February 2007
Hedging in Hanoi: The Progress and Pitfalls of U.S.-Vietnam Relations
In the past decade, the United States and Vietnam have normalized diplomatic relations, established permanent trade ties, and launched a budding military-to-military relationship. But as Washington seeks to upgrade its relationship with Hanoi, Vietnam is hedging against overdependence on either its northern neighbor, China, or the United States by balancing its ties with each off of the other. China’s growing influence in Southeast Asia places these developments in sharp relief: if the U.S.-Vietnamese relationship flourishes, Vietnam may serve as a bulwark against Chinese influence in the region and a model for security partnership with the United States. If it fails, the prospects for the “freedom agenda” in Southeast Asia will be dimmed by Beijing’s shadow.
How can the United States manage an agenda with Vietnam that does not sacrifice such priorities as human rights and democratization while fostering a potential stronghold against Chinese domination of Southeast Asia? What are Vietnam’s priorities for its relationship with the United States? How can a country emulating the “Chinese model” of political and economic development be a true U.S. security partner? How does China seek to influence Vietnam’s political development? At AEI on February 7, three panelists discussed these and other questions relating to the ever-evolving U.S.-Vietnam relationship.
Frederick Brown
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University
Since the normalization of diplomatic relations between the United States and Vietnam in 1995, relations have developed significantly. Key building blocks of this relationship are trade, economic reform, and diplomatic exchange. This bilateral relationship has helped Vietnam’s quest to join the world and to become an international stakeholder. Vietnam’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) is demonstrative of this.
Tension over human rights may test the U.S.-Vietnamese relationship, although Vietnam is no longer designated as a “country of particular concern” by the State Department.
The Sino-Vietnamese relationship manifests itself in many different ways, including party-to-party exchanges, and government-to-government exchanges. It is best characterized as asymmetrical. Hanoi’s motive is survival; Beijing seeks regional dominance.
Although there is a sentiment of mistrust against the United States rooted in the Vietnamese military, Vietnam remains cautiously positive about the U.S.-Vietnamese relationship. Training for officers, military-to-military exchanges, recent port calls, and search-and-rescue exercises have strengthened U.S.-Vietnamese security ties. But security relations should generally remain separate from efforts to encourage human rights and religious freedom.
Alexander Vuving
Harvard University
Two camps have been shaping policy in Vietnam since the 1980s. The first is that of the anti-imperialists, who seek to protect the socialist regime and oppose what is seen as U.S. imperialism. The second is that of the integrationists, who desire to achieve modernization by integrating Vietnam with the Western-dominated international order.
Anti-imperialists and integrationist thought has been shaped by two events. The first was the postwar socioeconomic crisis of the 1980s, which created a thirst for economic development. The second was the victory of Solidarity in Poland in 1989, which socialist leaders in Vietnam feared would presage a larger wave of anticommunism originating from the West.
Anti-imperialism was influential in the 1992 Vietnamese national security strategy, which established that friends and foes were to be determined on an ideological basis. As a result, China was regarded as a strategic ally and the United States a strategic enemy. The strategy changed dramatically in 2003 when the United States invaded Iraq, underscoring the reality of a unipolar world. According to the new Vietnamese security strategy, friends and foes would be determined on a pragmatic, non-ideological basis.
Currently, Vietnam’s grand strategy is modernization and integration, while anti-imperialism is relegated to second place. The rise of integrationist thought favors the United States, and relations are further cemented because there has been no recent fundamental disagreement on strategic issues between the United States and Vietnam.
The Honorable Raymond Burghardt
East-West Center
Ironically, Vietnam might be the most pro-American nation in Southeast Asia. Friendly relations have been strengthened by a pragmatic approach to normalization, which was reached in 1995, and the 2003 acknowledgement of shared strategic priorities.
Vietnamese motivation for strengthened ties stems from a desire for access to U.S. markets, a need to take its place on the global stage, and a realization that U.S. friendship is essential in order to join organizations such as the WTO and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.
Attention paid to economic issues grew in the post-normalization period. When the bilateral trade agreement was reached in 2001, trade blossomed between the United States and Vietnam. The United States is now Vietnam’s largest trade partner.
Relations entered a new phase after 2003. With the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Vietnam became concerned that U.S. policy neglected Asia in favor of the Middle East. Vietnam feared that the United States was not paying attention to China’s increasing influence in Southeast Asia. At that point, Vietnam began to hedge its bets, addressing security and strategic issues with respect to China.
It is critical not to exaggerate our strategic alignment with Vietnam. Vietnam is wary of the United States, and it does not wish to be part of the U.S. containment strategy against China.
AEI intern Betsy Bryant prepared this summary.
