American Enterprise Institute

October 4, 2006

[Edited transcript from audio tapes]

1:45 p.m.	Registration
2:00	Presenter:	Eunice Reddick, U.S. Department of State
	Panelists:	Ken Menkhaus, Davidson College
		Gérard Prunier, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris
		David H. Shinn, George Washington University
	Moderator:	Mauro De Lorenzo, AEI
4:00	Adjournment

Proceedings:

Mauro De Lorenzo:  We’re here today to learn about the situation in Somalia, and to think about what the United States can do to influence it.  We’re also here to assess how concerned we should be about the emergence of an Islamist movement in the horn of Africa, and that movement’s potential links to international terrorism.  On one hand, there are reports that public order has been restored and piracy has been ended.  There are fewer weapons on the streets of Mogadishu than at any other time in recent memory.  We also hear reports about strict interpretations of Sharia law, banning of the World Cup matches, jihadi training camps in the desert, and of foreign terror suspects who have found safe haven.  You have lots of reports, but not many confirmed facts.  It’s very difficult to tell what is credible.

The challenge to formulating policy on Somalia is that we only ever focus our attention on it in an emergency.  This meeting here is the first of several that are going to take place in think-tanks and other institutions around Washington, as people try to remind themselves what Somalia is about and if there is anything we can do.  There are very few foreign visitors to Somalia.  There is no U.S. government representation.  We’re forced to depend on interested local sources of sometimes dubious credibility.  My hope for this panel is that our experts and our policy makers will help us distill the good information from the bad, and start to suggest outlines for a real strategy for making sure the Islamic Courts movement does not become dangerous for the United States and its allies; and for lessening the significant regional tensions in the horn of Africa, in which the Somali situation is always embedded. 

When it comes to the horn of Africa, our panel today could hardly be more distinguished.  I’m going to introduce each person before they speak in some detail.  Ken Menkhaus of Davidson College has volunteered to give a sort of Somali news night roundup of the latest current events before our other panelists make their presentations.  I’m going to let Ken take 5 or 10 minutes to bring us up to speed on what’s been going on.  Thanks very much.

Ken Menkhaus:  I misunderstood my mandate.  I thought I’d have 5 minutes to give you some critical background that would include current events, but also some important developments over the past 5 or 6 years that help make sense of what is going on today.  I’ll quickly recap a few, though I’m doing violence to the rich Somali history. 

To begin, we need to remind ourselves that in the late 1990s there was the terrorist bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, in which several Somali Islamists were eventually implicated.  That got Somali on our radar screen in a way it hadn’t been before as a possible transit site or safe haven for jihadists or al-Qaeda.  At that same time, there was a decline in the power of warlords or militia leaders in Somalia, particularly in the south.  There was a simultaneous rise of a local populist movement of Sharia Courts, all clan-based trying to provide law and order for their lawless neighborhoods.  They were very popular and not particularly political.  They were not radical.  They were supported by local businessmen who had developed a renewed interest in the rule of law and safety, given the economic prosperity in Mogadishu and surrounding areas. 

In 2000, there was yet another attempt to create a national government; it was called the TNG:  The Transitional National Government.  It produced a government that was dominated by Mogadishu-based clans and interests.  It was not a government of national unity.  That’s been a recurring problem in these processes, as they end up being coalitions of some with others feeling marginalized.  What’s important to know about the TNG is that the clans and factions who opposed it were Ethiopian-backed.  The Ethiopians also opposed the TNG.  The leader of this movement was a gentleman named Abdillahi Yusuf, who is now the president of the TFG.  That matters a great deal in understanding what is going on today. 

The TNG failed.  As it failed, there were some political Islamists in Mogadishu who took advantage of the existence of the Sharia Courts, and created an umbrella group called the Union of Islamic Courts, which provided them with a political platform that was very popular.  The individual courts were providing good rule of law.  At the head of this was a gentleman named Hassan Dahir Aweys , who has since been designated on our list of terror suspects in the aftermath of 9/11.

The next attempt to create a government in Somalia was the Transitional Federal Government.  This was a peace process that was led by the East African States and held in Nairobi.  It took two years of negotiations and culminated in a government that was led by Abdillahi Yusuf, the former opposition leader.  It didn’t produce the kind of government of national unity we were hoping for.  Instead, it was a fairly narrow coalition.  Guess who was left out of this coalition - the Mogadishu-based and mainly Hawiye clans that were quite powerful in Mogadishu.  They left feeling marginalized in this government, which has been in existence now for almost 2 years.  It is strongly backed by Ethiopia.  It was resisted by most of the Mogadishu population – both the Islamists and the coalition of warlords and militia leaders that eventually formed a U.S.-backed alliance. 

The TFG was plagued with problems.  It took 7 months to relocate from Nairobi to Somalia.  It had to relocate in a transitional capitol.  It had to relocate its capitol a second time.  It controls almost no territory; it is extremely weak and vulnerable and on the verge of collapse.

In February of 2006, an alliance was created among a group of militia leaders, most of whom had been receiving support from the United States and had a relationship with them to monitor terrorist activities and occasionally apprehend suspects.  There have been consistent reports of a small number of foreign al-Qaeda suspects operating in and out of Somalia.  When that alliance was declared, the members took it upon themselves, with perhaps U.S. encouragement.  We still don’t know the full story there.  They set themselves up as opposition to this now very robust Islamic movement – the Union of Islamic Courts. 

The Courts saw the alliance as a U.S.-backed attempt to dislodge them.  They launched preemptive attacks, and a 5 month war ensued in Mogadishu, in which the Islamists proved to be dramatically superior on every count.  The militia leaders in the alliance had very weak, poorly paid, and unmotivated soldiers.  They were completely overwhelmed.  The Islamists took the entire city of Mogadishu in June, 2006.  Since that time, they have expanded their territorial control throughout much of south-central Somalia.  They haven’t generally done it by conquest.  They did use it to walk in without a fight, but they had to bring their military down to Kismayo last week to take that town.  Otherwise, they have been negotiating coalitions with local authorities, and now their control extends roughly from the Kenyan border in lower Juba – can I walk away from the mike to show?  Okay.

[Inaudible voice from audience]

Can you hear me now?  It’s through lower Juba, most of middle Juba, across much of the Bai region.  There is Baidoa, the provisional capitol.  Then it goes up the Shabele River.  All of this is controlled by the Islamists.  That leaves the autonomous state of Puntland beyond their reach.  It leaves the secessionist state of Somaliland beyond their reach, and the Gedo region and portions of Bay and Bakol in the hands of the transitional federal government, or in the case of Gedo - no one’s hands.  It is today the strongest political and military movement in Somalia.  It holds most of the cards.  We’ll talk more about the details and debates of the Courts in the course of our talks.

Mauro De Lorenzo:  Our first presenter is Eunice Reddick.  Eunice Reddick is director of the Office of East African Affairs at the U.S. Department of State. She’s been a Foreign Service officer for more than 25 years, dividing her time between Africa and East Asia.  Thank you very much for being with us today.

Eunice Reddick:  Thank you very much, Mauro.  On behalf of Assistant Secretary Fraser, I’d like to thank the American Enterprise Institute for inviting me to participate in this panel and for the opportunity to explore U.S. policy towards Somalia with you.  What I’d like to do is outline U.S. policy objectives in Somalia and our recent efforts in support of them. 

The complex and fluid dynamics inside Somalia require us to constantly review and update our approach to respond to new developments and support our policy objectives.  In recent years, we’ve seen the adoption of a transitional federal charter following the 2-year reconciliation process in Kenya, the formation of the transitional federal institutions, which I will call TFIs, and subsequent political divisions and disputes among the members of those institutions.  The partial resolution of these disputes in January, 2006 preceded the move to Baidoa. 

More recently, there’s been a rise of the Islamic Courts as a political force in southern Somalia, followed by a lengthy process of political dialogue between the leaders of the TFIs and the Courts.  In addition, the U.S. continues to engage with and support positive developments in the self-declared Republic of Somaliland, which held parliamentary elections in September, 2005. 

Despite the rapidly changing dynamics, the goals for the United States policy remain clear.  We address the threat of terrorism, support the reestablishment of effective governance and political stability in Somalia, respond to the humanitarian needs of the Somali people, and promote regional stability and security.  While counterterrorism remains a core concern for the U.S., it is not the only precept of our engagement strategy.  To address Somalia’s instability, we must also focus on governance and institution building, and the continued provision of humanitarian assistance.  In this regard, the U.S. is the largest bilateral donor of humanitarian assistance to Somalia.  In the last fiscal year, FYO6, that assistance topped $90 million.  U.S. development assistance programs are mitigating conflicts through support for peace building efforts and Somali civil society, while also promoting stability by helping the Somali people develop more productive and self-sufficient livelihoods. 

The U.S. also continues to coordinate closely with our international partners.  In June, the U.S. joined Norway, Sweden, the EU, the African Union, the Arab League, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Italy, Tanzania, the U.K., and the United Nations to form the International Somalia Contact Group to coordinate international engagement in Somalia and to support the return of effective governance.  However, it is the Somali people who are ultimately responsible for the establishment of a functioning central government. 

The United States believes that the Transitional Federal Charter and the TFIs offer the Somali people a way forward through a transitional political process leading to a transfer to an elected representative government by 2010.  However, the existence of the charter and institutions does not obviate the need for inclusive political dialogue and the inclusion of key stake holders into the ongoing transitional process.  The charter provides a viable framework for this process of inclusive dialogue among all key stake holders, including between the leaders of the TFIs and Islamic Courts. 

The dialogue taking place between the Courts and the TFIs in Khartoum, which began on June 22 and took place again on September 4, must resume as soon as possible.  It should eventually also be expanded to include the border elements of Somalian society:  civil society leaders, business leaders, regional authorities, religious leaders, clan elders, and other key stakeholder groups.  The International Somalia Contact Group intends to encourage this dialogue in a way that promotes respect for the Transitional Federal Charter and inclusion of the Islamic Courts into the TFIs.

Somalia cannot continue to serve as a haven for terrorists.  Several foreign al-Qaeda operatives have taken refuge in Somalia, including some of the individuals who perpetrated the 1998 bombings of the 2 embassies in East Africa, as well as the 2002 attacks against an Israeli airliner and a hotel in Mambazo, Kenya.  The U.S. government has called upon the leaders within the Islamic Courts to support efforts to bring foreign terrorist operatives currently in Somalia to justice.  Such affirmative steps would demonstrate the positive intentions of the Courts, as well as improve regional stability and domestic security in Somalia.  The U.S. is committed to working with all Somalis, regardless of clan, religious, or secular affiliation, to deny terrorists the ability to plan, operate, and execute attacks using Somalia as a base.

Somalia also constitutes a general security risk for the broader region of East Africa.  This reality compels American policy makers to consider a regional approach that seeks to improve stability, both in Somalia and its neighbors.  Toward that end, the U.S. government is continuing to work with East African countries to build their capacity to counter terrorism and criminality that originates in Somalia through activities and measures to the President of East Africa’s Counterterrorism Initiative, which was originally announced and funded in 2003.  We have continued to coordinate our regional counterterrorism efforts in East Africa through a field-driven process known as the Regional Strategic Initiative.  That facilitates coordination among U.S. embassies, from Yemen to Sudan to Tanzania. 

The security, governance, and development issues facing the U.S. government in Somalia are complex and not easily defined; they cannot be resolved easily with simple strategies.  We recognize that there are no easy answers and seek to ensure that our engagement can adapt to changing dynamics and future developments on the ground in Somalia.  This challenge has been compounded by longstanding insecurity which limits the presence of foreign diplomats, including our own and other outside actors.  We continue to work to cultivate and utilize the existing international and regional consensus on the way forward in Somalia, and to continue close engagement with our international partners.  Thank you.  I’ll stop there.

Mauro De Lorenzo:  Thank you very much.  Our next presenter is Ambassador David Shinn, who actually held the job that Eunice Reddick now holds.  He had a long career in the U.S. State Department, serving as Ambassador to Ethiopia, and also Burkina Faso.  He played an important policy coordination role for the U.N. intervention in Somalia in the early 1990s.  Ambassador Shinn?

David Shinn:  Thank you very much, Mauro.  I thank the American Enterprise Institute for including me in this very distinguished group today.  I’m going to talk about the regional aspects of Somalia.  I think we have a map that covers the region.  Do we?  Could we maybe put that up?  I’m going to talk about quite a number of different countries.  For those of you who may not be intimately familiar with this area, it will be a little easier to follow along as I try to briefly walk through them.  I also have a longer paper in the materials that were handed out.  I’m not going to read the paper, but I am going to draw from it.  I’m basically trying to pull the highlights out of it in order to stay within a time frame.

I want to start out by talking about Somalia’s immediate neighbors, of which there are technically 3, but 2 depending on how you treat Somaliland.  The immediate neighbors are Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti.  Djibouti actually borders Somaliland, which is a self-declared independent republic now and therefore, Djibouti is not an immediate neighbor of Somalia.  The three immediate neighbors are by far the most important elements of this regional equation.  They all have significant indigenous Somali populations. 

In the case of Ethiopia, it’s primarily in the Ogaden area that borders Somalia.  In the case of Kenya, it’s also the bordering area of the so-called Northeastern Frontier.  In the case of Djibouti, about 60% of the population is Somali, and they are scattered around Djibouti.  This is also important because Somalia traditionally had a stated and active policy – going back to 1960 - of trying to incorporate these populations into a unified Somalia.  You can imagine the outcome of that.  There was a lot of conflict that resulted, involving particularly Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti to a lesser extent.

This policy, which I’ll refer to as pan-Somalism or Somali-irredentism, basically became dormant in 1991 when the former Somali Republic became a failed state.  It has remained dormant up until very recently, when at least a couple of members of the Islamic Courts have started to revive the idea; at least in the case of Ethiopia.  They have been very quiet on Djibouti, and haven’t said much about Kenya either.  It happens that Ethiopia has a 1000-mile long border, with both Somalia and Somaliland.  That is a very long border and it creates obvious security issues for Ethiopia. 

It also happens that there are two groups operating in the Ogaden.  They are indigenous Ethiopian Somali groups that are agitated either for autonomy, independence, or getting rid of the current government.  Whatever it is, they don’t like their current state in life and want to change it.   As a result, Ethiopia is supporting the new Transitional Federal Government of Abdullah Yusuf.  They see him as being someone who is not threatening to Ethiopian interests and they have put considerable support behind him.  This means they are at loggerheads with the rise of the Islamic Courts in Somalia.  The Courts and the Ethiopian government are effectively enemies at the moment.

According to the U.N. monitoring group on Somalia, Ethiopia has provided at least three separate consignments of arms to the Transitional Federal Government of Abdullah Yusuf.  There are quite a number of reports suggesting that at least small numbers of Ethiopian troops have gone across the border into Somalia, probably to be supportive of the Transitional Federal Government located in Baidoa.  Ethiopia has made it very clear that it supports a peacekeeping operation; they actually call it a peace support mission, but I’m not sure I know the difference.  This would involve primarily the member states of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development of the IGAD countries, but it would be sanctioned by the African Union, and in fact has been. 

The problem with all of this is that there is a long period of hostility between Ethiopia and Somalia.  Whenever Ethiopians go into Somalia, it almost automatically touches off an innate Somali nationalism and inflames the situation.  One could argue it would be a move to simply inflame the current situation.  The Islamic Courts have become masters of exploiting this long historical difference between the two countries.

Let’s turn to Kenya for a minute.  Kenya once had the responsibility for actually mediating the Somalia dispute in connection with the Intergovernmental on Development.  There are 7 member countries of that organization; they’re all shown up there on the map:  Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan, and Somalia.  Kenya tended for a long time to be the neutral partner in all of this, trying to balance both sides and bring some sort of peaceful solution to it. 

More recently, particularly since the rise of the Islamic Courts, Kenya has tended to join with Ethiopia and Uganda in support of an African peacekeeping operation in Somalia.  Within the last 24 hours, there maybe a little backing away from that by Kenya.  I’m only guessing at this point, but the Kenyan support for this effort is probably related to concerns that the Islamic Courts will also take up this Somali irredentist question, and at some point in the future say they’d like to have that chunk of Kenya back too. 

Separated from Somalia by relatively peaceful Somaliland, the third neighbor is Djibouti.  Contrary to Ethiopia and Kenya, its policy is to not advocate a peacekeeping operation into Somalia, but instead push for a process of dialogue between the Courts and the Transitional Federal Government.  This has been ongoing in Khartoum and has had a little bit of success but not a lot so far.  It finds itself allied with two other of the IGAD member countries on this question – Eritrea and Sudan, which also tend to support this policy.

Now I want to turn to the countries in the outer ring of Somalia and look particularly at Uganda, Sudan, and Eritrea, which also happen to be IGAD member countries.  Uganda is the only country so far that has actually said it would provide troops to a peace keeping operation in Somalia.  It also supports the Transitional Federal Government.  The problem is, if you read between the lines, it looks like it is only ready to supply troops if there is peace in Somalia and if all parties accept the troops.  That becomes a problem because the Islamic Courts say they will not accept troops from the outside under any circumstances. 

Sudan and Somalia are both members of the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Conferences.  They have something in common in that connection.  It just happens that the Arab League is actually sponsoring this dialogue that is ongoing in Khartoum.  At the moment, President Bashir of Sudan is the Chair of the Arab League.  Sudan is in a particularly strong position for the moment on having impact on what is happening in Somalia.  Bashir also reportedly expressed his surprise recently that the African Union had recommended that there be a peace keeping force in Somalia.  You will often see in the press that the two countries likely to support troops to Somalia for a peace keeping mission are Uganda and Sudan.  Yet, I have never seen anything coming out of the government in Khartoum saying that they are willing to do this.  It’s only the press saying this.  I think it’s safe to assume that Sudan is sympathetic with the position of Somalia’s Islamic Courts.

Eritrea’s primary concern is actually Ethiopia, not Somalia.  They don’t really have much to do with Somalia.  Eritrea sees Somalia as an opportunity to put additional pressure on Ethiopia by supporting the Islamic Courts.  They’ve denied that, but the evidence is fairly strong.  According to the UN Monitoring Group, Eritrea has provided substantial quantities of arms to the Courts.  Eritrea described this as baseless, but this is the position of a neutral party.  Eritrea supports the reconciliation process in Khartoum, and it opposes the regional peace keeping mission for Somalia.

Moving a little further a field, I see that we don’t have some of the countries on the map:  Libya and Egypt.  Egypt is a particularly important player in all of this.  Its involvement in Somalia is actually linked to the Nile water question.  I’m not going to give you a dissertation on Nile water.  I’d love to; it’s one of the topics that I really love to talk about, but I won’t today. 

Suffice it to say, Egypt is almost entirely dependent upon Nile water for its existence.  Ninety-five percent of all Egyptians depend upon Nile water.  Also, 86% of all that water originates in Ethiopia and has to go through Sudan.  Hence, you’ve got a problem here since Egypt and Sudan have divided the water between them without any left for Ethiopia.  Egypt’s relations with Ethiopia are quite cordial at the moment.  This is a long standing issue with potential for conflict that rises and falls depending upon developments in the region.  It’s one to be watchful of in the future.  Egypt has periodically used the Nile water questions as a pawn in order to put pressure on Ethiopia.  If you can stir things up between Somalia and Ethiopia, it takes the pressure off of Ethiopia’s interest in Nile water.  In fact, it did just that in 1977 when it supported Somalia in a war against Ethiopia.  For the time being, Egypt supports the Khartoum peace process.

There’s not too much need to say much about Libya.  It just seems that Kadafi likes to engage in controversial issues just because they are there.  It’s kind of like a mountain; you gotta climb it.  Indeed, he’s fooling around with Somalia as he has most of the controversial issues in this region.

I’ll say a few words about the Gulf States and Iran.  Somalia is Yemen’s largest trading partner among member countries of the common market for East and Southern Africa.  Yemen also has 84,000 registered Somalia refugees, in addition to a lot of others who aren’t registered.  The United States suggested this summer that there was money moving from Yemen to the Islamic Courts.  The Yemen government quickly denied that.  Yemen now supports dialogue between the Courts and the Transitional Federal Government – the Khartoum Process. 

Saudi Arabia has traditionally been the principal importer of livestock from this entire region of the Horn of Africa, including Somalia.  It was once Somalia’s major export.  There was Rift Valley Fever in the area back in the 1990s.  Saudi Arabia cut off all the importation of livestock.  Even if Rift Valley Fever has disappeared, that ban remains in effect.  It puts a huge crimp in the economy of not just Somalia, but also some of the neighboring countries.  In addition, in the past Saudi Arabia has engaged in providing funding through Islamic charities for Wahibi fundamentalist activity in Somalia and elsewhere in the region.  One of those charities funded was al Haramain, which Saudi Arabia shut down a couple of years ago. 

There are still allegations that there is money from private Saudi sources going into Somalia.  The suggestion from an American official recently that there was Saudi money going into Somalia resulted in a strong denial from the Saudi Crown Prince, who said there is no funding going to the Islamic Courts.  Perhaps there is not.  I don’t know.

The United Arab Emirates is worthy of mention because it is the financial center for Somali businesspersons.  Somali airlines, money transfers, telecommunications and general trading companies tend to operated out of Dubai.  Qatar is also of some interest, particularly more recently.  For example, the Emir of Qatar invited the Chairman of the Executive Council of the Islamic Courts for talks in Qatar in September.  Even Shiite Iran, which has never shown a great deal of interest in Sunni Somalia, is beginning to look at Somalia as an object of some concern or interest.  I would argue that Iran is paying more attention to the Horn Africa, and particularly Somalia.  It supports the Khartoum peace process and it has questioned the wisdom of sending any peacekeeping force to Somalia.

I’ll make a few more general comments about U.S. policy in the region.  U.S. influence with these countries varies considerably, from a lot of influence in some cases to virtually none in others.  It’s very important to keep in mind when talking about U.S. influence with any country that there are always other things going on you need to take into account.  You can’t look at any of these countries in the context of Somalia policy, which will be low on the totem pole in most instances.  You’ve got counterterrorism and U.S. military base access; you have support for U.S. policy in the Middle East, and nuclear proliferation in the case of Libya.  These are all going to trump U.S. policy toward Somalia. 

Following 9/11, U.S. policy toward Somalia has focused almost exclusively on counterterrorism and responding to disasters.  I’ve argued that the time has long since passed to develop a truly comprehensive policy toward Somalia.  I see the beginning of that happening now, but it’s been a long time coming.  Any policy based exclusively on countering terrorism and the provision of emergency assistance in times of need will fail to deal with the complex situation that exists in Somalia.  I would also argue that the United States should support this Khartoum Dialogue to the extent it has any life in it.  It still seems to have some at the moment; the next meeting is October 30.  I find that any peace keeping force going into Somalia at this point would seem to not have any particular useful role, nor am I particularly hung up on having contact with the Islamic Courts.  I think there are some relatively moderate members of those courts, and it’s time we were speaking with them.  There are others we probably ought not to be in touch with. 

What is particularly important is to take steps which will help to improve the life of Somalis.  As Eunice said, the amount of American aid going into Somalia has been very impressive in the past year – more than $90 million – but about $90 million of that was emergency aid.  It was mainly food aid.  The development aid that has been going into Somalia and Somaliland combined has been averaging between $2 and $3 million.  That’s pretty small potatoes in the grand scheme of things.

The Islamic Courts have announced they will simply not accept any peace keeping mission coming into the country.  Even if it could be stood up, which is highly dubious since only Uganda has offered 1,000 conditional troops, the likelihood of it happening is virtually nil anyway.  It’s hard to see how that is going to contribute to a peaceful situation there.  The cost is estimated to be $34 million a month.  A number of countries are supplying arms to one or more parties in Somalia.  The United States should certainly put pressure on all of those parties to the extent they can do it equally.  The U.S. should focus on funding development, legitimate peaces processes, and accept institutions rather than subcontract with unreliable Somali factions to catch elusive terrorists. 

For the sake of time I’m going to skip over the recommendations that I made individually for each country in the region.  You can read that in the paper.  I will simply make one overall conclusion:  It appears that the United States has become more engaged with Somalia in a positive way since the defeat of the warlords in Mogadishu earlier this past summer by the Islamic Courts.  The U.S. has lost more than a decade getting to this point.  The situation in Somalia is too important for U.S. interests in the wider region to return to a policy of indifference.  Thank you.

Mauro De Lorenzo:  Thank you very much.  I neglected to mention that Ambassador Shinn’s current affiliation is with George Washington University, where he is a professor.  We’ll turn next to Ken Menkhaus, who is a professor of political science at Davidson College in North Carolina.  He did dissertation fieldwork in Somalia in the late 1980s.  He was a political advisor to the UN operation in Somalia in the early 1990s.  I think he is widely regarded as one of the leading academic authorities on Somalia in the United States.  Thank you very much for coming here today.

Ken Menkhaus:  Thank you for having me.  The American Enterprise Institute asked us the question:  Is Somalia Dangerous?  For those of you who are taking short notes my answer is yes.  It is dangerous, and it has been dangerous for some time.  I would argue that we partially misread the dangers that Somalia poses.  The danger of a small number of foreign al-Qaeda suspects that occasionally use the country as a safe haven is a concern, but it has been overstated.  It has driven our policy in the past too far. 

The enduring threat of Somalia as a trans-shipment site for foreign terrorists to move money, men, and material through Somalia and into Kenya has been a chronic concern.  That remains a threat that Somalia poses to East Africa as a whole.  I would like to point out that as a trans-shipment point with this long unguarded coast, you don’t need al-Qaeda operatives.  You don’t need al-Qaeda sympathizers inside Somalia.  All you need to do is make a deal with a local businessman to move the stuff across the border.  That remains a great concern to us:  The threat of spill over of instability into the broader region – the refugee flows that are again now plaguing Kenya and Yemen and the flow of small arms. 

Somalia is one of the major sources of small arms into East Africa as far as South Sudan.  All of the piracy and crime that spills over into the region is chronic and has been a threat to the region for some time.  Then there is the dramatic ascent of the Islamists, which is a threat.  That begs the question:  What is the precise nature or danger that the Islamists either pose or could pose?  And danger to whom?  Sheikh Sharif and other leaders of the Islamist movement in Mogadishu have invited us to judge them based on their actions.  I think that despite the very fragmentary nature of the evidence we have to deal with in assessing who and what this movement is, that’s precisely the route we have to go in.  That’s what I’d like to talk about – assessing both their actions and their rhetoric, then also using a little bit of deduction to tie them together.

First, let’s assess the positives.  There is much to say that is good about what the Courts have achieved in the past few months and even earlier.  The first is the leadership role that has been assumed by Sheikh Sharif, who is widely understood to be and has the credentials to be an Islamic moderate.  He’s certainly someone we can live with and work with, and we should be talking to him and we are.  That is a very good thing. 

It is clear that the Courts are divided between hardliners and moderates.  The fact that a moderate has a major leadership position is good.  The Courts have made reassuring statements to the international community over the past few months, often penned by Diaspora members who have come back to help and whose English is better.  These have said all the right things; that what they wanted was to eliminate warlords, they want law and order for their people, democracy, and peace with the neighbors.  You couldn’t have asked for a more reassuring statement.  They have provided law and order in the capitol, and they have done that for years quietly and at the local level in places they control through the elimination of the warlord fiefdoms, where so much lawlessness and instability had taken place. 

They’ve also effectively ended piracy, which temporarily made Somalia’s coast one of the most pirate-ridden places on Earth.  They have enjoyed widespread support, both in Mogadishu and much of Somalia, and in the Diaspora.  That’s something to pay attention to.  Somalis themselves have generally viewed this as a positive development.  They’ve reopened the seaport and airport after being closed for 10 years.  They are engaged in demobilizing some of the militia, against which they fought just a few months ago.  They have expanded their control mainly through negotiation and by invitation. 

They’ve made some very impressive moves to try to return stolen property from the early 1990s to the original owners.  This is interesting because this goes against their core constituency, which Dr. Prunier will talk about in a few minutes.  The clan constituency stands to lose if some of the stolen property is returned to other clans.  They are organized militarily; their troops are disciplined; they are not warlords.  They are receiving backing from most of the powerful businessmen in Mogadishu, many of whom we have worked with in the past and generally trust as well.

In addition to this positive evidence, we can deduce that there are good things about this movement as well.  That is to stay when we look at the split between the moderates and hardliners, which is clearly evident in the Courts, a close reading of Somali history and politics suggests that Somali political culture is essentially pragmatic.  It takes a very pragmatic approach to foreign ideologies. 

Make no mistake; Wahibism is a foreign ideology in Somalia.  It has no standing roots in Somali practices of Islam historically.  As the Courts are engaged increasingly in the day-to-day affairs of governing the territory that it now controls, they’re going to have to start making deals.  They’re going to have to start getting their hands dirty again in the compromises of everyday politics.  That’s going to moderate them.  That’s going to provide an environment in which the pragmatists and moderates rise to the fore.

On the negative side, we’ll first start with the rhetoric.  I would say we have to be careful in assessing what they say because a lot of it is playing to their base, or they are statements made by people who don’t necessarily represent the broad view of the courts.  But nonetheless, they bear some scrutiny.  The first and most worrisome one is the statements made and repeated by Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, who is widely regarded as the most powerful figure in the Islamic movement. 

He embraced an irredentist view toward Somali inhabited territory of Ethiopia.  This is very dangerous.  He has said it explicitly.  He is drawing on a longstanding claim that was made by the old Islamist organization, Al-Ittihad, which had written that into its charter.  It sought to create an Islamic state in all Somali inhabited portions of East Africa.  More recently, he put a new twist on the claim by arguing for the right to intervene in Somali inhabited Ethiopia because the Ethiopian state mistreats its Somali citizens there.  That’s interesting because it separates the Somalian inhabited portions of Kenya from Ethiopia.  He doesn’t currently want to rile up Kenya, though not long ago, he also declared that Kenya was an enemy of the Somali people. 

Some of the hardliners in the movement have said that they are essentially in a state of war with Ethiopia.  When the possibility of foreign peacekeepers was introduced a year ago into the Somali debates, Aweys offered clan militias the opportunity to cleanse themselves of their past sins and the blood of foreign peacekeepers.  He and others have described Somalis in the TFG, which is affiliated with Ethiopia, as traitors.  He declared women’s rights a Western agenda that has nothing to do with them. 

One of their leaders also recently said if there is a fight with Ethiopia they will take it all the way to Addas.  None of this is reassuring rhetoric.  This is very hostile rhetoric; you have to take it with a grain of salt under the circumstances, but you can’t altogether dismiss it either.  What about the action?  That’s what they really want us to look at.  What have they done?  Well, let’s look back a few –

[Break in audio at 52:30]

Talk about some of their present actions.  In the recent past, what we know is that within the broad Islamist coalition in Mogadishu, there has developed one or several cells.  They have been responsible for at least 3 dozen assassinations of Somalis, most of whom were former military, intelligence, or police officers – anyone who could be a potential rival.  It includes some prominent civic and peace leaders who crossed swords with them.  This is not reassuring. 

Assassination has been a tool of choice in the past 2 years for one wing of the Islamist movement.  No doubt, many of the other Islamists abhor this; they say so privately.  They fear it, but if they say so publicly they could also be a victim of it.  We know that they have harbored several foreign al-Qaeda suspects, though they continue to deny it.  We know that Aweys was implicated in the 1998 Embassy bombings.  We know that one of the leaders of the jihadist cell was involved in the desecration of an Italian cemetery not long ago.  That was public knowledge and there was no open criticism in Mogadishu, which was very disappointing given the nature of that particular act. 

We know they have training camps in and around Mogadishu, and we know there has been inaction on the part of many Somalis who are broadly sympathetic to the movement, but who are appalled at some of these acts.  What is worrisome is that they are either unable or unwilling to come out and directly criticize or condemn it.  That suggests to me there is an air of fear, particularly of assassination.

What about current actions?  There are 4 that are particularly worrisome, by way of category.  The first, and most serious in my view, is provocations of Ethiopia.  Ethiopia deserves plenty of blame for the current situation as well.  We are on the verge of a war in Somalia that will draw Ethiopia, Eritrea, and possibly other countries in.  This is the most dangerous aspect of the current crisis in Somalia in my view.  It will be bad for Ethiopia; it will be bad for the Somalia people; and it will be bad for us.  The only people who might win are jihadis who get their jihad.  The Courts have done all of these positive things to make life more secure and better for the Somali people.  It comes at some surprise that at the same time they’re doing that, they are also taking numerous steps that seem designed to provoke a war that would be devastating to the very constituency they are making more secure in Mogadishu. 

What are they doing in particular?  First, they are sponsoring and supporting 2 insurgencies that are operating inside Ethiopia, with the help of Eritrea: the Oromo Liberation Front and the Ogaden National Liberation Front.  This can only be designed to provoke Ethiopia.  Second, it has repeatedly broken promises regarding the use of force to expand its territorial control.  In a number of cases it has used force, and most recently in Kismayo.  Some of the movements of its forces have gone into tripwire areas near the Ethiopian border, seemingly designed to provoke an Ethiopian response.  Finally, extensive money and arms are coming from Ethiopia’s enemies and adversaries, including growing evidence of Iran.

What can we deduce from this?  We can deduce that the hardliners in the movement either want a war with Ethiopia or they want the threat of war.  I don’t know the answer to this.  Either way, they are trying to provoke Ethiopia into actions that will allow them to mobilize the broad Somalia population.  As Ambassador Shinn has said, they’ve done a fabulous job of conflating their Islamist agenda with a Somalia nationalist agenda.  The anti-Ethiopian, anti-Christian, and xenophobic sentiments are all bundled together very nicely.  That holds together as long as Ethiopia poses a mortal threat to southern Somalia.  They have every reason to continue to provoke this current situation, and they’ve done so very effectively.  In the process, they’ve also marginalized moderates who are arguing for dialogue.  They discredit any rival because currently, as any Somali will tell you, it’s very difficult to oppose the Courts as long as they are posing as the main source of protection of Somalis against their Ethiopian neighbors. 

A second concern is the radicalization of the movement and its move toward authoritarianism.  There has been a crackdown on civic groups, women’s groups, and the media.  There is morality policing and the closing down of cinemas, and restrictions on sports.  They have recently banned the mild narcotic drug Khat from consumption, which is a brave thing to do because it is very popular in some Somali quarters.  They have restricted gatherings in which politics is discussed.  They have concentrated power, even at the expense of the some of the leading businessmen that brought them into power. 

The hardliners are monopolizing some of the most important sources of power – the funding that is flowing in from outside.  They control the most powerful Islamic militias, and they have rewarded some of the hardliners with top positions.  Aweys is Chair of the Consultative Council in the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts.  Hassan Turkey is another individual designated as a suspect on the terrorist list.  He was just awarded administrative control over Kismayo, which they took last week. These are not actions designed to reassure; they are not actions that appear in any way moderate.  They are certainly policies that are driven by the hard line wing of the movement. 

In addition, there have been a couple of assassinations of foreigners in Mogadishu over the past couple of months.  Most recently, it was an Italian nun and longtime aid worker there.  There is fear that we don’t know who is behind these assassinations.  There is fear that some of the indoctrinated jihadis in the Shihad movement have been convinced they should go out and kill foreigners.  There was recently a threat posed against the UN Security Office – the UNDSS.  All UN international staff has recently been relocated from all of Somalia to Puntland down to the Kenyan border.  The only ones remaining anywhere in Somalia are actually in Somaliland.  That suggests that they are aware of some broad threat against international aid workers.  Finally, the Courts are insisting that all aid be channeled through the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts, which will dramatically restrict the ability of international aid agencies to work with their local partners.  None of these are a good thing.

Third, though they are meeting in Khartoum with the TFG and their moderates still appear interested in trying to broker a true government of national unity, they have actively sought to undermine the TFG at the same time.  One recent was example was the taking of the port of Kismayo by force.  The suicide bomb attempt against President Yusuf in Baidoa just two weeks was a disturbing new precedent.  We have never seen suicide attacks in Somalia.  Suicide is taboo culturally.  If in fact it was a suicide attack, this is a very dangerous new precedent.  Earlier there were two assassination attempts on the TFG Prime Minister while he was visiting Mogadishu.  Back in September of 2005, there was a foiled bombing attempt in Somaliland designed to disrupt their elections and possibly free some Islamist prisoners from a Somaliland prison.  None of these are a good thing.  All point to the possibility that hardliners are driving the policies that matter most.

Finally, the Courts have accumulated an enormous amount of weapons.  Thanks to the UN monitoring group and others, we have a pretty clear idea of what is coming into the country.  They include some heavy weaponry and surface-to-air missiles that are presumably designed to neutralize Ethiopia’s superior airpower in the event of a war.  We all know that surface-to-air missiles have crossed the border into Kenya.  That is a real concern for the United States as well. 

What does all this mean?  The evidence is still fragmentary.  We still have to review where we think the Courts are and are going.  At this point, we can conclude that the threat of war with Ethiopia is very high and very dangerous to all concerned.  It will have regional implications and become a proxy war if it happens.  The evidence is suggesting that hardliners are increasingly in control of power.  They are content to allow the moderates to attend the Khartoum talks and some affairs of governance in Mogadishu, while they are engaged in other business.  They are using the moderates to buy time to consolidate power. 

The threat of jihadist attacks on foreigners inside Somalia and Somaliland is clearly higher than it has ever been in the past.  The threat of jihadist or terrorist attacks on Western targets in Kenya may actually be temporarily reduced.  If the Islamists have any survival instincts at all, they would know that sponsoring that kind of attack would effectively end the discussion we’re having right now.  They would simply be perceived as sworn enemies.  One could hope they would be keeping whoever thinks that is a good idea on a short leash.  Nonetheless, infiltration into Kenya is likely to be very high.  General spillover of this crisis into Kenya and Yemen is going to be high. 

Foreigners will continue to dabble in Somalia.  Nature abhors a vacuum and Somalia has been a vacuum for years.  It is easy to become a player there.  It only takes a few million dollars to have a significant amount of short term influence.  Most of the foreigners are in fact just dabbling.  Somalia is a subsidiary concern, whether it’s al-Qaeda or Eritrea.  They use Somalia in pursuit of larger goals.  I think the greatest single threat right now is actually the paradoxical combination of the Court’s strengths and weaknesses that make it a real source of danger.  The Courts have risen so suddenly and unexpectedly. 

I think it’s clear that the establishment of the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism propelled the Islamists into a war that then propelled them into control of Mogadishu and a great deal of territory long before they thought they would have that.  They are clearly unprepared.  That’s why we have so many internal discussions about the nature of an administration they would put together, and the role of clans.  If they knew they had been power in 2006, presumably some of these things would have been worked out.  The fact that they won power so dramatically and decisively is making them very confident, perhaps over confident.  It makes them much less willing to compromise. 

At the same time, they have a lot of deep internal weaknesses: clan fissures that Dr. Prunier will talk about, ideological fissures, and a lot of other differences.  What I worry about is that while that makes them vulnerable to fracture, it’s also going to tempt the leaders to continue to engage in acts of provocation designed to sustain this state of emergency, this threat of war with Ethiopia in order to close ranks and outmaneuver the moderates.  The danger is that the longer they play brinksmanship with Ethiopia, they more likely we are to actually have a war that will get out of control.

Mauro De Lorenzo:  Thank you, Ken, for that very sobering synthesis.  I’m pleased now to introduce our final presenter, who is Gerard Prunier.  From 2001 until this summer, he was the Director of the French Center for Ethiopian Studies in Addis Ababa where he continues to live.  He is also a CNRS research professor at the Sorbonne in Paris.  For more than 35 years, he’s been living, working, and studying in East Africa.  He occupies a unique space in contemporary studies of these regions.  He’s certainly the only person who has produced authoritative studies of both Rwanda and Sudan.  His most recent book is on the Darfur genocide.  I venture to say there is hardly another scholar alive who has such a depth of knowledge in such a wide area of Africa.  Somalia is another of the countries he has been following.  I’m happy he is here with us today.

Gerard Prunier:  Thank you very much for this praise I don’t deserve.  The basic question I think we have to ask ourselves – Ken just asked a basic question:  Is Somalia Dangerous?  Perhaps I will attempt to make it sound a little less dangerous than he made it sound.  The other basic is:  Who are these guys and what do they want?  Coming from a Western background there is a tendency to think any political movement will draw its backing from a wide array of people.  In fact, the Union of Islamic Courts and the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts do not draw its support for a wide array of the population. 

As you are aware, the Somali population is deeply divided into clan units.  The history of the Union of Islamic Courts starts in 1993.  As Ken mentioned, it was spurred by notion that Islam was the only element of the Somali culture that could bring together a number of people and introduce some morality into what was happening in Mogadishu, which was definitely a very immoral type of society.  Over the last 13 years these Islamic courts have grown, but very slowly.  This is why I agree with Ken that they own successes enormously surprised them.  That is part of the problem.

How were the courts built?  They were built along clan lines, which is logical in Somali society.  There were about 11.  An inordinate number were linked with the Hawiye/Habar Gedir/Ayr family of clan, clan and sub clan.  It’s logical, given the fact that the battle for Mogadishu in 1991 was largely Habar Gedir imperialism.  They were taking over an area which wasn’t theirs.  Then you have this period in the 1990 when they are there, and they somehow had to administer little chunks of Mogadishu, so they built the Islamic Courts.  This situation is not a triumph of the Islamic Courts.  It is an implosion of the system we’ve had since the failure of Operation Restore Hope. 

Between 1995 and today, roughly 10 years, the warlords were not a real government.  They were a state of fact.  They ran things in a terrible fashion, but they ran things.  They increasingly lived on top of a void.  The Islamic Courts moved into that and filled the void, to their great surprise.  As a result, it was a group of Hawiye/Habar Gedir/Ayr people, who happened to be on the Islamic Courts.  Now they are on to a much bigger agenda.  In a way, they are suddenly on the edge of a cliff and they are looking at an enormous expanse of ground under them.  They are little people.  The Hawiye are only one of the clan families in Somalia. 

Then you have the other main clan, which is the Abgaal.  That’s another story.  Within the Habar Gedir, the Ayr is not [indiscernible], so the sub clan is something else.  Now I’m beginning to realize, with the help of Ethiopian friends, that it’s not only Habar Gedir/Ayr, but there are 4 sub-sub clans.  The Islamic Courts are built on two of them.  Frankly, I cannot tell you which ones because we have not yet identified the names.  Somali culture is a maze.  Even after years and years, you still discover things that you didn’t know.  You have a narrow clan base there.  This is the first part of my two-barreled question.  Who are these guys?

The second barrel:  What do they want?  They want it all. They want to govern the whole country.  You see an immediate contradiction when you represent perhaps 5 or 6 percent of the population, and you want it all.  It doesn’t mean they don’t have the necessary appeal through the use of politicized Islam to seduce and work their way into a global government.  But there is an immediate difficulty when you are only 6 percent and want 100 percent.  How do you go from one to the other?  This is one of the reasons for the good governance measures that Ken was talking about. 

I would add one which I personally consider very important:  Ban the trade in charcoal.  That doesn’t sound very exciting, but Somalia is an ecological disaster.  Since everybody is short of cash, one thing you can do is cut out a few remnant trees, turn them into charcoal and sell them to the Middle East.  This is an abomination.  You think immediately of things like women’s rights and so on, but killing a country is also a very basic thing.  The trade of charcoal is killing Somalia.  Banning it is even more important than piracy. 

In piracy, the victims are foreign.  If you are a Somali, that’s too bad.  I wouldn’t mind seeing some of the people who are in Somali waters caught by pirates.  You have Korean and Pakistani trawlers fishing in the most illegal way.  They’re just taking advantage of the situation because there is no government.  No other part of the world would allow them to do that.  Sorry, where is your fishing permit?  What is your catch?  What are you doing?  But there in Somalia you can do anything from dumping toxic wastes, as was done in the early 1990s by the Italians, to over-fishing by Koreans, Japanese, and Pakistanis.  We have to see it from the Somali point of view too.  The banning of charcoal is more important to me than the piracy thing.  I have nothing against banning pirates, but when you say no to burning the trees, it’s more grounded in the realities of Somalia.  They’ve burned about 95 percent of them.  Somali is turning into a desert.

The problem is for these guys with a limited clan base to expand.  As Ken mentioned, the great thing is to take leaf out of the nationalist agenda.  That enables you to say you are speaking for all Somalis.  Getting the Ogaden is a highly popular thing because the Somalis have always had this problem of thinking – if only we could get together the 5 things to correspond the 5 pointed start that goes back to the 1960 independence, then we would be happy.  I’m not sure if that proposition makes any sense.  You can’t manage two of the points of the star and then hope that magically the other 3 will become manageable. 

The problem of governance of the Somali state is rooted in the nature of Somali culture and the clan-based society.  It will not be solved by adding more clans and territory, but never mind; that is how they feel about it.  Once you’re doing this demagogical thing of saying you want the old target, you automatically get a few people drifting to your side.

What are the possible targets of the territorial expansion by the SCIC?  Obviously, the first one would be the area supposedly controlled by the TFG.  Personally, I don’t think they will touch it.  I think occupying Kismayo is part of a [indiscernible] in Ethiopia policy.  It goes with the anti-Ethiopian rhetoric.  I don’t think the anti-Ethiopian rhetoric should be taken seriously either.  It is a mobilization process.  They want permanent confrontation with Ethiopia and no war.  Keep everyone on the edge of their seats, but don’t jump.  It helps the mobilization, which increases their support while an open war would only bring problems.  At the same time, they have to make sure the IGAD military intervention is impossible.  Taking Kismayo is part of that because that would be a likely point of entry for IGAD forces.  Now they have to be flown in. 

I think Museveni is probably the only who thinks this can be done, but he has been deluded on a whole number of other issues in the Congo.  I think he is still deluded in his Somalia dreams.  There are 60 poor soldiers in Baidoa; I do not envy their position.  Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys was a little humorous when he said, “Why don’t you go home?  We might have to kill you and honestly, we don’t want to.”  I think they should take that piece of advice.  I personally don’t think they will attack the TFG territory. 

I think the Khartoum process is actually part of that.  The Khartoum process is going to be like the North/South Korea peace discussions; it could go on for 20 years.  They will keep it alive with the firm intention that it will not produce any result.  In the meantime, it means they can be in this state of no peace and no war with the TFG, which is what I think they are ultimately aiming for.  They can keep the mobilization without having to fight a war. 

Another target could be Puntland.  There we are unfortunately in more serious waters.  The flashpoint is Galcaio, which is held by a man called [indiscernible].  He has a whole bunch of other names, but the Somalis give you nicknames.  When you are called [indiscernible], everybody gets lost.  I’ll call him by his nickname.  He’s a Habar Gedir.  This is one of the interesting points.  The guy is a Hawiye/Habar Gedir, but a Saad and not Ayr.  He is one of the losers of the CIAO coalition.  He ran to his home area of Galcaio and made an alliance with the TFG asking if they needed some kind of deputy.  I’ll hold Galcaio for you.  Galcaio is the key to Puntland.  The Islamic Courts are glaring at him, and he is glaring back, but no one is shooting. 

Puntland is the problem because that is where Yusuf Abdullah is from.  He has lost Puntland because he tried to prevent Mohamud Adde Muse from becoming President.  When he became President of the TFG, Mohamud Adde Muse managed to become President Puntland anyway.  The guy is good.  He is from the former Sultan clan and has moral authority.  To the best of my knowledge, he is not too dishonest.  He’s got a firm grip on his little semi-autonomous country.  Dislodging him would immediately get all of the Majertain clan together because it would not be seen as the Islamists coming.  It would be seen as an invasion from the Hawiye and the Habar Gedir.  Even the defender himself of the gateway to the north is a Habar Gedir.  If you want to get a whole bunch of Majertain angry like hornets, you try to invent Puntland.  I think there will be a standoff.  The real negotiation form is not that with the TFG.  The TFG is a ghost of a ghost of a shadow.  It’s a paper thin government.  Puntland is not a paper thin government, and it is not in the hands of Yusuf Abdullah even if he is there.  The real negotiation will be with Puntland.

Somaliland is another case because it is for all practical purposes a separate country.  Now it is hated with such a passion by Somali nationalists that if they really want to get their credentials as ultra-nationalist, it would be better to attack Somaliland perhaps than the Ogaden.  I hope that doesn’t happen because Somaliland is the only working part of the former Somalia.  Frankly, I hope that they survive. 

I have a lot of sympathy for them, which does not make me very welcomed by Southern clans.  It would be a major war because even more than in Puntland, you would get a solid Isaaq wall.  The guys in the eastern part of Somaliland are related to the Puntland ones.  It would depend on the attitude toward Puntland.  But there again, you would get a hornet’s nest.  It would be a great mobilizing agenda for the Islamic Courts, but it would be a 2-edged sword.

Then there is the Ogaden.  The Ogaden is perhaps the most dangerous part because it is the one thing everyone can agree on fighting and attacking.  There is of course another thing.  There is at least natural gas there, and quite possibly oil.  Everybody’s appetites are up with the notion of going into the Ogaden because it’s good for your political mobilization.  Take all of the nationalist credentials and you might win the big prize.  Personally, I don’t think the governments of the Somali people would be sold at all.  This is what they are thinking; I don’t think it would work, but it is at least very attractive.  That is not question of knowing whether the Ethiopians would accept or not.  The answer is no.  If you try to circumvent the TFG, not attack Baidoa, and then do it in the Ogaden at the same time, the danger will be there too. 

Somehow, I don’t think it will all end up that badly.  I’m not too worried about the fact that there is no real dialogue.  The dialogue with the TFG is not a real dialogue.  It’s a dialogue between something that exists and a ghost.  Frankly, I don’t think any solution can come out of that.  I would be much more interested in the idea that the Islamic Courts could call some kind of a national convention in the future, and perhaps with Puntland participation.  Somaliland is simply not going to deal with it.  It would be a kind of national convention where they could say we agree on the Islamic Republic. 

I know that when people say Islamic, Americans hear Muslim.  It is not the same thing.  Among your allies, you supposedly have a number of Islamic republics, like the regime in Pakistan.  Is it so bad?  You have people in France who call themselves an Islamic republic.  If the internal dynamics of the Islamic Courts are channeled or manipulated in the right direction, you could end up with an Islamic republic that you could live with.  It isn’t impossible.  Actually, it might prove more balanced than a desperate gamble for clan control because the TFG is not clan-free. 

People say the Islamists aren’t having a frank dialogue with the TFG, but whoever said the TFG was honest or clan-free?  I’m sorry, but it’s not the case.  The TFG is like everyone else in Somalia – indebted to some clans very deeply.  There is a whole Majertain crowd around Yusuf Abdullah.  It has enormous ambitions; it wants to govern the whole country, but it has even less of a base than the Islamic Courts.  The gap between their dreams and their reality is even bigger. 

The problem is when you try to bridge such gaps you usually do it with guns.  There would be a lot more guns to bridge that particular gap.  If the moderate Islamist agenda can be achieved and if it results in an Islamist Republic that would run roughly from the Kenyan border to Puntland, perhaps Gedo and other such areas would be best left as gray areas for the time being.  Trying to make them too clearly defined might prove to be extremely costly and counterproductive.  It would cover perhaps 40 to 50 percent of Somalia’s territory.  It could prove to be a kind of aggregate towards which other areas can gravitate. 

The proof of the pudding is in the eating.  Once such an Islamic republic would exist, it would have to be held to a certain number of obligations and results.  Money would be forthcoming or not.  It’s another twist on what used to be called the building block theory.  Nobody expected that the building block theory might be done by the Islamists, but why not?  If they are the ones who can do it, why not?  Almost anything is better than the present situation.

I would like to conclude with two remarks.  One is for the people who interested in Somali history.  Remember and perhaps reread a couple of books, like Divine Madness, about the history of Mohamed Abdullah Hassan.  He was a great nationalist leader who fought the Ethiopians, Italians, and the Brits between 1900 and 1920 until he died of influenza.  He never managed to unite the Somali clans.  He built clan alliances, but he couldn’t them all behind him.  I don’t think these guys will do it either.  The best they can do is to build some kind of coalition that proves balanced and efficient enough to attract other people outside their coalition.

The 15 attempts at recreating governments that ran from 1993 to the present TFG are wrong.  The myth is that you can have an all inclusive, all-clan government.  You can’t.  This is why you have had 15 failures.  If you go to the same doctor for the same ailment 15 times and he fails to cure you, then maybe you’d better change doctors.  The whole notion that we can build a 16th government in Somalia is not possible.  Islam is not capable of doing it either, but it can prove to be some kind of a magnetic field that will not tramp the clans.  Anybody who has every dealt with Somalia knows you cannot tramp the clans.  Get them to work together with the kind of mini-mall project that they can all agree on, provided it does not threaten their interests too far.  Perhaps I’m being too optimistic.

This is another remark.  The Habar Gedir Ayr are not the Pashtun.  This thing has all been about the Taliban, but the Taliban are based on the Pashtun.  I’m sure there are people who the country and might correct my figure, but I think they are about 60 percent of the population in Afghanistan.  We just don’t have the same base here.  We’re not dealing with the same thing.  Plus, there is no Pakistan next door.

Maura De Lorenzo:  Thanks, Gerard.  For those of you who need to go, now is the moment.  I want to move pretty quickly into discussion.  We’re going to have somebody going around with a microphone.  There are three ground rules:  Please state your name and affiliation.  Please limit yourself to one question.  Please do ask a question instead of giving a speech.  I’m probably going to take three people at a time and then let the panel react to them.  If you indicate, I will call on you.

Male voice:  Thank you.  My question is to Ken.  You said the Islamic Courts are sponsoring OLF.  I am from there, and we are not being sponsored by the UIC.  The last time we were there was in 1999.  One thing you have to remember is that the Islamic agenda is not up to our objectives because we are Muslims, Christians, and people of traditional African religion.  Any kind of religious agenda would break us apart.  We have a vested interest in not aligning ourselves with any religious movement.  What kind of sources are you using to make this kind of allegation?

Maura De Lorenzo:  Thank you.  There is a second person there.

Elaine Monahan:  I’m Elaine Monahan with Congressional Quarterly.  I have a question for Mr. Prunier and Ms. Reddick.  Ms. Reddick, what do you think of the suggestion that the United States should allow a moderate Islamic republic to develop?  Is that an option that is part of your policy?  Mr. Prunier, what exactly is your advice to the U.S. government if it wants to create that kind of situation?  Thank you.

Stanford Mukasa:  Thank you.  I am Stanford Mukasa from Indiana University of Pennsylvania.  This is addressed to any of the panelists.  My question now is do you see the solution ultimately lying in the partition of Somalia into 3 sovereign territories - namely, Somaliland, Puntland, and the rest of Somalia?  And should the international community now focus its efforts to negotiate that kind of transition for Somalia?

Maura De Lorenzo:  Ken, would you like to start off?

Ken Menkhaus:  With regard to the question of the OLF being sponsored by the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts:  Sponsoring may be an inappropriate word, but they have been channeling arms via Eritrea to the OLF.  The evidence is from the UN Monitoring Group, which has consistently reported this is some detail.  The logic is interesting. 

I agree with you that the OLF would not share the ideology of the Courts, but nor would Eritrea for that matter.  Eritrea is in a very similar situation – half Muslims and half Christians, with a secular government.  Why in the world would it get in bed with an Islamist government?  The answer is very simply that the enemy of my enemy is my friend.

Mauro De Lorenzo:  And Gerard and Eunice, who wants to go first?

Gerard Prunier:  I’m sorry.  I might not understand the system clearly.  I’m also supposed to answer the OLF question?  What Ken said was quite clear.

Mauro De Lorenzo:  No.  It was the question from here.  What advice would you give?

Gerard Prunier:  Oh.  It’s the $375,000 question.  It’s extremely difficult because giving advice is a very cowardly thing to do.  You run away if your advice is wrong.  This is something that the Americans are not used to doing.  It would involve getting inside the subject of your manipulation.  Let’s call a spade a spade.  It means getting on friendly intimate terms with a number of people who are part of the movement.  We have bold psychological outlines. 

Hassan Aweys is perhaps not as radical as he is being painted.  There are some moderates.  There is a role for Alislah, which as been kept out of the movement.  There is the Union of Ulamah, who did condemn the desecration of the Italian cemetery.  They are a bunch of old fogies in a way, but they do command a certain measure of respect.  You have to go into all the various tiers and levels of complexity.  I’m afraid of an American tendency to see good guys and bad guys.  These are middle-of-the-ground guys who are a little bit good and a little bit bad, depending on which day of the week it is and how you look at them.  Unless you get to know them more intimately, you cannot influence them. 

Influence starts with friendship, exchange, and discussion.  Then you discover that the guy who looked so threatening from a distance becomes less and less threatening.  Or perhaps you discover the opposite.  The guy you thought was a moderate turns your ears up after a couple of times.  You didn’t realize what was really inside him.  The great danger is to operate with people you don’t know very well and to pass quick judgments on people.  That is not part of your tradition because you’re a country made up of heterogeneous people, who have all blended into one.  There is the American ideology.  The notion that people are different and getting inside their minds, hearts, and ways of feeling is foreign to you.  They should be of all one piece, and they’re not. 

God knows, the Somalians are not of all one piece.  The problem is that there are too many pieces.  This is a little bit of cultural advice.  In sheer political terms, the situation is going to shift and shift again.  Any advice I would be giving would be obsolete by next month, perhaps even by next week.

Mauro De Lorenzo:  Eunice, can we countenance an Islamic republic in Somalia?

Eunice Reddick:  Well, there are Islamic republics.  In principle, the U.S. has relations with governments that are Islamic republics.  But I think the issue here is going to be – are the Somali people making the decisions?

[End of tape one]

[Beginning of tape two]

Eunice Reddick:  So, again, given the situation on the ground is developing quickly and this is a dialogue that the people of Somalia have to proceed with, but we hope what comes out of that process will be a government that will be able to deliver services to its people, that won’t harbor terrorists, that won’t threaten its neighbors.  That is, I think, a perspective to deal with it in more a theoretical or conceptual basis than the situation on the ground. 

Mauro De Lorenzo:  Any comments about the desirability of splitting Somalia into three pieces?

David Shinn:  Let me say, generally, you, in effect, have at the moment an independent Somaliland – at least the Somalilanders will tell you that.  You have more or less an autonomous Puntland, but then the problem comes with all the rest, and I’m not sure that I see all the rest as being, at least over the long-term, a coherent piece of geography.  Therefore, I’m not convinced that this is the way to look at it. 

I think, quite frankly, eventually you will probably have a return to what is or what was the Somali Republic – the borders of the Somali Republic with Puntland probably coming along first and probably being talks between Somaliland and the rest of Somalia.  I don’t know how those talks will turn out.  The Somalilanders will tell you they will never rejoin, but times change and peoples’ ideas change.  Who knows what’s going to happen if you have peace in the rest of Somalia and you have a viable government there?

Gerard Prunier:  I would like to say that the last point is the most important.  The big objection of Somaliland is:  why should we get in bed with these people who are killing each other every day?  If there are 5, 6, 7, or 8 years of peace in the south, I agree with Ambassador Shinn.  Then some people in the north will begin to say, couldn’t we at least talk?  But there is that first hurdle and it is not yet cleared. 

Male voice:  I want to sort pick up on what you just said.  I’m [inaudible] from the Library of Congress.  Since you’re talking about Somaliland, what is the problem with the recognition of Somaliland as an international entity?  If this is going to be a building block, why doesn’t the U.S. government amongst others not finally get their act together and deal with this group of people who have their act together, and have the potential for pulling the rest of the country together beneath them.  What is the problem?

Mauro De Lorenzo:  The question is about the recognition of Somaliland and why don’t we just get our act together and recognize it.  Who wants to start?

Ken Menkaus:  I think different people would have different answers.  My own answer, right now, and this links to some of the other policy recommendations, is the United States in particular has to be very careful who and what one embraces in Somalia and Somaliland right now.  We are perfectly capable of delivering the kiss of death, and that’s why certainly if we recognize Somaliland at this moment in time, that would make it target #1 for hard line Islamists as well as some nationalists who are just [indiscernible] for other reasons. 

In the same way, we have to be careful with how we interact with moderates, and we say we should be talking with everyone, but picking anyone that we’re backing right now is a great way to discredit them or even get them killed.  That would go for Somaliland as well.  The timing, for me, would be very bad right now.

David Shinn:  I would just add to that:  some of you in the audience know that I have been fairly sympathetic towards Somaliland over the last several years, but not to the point of urging U.S. diplomatic recognition.  As a result, I make myself unpopular with both Somaliland nationals and Somali nationals.  They all kind of hate me, which is sometimes a good position to be in.  But my reason is really very simple.  I think it is in the first instance, up to the African Union to make the decision as to whether they are going to make that political decision to recognize Somaliland or not.  If they do, the United States by all means should follow suit, but so far they have not chosen to do that. 

The legal argument for Somaliland is pretty clear.  If you look at the guidelines for establishing the African unity and the charter of the African Union, it legally and technically permits the recognition of an independent Somaliland.  It’s strictly a political question.

Kay Maddox:  Thank you.  Hi, I’m Kay Maddox from the Voice of America.  This is a question for anyone on the panel.  A lot of reporters and a lot of reports out there say that the United States is backing the warlord government, if you will, in its fight against the Islamists.  I would love to hear the opinion of anyone on the panel whether or not you can confirm that in this sort of war against terror that there are some sort of special operations going on, or at least the funding of warlords who do get into violent conflicts with the Islamic courts.  Thank you.

Mauro De Lorenzo:  Perhaps you should start, Eunice.

Eunice Reddick:  Just as a matter of policy, I really can’t discuss allegations like that, but I can say that worldwide, the U.S. has tried to talk to people and entities that have information about terrorist threats, terrorist plotting, and terrorist operatives.  We do have some very serious concerns regarding terrorists who have safe havens in Somalia.  I mentioned that countering terrorism and ensuring Somalia doesn’t rest as a terrorist safe haven has been and is a priority and will continue to be so.

Gerard Prunier:  I think there is a little bit of a time problem in your question.  I’m not an American and I have no official position.  I think the C.I.A. gave money to the warlords.  It was a totally misunderstood idea that these guys were going to get the al-Qaeda guys for them.  And by the way, they are very loose al-Qaeda because somebody like Fazul or somebody like Nabhan; they are free agents.  They’ve got the old networks.  I think you’re talking about the past. 

I don’t know if these guys can make a comeback.  For the time being, they are not around.  There are a few survivors here and there like [indiscernible name], who is of course an old warlord, like [indiscernible name], but there is no more coherence.  You use the warlord government, and I don’t think it exists now.  There is nothing even like a warlord alliance.  In the past, yes, but in the present, I really don’t think so.

Philippe de Pontet:  Yes, thank you.  I’m Philippe de Pontet from Eurasia Group.  My question has to do with the nature of Osama bin Laden’s interest in the region and whether it’s changed at all over the years.  I would note that in recent months he’s made comments on both Sudan and Somalia, mostly in opposition to peacekeepers, but seemed to go out of his way to do so.  I guess the broader question is has Somalia piqued al-Qaeda’s interest in recent years in any tangible way?  And if so, how?

Ken Menkhaus:  First, with regard to Osama bin Laden’s claims about Somalia – he also claimed back in 1994 that he was behind the downing of the Black Hawks in Black Hawk Down and the fighting between General Aidid’s militia and the U.S. troops as part of the U.N. presence there.  Those of who were there at the time continue to believe that any al-Qaeda presence was entirely incidental at that time, so it is entirely possible that he is just trying to grab some free attention with Somalia.  Obviously, anywhere it looks like al-Qaeda and its friends could take credit for and accelerate a trend that would set back U.S. interest or be perceived as a defeat for friends of the United States, particularly at the hands of an Islamist movement, he would obviously take advantage.  But I don’t think at this time, Somalia is going to attract foreigners beyond those who are again dabbling.  It is actually a very difficult place for anyone to operate.  Whether you are working for UNHCR or al-Qaeda, it is very hard on the ground.  It’s very treacherous.  There are better places to base yourself in East Africa than Somalia. 

Gerard Prunier:  Actually, you should remember in 1996, why is it that Osama bin Laden did not go to Somalia?  Because when he had to leave Sudan, he did briefly consider Somalia as a possibly alternative, and he decided against it exactly for the reasons that Ken was talking about.  And I think to operate in Somalia you have to be a little bit crazy, which is fine – some people are, like Fazul.  Fazul is great.  He’s fantastic, because he is crazy.  How many people who are both crazy and efficient at the same time?  Usually crazy people are not efficient, and efficient people are not crazy.  These are two requirements you need to work in Somalia.  Not many people have them.

David Shinn:  If I could just add on this, there is a tangential link that does sort of get to your question and goes back in time.  That is, you have an organization called al Ittihad al-Islami, which was an organization that at a minimum carried out terrorist acts inside Ethiopia and its spokesman at the time in Mogadishu even acknowledged publicly that they did that.  One of the key members of their organization was Hassan Dahir Aweys, who is now one of the principle people on the Islamic Courts.  There is also public information that I have seen from the British government among others that goes back about 6 years now, which provided fairly compelling links of contact between al-Ittihad al-Islami and al-Qaeda – communication and maybe some training – so there is a tangential link here that goes that goes back in time.  I think some people are continuing to extrapolate that into the present.  Whether it is active at the present time, I have no idea, but at one time there was something there.

[Inaudible question from audience]

Mauro De Lorenzo:  It’s hard to hear him.  Do you need this one?

Yusef Brali:  My name is Yusef Brali [phonetic].  I am from the Djibouti Embassy.  The Islamic Courts almost controls Mogadishu and Mogadishu is now safe, though there is always the U.S. allegation that there is a terrorist in Mogadishu.  If the Islamic Court invited the U.S. to come to Mogadishu to verify it, is the United States going to go there?

Eunice Reddick:  I think that if we had information, we would certainly pursue it.  Again, you’re presenting a hypothetical, so we would have to examine any information that concerned these foreign operatives who are in Mogadishu or who had received refuge in Mogadishu.

Mauro De Lorenzo:  Could you identify yourself please?

Charles Feldmeyer:  Charles Feldmeyer.  General John’s SHAPE commander has discussed refocusing combatant commanders’ responsibilities in Africa.  Can you give us an update on that?  If that occurs, do you see greater emphasis or changes in U.S. policy as a result of that?

Eunice Reddick:  No, I don’t have details on that since it’s still under discussion and has not been formally announced with the make-up of that command, but we do have CJTF-HOA, which is the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa based in Djibouti, that has provided counter-terrorism training.  It has also provided assistance to governments in the region of East Africa and the Horn of Africa to strengthen their capabilities to deal with the terrorist threat at airports or along the long coast of East Africa and the Indian Ocean countries.  I think however that command develops; we would still have CJTF-HOA, which has played a very important role. 

Looking at it from my limited lens of how it would affect East Africa, the Horn of Africa, and the Indian Ocean countries, I think we are fortunate to have that facility in Djibouti, which I’m assuming will likely continue, whether it would remain under the current command or become attached to the New Africa command, would still perform a similar role and function.

Amar Fatah:  My name is Amar Fatah.  Concerning Somaliland, are the panelists aware that the sole [indiscernible] regions of the North are part of the all-British Confederate of Somalia?  They are not with Somaliland, but they are part of Puntland and they comprise 40 percent of what is called Somaliland.  Are they aware of that?  Anyone can answer.

David Shinn:  I think all of us are quite aware of that, but to be very precise, I think we’re talking about Eastern Sanaag, most of which opposed to the government at Hargeysa and virtually all of Sool.  If you look at the voting that took place in the last parliamentary election, relatively few of the residents of Eastern Sanaag or Sool voted, which is an indication that there is not much support for what’s going on in Hargeysa among those people, but I think the total number of votes was 18,000 or something like that.  It was quite small.

Frederick Carnrike:  I’m Frederick Carnrike, U.S. Department of State.  I guess a general question is the future of the courts, the long-term sustainability and survivability of the span of the courts or ability to survive beyond the Somali social terrain where over the years we have basically seen the clans remain but institutions fade away very often, particularly in the area where all the colors come together.  Given the Somali terrain, what is the long-term likelihood of the courts to sort of remain a major force, growing force, or shrinking?

Ken Menkhaus:  Thank you for asking that question, because I didn’t get a chance to talk about that given what I was asked to talk about.  This is a very important and unanswered question.  Where are the courts likely to go?  One of the reasons we are worried that their leadership is going to simply perpetuate tensions with Ethiopia is to defer this question, because right now they face enormous dilemmas. 

This is, on the one hand, an Islamist movement that is supposed to, as a pan-Somali confessional movement, cover everyone.  At the same time, as Gerard has said, it is currently still very narrowly defined by clan.  The territory that it controls is coterminous with land that is either inhabited by or recently conquered the Hawiye clan.  The Kismayo was the most interesting.  It’s a mixed bag.  That was not traditionally a Hawiye city, but over the course of the civil war, they have become major players.  So expanding beyond that is going to be a major challenge and it is going to raise these fundamental, really existential, questions about the movement. 

The other part of it that’s interesting is that they have, for now, simultaneously built their entire power base on clan-based Sharia courts, so they have institutionalized clanism at the same time that they reject the proportionality of the 4.5 formula that apportions positions by clan that the previous government, the TSG and the TNG, have done.  Hassan Dahir Aweys just last week or 2 weeks ago made a statement to the Mogadishu press to the extent that there are too many of these clan-based courts.  They are up to 35 or 36 now.  This is becoming unwieldy and we have to rethink the whole thing. 

Imagine what this means.  On the one hand, he is very brave for doing this.  He is saying that this is a system that cannot hold.  It has to cover everyone.  Currently, if you are a Darod or a Rahanweyn and you go to – well now they have started to establish courts in absence – but there are lots of clans in Somalia that cannot go to Mogadishu and enjoy any protection of rule or law, because the courts cover other clans. 

Well, how do you ensure that your system is universal and free and fair and impartial?  You’re going to have to get rid of clanism.  In so doing, you undermine the entire basis – the one thing that works, the thing that Somalis love about the court movement, is that the clans have provided very good rule of law in the areas that they control.  He risks undermining the very success on which the movement is based by taking it from clan to a truly Islamist movement.  They’ve got dozens of those kinds of questions that are unanswered and that are really complex.  I suspect they are going to defer as long as they possibly can and possibly by mobilization for war.

Gerard Prunier:  I think that the question of legal system, which is key because Ken is right, their strong base is due to what they have delivered.  They cannot get rid of the clan in any way.  They even have to go back to precise Xeer elements, because Xeer, which is the traditional legal system of the Somali, is not for everybody.  It is the Xeer of that plan that it operates in relationship.  It’s like electric connection – you can think of them as wires.  It’s the relationship with the Xeer of the other one.  If you are dealing with another clan, then you have another connection.  I’m sorry; they are going to have to go into that.  And that requires legal experts in traditional Somali law.  They have to stick to it.  It has to be recodified completely.  They cannot jump over the clan. 

Another aspect that nobody is talking about is money.  What is the tax base?  Any government needs a tax base.  Right now they do not have one.  You do not want to do what the warlords were doing, like pointing a Kalashnikov at people and demanding their money; which is a rough way of getting your tax base and it doesn’t make you very popular.  Getting some kind of a tax system – the easiest part is customs.  Customs is taking money from foreigners or people dealing with foreigners. 

I think you see my point.  The fact that they reopened the harbor is a good point.  The fact that they have a working relationship with a number of businessmen is a good point, because they can negotiate with them and say that they are going to be taxed.  Of course, this is the one thing that no businessman in the world likes, but at the same time, they have lived long enough in the terrible environment that giving taxes might go back to, “Why are we all paying taxes?”  It is so that we do not get killed on the next street corner.  We are right back to the basics in terms of government in Somalia. 

I think they are going to have to work on that.  This is a very big agenda, things like the legal system and the tax base, for the moment, it is only rhetoric.  Now they have to get down to brass tacks to technicalities.

Mauro De Lorenzo:  Thanks.  We have run out of time unfortunately.  I want to thank all of the panelists.  I want to thank all of you and all of the important questions that have gone unasked.  We actually plan to do more work on this topic and we’re going to be having other events about the Horn of Africa over the coming months. 

Thank you all for coming.

[Applause]

[End of transcript]