be garnered for the long run. Do they really want Islam for Islam’s sake? Do they really know what an Islamic state will mean for them? Are they fully aware of the cultural and social impact of this decision? And to what extent do the people understand the role of religion in modern life? In order to answer these questions, we must go back in history and examine the golden age of Baghdad. When looking at the prosperous times in Baghdad, we realize that Islam has always been a religion that tolerated different ideas and cultures. Without a creative exercise of this tolerance, the diverse cultures and people could not have been engaged and eventually assimilated into the nation.

Our ultimate goal with the reconstruction of Iraq should be to build a progressive, pluralistic, and modern Iraq within an Islamic framework. This is an enormous challenge that requires careful deliberations and a national debate based on extensive studies.

Sama Hadad
Iraqi Prospect Organization

There are two opposing views in Shia Islamic political theory. The first is the “rule of jurisprudence,” which was espoused by Rohollah Khomeini of Iran. The second is the “rule of the people,” espoused by Mohammad Bakr al-Sadr. Khomeini believed that the legitimacy of an Islamic government was derived from religious scholars, who were the rightful representatives of God on earth. He extracted two concepts from the Koran: “governance” and “supervision.” Conversely, al-Sadr claimed that the legitimacy of an Islamic government comes from the people and therefore an Islamic state requires the establishment of a democratic system. To him, democratic elections were not a way to power, but a way to apply the “rule of the people.” Al-Sadr was executed by Saddam Hussein. The question regarding the role of Islam in a new Iraqi government is whether the people will move towards Khomeini’s “rule of jurisprudence” or al-Sadr’s “rule of the people.” I am glad to report that so far it seems as if Iraqis are moving towards the “rule of the people.”
     
The key question concerning Islam in the new constitution is how the concept of supervision will be implemented, if at all. Constitutional supervision would appoint Islamic scholars to the judiciary to oversee executive decisions and interpret whether or not they conflict with Islamic law. Non-constitutional supervision would mean that key human rights are built into the constitution, assuring the supervision of Islamic scholars by giving them free speech. Clearly, a Supreme Court that does not require Islamic scholars must be established. Anything else will endanger Iraq’s democratization and would deal a death blow to al-Sadr’s enlightening vision.

Zainab Al-Suwaij
American Islamic Congress

Before the fall of Saddam, Iraq’s educational system was under government supervision, and religious classes were taught from a Sunni perspective. In essence, education was propaganda that served the regime of Saddam Hussein and did not acknowledge other faiths. Two and half years after the fall of Saddam, that curriculum has not changed very much. Hate speech, anti-Semitism, and jihad against non-Muslims are still key components. This curriculum must be changed in order to enter a new era for Iraq. Likewise, radical religious parties have significantly influenced the education of Iraqi youth by sending representatives to lecture, brainwash, and recruit schoolchildren for their cause. This is most obviously the case in the south of Iraq, which at the moment looks a lot like Iran.

Keynote Address

General David H. Petraeus
Multi-National Security Transition Command

The most important measurement when trying to build successful Iraqi security forces is the amount of aggregate Iraqi police and armed forces in training and close to reaching operational independence. Concern should be focused on how steadily a unit is progressing from one level of operational independence to another, not how many are currently independent. Currently, there are 115 combat battalions in training, which is a significant amount. Many of these battalions are literally “in the fight” as most of them are based in the Sunni Triangle where the majority of the insurgency is taking place. 
 
Iraqis are in the lead in many areas of security, such as force protection, construction of proper entry control points, and radio networks. NATO is involved in the security of Iraq, and military academies in Iraq are open and training cadets. A generational change is being brought about that will ensure a secure Iraq in the future. However, it must be realized that this institutional building takes time. 

There is no shortage of Iraqis who want to join the army or the police forces: our primary concern has been to highly train and equip a certain amount. Are they competent enough and can they maintain themselves? This is the question trainers are asking themselves.

In addition to training, equipment aggregation and construction is proceeding smoothly. The construction effort over the course of two years has received about $2 billion. Additionally, a large amount of equipment has been delivered, and the coalition is helping Iraqis build support structures, combat engineers, combat multipliers, and more. This all amounts to progress in building successful Iraqi security forces. The number one thing that is needed to make this all work is Iraqi leadership, and so far there has been no shortage there. 
 
Panel 4: Rights in the New Iraq, Women, Freedom of the Press, and Justice

Ammar Al Shahbander
Institute for War and Peace Reporting

The two major obstacles in the way of developing a media in Iraq that is up to international standards are the patronage system among the media workers and self-censorship. Most of the media outlets in Iraq have loyalties that lie with a political faction or group that has a particular agenda, thus inhibiting the existence of a truly independent and apolitical media. Self-censorship, on the other hand, is a habit that has developed in the Iraqi media because of its long history of oppression. Despite the fact that a number of international organizations have been trying to help the Iraqi media, the challenges have remained. Self-censorship and patronage must be targeted when attempting to conduct media reform in Iraq.

Mishkat Moumin
Former Iraqi Minister for the Environment

People in Iraq are asking themselves why women should participate in public life. The answer to that question is simple: women should be allowed to participate in public life so that other social groups are not blocked from doing so. If women cannot participate in public life then Iraq could be left with a dictatorship instead of a democracy. Iraqi women are close to being involved in the decision-making processes that goes on in public life but they are not quite there yet. There are positive sides to the constitution, such as allowing women to pass their own national identity to their children, but there are still major areas of concern. The international community should monitor this situation because Iraq cannot have good governance without involving women. Iraqi women are on the right track, and there are good reasons to have faith in their capabilities and what they can achieve.

Salem Chalabi
Attorney

Emergency laws have been put in place to protect human rights, but in practice there have been serious problems. One of the reasons for this gap is that the postwar plan was not comprehensive--it did not count on such a large insurgency. Another reason for human rights violations in Iraq is that the judiciary and the executive branches have not been inclusive enough. Judges have been reluctant to make independent decisions because they rely on certain politicians and do not want to go against their wishes. Lines of demarcation are not clearly drawn in the judicial system that is being formed.  

A bill is being put forth to the Transnational Assembly that attempts to amend the Iraqi Special Tribunal. This bill is troubling because it is does not provide the international help that was hoped for and does not encompass due process as much as it should. This draft bill is particularly important because Saddam’s defense team is going to focus on the legitimacy of the tribunal and the invasion of Iraq. Furthermore, most of the evidence against Saddam is being held in Qatar by Americans, while Iraqis do not have access to it. Laws need to be passed by Iraqis, and no one else, to make the tribunal legitimate.

AEI interns Shawn Mayo-Pike, Bjoern Siebert, and Thomas Lenne prepared this summary.